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THE SMALL FIRM LOAN GUARANTEE SCHEME IN 
JORDAN: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
NLAHER HASAN AL-MAHROUQ 
ABSTRACT 
In Jordan around 98 percent of manufacturing and service sector firms are small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while around 80 percent of the Jordanian labour force is 
employed by S MEs. However, SMEs face considerable difficulties in obtaining sufficient 
funds, especially from external sources such as commercial banks. This has been recognized 
in Jordan by the establishment of a loan guarantee scheme in 1994. However, neither this nor 
any other similar scheme introduced by a developing country has b een fully evaluated to 
establish its impact and success. The purpose is to evaluate the effects of the Jordanian loan 
guarantee scheme to establish its role in improving the supply of funds to SMEs, and to 
suggest policies and procedures for the improvement of the scheme. 
The methodology for the study is based upon an interview questionnaire survey of 
142 Jordanian firms receiving loans from the commercial banks backed by a guarantee. It 
covers firms in different types of business (manufacture, services, retail and agriculture) and 
in different locations (Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, Balqa and Aqaba). The study also utilizes 
interviews with the credit managers of commercial banks participating in the loan guarantee 
scheme. The thesis is organized around nine chapters including on the Jordanian economy, 
SMEs in Jordan, a literature review of loan guarantee schemes and the qualitative and 
quantitative results of the surveys. 
The main findings are that younger borrowers and newer SME firrns are more able to 
receive commercial bank ftinding under the scheme than they would otherwise obtain. The 
scheme also helps firms with uncertain profitability and projects that are traditionally viewed 
as 'low quality' (e. g. low level of education or female entrepreneurs) to obtain extra finance. 
These projects have low default rates and do not have high failure rates suggesting a 
substantial market failure. However, the study finds that the commercial banks tend to use 
the scheme as an additional source of security in their lending, and do not necessarily lend to 
riskier projects, as they require similar levels of collateral. Further, the study draws attention 
to the management of the scheme, so that it needs to be better marketed to the target group 
and there needs to be better monitoring and follow-up of projects. Lessons could also be 
leamt from other guarantee schemes, such as in the UK, including the introduction of a 
premium charge for firms. 
CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
Virtually all countries, at whatever stage of economic development, recognise the 
importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the need to support their 
development. The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises can be observed in their 
share of employment and output, as well as the number of firms. Small and medium-sized 
firms are a very important component of national economies all over the world. 
In Jordan around 98 percent of manufacturing and service sector firms are small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and nearly all of the retail and agriculture sectors are 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Further, around 80 percent of the total Jordanian labour 
force is employed by SMEs and around one third of the total output is produced by these 
firms. However, the development of SMEs in Jordan, as elsewhere, is hampered by a variety 
of problems. The problems may differ from one region to another and from sector to sector, 
but there are certain problems that are common to all SNffis. One of the most important of 
these is finance. This can be observed in the firms' need for funds to start-up and to grow, 
while the commercial banks, as a main source of finance, are reluctant to provide loans to 
small firms. This is because these firms are often unable to pledge enough collateral, and 
sometimes their newness translates into 'bank speak' as an insufficient track record. 
Thus, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in developing countries, find it 
difficult to start-up and grow because of insufficient bank credit. The small and medium- 
sized enterprises are seen as more risky than larger firms, because of the high level of 
uncertainty surrounding them, and because of their much higher rates of failure. Banks prefer 
to deal with larger firms, due to the existing links with them, and because large fin-ns often 
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have a good track record and adequate documentation, in contrast to SMEs. However, small 
business owners are likely to know significantly more about their firms than any outsider, 
including the commercial banks, but this lack of infori-nation makes the small firm's mission 
to b orrow f rom t he b anks d ifficult, e ven t hough t hey may h ave s ound and c ornmercially- 
viable projects. This asymmetric information in the credit market makes the commercial 
banks' mission to distinguish between good and bad borrowers difficult, and it is a cause of 
both adverse selection (hidden-borrower type) and moral hazard (hidden-borrower effort) 
problems, and ultimately market failure. Collateral is considered to be the main way to solve 
this problem, because the borrower bears a penalty from loan default in addition to losing the 
project. However, as we have argued, SMEs do not have enough collateral to pledge in order 
to acquire the funds that they need from the commercial banks. 
As an attempt to overcome this problem in the credit market, governments have 
established commercial loan guarantee scheme for SMEs. To this end, the Jordan Loan 
Guarantee Corporation (JLGC) was established in 1994 to offer loan guarantees to SMEs. 
The objective of the Jordanian Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) is to overcome the 
"difficulties encountered by owners of productive projects, including their inability to 
provide adequate conventional collateral to acquire the required financing from commercial 
banks to start or expand their feasible projects" (JLGC, 1994). The Corporation offers 
guarantees to commercial banks participating in the Loan Guarantee Scheme to encourage 
them to extend the required credit to the owners of target SME projects, as long as the 
individual loan guaranteed by the Corporation does not exceed 100,000 Jordanian Dinar 
(J. D) or about f 100,000, and the number of workers in the project does not exceed 50 
employees. 
The purpose of the guarantees provided by the JLGC is to help entrepreneurs of target 
SMEs (ie. new firms, firms in rural areas, younger borrowers, female borrowers and so on) 
acquire sufficient finance from commercial banks for setting up or expanding their income- 
generating small and medium-scale enterprises. This is provided to feasible projects, which 
do not have sufficient traditional collateral to acquire such finance. The importance of SNEs 
to Jordan follows from their role in national economic and social objectives, such as 
promoting real and productive investment, which boosts production capabilities. The Jordan 
Loan Guarantee Corporation is the first venture of its kind in Jordan to guarantee bank loans 
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for entrepreneurs based on economic feasibility and cash-flow assessment rather than the 
traditional collateral. Further, it is the only private initiative for supporting SMEs in Jordan. 
Since its inception, the JLGC gives most importance to the coverage of risks associated with 
loans extended by commercial banks to small and medium scale projects in Jordan, whether 
these projects are in manufacturing, retail, agriculture or services or in projects related to 
handcrafts or the professionals. In total, about J. D 70 million in loans to SMEs have so far 
been guaranteed under the scheme, but surprisingly there has been no independent evaluation 
of this scheme. 
1.2 Objectives of this Study 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the effects of the Jordanian Loan 
Guarantee Scheme to establish its role in improving the supply of funds to small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Jordan. The thesis aims to measure the scheme's 'additionality' 
and its economic impacts, and to recommend policies and procedures for improvements. The 
study has a number of other objectives. These are to investigate the impact of the loan 
guarantee scheme on the commercial banks willingness to provide loans to small and 
medium enterprises, and on encouraging entrepreneurs to take-up loans from the banks. It 
also seeks to examine the impact of the scheme on encouraging the commercial banks to base 
their credit decisions on a project's feasibility and cash flow rather than conventional 
collateral. As such, an important issue is whether it encourages entrepreneurs to use business 
plans and other documents to prove their project's potential to grow, survive and to repay the 
bank's money on time. 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Scheme was established in 1994, and our period of study 
is 1994-99. One of aims of this study is to measure the scheme's 'additionality' and the 
economic effects of projects that were funded by the guaranteed loans. As mentioned in the 
literature, both additionality and the economic effects generated by a project need at least 
eighteen months to become measurable (NERA, 1990). This study focused on guarantees 
made in the main five governorates of Jordan: Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa and Aqaba. The 
choice of these governorates was based on to them having the majority of economic activity 
and around 80 percent of the population. The governorates also have more than 90 percent of 
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the total firms that received guaranteed loans during the study period 1994-99. The 
methodology for the study is an interviewee questionnaire survey of fin-ns receiving loans 
guaranteed under the scheme. The study also utilizes interviews with a small number of 
commercial banks participating in the loan guarantee scheme. The data collected from the 
fin-n survey are analysed in two main ways. The first is a qualitative analysis, and the other 
concentrates on a quantitative analysis using regression techniques. 
In the field of loan guarantee scheme evaluation in Jordan, this study must be 
considered asa pioneering research. It might a Iso be considered to be pioneering in rn ost 
other low income countries, as Vogel and Adams (1997) report that they are "unable to find 
any evaluation of loan guarantee programs in low-income countries" (p, 26). Also Cressy 
(2000) reports that "despite widespread use of LGS [loan guarantee schemes], only a few 
attempts have been made to evaluate the contribution of these schemes, especially in Europe" 
(p, 251). As such, this is the first evaluation of loan guarantees in developing countries, and 
an important contribution to the literature. The main finding of the study is that the I oan 
guarantee scheme has had a relatively poor effect, and that the býnks lending practices have 
been little changed. However, the scheme is more successful in encouraging the banks to 
adopt the appropriate credit policy in the case of some target groups of firm and borrower. 
The study offers a number of recommendations for improving the operation of the scheme. 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
The main body of the thesis is organised into seven chapters, plus a concluding 
chapter. In the next chapter, a general overview of the geography of Jordan, its economic 
background and socio-econorr& characteristics is provided. The chapter looks at the labour 
market and trade and investment in the Jordanian economy. It gives a brief explanation of the 
sectoral composition of the economy, focusing on the period 1994-1999. Chapter Three is 
sub-divided into four main parts. The first part discusses the definition of small and medium- 
sized enterprises in Jordan, but looks at this definition in the UK, the European Union and 
elsewhere in the world. In the second part, the role of SMEs in Jordan is reviewed, including 
the number of SMEs, their employment level, their output and productivity and their value 
added. The third part looks at the problems facing SMEs, as outlined in the literature, and 
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particularly the problems specific to Jordan. Finally, the chapter presents the main features of 
SME finance in Jordan, such as different sources of finance, obstacles to financing SMEs, 
collateral requirements from commercial banks and the 'finance gap' in Jordan. 
In Chapter Four a survey of the loan guarantee scheme literature is undertaken. This 
is organised in to three main parts. The first part examines asymmetric information as a 
reason for credit market failure, which could be potentially be corrected by firms pledging 
conventional collateral to the commercial banks. However, it is argued that this is a problem 
for small firms. In the second part the rationale for the loan guarantee scheme as an 
alternative or substitute for collateral is examined. Finally, the last part of this chapter 
considers the empirical evidence on loan guarantee schemes, including the evaluation 
experiences of the UK and the USA. Chapter Five explores the Jordanian experience of the 
loan guarantee field. Attention focuses on the early loan guarantee programme that existed in 
Jordan for two years in the early 1990s. The rest of the chapter concentrates on the Jordanian 
Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) ran by the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC) since 
1994. It describes the nature of the loan guarantee scheme and its scale. 
The methodology for this study is set out in Chapter Six. In order to support the 
chosen methodology, a review of previous approaches that have been taken by similar 
evaluative studies is provided. The methodology involves a large-scale interviewee survey of 
loan guarantee recipients, and a small number of interviews with participating banks, and 
these are described in some detail. In the subsequent two chapters, the analysis is undertaken 
of the data gathered from the survey of loan recipients. This commences in Chapter Seven 
with a qualitative analysis of the data, which presents data on the demographic nature of the 
interviewees and the characteristics of the sample firms. It also considers the start-up of the 
firm, the firms' history with the commercial banks, the take-up of JLGC support and the 
financial and economic effects of projects that were supported by a guaranteed loan. This 
chapter reviews the qualitative feedback from firms on the loan guarantee scheme. The last 
part of this chapter discussed the commercial banks' view on the scheme. Chapter Eight 
presents the quantitative analysis of the firm survey results. It discusses the variables that are 
used and the nature of the model estimations. The rest of this chapter examines the firrns' 
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situation prior to the project, the nature and size of the guaranteed loan, the fmance 
additionality of the guarantee and the economic effects of the project. 
Finally, Chapter Nine concludes the study. It contains a discussion of the main results 
to emerge from the research, and puts these in the context of the loan guarantee scheme 
evaluations in developing countries. The chapter also presents recommendations and 
suggestions to improve the procedures and activities of the Jordanian Loan Guarantee 
Scheme. Since each of the chapters is reasonably self-contained, tables and figures are 
collected at the end of each chapter to make the reading of the text easier. The appendices for 
all chapters and the bibliography are collected at the end of the thesis. 
CHAPTER 2 
JORDAN AND ITS ECONONW 
This chapter is concerned with describing the main features, changes and problems 
facing the country of Jordan. It examines the geography, population, economic background, 
socio-economic characteristics of Jordan. It also examines the Jordanian economy and 
industry. The purpose is to give an overview of Jordan and its economy. 
2.1 Geography 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small developing country, located in the 
Middle East between latitudes 29 and 33 north and longitudes 34 and 39 east. It is situated 
between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority regions in the west; Iraq and Saudia 
Arabia in the east; Syria in the north and Saudia Arabia and the Red Sea in the south. This is 
shown in Figure 2. L The total land area of Jordan is 89,300 km2, of which only 7.8 percent is 
agricultural land. The remaining area is uncultivated, and comprised of either desert or barren 
hills. The country can be divided into three main geographical regions; namely, the 
Highlands, the Jordan Valley and the Desert region. 
The Highlands which are towards the west of Jordan extend from the Syrian border in 
the north to the Aqaba Gulf on the Red Sea in the south. The Highlands are host to the main 
cities of Jordan (see Figure 2.2). These are the Capital City of Amman, as well as Zarqa, 
Balqa, Irbid, Ajloub, Jerash, Madaba, Karak, Tafilah and Aqaba. The Jordan Valley lies 
along the western border of Jordan, and along the western edge of the Highlands; through it 
runs the Jordan River. Most of the Valley is below sea level. The Dead Sea lies in the centre 
of the Valley with a total length of 90 km and a maximum width of 16 km. The Jordan River 
runs from Lake Tiberias in the north and empties into the Dead Sea as shown in Figure 2.1. 
The Desert region, to the east and southeast of Jordan, occupies nearly 70 percent of the total 
land area. For a long time, only a small number of nomadic Bedouins have lived here. 
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Jordan consists of twelve administrative areas, which are known as Governorates (see 
Figure 2.2). Ten Governorates, located in the Highlands and Jordan Valley, account for 33 
percent of total land area. The other two M a'an and Mafraq account for the remainder of 
Jordan, and are in the Desert region. Table 2.1 shows the total land area of each Governorate. 
The country generally has a Mediterranean climate, though the temperature varies 
from one region to another. The temperature in the Highlands may reach an average 30'C in 
summer, but rarely falls bellow zero in winter. The rainy season in this region usually starts 
in early November until the end of March, with an average annual rainfall of around 125mm. 
In the Desert the temperature is very high and reaches an average of 45'C in summer and 
around 15'C in winter, without rain. The Valley has a dry surnmer with an average 
temperature of 40'C and warm short winter with an average temperature of 20'C. The 
average quantities of rainfall in the Jordanian Governorates during 1997/98 are shown in 
Table 2.1. It shows clearly the lower rainfall in the Desert region, and the much higher levels 
of precipitation in the Highlands, especially in the areas such as Irbid and Ajloun, while the 
south receives only 37 nun. 
2.2 Economic Background 
From the sixteenth century to the end of the First World War, Jordan was a part of the 
Muslim Ottoman Empire. The Allies defeated the Ottomans in the First World War, and 
signed the Saykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, whereby Great Britain was to govern Iraq, Palestine 
and Transjordan (now Jordan, which was an appendage to the British mandate in Palestine), 
and France assumed responsibility over Syria and Lebanon. The state of Transjordan, which 
was under close British supervision, was formally created in April 1921, and recognised 
Amir Abdullah as its ruler. 
Jordan became independent at the end of the Second World War on 25 May 1946, but 
remained under British tutelage. However, it experienced periods of instability, firstly due to 
the death of its ruler Abdullah in 1947, and secondly due to King Talal's illness between 
1948-52. In several respects then, Jordan only really became independent after the accession 
of King Hussein in 1952. Since this time the country has faced several obstacles to its 
development. These are a general lack of natural resources and two periods of Israeli 
occupation of Palestine in 1948 and of the West Bank in 1967, which was the formerly a part 
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of Jordan. It created political instability, and made thousands of Palestinians homeless or 
refugees. In 1994 Jordan signed a Peace Treaty with Israel, ending almost 50 years of 
conflict. 
During the period 1952-66, the emphasis of government policy was on building the 
country's infrastructure. Numerous projects were undertaken in industry and agriculture, 
including irrigation, and national output increased substantially from J. D (Jordanian Dinar) 
60.5 million in 1952 to J. D 239.2 million in 1966 (market prices). Funding for this 
investment depended heavily on foreign loans, and on grant assistance from other Arab and 
European countries. Real per capita income increased by 4.4 percent per annum during the 
period 1955-66, with agricultural income growing by 3.6 percent annually and industrial 
income by 14.4 percent. Income from the service sector increased by 9.1 percent annually. 
In 1967, Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel, a significant part of its territory. Over 
the next five years the Israeli occupation drove tens of thousands of refugees into Jordan, 
with significant demographic and labour market implications. Matters came to a head in 
September 1970, with serious civil unrest between government forces and some of the 
Palestinian refugees. The refugees wanted to use the Jordanian western border to fight 
against Israel, but without Jordanian Government acceptance. Emergency economic 
measures were taken to maintain order and to revive the economy. Despite this, national 
output grew from J. D 229.9 million in 1967 to J. D 285.7 million in 1972. 
The Jordanian economy continued to grow after 1972, and this has been aided by a 
series of Government Plans. The primary objective of the 1972 three-year Plan was to 
"realise the highest possible level of economic activity and employment, and to develop 
manpower skills, qualifications, and capabilities in the service of development". The second 
objective was to "realise the highest possible rate of growth of GNP", and the third objective 
was "the distribution of public services and the benefits of development among all regions of 
the Kingdom and all groups and start a society" (see Ifram, 1997) (p, 73). This Plan aimed to 
solve the problems resulting from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the civil unrest 
in 1970. 
A new five-year Plan followed in 1976, and this was supported by assistance from the 
Arab oil-producing countries, which benefited from rising oil prices. The country 
Jordan and Its Economy 10 
implemented most of the economic and social projects envisaged by this plan, and output 
grew further, from JD 285 million in 1972 to JD 1,214 million in 1980. However, oil prices 
fell over 1981-85, and the Jordanian economy encountered new problems, with the Arabian 
settlements to Jordan falling from JD 415 million in 1981 to just JD 229 million in 1985. 
This was compounded by the War between Iraq and Iran, which lasted until 1988. 
Further problems arose in 1988, as the Jordanian economy suffered as a result of a 
general economic depression throughout the region. Foreign debt increased and the 
government started to make use of its foreign reserves, resulting in a loss of confidence in the 
Jordanian dinar. The value of the dinar fell from JD 1= US $3 in May 1988 to 42.5 percent 
of this value in May 1989, stabilising at around US$ 1.41. With the resulting balance of 
payment crisis, the government abandoned the 1986 five-year Plan, and introduced a 
structural adjustment programme supported by the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank. However, with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the government also 
had to abandon this adjustment programme. Because of governrrient support for Iraq, many 
Jordanian citizens were obliged to give up jobs in Gulf countries, leading to a substantial 
increase in unemployment. 
Faced with the problems of rising unemployment, a serious imbalance in foreign 
trade and reduced assistance from other Arab states, the government took a two-pronged 
stance to resolve these problems. Firstly, it prepared a structural adjustment programme for 
the 1992-98 period, which was again supported by the IMF. The funding served to 
compensate for the declining assistance from the Arab countries, which had ceased due to the 
Jordanian stance during the second Gulf War. Secondly, to work alongside this, it introduced 
a new five-year Plan (1993-1997). 
After t he d eath of King H ussein in 1999, a nd t he a ccession ofh is successor King 
Abdullah, there was intensive scrutiny of the economy. The government undertook new 
measures to develop the economic situation and to encourage investment. This was achieved 
through the creation of new laws such as the Privatisation Law, Investment Law and the Free 
Zone Law. Under the new king, the government has adopted a more international approach to 
the economy. So, within the last few years, the Jordanian government has joined the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and signed a free-trade agreement with the USA in October 2000. 
It has also signed a partnership agreement with the European Union in November 1997. 
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2.3 Socio - Economic Characteristics 
2.3.1 Demography 
The Jordanian government has cast four censuses of population and housing; the first 
one in 1952 and later censuses in 1961 ý 1979 and 1994. These form the basis 
for our 
discussion, although for some other years the Jordanian Government has produced estimates 
of population size. 
Jordan has a population of around 4.8 million (in 1998), of which 52 percent are 
males. Population growth is3.9 p ercent per a nnum, c ompared with a round 2.5 p ercent in 
other developing countries and just I percent in industrialised countries. Jordan's population 
increased from 680,000 in 1952 to 2,133,000 in 1979 and to 4,755,000 in 1998. The average 
annual population growth rate during the period 1952-60 was 3.1 percent, rising to 4.8 
percent during 1961-79, but at 3.9 percent during 1994-98, reflecting both a natural increase 
and net immigration. Table 2.2 shows the population level over the years 1952-98. 
The population density of Jordan has changed significantly over its short history. In 
1952 there were 8 people per km2, in 1961 there were 10 people per krný, 24 people per kmý 
in 1979 and 44 people per km2 in 1994 (Ziuod, 1997). The current population density is 
around 54 people per km 2. The largest proportion of the Jordanian population is in the centre 
of Jordan, in the administrative areas of Amman and Zarqa (see Table 2.1). Together these 
account for 54 percent of total population in 1998. Irbid, in the northwest of Jordan also has a 
significant proportion of the population around 18 percent of total population, and 523 people 
per kM2 . Approximately 80 percent of the 
Jordanian population are urban, while the rest is 
rural. The urban population is concentrated away from the Desert region, which means 90 
percent of the Jordanian population live in just 30 percent of the whole land area (Table 2.1). 
During the period from 1950 to 1998, the rate of population increase, as well as the 
demographic distribution of the population, has been influenced by a variety of social, 
political and economic factors. These may be considered as a permanent change in 
population growth patterns, coupled with imbalance in demographic distribution and the 
domestic labour market (Ziuod, 1997). These factors include: migration from the West Bank 
to Jordan, especially after the 1948 and 1967 Wars between the Arab countries and Israel; 
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migration from the rural area to the cities, especially to Amman and Zarqa; immigration of 
Arab and foreign workers, partly to cover for Jordanian workers attracted to the Gulf States; 
and the returned of Jordanians from the Gulf countries due to the Gulf War in 1991. 
Life e xpectancy at b irth is68 years f or males and 70 years f or f emales (in 1998). 
Generally, this high rate of life expectancy reflects a good level of health services. In Jordan 
there are around 7,480 physicians, of which 50 percent are in the public sector. From Table 
2.2ý it can be seen that more than 50 percent of the total population are less than twenty years 
of age, while around 85 percent are under forty years of age. This means that the majority of 
Jordanian society is young, which has implications for education and other service needs. 
The majority of the population (92 percent) is Sunni Muslim, nearly 6 percent are Christians 
and the rest are small communities of Circassians, Chechens or Armenians. The official 
language of Jordan is Arabic, but English is widely spoken. French and German are spoken 
by people who have commercial or cultural interests. 
2.3.2 Education 
Education in Jordan is free at the point of use, and compulsory in the first ten school 
years grades. It is free in both types of secondary education (general and vocational), at all 
Teacher Training Institutes and Higher Institutes of Agriculture, and for boarding students in 
secondary vocational and higher education institutes. The policy of free education has led to 
a rapid expansion of education and attainment. As a result, the illiteracy rate in Jordan has 
been reduced sharply, from 68 percent in 1961 to 34 percent in 1979. In 1998 the illiteracy 
rate stood at 12 percent for the whole population, but it is 6 percent for males and 18 percent 
for women (Ministry of Education, 1998). 
The number of school students in Jordan rose from 290,000 in 1967 to 895,000 in 
1985, giving an annual average growth rate of student numbers of 7 percent. This is 
significantly higher than the growth rate of the population, reflecting the soaring demand for 
education and the successful implementation of compulsory education. However, in the last 
four years the average annual growth rate has slowed to just 2.5 percent, due to the reduction 
in population growth. However, Table 2.3 shows that the number of school classrooms and 
teachers at all levels has continued to grow over recent years. Eight public universities have 
been established inJ ordan, mostly int he I ast t wenty years. In a ddition, t here a re t hirteen 
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private universities. Access to university is much greater through the public universities, 
where the fees are substantially lower. The total number of university students educated in 
Jordan rose from 167 in 1963 to 115,842 in 1998. In addition, there are around 45 two-year 
colleges. In 1998 the number of students in these colleges was 24,657. 
2.4 The Jordanian Economy 
The performance of the Jordanian economy during the period 1995-99 is shown in 
Table 2.4. It can be seen that the economy is still suffering from the effects of the above 
mentioned p roblems. P er c apita i ncome in 1995 w as J. D 1063, b ut inr eal t erms t his h ad 
fallen to J. D 982 by 1999; an annual rate of decline of about 2 percent. This decline in per 
capita income is compounded by unfavourable regional conditions, including the political 
turmoil in Palestine and the ongoing embargo against Iraq, a leading trade partner of Jordan. 
National income as a whole has been growing, but at relatively slows rates, so that it has 
been exceeded by population growth, which has increased at an annual rate of 3.3 percent 
between 1995 and 1999. The control of inflation has been one of the main successes of this 
period. From 6.5 percent in 1996, inflation has fallen to 0.6 percent in 1999. This decrease in 
inflation has not only been a result of government policy, but is also due to a fall in the world 
price for goods, such as wheat and sugar (Central Bank of Jordan, 1999). 
2.4.1 Labour Force 
The growth of manpower in Jordan has been influenced by demographic, economic 
and social factors. On the one hand, there has been an increase in the proportion of the 
population under the age of 15 years, increased enrolment in education at all levels and 
growing manpower emigration. On the other hand, there was a large influx of Arab and 
foreign labour, and an increase in participation by women in the domestic labour force, 
which has increased from 3.1 percent in 1961 to 12.5 percent in 1985, and is reckoned to be 
around 20 percent in 2000 (Ministry of Planning, 1999). 
The size of the labour force in Jordan was 218,000 in 1961, rising to 405,000 in 1979, 
to 680,000 in 1988 and around 1.25 million in 1999. According to Jardaneh (2001), the 
Jordanian labour f orce increases 5 percent yearly, which m eans a round 4 0,000 people are 
expected to enter Jordan's job market each year. Table 2.4 shows also the labour force 
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distribution by major economic sectors. The service sector currently employs 54.5 percent of 
the total labour force in 1999, while the retail sector (the Department of Statistics separated 
out the retail sector from the rest of the service sector, because of the size of this sector, and 
because its erves p rimarily v ery I ocal markets) employs a further 18 p ercent. Mining and 
manufacturing, construction, and agriculture employ 14.5 percent, 7.5 percent and 5.5 
percent respectively in 1999. Services are the main sources of growth in the economy, while 
other sectors have been declining in their share of employment. 
Emigration of Jordanian manpower to the Gulf countries started in the early 1950s, 
and increased in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1989, it stood at 380,000 people according to the 
Ministry of Labour estimates. As a result of this outward migration Jordan has encouraged 
immigration by foreign labour. Arab and other foreign labour working in Jordan registered an 
increase from 41,000 in 1979 to 143,000 in 1985. In 1997, the number of Arab and foreign 
labour was 250,000, plus an estimated 100,000 additional illegal workers (about 28 percent 
of all employees). 
24.2 Unemployment 
As an outcome of the Gulf War in 1991, around 300,000 Jordanians returned from the 
Gulf countries, leading to a steep rise in unemployment. The unemployment rate rose to 
about 25 percent. This increase in unemployment has also been caused by other factors, 
which are identified by Ziuod (1997) as follows: the low economic growth in Jordan and the 
Gulf countries; the high rate of population growth; the mismatch between education and the 
needs of the economy; the increase in female participation in the labour force; and the poor 
information available to employers and employees on the supply and demand for labour, 
which has resulted in fictional unemployment. 
Government efforts to reduce unemployment have been manifested in the adoption of 
several measures. Regulations governing Private Employment Bureaus were enacted. The 
aim of these regulations is to provide job opportunities for the Jordanian labour force inside 
the Kingdom and abroad. The government also continued its efforts to regulate the labour 
market and monitor expatriate labour by issuing instructions, setting forth the condition and 
procedures for both recruiting and employing immigrant labour. In addition, the government 
has continued to allocate funds for the implementation of the first stage of the social safety 
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net, and give the necessary financial support to the National Aid Fund (NAF) and 
Development and Employment Fund (DEF). The aim of these is to provide the necessary 
financing for small-scale, labour-intensive, income-generating projects throughout the 
Kingdom. Further, approval has been given to the Vocational Employment Management Law 
No. 27 in 1999, which aims to enhance the role of the Vocational Training Corporation in 
qualifying the Jordan labour force and increasing their efficiency to meet the needs of the 
Jordanian labour market. The corporation will carry out this task through classification of 
workers, preparation of job descriptions, and granting vocational practicing licenses to 
workers after they have passed a prescribed test of their technical ability. As a result the 
government has reduced the unemployment rate, as shown in Table 2.4, from 18 percent in 
1995 to around 12 percent in 1999. 
Table 2.5 shows that the unemployment rate by governorates is different. In Amman, 
which has 38.1 percent of total population, the unemployment rate is 9.8 percent, while in 
some other governorates, such as Tafeleh, Karak and Irbid, the unemployment rate is around 
11.5 percent. This difference in unemployment rates between governorates is due to the 
different levels of development between these, with projects tending to focus on the main 
cities and regions. The unemployment rate differs between males and females. It is 8.8 
percent for males, but 18.5 percent for females, as shown in Table 2.5. This is partly due to 
the conservative social view of women's participation in the labour force. The government is 
still working to reduce the unemployment rate by creating new job opportunities for the 
Jordanian labour force in other countries, such as Libya, and through encouraging investment 
in Jordan in different sectors in order to create new jobs. The Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation is one such initiative. 
24.3 Trade 
The traditional export markets for Jordanian products are other Arab countries, which 
accounted for 41 percent of the total value of exports in 1999, while only 7 percent of the 
total values of exports were to the European Union countries. The destination of these 
exports is shown in Table 2.6. Iraq is the biggest market for Jordanian exports. This 
represents around 8 percent of total exports, which is down to the accessibility of the Iraqi 
market, despite the international economic sanctions against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990 and the Current tense political situation. According to the commodity composition of 
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domestic exports chemical products account for the largest share of exports, at around 32 
percent, followed by phosphate and potash, at 27 (see Table 2.6). 
According to the geographical distribution of imports, Table 2.6 shows that imports 
from the European Union countries make up around 31 percent of the total value of imports, 
followed by 24 percent of total imports from Asian countries and 22 percent from the Arab 
countries. The composition of imports by commodity is also shown in Table 2.6. Machinery 
and transport equipment accounts for 27 percent of the total imports in 1999, whilst food and 
live animals made up around 18 percent. The other main imports are manufactures and raw 
materials, while chemical and mineral fuel accounts for around 15 and 13 percent 
respectively. 
Jordan has suffered from a continual deficit in its trade balance, acting as a 
considerable constraint on its growth. This is also shown in Table 2.6. The deficit was JD 
2,004 million in 1996, but narrowing to JD 1,584 million in 1999. It is evident that the trade 
deficit is persistent, but the government looks yearly to reduce this balance as well as it can. 
Decreasing imports reduced the trade deficit by J. D 80 million in 1999, or (3 percent), while 
an increase in exports also reduced the deficit by 1.6 percent. Accordingly, the ratio of the 
trade balance deficit to GDP declined by around 3 percentage points below the 1998 level to 
reach 25 percent in 1999 (Central Bank of Jordan, 1999). 
2.4.4 Investment 
The level of investment in the Jordanian economy is volatile, being susceptible to 
changes in politics, the economy and other circumstances. Gross domestic investment was 
around 31 percent in 1995, but decreased to 23 percent in 1999 (Central Bank of Jordan, 
2000). This was due to a fallback in the benefits that were expected after Jordan signed the 
Peace Treaty with Israel in 1994. A shortage in savings was the main reason for the low level 
of investment in Jordan. Saving is always lower than domestic investment, but the savings 
gap has increased annually, so between 1995 and 1998 it increased from JD 997 million to 
J. D 1,114 million. Another reason for the savings gap is that the government created a large 
budget deficit by overspending relative to total government domestic revenues. The only way 
to fill the gap between investment and saving is to depend on foreign assistance and grants. 
Nowadays the government is working with the IMF through the adjustment programmes to 
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bridge the g ap between s aving a nd domestic investment on one hand, a nd to improve the 
national economic performance on the other hand. 
2.5 Jordanian Industry 
The Jordanian economy is market-oriented, but consisting of both private and public 
sectors. Both sectors have an important role in the Jordanian economy, with the Government 
playing a vital role in regulating the economy and attracting inward investment. The 
Jordanian economy consists of five sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, retail and 
services. The Department of Statistics separates out the retail sector from the rest of the 
service sector, because of the size of this sector, and because it serves primarily local 
markets. The relative size of each sector as a proportion of GDP is shown in Table 2.7. 
Two-thirds of GDP comes from the service sector. This share has increased recently 
from 59.4 percent in 1995 to 64.3 percent in 1999. Services and retail combined amount to 
nearly 70 percent of total output. The next most important sector is the industrial sector 
(manufacturing and mining). Its share of GDP has been stable at around 20 percent over the 
period. The output share of the construction sector increased after the Gulf War; it was 
around 9 percent in 1994, but it decreased to 5.7 in 1999. Finally, the agriculture sector has 
lowest share of total output, which has decreased from II percent in 1992 to around 4.5 
percent in 1999. The remainder of this chapter briefly discusses the nature of each of these 
economic sectors. 
2 5.1 Agriculture 
Only about 7.8 percent of the c ountry's land area is c ultivatable, with m ost of the 
agricultural activity being concentrated in the rain-fed Highlands, situated mainly in the 
middle and north of the country. Only 10 percent of the cultivatable area is irrigated, mostly 
in the Jordan Valley, where the principal services (including irrigation, housing and roads) 
are controlled by the Jordan Valley Authority. The agricultural sector is the main source of 
income for about 15 percent of the population, and in 1998 it provided employment for about 
6 percent of the labour force. The available indicators on the agriculture sector show that 
output fluctuates, but the annual growth rate has fallen by 4.3 percent over the period 1995- 
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99 (Table 2.7). The value added of the agriculture sector decreased by 20 percent in 1999. 
This compares with a reduction of 4 percent in 1998 (Five Years Plan, 1999-2003). 
The output of the main agricultural products is shown in Table 2.8. This table also 
presents the percentage changes output of these products over 1998-99. Field crops declined 
dramatically from 103.1 thousand tons in 1998 to 59.1 thousand tons in 1999, including 
wheat, barley, corn and clover (see below). However, vegetable crops, including tomatoes, 
aubergines, cucumbers and potatoes, registered a substantial growth in 1999. Agricultural 
stock products increased in 1999, but meat (both red meat and poultry) increased by 13.7 
percent. Egg production was broadly static. The agriculture sector's significance to GDP was 
reduced from 9 percent in the 1970s to 7 percent in the 1980s, and to only 5.5 percent in the 
second half of the last decade, as shown in Table 2.7. This reflects the long-term relative 
decline of the agriculture sector. 
This sector has been affected by many problems, the most important being the 
relative loss of traditional markets, especially for vegetables. This is due to the competition 
from o ther c ountries, w hich h as r esulted inani rregular f low tot he e xports m arket. A Iso, 
there has been a shrinking of agricultural land due to uncontrolled urban expansion, which 
has affected agricultural products, and in particular field crops. Furthermore, the lack of rain 
is still one of the main problems facing this sector (Five Year Plan, 1999-2003). 
The government has tried to encourage private-sector investment in agriculture. And 
has geared its policy towards irrigation, with the implementation of advanced methods and 
technology. Private sector investment in agriculture was only around J. D 400 million in the 
last decade. Credit facilities extended to the agriculture sector by the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation (ACC) rose from J. D 92.7 million in 1998 to be around J. D 103.4 million in 
1999. The growth in ACC financing was due to the government policy of helping farmers 
alleviate the effects of drought. Likewise, credit facilities by commercial banks increased 
from J. D 115.3 million in 1998 to J. D 121.8 million in 1999 (Central Bank of Jordan, 1999). 
2.5.2 Mining 
Jordan is relatively poor in natural resources. The minerals that are available in 
economically feasible quantities are phosphates, potash and cement (Central Bank of Jordan, 
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2000). Together, these account for about a quarter of Jordan's exports by value. So, the 
mining industry in Jordan is one of the main contributors to economic growth and a principal 
generator of national income. The mining industry earned approximately JD 182 million in 
1999, representing around 3.5 percent of GDP. 
Phosphate is the main mineral in Jordan, and the country is the largest producer of 
phosphate in the Third World after India. Table 2.8 shows that phosphate rock production has 
grown by an average of 4.9 percent per annum. over the years 1995-99. Phosphate production 
is controlled by the Jordan Phosphate Mining Company, which exports a large percentage of 
its production. On average, the amount exported is around 12.3 percent of the total value of 
Jordanian GDP (see Table 2.8). The share of phosphate in total exports is likely to increase in 
the future, as Iran has decided to buy a large quantity of phosphate from Jordan. 
Jordan's second mineral resource is potash, which also accounts for a significant 
proportion of total exports. Potash is mined from the Dead Sea by the Arab Potash Company, 
which is the second largest company in Jordan. The Potash Company now has a permit to 
begin work to mine other minerals from the Dead Sea. Its production of potash decreased 
from 1,780 thousands tons in 1995 to 1,416 thousands tons in 1997. This was due to 
competition from an Israeli company, which was also operating in the Dead Sea, but 
production has recovered by 18 percent in 1999 (see Table 2.8). It reflects the company's 
successful efforts in implementing new marketing strategies. 
Cement production increased slightly from 3,415 thousands tons in 1995 to 3,512 
thousands tons in 1996. This was due to the Peace Treaty signed between Jordan and Israel 
in 1994, which resulted in Jordanian cement being allowed to reach the Palestinian markets. 
In 1999 cement production decreased to 2,682 thousand tons (see Table 2.8), due to the 
closure of the Palestinian markets after the clashes between the Palestinians and Israelis. The 
share of cement in the total value of Jordanian exports has decreased from JD 33,449 
thousand in 1997 to JD 16,546 thousand in 1999, as shown in Table 2.8. 
2.5.3 Manufacturing 
The discussion about the manufacturing sector is brief due to the lack of generally- 
available manufacturing information in official statistics. These statistics mainly relate to the 
industrial sector, which includes both manufacturing and mining. Industrial firms, on the 
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whole, are mostly privately owned and are characterised by small-scale. More than 40 
percent of the industrial establishments produce food products or clothing. The three heavier 
industries (phosphate, potash and cement) account for 30 percent of the products in the 
industrial sector (Department of Statistics, 1999). 
Manufacturing industry is concentrated in the northwest of Jordan in the 
Governorates of Amman and Zarqa, which contain 65 percent of all manufacturing. Twenty 
percent is located in the Irbid Governorate, and the remainder is distributed between Balqa, 
Ma'an, Karak and other Governorates. The relative importance of the manufacturing sector 
in total output has increased yearly. It was around II percent in 1992, but 13 percent in 1999. 
The growth rate of this sector was around 2 percent in 1999. 
The available figures indicate an increase in the growth rate of real value added 
generated by the industrial sector, including both manufacturing and mining, to reach 3.5 
percent in 1999 compared with 2.5 percent in 1998 (see Table 2.8). This came as a result of 
growth in mining industries, which had a positive growth rate of 6.5 percent in 1999, against 
a decline of around 6 percent in 1998. It also arises because of an increase of potash products 
and exports in 1999 (Central Bank of Jordan, 1999). However, the available information on 
the manufacturing sector shows that output was fluctuated during the period 1995-99, but 
showing a slight increase in 1999 (see Table 2.8). 
Credit facilities extended by commercial banks to the industrial sector increased from 
J. D 701.8 million in 1998 to J. D 769.1 million in 1999. Also the credit facilities provided to 
this sector by the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) increased from J. D 92.5 million to J. D 
98.2 in illion in 1999 (Central B ank ofJ ordan, 1999). T he G overnment iss till w orking to 
develop this sector through establishing Qualifying Industrial Zones (QlZs), and has signed a 
free-trade agreement with the USA, which provides benefits for national industries, and a 
partnership agreement with the European Union. 
25.4 Construction 
The available estimates on the performance of the construction sector in 1999 indicate 
that this sector's share in GDP has fallen compared with the previous years. Table 2.7 shows 
that the construction sector share in the total output increased in the first five years of the last 
decade. This was due to the return of Jordanians from the Gulf States during the Second Gulf 
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War, who needed places to live, as well as the optimistic projections for tourist activity after 
the country signed the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1994. Unfortunately, the breakdown of the 
Peace Treaty and the unstable situation that has followed in the region has led to a reduced 
share of the construction sector in the national economy during the second part of the 1990s. 
2.5.5 Services and Retail 
Services and retail combined amount to nearly 70 percent of the total output, and the 
growth rate of these combined was around 3 percent in 1999. The largest sector in the 
Jordanian economy is the service sector (excluding the retail sector). The total share of this 
sector in the Jordanian economy was around 64.3 percent in 1999 (see Table 2.7). Because of 
the size of this sector the Department of Statistics divides it into six main sub-sectors as 
follows: transport and communication; finance, real-estate and business services; social 
service; producer of government services; non-profit institutions; and domestic household. 
Transport and communications took a leading role in driving the real growth of the 
service sector. It registered a real growth rate of 8 percent in 1999, compared with 12 percent 
in 1998. Growth in these sub-sectors moved in parallel with implementation of the 
privatisation process in transport and communications activities, with the expansion of the 
Jordan Telecommunications Company and other private companies operating in this field. 
Finance, real estate and business services, and the social services sub-sector each registered a 
real growth rate of 2 percent in 1999, against 2.3 percent and 2.5 percent respectively in 
1998. The government service sub-sector achieved a real growth rate of I percent compared 
with a growth of 0.5 percent in 1998. Consequently, the finance, real estate and business 
services; producers of government services, and transport and communications sectors 
retained the three main sub-sectors of the services sector (Jaradneh, 2000). 
The importance of the retail sector in total output is shown in Table 2.7. In 1990s, the 
share of the retail sector in total output was around 4.5 percent on average. This share 
increased in the first five years of 1990s, from around 3.6 percent to 5.8 in 1997 (see Table 
2.7). T his w as b ecause of t he r eturn ofJ ordanians from t he G ulf C ountries in 199 1, w ho 
started-up in retailing d ue to the easy entrance for the n ew entrepreneurs i nto, this s ector, 
which does not require special skills or experiences. This situation continued until 1998, and 
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the sector's share then declined to around 4.6 percent in 1999. It was badly affected by the 
renewed political instability in the region. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Jordan become independent with the accession of King Hussein in 1952, and its land 
area is 89.3 thousand kM2 . The population is around 4.8 million, and the annual growth rate 
in population is 3.9 percent. The capital city is Amman, which has 38 percent of the total 
population. Education in Jordan is free and compulsory, and this has helped to reduce the 
illiteracy rate d uring t he I ast f ew years, sot hat student n umbers int he different I evels of 
education are around 1.3 million, which is about one-third of the total population. Jordan's 
health care has also achieved a good level of service, so the number of population per 
physician has decreased from 893 in 1996 to 636 in 1998. 
Jordan has a market-oriented economy with both government and the private sector 
playing an important role. However, the economy is handicapped by a shortage of natural 
resources, so that its main sources are phosphate and potash. The other problems facing this 
economy are the small size of the domestic market, and the high rate of unemployment, 
which stood at 12 percent in 1999. The deficit in the balance of trade and the government 
budget, as well as the gap between investment and savings are, also important economic 
problems. 
Despite these problems, the Jordanian government has succeeded in putting the 
national economy in good order with good growth rates in output. National income has been 
growing in the last five years by 3 percent annually (1995-99), and the government has 
succeeded in controlling inflation, to keep it at less than 2 percent. The government has 
sought to solve the unemployment problem by creating new jobs for the Jordanian workers, 
both in Jordan and in some other countries. The Implementation of loan guarantee scheme is 
an important component of this, with the purpose of helping to create jobs in small firms and 
to reduce unemployment. 
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Table 2.1: Area of Governorates, Population and Rainfall 
23 
Governorate Area (km2) % Population Density 
(person/kM2) 
Population 
(thousands)* % 
Average Rainfall 
(mm) 1998/99 
Amman 8,231 (9.2) 220 1,809.8 (38.1) 341 
Irbid 1,621 (1.8) 523 848.3 (17.8) 406 
Zarqa 4,080 (4.6) 183 747.9 (15.8) 120 
Balqa 1,076 (1.2) 290 312.2 (6.6) 363 
Karak 3,217 (3.6) 59 191.4 (4.0) 234 
Jerash 402 (0.4) 348 139.8 (2.9) 371 
Madaba 2,008 (2.2) 60 121.3 (2.6) 289 
AjIoun 412 (0.5) 256 105.5 (2.2) 735 
Aqaba 2,114 (2.4) 14 95.4 (2.0) 37 
Tafielh 6,593 (7.4) 34 72.4 (1.5) 204 
Mafraq 26,435 (29.6) 8 219.0 (4.6) 129 
Ma'an 33,163 (37.1) 3 92.7 (1.9) 161 
Total 89,342 (100.0) 54 4755.8 (100.0) 
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan, 1999. 
* Population by governorates in 1998 
Table 2.2: Population in Jordan 
In Thousands 
(a) Population over time 
Year 1952 1961 1979 1994 1998 
Males 350 470 1,116 2,182 2,487 
Females 330 431 1,017 1,920 2,269 
Total 680 901 2,133 4,102 4,756 
(b) Population by age and gender in 1998 
Age Male Female Total Cumulative of total population % 
0-4 376 354 730 15.3 
5-9 346 324 670 29.5 
10-14 308 295 603 42.1 
15-19 283 263 546 53.6 
20-24 281 236 517 64.5 
25-29 234 195 429 73.5 
30-34 159 138 297 79.7 
35-39 119 107 226 84.4 
40-44 85 82 167 87.9 
45-49 70 68 138 90.8 
50-54 70 61 131 93.6 
55-59 57 50 107 95.9 
60-64 40 35 75 97.5 
65+ 59 61 120 100.0 
Total 2,487 2,269 4,756 --- 
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan, 1999. 
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Table 2.3: Number of Students and Schools, 1995-99 
In thousands 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Student numbers 1,249 1,281 1,305 1,346 
Number of Schools 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.5 
Number of Classrooms 42.2 43.7 45.0 45.6 
Teacher Numbers 59.3 63.1 63.5 61.7 
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan, 1999; Ministry of Education, Jordan, 1997 
Table 2.4: Economic Indicators 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(a) Output 
Per Capita GDP (J. D, 1995 prices) 
GDP (J. D million, 1995 prices) 
Growth rate of GDP (%) 
GNP (J. D million, 1995 prices) 
Growth rate of GNP (%) 
(b) Inflation 
Change in cost of living index 
(c) Other Macroeconomic Indicators 
Ratio of total consumption to GDP 
Ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP 
(d) Labour Force by Economic Sectors 
Agriculture 
Mining & manufacturing 
Construction 
Retail 
Other Service 
(e) Unemployment Rate (%) 
1,063 1,036 1,013 997 982 
4,560 4,605 4,662 4,741 4,815 
--- 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.6 
4,444 4,546 4,617 4,735 4,807 
--- 2.3 1.6 2.6 1.5 
2.4 6.5 3.0 3.1 0.6 
87.8 94.6 96.4 97.6 97.3 
30.9 30.7 26.8 22.8 21.8 
6.8 9.3 7.7 6.1 5.5 
14.7 12.8 14.2 13.1 14.5 
10.3 9.7 9.5 7.1 7.5 
16.5 17.1 18.2 19.0 18.0 
51.7 51.1 50.4 54.7 54.5 
18 16 14 14 12 
Source: Thirty Six Annual Report, Department of Research and Studies, Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, 36,1999. 
Department of Statistics, Jordan, 1999. 
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Table 2.5: Unemployment Rate by Governorate and Gender 
In percent 
Governorate Total Gender 
(Male) (Female) 
Highlands & Jordan Valley 
Amman 9.8 (8.3) (17.7) 
Irbid 11.8 (10.1) (21.0) 
Zarqa 10.2 (8.8) (21.4) 
Balqa 9.2 (8.0) (15.0) 
Karak 11.4 (9.5) (21.6) 
Jerash 7.9 (7.7) (9.5) 
Madaba 11.6 (11.2) (13.7) 
AjIoun 10.2 (8.7) (18.6) 
Aqaba 6.2 (4.8) (15.6) 
Tafielh 11.1 (10.5) (14.7) 
Desert 
Mafraq 10.2 (8.7) (21.9) 
Ma'an 10.0 (9.8) (11.1) 
Total 11.3 (8.8) (18.5) 
Source: Unemployment Survey, Department of Statistics, First round, Jordan, 1999 
Table 2.6: Trade in 1999 and Trade Balance, 1995-99 
Jordanian Dinars, millions 
Exports Imports Trade Balance 
(a) Trade Partners 
Arab countries 427 574 -147 
European Union countries 61 830 -769 
Other European countries 8 172 -164 
NAFTA countries. 10 271 -261 
South America countries 0.5 69 -68.5 
Asian (non Arab) countries. 315 637 -322 
Other countries 230 82 148 
Total 1,051 2,635 -1584 
(b) Trade by Commodity 
Food &Live animals 127 483 -356 
Beverages and Tobacco 3 27 -24 
Phosphate and Potash* 282 84 198 
Mineral Fuels 0.1 323 -322.9 
Animal and vegetable oil and fats 45 45 0 
Chemicals 341 336 5 
Manufactured good classified by Material 107 391 -284 
Machinery Transport Equipmept 69 721 -652 
Misc. Manufactured articles 77 180 -103 
Others 0.1 45 -44.9 
Total 1,051 2,635 -1584 
(c) Trade Balance 
1995 1,005 2,590 -1585 
1996 1,040 3,044 -2004 
1997 1,067 2,908 -1841 
1998 1,046 2,714 -1668 
1999 1,051 2,635 -1584 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research and Studies, Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, Vol 
36.6, June 2000. 
Jordan exports phosphate and potash and imports crude materials except fuels. 
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Table 2.7: Sectoral Shares of GDP, 1990-99 
In Dercent 
Sector 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Annual Growth Rate 95-99* 
Agriculture 10.5 7.7 6.0 5.3 4.5 -4.3 
Industrial 19.4 18.7 21.4 20.7 20.9 5.7 
Construction 5.2 8.7 8.5 6.9 5.7 -6.4 
Total Commodity 35.1 35.1 35.9 32.9 31.1 -0.80 
Retail 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.8 4.6 -2.8 
Services 61.5 60.8 59.4 61.3 64.3 4.4 
Total Services 64.9 64.9 64.1 67.1 68.9 3.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research and Studies, Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, Vol 
34.10 and 36.6, Dec. 1998, June 2000. 
Note: Industrial production includes mining and manufacturing. 
* Average annual growth rates 95-99. 
Table 2.8: Agricultural and Industrial Output 
Products 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1998-99 % change 
(a) Agriculture Products 
Field Crops (tons, thousands) 
Vegetables (tons, thousands) 
Fruit Trees (tons, thousands) 
Meat (tons, thousands) 
Milk (tons, thousands) 
Eggs (million) 
(b) Some Industrial Products 
Phosphate (tons, thousands) 
Potash (tons, thousands) 
Cement (tons, thousands) 
(C) Exports of Industrial Products 
Phosphate (JD thousands) 
Potash (JD thousands) 
Cement (JD thousands) 
(d) Indicators of Industrial Sector* 
Value Added (J. D millions, current price) 
Growth Rate (%) 
Share of GDP (%) 
(e) Manufacturing Products (tons, thousands) 
133.4 129.8 109.5 103.1 59.1 -42.7 
886.6 680.5 714.4 740.9 762.3 2.9 
273 305.6 293.5 379.7 209.7 -44.8 
122.0 116.0 113.5 115.2 131.0 13.7 
147.0 165.1 170.0 170.8 170.8 --- 
715.0 726.0 954.0 948.1 937.0 -1.2 
4,984 5,355 5,896 5,925 6,014 1.5 
1,780 1,765 1,416 1,527 1,800 17.9 
3,415 3,512 3,251 2,650 2,682 1.2 
105,493 126,922 134,533 139,717 132,508 -5.2 
121,616 125,628 98,599 111,633 125,956 12.8 
29,576 41,453 33,449 16,189 16,564 2.3 
737 695 761 780 807 3.5 
11.0 -5.7 9.5 2.5 3.5 40.0 
21.4 19.9 20.7 20.5 20.9 2.0 
8,382.8 8,070.2 11,642.6 10,890.7 10,900.7 0.1 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research and Studies, Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, Vol 
36.6, June 2000. 
Industrial production includes mining and manufacturing, and its expressed as GDP at factor prices 
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Figure 2.1: Political Map of Jordan 
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Figure 2.2: Map of Jordanian Governorates 
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CHAPTER 3 
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
INJORDAN 
3.1 Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are a vital component of the socio- 
economic development of emerging states. Many such countries have given SMEs special 
attention in view of their role in promoting productive capacity, and in helping to deal with 
the problems of poverty and unemployment. Hobohm (2001) shows that small and medium- 
sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the private sector, making-up over 90 percent 
of enterprises in the world and between 50 and 60 percent of employment. The importance of 
SMEs lies in their role in growth at various stages of economic development. They contribute 
to output, fulfil social objectives, attract considerable foreign reserves into a country and 
have a clear importance in providing employment. 
Hobohm (2001) attributes the vital contribution of SMEs in the development process 
to the following reasons: firstly, SMEs are more labour-intensive and tend to lead to a more 
equitable distribution of income than do larger enterprises; secondly, SMEs contribute to a 
more efficient allocation of resources in developing countries; and thirdly, SNffis support the 
building of systemic productive capacities. 
In Jordan, both the government and the private sector support SMEs. In particular, the 
state has begun to implement a comprehensive programme of social 'safety-net' packages to 
fight unemployment and poverty. This comprises schemes worth a total of JD 431 million to 
develop the infrastructure of disadvantaged areas (see Chapter 2). A National Aid Fund has 
also been activated and restructured to enable it to combat poverty by providing recurring 
cash assistance and emergency aid to needy individuals incapable of working, as well as 
affording vocational rehabilitation opportunities and setting up income-generating self- 
employment projects for needy individuals capable of work. Another scheme is being set up 
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to finance training for the poor as a practical response to their needs, so that they may enter 
the labour market through self-employment. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider small and medium-sized enterprises in Jordan. 
The definition of an SME is important, but it varies across the countries, so that the chapter 
begins by considering this issue. It also considers the role of SMEs in the Jordanian 
economy, the problems experienced by SMEs, both in general and specific to Jordan, and 
finally, the chapter examines the financing of SMEs in Jordan. 
3.2 Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
There is no consensus on the definition of a small and medium-sized enterprise 
(SME). The terms 'small' and 'medium' are relative terms, and vary from one country to 
another, and from sector to sector within the same country. One study by the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, for instance, identifies over 55 different definitions of SMEs in 75 
countries (Abdullah, 1999). 
Despite t he d ifferent d efinitions, Bridge eta1. ( 1998) a rgue t hat a ny d efinition ofa 
small business should possess at least two of the following four characteristics: 
The management of the business is independent. Usually, the managers in small 
firms are also the owners. 
An individual or small group provides capital and ownership. 
The areas of operation are mainly local, with the workers and owners living in 
one home community. However, the markets need not be local. 
(iv) The relative size of the business within its industry must be small when 
compared with the biggest units in the field. This measure can be in terms of 
sales volume, number of employees or some other significant comparison. 
The definitions of SMEs can depend on many criteria, such as the number of 
employees or the value of paid-up capital, or a combination of both of these. Other 
definitions use total turnover, either annually or as an average over a few years; total fixed 
assets; the market share of the firm; or the level of technology used by the firm (Al-Sharna'a, 
1998). Other studies such as SESRTCIC (1987) explain that the definition depends on the 
subject under consideration, and various qualitative and quantitative criteria maybe taken 
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into account. The quantitative criteria focus on the size of the firm's labour force, the size of 
capital outlay, the level of utilisation of inorganic energy and the like. The qualitative 
criteria result in dichotomies, such as between organised /unorganised, modem / traditional, 
capitalist / pre-capitalist, formal / informal and factory / non-factory, but these can be 
regarded as making the definition unoperational and perhaps controversial. 
The World Bank seeks to define SMEs according to the number of employees, which 
it considers to be the primary criterion. It regards a firm as 'small' if it has 50 or fewer 
persons working in it. Several countries also use staff number as a criterion, though the actual 
number varies between countries. In the USA, Italy, and France a firm is small or medium if 
it has up to 500 employees, in Sweden up to 200, in Canada and Australia up to 99 and in 
Denmark up to 50 (Amman Chamber of Industry, 1991). 
The employee number benchmark has a number of advantages: it makes it a simple 
matter to compare firms in different sectors and countries, and it is also a stable yardstick, 
since it has no direct automatic relation to variations in prices, such as movements in 
exchange rates or inflation. It is also relatively easy to gather data for it. For example, Pratten 
(1991) in his study uses the number of employees rather than sales turnover or value added 
because "information about the employment is readily available and because it may be 
considered by managers to be less confidential" (p, 3). 
Other countries use the capital paid to define small and medium enterprises. In 
Malaysia, for example, small enterprises are considered as having paid-up capital not 
exceeding (Malaysian Ringgit) RM 500,000 (El = 5.5 RM) and medium-sized enterprises as 
having paid-up capital not exceeding RM 2.5 million (Abdullah, 1999). In Egypt, a small 
project is one with capital not exceeding (Egyptian Pound) Ef 550,000 (El =7 Ef). Here, the 
value of the currency causes problems, as it is difficult to make comparisons between 'small' 
firms in two countries because of the need to convert currencies and because of currency 
value fluctuations. Other countries seek to utilise several criteria, such as paid-up capital and 
the number of employees, so as to obviate the disadvantages of using just one or other of 
these. Whatever benchmark is selected, however, reaching a satisfactory definition of a small 
or medium-sized business has proved to be headache for researchers and policyrnakers 
throughout the world. 
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3.2.1 The Definition of SMEs in the UK 
In the United Kingdom, the Bolton Committee (1971) found that a small firm could 
not be adequately defined in terms of employment, assets, turnover, output or any other 
arbitrary single quantity. The Committee sought to differentiate between an "economic" 
definition and a "statistical" definition. The economic definition regarded firms as being 
small if they satisfied three criteria, as follows: 
" The firm has to have a relatively small share of the market; 
" The firm is owned or part owner-managed in a personalised way, but not 
through the medium of a formalised management structure; and 
The firm is independent, in the sense of not forming part of a larger enterprise. 
Under the statistical definition, the Bolton Committee adopted some limits, which 
applied to different sectors of the economy, using three criteria: the number of employees, 
turnover, and the number of vehicles used in the firm. These are set out in Table 3.1. 
Manufacturing enterprises, construction and mining were defined by the employment 
criterion; retailing, wholesaling, the motor trades and miscellaneous enterprises were defined 
by a turnover criterion; and enterprises in the road-transport field were defined according to 
the number of vehicles owned. The employment criterion uses two upper limits: it is 200 
employees for manufacturing, but for construction and mining it is 25 employees. The 
turnover criterion uses three upper limits: for retailing and miscellaneous firms it is f 50,000 
or less; for motor trades it is f 100,000 or less; and for wholesales criterion it is f200, OOO or 
less. The nw-nber of vehicles criterion uses 5 vehicles as an upper limit for road transport 
(Bolton, 1971). 
The Bolton definitions (economic and statistical) have a number of criticisms. In the 
case of the economic definition, these are considered by Storey (I 994a) as follows: 
0 The economic and statistical definitions are incompatible. Bolton requires that 
the owners or part-owners manage the small business in a personalised way and 
not through the medium of a formal management structure. This, however, is 
almost incompatible with the statistical definition of small manufacturing firms 
which could have up to 200 employees. It is not easy to manage this number of 
employees in a personalised way. 
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The second criticism of the Bolton economic definition is the emphasis upon the 
inability of the small firms to affect their environment-most notably their 
inability to influence, by changing the quantity which it produces the price at 
which a product or service is sold in the market place. In this respect, Bolton is 
clearly influenced by the economist's concept of perfect competition. 
According to Storey (1994a) there are five basic criticisms of the Bolton Committee 
"statistical" definition of a small firm. Firstly, there is no single definition, nor even any 
single criterion of 'smallness'. Instead, four different criteria are used in the definition - 
employees, turnover, ownership and assets. Secondly, three different upper limits of turnover 
are identified for the different sectors, and two different upper limits of employees are used. 
These make the definition too complex to enable comparisons to be made, either over time or 
between countries. Thirdly, the monetary unit used in the turnover definition makes 
comparisons over time very difficult, since appropriate index numbers have to be constructed 
to take account of price inflation. They also make international comparisons difficult, 
because of currency value fluctuations and differences in purchasing power parity. 
Fourthly, there are problems with employee-based criteria in comparing small and 
large firms over time. As Dunne and Hughes (1989) point out, output per head at constant 
prices varies according to firm size. Using an index of net output per head, where 1979 
equals 100, output per head in enterprises with less than 100 workers was 125.1 in 1986, 
whereas for enterprises with more than 1,000 workers it was 132.8. Hence, taking account of 
these increases in productivity over the last twenty years, the manufacturing upper limit for a 
small firm, which was 200 in 1971 , would be much closer to 100 
in 1993. Fifthly, the Bolton 
Conin-iittee definition treats the small firm sector as homogeneous. Even though the 
Comi-nittee, in their text, explicitly recognises that this was not the case; the single statistical 
definition for small firms implies the existence of homogeneity. 
The Bolton Committee faces other objections. Curran (1986) in his review and 
analysis of small business research in Britain over 1971-86 argues that "the government 
could influence a consensus on definition usage but has shown little willingness to do so. 
This definition has more serious drawbacks when it comes to the construction of adequate 
statistics on the extent and importance of the small enterprise" (p. 16). Also, there is another 
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objection according to Curran (1986): "The definition [of a small firm by Bolton Committee] 
is rather narrower than some others and deliberately excludes what has been called the 
'informal economy', where goods and services are produced but no money payment are 
involved and the 'fiddle' or theft of goods or services or money from employers or 
customers, which are consumed by the employee. Some of the figures discussed in relation to 
estimates of the extent of black economy may cover a wider range of activities than those in 
the definition adopted here but those offering the estimates are not always clear on these 
matters"(p, 16). 
In practice, a wide variety of definitions of SMEs are used in the UK, such as by the 
Companies Acts, the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS), and by different 
agencies, such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Inland Revenue and the 
Bank of England. These are summarised by Bridge et aL (1998) as follows. They show the 
considerable diversity in the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
D TI. - The DTI uses the following definitions: 
" Micro firm: 0-9 employees 
" Small firm: 0-49 employees (includes micro) 
" Medium firm: 50-249 employees 
" Large firm: 250 or more employees. 
Inland Revenue: The small companies' rate of Corporation Tax applies to 
businesses with taxable profits of up to f 300,000 and a marginal 
rate is applied to profits between 000,000 and E1,500,000. The full 
rate applies above this. 
Bank of England: For the purposes of considering finance issues for small businesses 
the Bank of England focuses mainly on business with a turnover of 
up to and including f1 million per year. 
Companies Act, 1985: Company is "small" if it satisfies at least two of the following: 
9A turnover of not more than f 2.8 million. 
*A balance sheet total of not more than f 1.4 million. 
9 Not more than 50 employees. 
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A medium-sized company satisfies at least two of the following: 
9A turnover of not more than f 11.2 million. 
*A balance sheet total of not more than f 5.6 million. 
9 Not more than 250 employees. 
SFLGS: - The scheme applies to businesses with fewer than 200 employees 
and with a turnover of not more than f3 million in manufacturing 
or f 1.5 million for other eligible businesses. 
3.22 The European Union Definition 
The European Union has a different definition of SMEs to that of the UK. To avoid 
inconsistencies and the sort of criticisms discussed above, the European Commission has 
adopted the following definition: 
" Micro-enterprises: those with between 0-9 employees. 
" Small enterprises: those with 10-99 employees. 
" Medium enterprises: those with 100-499 employees. 
In this case small enterprises do not include micro firms. Storey (I 994a) argues that 
the definition adopted by the European Union is more appropriate than that of the Bolton 
Committee for the following reasons. First, it is based exclusively upon employment, rather a 
multiplicity of criteria. Second, the use of 100 employees as a small firm limit is more 
appropriate, given the rises in productivity that have taken place in the last two decades. 
Third, it recognises that the SME group is not homogeneous, in the sense that distinctions are 
made between micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. 
3.2.3 Definitions Used Elsewhere in the World 
Elsewhere in the world there are other definitions of small firms. In this section we 
look at the definition used in some countries, which are comparable to Jordan. In particular, 
we look at Malaysia and Turkey, on which there have been a number of studies. In Malaysia, 
the definition of a small and medium-sized enterprise depends on the view of various 
government agencies. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry definition of SMEs 
has changed over time. In 1975 companies with less than 25 workers and paid-up capital of 
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more t han (Malaysian R inggit) RM2 50,000 w ere sm all and medium-sized e nterprises. In 
1985 the definition changed to cover companies with paid up capital up to RM I million and 
not more than 50 full-time employees, and a year later the paid-up capital was increased to 
RM 2.5 million and to 75 full-time workers (Abdoulah, 1999). Meanwhile, under the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation of Malaysia, the definition of a small and medium-sized enterprise 
depends on the paid-up capital only; it should not exceed RM 200,000 for 'Bumiputera' 
(ethnic Malays) enterprises and RM 100,000 for 'non-Bumiputera' enterprises. 
However, researchers on the Malaysian economy have used several other measures to 
define the small and medium enterprises, such as Chee in his study of 1985. He defines small 
firms in the manufacturing sector as employing less than 50 full-time workers, while the 
medium-sized firms employ between 51-200 full-time workers. Lim and Aziz adopt another 
definition, that the small and medium-sized enterprises in Malaysia are those that have a 
workforce of between 10 and 100 full-time employees (see Abdoulah, 1999 for a translation). 
Abdoulah defines a small and medium enterprise as having no fewer than 200 full-time 
employees and fixed assets of less than RM 2.5 million. 
Turkey also uses different criteria for defining SMEs. The Small Industry 
Development Organisation defines small-scale industry as firms employing up to 50 workers 
(SESRTCIC, 1987). However, Halk Bank (a government bank to support SMEs in industrial 
sector) has a definition of enterprises based on the number of employees and total assets. 
Small enterprises employ up to 100 workers and have up to US $ 25,000 of total assets, and 
250 workers and US $ 125,000 are the upper limits for medium enterprises. This latest 
version of the Halk Bank definition was made necessary by high inflation (Sogut, 1999). 
3.24 The definition of SMEs in Jordan 
The definition of small and medium enterprises in Jordan is no easier than elsewhere, 
as there is a multiplicity of definitions. This has led the various government agencies and 
institutions to adopt their own definitions. 
The central government Department of Statistics (DOS), for example, defines SMEs 
for all sectors according their employment size. It distinguishes between firms as follows: a 
firm e mploying 1 -4 w orkers is as mall f irm; 5 -19 w orkers isa medium f inn; a nd aI arge 
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firms employ 20 workers or more. The Encourage Investment Law number 11 (1987), which 
is designed to encourage investment, especially in small firms in less-developed regions (see 
Chapter 2), defines a small firm in Jordan as an investment in fixed assets that is not more 
than some unspecified limit. However, it does not explain why and how this definition was 
adopted, but it reflects the Government point of view (Amari et al, 1994). The Amman 
Chamber of Industry defines a small firm as employing 9 employees or less, and medium 
firms as employing 10-50 employees, while the Industrial Development Bank has defined a 
small firm as those employing not more than 5 employees, whose capital is not more than JD 
25 thousand and where the manager is the owner. 
In this study we will adopt the definition of a small and medium-sized firm used by 
the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC), which operates and executes the loan 
guarantee scheme in Jordan. However, much of the aggregate statistics for this sector arise 
from Department of Statistics, and it is these that appear below when reporting aggregate 
published data on SMEs in Jordan. In adopting this approach, we are not alone, as there are a 
number of other studies that adopt their own definitions for particular applications (e. g. 
Abdullah 1999, SESRTCIC 1987, and Cressy and Olofsson 1997). It means that the practical 
definition of a small and medium-sized enterprise used in this study depends on the number 
of employees criterion. The JLGC has a condition that the employees in the firm, which is 
looking for a JLGC-support loan, should not be more than 50 employees. So the small and 
medium-sized enterprises according to the JLGC definition is the firrns that employee not 
more than 50 employees. Overall, it is difficult to compare the Jordanian definitions and 
figures with British figures. This may be attributed to the differences between the two 
country's economies; the British economy being much more developed, while the Jordanian 
economy is still in its infancy. 
3.3 The Role of SMEs in Jordan 
The Bolton Committee chose three ways to measure the role and importance of the 
SME sector to the economy: their share of employment; their share of output; and their share 
in the total number of the finns. However, in this section will give an indication of the 
importance of SMEs in the J ordanian economy, by considering t he n umber of SMEs, t he 
employment in SMEs, output and productivity, and value added. The defmition of SMEs 
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used in this section is the same as the definition used by the Department of Statistics. This is 
because D OS is the o nly source ofa ggregate i nfon-nation on S MEs. However, b efore t he 
importance of SMEs can be considered we must remind ourselves of the common functions 
of the small fin-ns sector. These are summarised by Storey (1986) as follows: 
Small firms provide a source of competition (potential and actual) to larger firms 
in their industry, limiting the latter's ability to raise prices and/or be technically 
inefficient in the use of factors of production. 
Small firms are increasingly claimed to be major creators of new jobs in 
developed countries, since standardised products, which have traditionally b een 
produced in large enterprises, are now increasingly produced in developing 
countries. 
(iii) Small firms provide the "seed com" from which the giant corporations of future 
years will grow. 
(iv) Small firms can provide a harmonious working environment where owner and 
employee work "shoulder to shoulder" for their mutual benefit. This is likely to be 
reflected in fewer industrial disputes and lower absenteeism. 
(V) The inner city areas of industrialised nations contain concentrations of high 
unemployment, low incomes and poor housing. It is argued that small firms can 
make an important contribution to the regeneration of these areas. 
(vi) Small firms are likely to be innovative and found in industries where technical 
development is essential for survival. The low capital requirement in modem 
microelectronics makes this industry particularly suited to new small firms. 
3.3.1 The Number of SMEs 
Since most firms in Jordan are single-plant enterprises, we have chosen to use the 
terms firm, plant and establishment interchangeably. Table 3.2 shows the small firrns, share in 
the total number of plants in the industrial sector (manufacturing and mining) over 1987-97. 
There is an increase from 7,933 establishments in 1987 to 19,580 establishments in 1997. 
The table also shows that the growth in small firms has been more or less continuous over of 
the period. 
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Table 3.2 also shows that the firms employing four workers or less accounted for 82 
percent of the total number of industrial enterprises in 1997 (ie. 19,580 of 23,878 firms). If 
we include medium-sized firms (those employing 5-19 employees), the number of small and 
medium-scale firms in Jordan is 23,400. This means around 98 percent of the total fin-ns in 
the industrial sector in Jordan are small and medium-sized enterprises. Thus, SMEs are 
important not only in the industrial sector (manufacturing and mining), but also to the 
national economy. Moyers (1998) reports that at least 80 percent of existing private 
businesses have fewer than ten employees, and most have less than five workers. 
For the service sector it is difficult to obtain data on the number of firms. However, in 
1992, Amari et al. (1995) calculate that SMEs (ie. firms with less than 20 employees) 
represented 98.7 percent of all firms in this sector (ie. 14,490 out of 14,677 firms). Moyers 
(1998) notes that there are particular concentrations of SMEs in activities such as retail, 
hairdressing, restaurants, wholesaling and general services. However, the concentration of 
SMEs is smaller in other activities, such as construction, banking and insurance. Hence, 
overall, small and medium-sized firms account for the vast majority of enterprises in Jordan. 
If we examine the geographical distribution of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the industrial sector, then we see that these enterprises are heavily concentrated in particular 
areas. Table 3.3 shows that Amman accounts for nearly half (44.5 percent) of all small and 
medium-sized firms in Jordan. Further, two other areas (Irbid and Z arqa) account for one 
third (33.5 percent). These three governorates contain the major cities of Jordan, where 
industry is at its greatest. 
3.3.2 Employm en t 
In the United Kingdom the role of small and medium-sized enterprises in creating 
jobs has been a main plank in the government's policies to reduce unemployment. However, 
almost two out of three people working for themselves don't employ anyone else (Curran, 
1986). Storey (1994a) says that small firms in the UK create jobs at a faster rate than larger 
firms. The labour force is the most important factor in the development process in Jordan, 
due to the lack of natural resources. This is the reason that the government supports small 
and medium-sized enterprises by encouraging people to create their own businesses. 
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In 1996, small and medium-sized finns in the industrial sector provided around 16 
percent of the total labour force in Jordan. However, the total share of small and medium- 
sized enterprises in all employment was around 83 percent of the total labour force in Jordan. 
This is plausible for a small economy like Jordan, especially if one considers that 53 percent 
of the American labour forces are working in small firms, employing less than 500 persons 
(Rayan and Ludtke, 1995). Table 3.4 shows the number of employees in the SMEs in Jordan 
in all sectors at 1992 (the available data is for the private sector). According to this table, 83 
percent of total employees in the private sector are working in firms with less than 20 
employees, but this is as high as 100 percent for agriculture. The figure for the other sectors is 
industrial (49 percent), construction (20 percent), services (64 percent) and retail (96 percent). 
The most important sector from the Jordanian Government's point of view is the 
industrial sector (ie. mining and manufacturing), due to its ability to maintain sustainable 
development in the economy. The ability of small and medium-sized firms to provide jobs in 
this s ector is s hown inT able 3.5. In 1996 t he t otal n umber of employees int he i ndustrial 
sector was 139,000 of which around 46,000 employees were working in nearly 19,000 small 
firms. Every one of these 19,000 small firms employed less than five persons. In addition, 
around 27,000 employees were working in 4,000 medium-sized firms, employing between 5- 
19 persons. Hence, the total number of employees in small and medium firms in the industrial 
sector was around 73,000, which is about 52 percent of the total labour force of the industrial 
sector. The other 48 percent of jobs were provided by only 2 percent of the total firms in the 
sector. This is due to some very large firms in the Jordanian economy, such as the Arab 
Potash Company, which employs around 4,500 persons. Table 3.5 shows the distribution of 
employees by gender for SMEs in the industrial sector. Only 6 percent of the workforce of 
SMES in the industrial sector is female, but then only 3 percent of the total labour force in 
small and medium-sized industries is female. 
3.3.3 Output and Productivity 
The share of small and medium-sized enterprises in output (Gross Domestic Product) 
is shown in Table 3.6. The SMI share of output was around 27 percent of the total output in 
1992. By industrial sector, the retail sector has the largest SME share, at around 8 percent, 
followed by agriculture with around 7 percent. This is because these sectors are virtually all 
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comprised of small and medium-sized firms, whereas the table shows, other sectors, such as 
manufacturing; have a much greater proportion of large firms. 
The productivity of the labour force in SMEs is estimated by dividing the value added 
(at 1991 prices) by the number of employees (Amari et al, 1995). The productivity in SMEs 
and large firms is shown in Table 3.7. The average productivity in SMEs is higher in the 
service sector J. D 20,000, and lowest in the industrial sector at J. D 2,300. Generally, 
productivity in large firms is more than that in the small and medium-sized firms, but except 
in agriculture and retail (see Table 3.7). This is due to the high technology used in large firms 
on one hand, and the lower capital-labour ratio in SM[Es on the other hand. The most 
important thing to note from Table 3.7 is that productivity in the agriculture sector is higher 
than in the industrial sector. This is surprising, but it is due to the way in which the nurnber of 
employees in the agriculture sector has been calculated. The number that is used here does not 
include seasonal employees. 
3.3.4 Value Added 
All firms in the agriculture sector are small and medium-sized firms (employing less 
than 20 employees), so that all of the value added in this sector is from SMEs. Value added 
was around J. D 114 million in 1999, and accounted for 4.5 percent of GDP in 1999. In the 
trade and construction sectors, small and medium-sized firms consisted of approximately all 
the value added in this sector. The value added from the service sector was around 36 percent 
in 1994, while the total value added from the small firms was around 24 percent in 1996 
(DOS, 1996). 
The small firm (ie. with less than 5 employees) share in value added in the industrial 
sector during the period 1986-94 is shown in Table 3.8. It shows that the value added from 
small firms increased sharply from J. D 27 million in 1986 to J. D 55 million in 1989. This 
was due to the general improvements during the 1980s. Unfortunately, the amount of value 
added from small firms decreased sharply in 1990 to around J. D 49 million; which was 
caused by the lack of confidence in the Jordanian dinar in late 1989 and the Gulf problems 
when Iraq i nvaded Kuwait. However, it increased sharply again to around J. D 56 and 80 
million in 1991 and 1992 respectively, and then decreased again in 1993 and 1994 due to an 
uncertain political climate. The small firm average share in total value added in the industrial 
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sector was around 9 percent over 1987-93 (between 7.2 percent to 11.6 percent), but in 1994 
this was only around 5 percent. This can be linked to government policy after the peace 
process, which aimed to prepare the Jordanian manufacturing sector for new competition (ie. 
from Israel) by concentrating on medium and large firms at the expense of small firms. 
3.4 Problems Experienced by SMEs 
The development of SMEs everywhere is hampered by a variety of problems. These 
may differ from one region to another and from sector to sector, but there are certain problems 
that are common to all SMEs all over the world (Benacek and Zemplinerova, 1995). In this 
section we will discuss the general problems facing small and medium-sized enterprises and 
some issues that specific to Jordan. 
3.4.1 Some General Issues 
The economic difficulties that small firms encounter are not identical to those faced 
by large firms (Johns, 1983). The problems are not only varied and complex, but they also 
interact with each other. In general, the types of problem facing SMEs may be divided into 
those problems of an internal nature and those of an external nature. The problems can be 
considered internal if they are found within the organisation of a small firm or caused by the 
entrepreneurs themselves, and they can be considered external if they arise from the external 
environment o utside t he d irect control of the f inn ( Schmitz, 1993). Some authors, s uch as 
Bruch and Hiemenz (1984) and Harper and Ramachandran (1984) refer to these problems as 
"supply-side and demand-side constraints". 
By reviewing the literature on the issues facing SMEs in different countries, it is 
possible tos unimarise t he main p roblems f acing SMEs. T he f ollowing r eview isb ased on 
evidence gathered from countries and areas such as the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Japan, Sweden, Germany, South East Asia and Africa. It shows that there are problems 
common to all small and medium-sized firms, as follows: 
Availability and cost of capital: As Thompson and Leyden (1983) note, the 
availability and cost of capital affects the profitability of small enterprises in two 
main ways. One is that small business must pay significantly higher interest rates than 
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their larger competitors on loans of the same type and maturity. While a large firm of 
good credit standing is likely to pay the prime rate on its short-term bank loans, small 
firms typically must pay from 2-4 percent above the prime rate on such loans, and 3-6 
percent above prime on I oans from finance companies. A second reason why high 
interest rates have such a great impact on small businesses is that small firms depend 
much more heavily upon debt financing and bank loans as a source of funds, and they 
have little or no other access to the capital market. 
Inflation: Increasingly high prices of raw materials and labour will increase the 
operating costs of firms. The problem is that it is difficult for SMEs to pass on 
increased costs by raising prices because they usually face strong competition in their 
product markets. As John M. Blair, former chief economist of the Senate Antitrust 
Committee explains: "smaller firms pay more for money even in the best of times, but 
inflation h as a ggravated t he d ifference. T he b ias a gainst S MEs a pplies not o nly to 
corporate bonds and bank lending, but also to the equities market. The securities of 
the large companies enjoy higher price/earnings ratio because they are better known, 
more actively trader, and therefore more liquid" (p. 28) (Thompson and Leyden, 
1983). Inflation imposes the heaviest burden on SMEs and impairs their development 
and survival. It is difficult for SMEs to restore their capital, and they have limited 
resources available to resist inflation, by enlarging the stocks and fixed assets. In 
addition to the economic effects of inflation, there are socio-psychological effects on 
SMEs, as they may be unfairly blamed for inflation by consumers (Sougt, 1999). 
Finance: For small and medium-sized firms there are difficulties in finance related to 
their size (lack of collateral) and their 'newness' (lack of track record) (Cross, 1983). 
Financial institutions therefore face higher risks if they seek to provide loans to small 
and medium-sized firms. According to Suzuki (1996), the amount of finance obtained 
by SMEs depends on the 'five-stage growth model' of the corporate life cycle. The 
five stages are: the start-up stage; the early stage; the e arly-growth stage; the late- 
growth stage; and the consolidation stage. In the start-up stage, high risk is inherent 
and the source of funding is informal due to the banks refusal to extend loans to 
SMEs. In the early stage, the commercial banks are still reluctant to provide finance 
to SMEs due to the low-credit profile of these firms. In the third and fourth stages, 
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commercial banks provide short-term loans for SNfEs. Long-term loans are provided 
in the last stage. So banks are not the right source or institution for financing SMIEs 
for the following reasons, as Harper (1998) reports, "bankers are trained to be 
conservative, because they are taking care of [savers] money. Banks work on low 
margins they cannot afford the time to assess new business propositions, and banks 
need to get their money back, and also know when they will get it back. SMEs often 
fail and the timing of their success are unpredictable" (p. 7). 
(iv) Government Regulations: This problem is more common in the developing countries, 
where there is a lack of regulations that relate to the organisation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Such problems can be seen particularly in the management 
process. This creates more obstacles for SMEs, especially in the early stages of start- 
up and growth. 
(v) Taxes: The tax system is one of the main problems facing SMEs all over the world. In 
the United States small businesses criticise the tax system because of its 
discrimination between small and large firms. The US tax system is also very 
complex and does not allow for the special need of SMEs (Thompson and Leyden, 
1983). In t he U nited Kingdom, B annock (1976) a rgues t hat t he d irect t axation of 
profits has more severe effects on the small firms than large firms for three reasons. 
Firstly, because small firms, and particularly new ones without a profit record, have 
only limited access to the capital market and therefore find it more difficult to raise 
new equity or long-term finance to substitute for retained earnings as a source of 
development capital. Secondly, the owners of small firrns are jealous of their 
independence and feel reluctant to borrow, because borrowing threatens their 
independence. This reluctance does not affect the managers of large firms, due to the 
independence of their firms from the actual owners. The third effect of the tax system 
is to diminish the availability of capital. 
(vi) Competition: Problems related to competition and marketing are manifold. 
Competition seems to be especially strong in markets for simple, standardised items 
where technological and capital requirements are low. Competition for SM[Es comes 
from the large firms and imports. 
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(vii) Lack of Raw Materials: For many small producers in developing countries obtaining 
material input poses a major problem. Many SMEs have to reduce their volume of 
production because of the lack of supply of inputs or raw materials or due to the 
currency exchange rate (Tambunan, 2000). But Bruch and Hiemenz (1984) argue that 
the "supply of raw materials and intermediate inputs of the required specifications is 
often unstable in quality, quantity and price because of deficiencies in the trade sector 
and due to lack of infrastructure in transportation and communication. Large 
industries, on the other hand, can rely on long-term contracts and favourable prices 
for b ulk p urchases". H owever, t here a re m ore p roblems f acing S MEs, n amely: t he 
lack of technology, the lack of skilled workers, inadequate infrastructure, and the 
problems in the export market relating to the lack of information about international 
trading practices. Every one of these problems has a relation with the previous 
problems in one way or another. 
The problems mentioned above are common problems facing SMEs. Stanworth and 
Gary (1991) explain that the key problems and issues discussed in the Bolton Report 
(finance, governmental regulations and marketing) are still under discussion today. However, 
it should be remembered that every country and sector has its different idiosyncrasies. 
3.4.2 Issues Specific to Jordan 
Many difficulties facing small and medium-sized enterprises in Jordan are similar to 
those faced by their counterparts elsewhere. However, there are special problems facing SMEs 
in Jordan due to the structure of the economy, the nature of SMEs and to the government's 
economic policies. These problems are now discussed in the remainder of this section. 
The Econom 
About 80 percent of enterprises in the Jordanian e conomy are small a nd m edium- 
sized firms (see Section 3.3). The economy also suffers from problems, such as a lack of 
natural resources, a deficit in the trade balance and the government budget, and a low level Of 
savings (see Chapter 2). All of these issues influence firms in the country, especially SMEs. 
For example, small and medium-sized enterprises in the manufacturing and construction 
sectors import their raw materials from foreign markets, because it is impossible to find the 
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materials that they need in the local market. This ig reflected in the input prices of SM[Es, 
which fluctuate according to international markets. 
If we compare the Jordanian economy with those of neighbouring countries, it seems 
that starting a business is easier in Jordan than elsewhere because it is a free market-orientated 
economy. However, the nature of the economy also means more competition for Jordanian 
SMEs, not only from the large firms in the country, but also from small and large firms in 
other countries. All of these problems are due to the structure of the Jordanian economy, and 
therefore SMEs seek extra finance to combat them. However, a lack of finance is one of the 
biggest problems facing small and medium-sized businesses in Jordan. The conservative 
policy of the commercial banks regarding extending credit facilities to small investors makes 
it impossible for small and medium-sized investors to get loans from these banks. 
Governmental organisations also cannot provide the needed funds to these firms because of 
the d eficit in the government budget and the low I evel of savings generally. As Hamilton 
(1990) indicates, many businesses fail each year due to a lack of funding. 
The Nature of SMEs 
Other k inds ofp roblems t hat f ace S MEs in J ordan a re r elated tot he n ature oft he 
firms themselves, which often depend on only one person; the owner, who is also the 
manager. However, many of the problems that face small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Jordan are similar to those of other developing countries, due to the similar econon-fic and 
social conditions of these countries. The main problems for SMEs are as follows: 
There is more than one definition of a SME in Jordan. (see Section 3.2). This 
lack of consistency means that a firm may satisfy the definition of an SME for 
one agency, but not another, causing confusion. 
Lack of information and knowledge for and about small firms. This is partly due 
to the policyrnaker's ignorance about SMEs and their perceived lack of 
importance to the national economy. This situation also existed in UK when the 
Bolton Committee began its work. It found that one of the main obstacles facing 
SMEs was the lack of information for small enterprises (Curran, 1986). 
The low level of productivity of small and medium-sized firms, often due to the 
low-quality of workers employed by these firms 
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(iv) Small fin-ns face a high rate of employee tumover, due to the low wages 
compared to the wage levels offered by large firms. Workers obviously look for 
the best job, and are attracted to work in large firms by the higher wages, greater 
job security and a better working enviromment. 
(V) In order to reduce their costs, Many SMEs pay no attention to health matters, 
environmental conservation and the need for general safety. 
Govemment Economic Polic 
The 1995 Encouragement of Investment Law No 16, which aims toe ncourage the 
private sector to invest in rural areas, defines areas for tax exemptions according to the level 
of development. An "A" area covers parts of the main three cities, Amman, Zarqa and Irbid, 
offering 10 years tax exemption for firms and a 25 percent discount from income tax for 
entrepreneurs. A "B", area is defined around the less developed cities, such as Ajloun, Jaresh, 
Mafraq, Madaba, Aqaba and Karak. Finns in these areas have 10 year's tax exemption and 50 
percent exemption from income tax. The "C" areas cover the least developed parts of Jordan, 
such as the south-east areas, Ma'an, Mafraq and Tafeleh. Firms here have 10 years tax 
exemption and 75 percent exemption from income tax. 
Around 80 percent of SMEs are located in the 'A' areas, because SMEs usually prefer 
to be near the main cities so as to reduce the cost of transportation, marketing and so on 
(Amari et al, 1995). This means that small and medium-sized firms do not take advantage of 
the greater tax exemptions provided by B and C areas. This Investment Law mostly benefits 
large firms, which have the ability to choose the regions that have more exemptions, because 
they can afford to transport and market their products more widely. 
3.5 Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Jordan 
All firms, and especially small and medium-sized firms, need funds to achieve their 
goals and objectives. Firms require and seek finance at the different stages of their life cycle: 
at the beginning of their life; during the development period; and at the time when they are 
preparing their products for export to foreign markets. The vast majority of small and 
medium-sized enterprises mobilise the small amounts that they need to start their businesses 
from their own savings or from their friends and family. There are various reasons why SMEs 
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have little or no access to institutional finance. Banks consider lending to small businesses 
risky and the administrative cost of such lending is high (Levitsky, 1999). 
The financial sector in Jordan consists of the following: 
The Central Bank of Jordan. This is the monetary authority that controls the financial 
system. 
(ii) The Commercial Banks. In 2000, there were 21 banks with 547 branches throughout 
the country. The majority are concentrated in urban centres. The commercial banks 
are the largest source of loan finance for small business. All 21 banks are privately 
owned; 16 are owned by Jordanians and 5 by foreigners. They provide short and long 
terms loans for all sectors of the economy. 
(iii) Specialised Credit Institutions. These include the following: 
" The Agriculture Credit Corporation 
" The Cities and Villages Development Bank 
" The Jordan Cooperative Organisation 
" The Industrial Development Bank 
" The Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
3.5.1 Sources of Finance Available to SMEs in Jordan 
Sources of finance in Jordan, as Baydas (1998) has described, include both formal 
and informal channels. He found that entrepreneurs used one or more of the following four 
sources. First, some borrowers use trade loans from their suppliers and a few use advances 
from their customers. Suppliers' credit is the principal type of trade credit. Second, some 
entrepreneurs have acquired formal finance. Third, informal sources of finance from family 
and ffiends. Fourth, some entrepreneurs report never requesting formal loans, primarily 
because of the availability of finance from other sources, fear of the inability to repay or 
religious beliefs that prohibit the payment of interest under Islamic Sharia'a. A study by Bird 
(2000) has defined the sources of finance for SMEs in Jordan as follows: 
0 Informal Lending - family, friends' suppliers and customers. 
0 Formal Lending - commercial banks; 21 licensed banks; 
0 Government of Jordan supported lending programmes - sector lending and 
guarantee programmes: including specialised credit institutions (see above); and 
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governments institutions such as the National Aid Fund and the Development 
Employment Fund. 
Non-governmental organization, such as: Nour Al-Hussein Foundation, Jordan 
River Foundation, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), United 
States Aid for International Development (USAID) and Access to Microfmance 
and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform (AMIR). 
The commercial banks, specialised credit institutions and non-governmental 
organisations are all formal sources of financing small and medium-sized enterprises. 
However, there are no specific data available for informal lending (Bird, 2000). In the 
remainder of this section we discuss the main formal sources of finance for SM[Es. 
Commercial Banks 
Ifram (1997) notes that the banking system structure in Jordan was influenced by the 
British model. The new indigenous banks simply adopted the practices and policies of British 
banking, the most important of which had to do with the nature of banking. Indigenous banks, 
like their British model, have always been "commercial", as opposed to "credit" or "saving" 
banks, which evolved in many parts of continental Europe. Consequently, indigenous banks 
have always felt that their proper sphere of business lies in meeting the legitimate "need of 
trade". In practical terms, this attitude has meant that the banks' main business is to finance 
international, and to a lesser extent internal trade, typically by short-term loans. 
Table 3.9 shows the increase in total credit facilities extended by commercial banks to 
the firms in all economic activities increased from JD 1,309 million in 1987 to JD 4,466 
million in 1999. In relation to short and medium-terin loans, the commercial banks in Jordan 
usually extend these to the firms in all sectors, especially to small firms in the industrial 
(mining and manufacturing) and retail sector. Table 3.9 shows also the credit facilities 
extended to different sectors by commercial banks during the period 1987-99. The total credit 
facilities increased yearly, especially to the industrial sector with an average growth rate of 
around II percent per annum. The relative importance of the industrial sector in relation to 
finance from the commercial banks is about 17 percent (CBJ, 1999). This facility has 
increased from JD 220 million in 1987 to JD 765 million in 1999. The Central Bank of Jordan 
(2000) reports that around 80 percent of these facilities provided to the industrial sector were 
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for manufacturing firms. In the service sector, the total value of credit facilities provided by 
the commercial banks increased from JD 685 million in 1987 to JD 2,456 million in 1999. 
The retail and agriculture sectors have around 25 and 3 percent respectively of the total credit 
facilities provided. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain specific data on the credit facilities provided 
to the SMEs, because it is not published, neither by the commercial banks nor the Central 
Bank of Jordan. 
In relation to long-term finance, the banks do not extend these facilities to SMEs, due 
to the high risk in offering such facilities to SMEs, who are unable to provide enough real- 
estate collateral to satisfy the commercial banks requirements. So, the banks extend their long- 
term loans to large firms, due to the low level of risk and mutual benefits; and relations 
between the large firms and the banks, such as partnership and co-ownership in different 
projects. However, Aqel (1998) believes that a role of the banking system is to supply finance 
to SMEs, due to the following advantages of the banks: 
(i) Proficiency and ability in both management and financial expertise. 
(ii) A wide distribution of bank branches in all regions in the country; there are 
currently 21 banks with 547 branches in all parts of Jordan. 
(iii) The proficiency of auditing and adopting the international standards of 
accounting. 
(iv) Stability of banks' financial resources and their ability to offer banking services. 
Specialised Credit Institutions 
To confront the banks refusal to extend long-term loans and facilities to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, the government has established specialised institutions that aim to 
extend long-term facilities to SMEs. 
The first such organisation is the Agriculture Credit Corporation (ACC). This is 100 
percent owned by the government and was established in 1959. Its main purpose is to provide 
loans to borrowers in agriculture sector under special conditions and at subsidised rate of 
interest of around 7 percent. This institution provides three types of loan: short-term loans up 
to 2 years; medium-term loans for 2-10 years; and long term-loans for 10-15 years. It 
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provided around JD 16.8 million in 1997 as finance for the firms working in the agriculture 
sector, all of which were small and medium-sized firms. 
The second specialised institution is the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), which 
was established in 1965. This Bank aims to provide finance for firms in the industrial sector at 
a subsidised rate of interest of between 7-10 percent and loans of up to 7 years. The bank 
offers a number of other banking services and special programmes such as: risk capital loans; 
venture capital; commercial bill discounting; and financial broking in the Amman stock 
market. The bank does not accept deposits, but it relies on the government and donor laws. 
However, the small firms in the industrial sector could not meet the IDB conditions, so the 
bank established a special unit for financing small businesses and handcrafts in 1975. The aim 
of this unit was to finance small businesses with 5 employees or less and the maximum value 
of the loan was up to JD 10,000 for up to 5 years with six months grace period. In 1997 this 
unit provided funds for 3,726 small firms, totalling JD 15.2 million. 
The other institutions are: the Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDC), which extends loans to borrowers in the housing sector; the Cities and Villages 
Development Bank (CVDB), which participate in the development process in the less- 
developed regions, especially in the south of Jordan; and the Jordan Co-operative Corporation 
(JCC), which provides finance to the agriculture sector, through cooperation associations. 
Other governmental institutions have been established, due to the government's conviction 
about the importance of SMEs and their role in the Jordanian economy. These include the 
National Aid Fund (NAF), which has lent about JD 12.1 million in 1997, and the 
Development and Employment Fund (DEF), which in 1999 offered around JD 23 million for 
5,600 small firms and handcraft businesses (CBJ, 1999). The objective of these institutions is 
to provide the necessary financing for small-scale firms and self employed individuals, to 
contribute to the struggle against poverty and unemployment. 
Non-Govenunental Organisation 
Some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also been established to support 
specific groups of borrowers or firms. Some of these organisations are local, such as the Nour 
Al-Hussein Foundation, Jordan River Foundation and the Hashemite Jordanian Fund for 
Human Development. Others are international organisations, such as: the United Nations 
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Development Programme (UNDP); the Co-operative for Development (CD); CARE 
International; the Near East Foundation (NEF); the Co-operative Housing Foundation (CHF); 
Access to Microfinance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform (AMIR); and the 
United States Aid for International Development (USAID). All of these donors support SM[Es 
to deal with economic and social problems. All of the NGOs work through specialised credit 
institutions. The facilities from all of the non-governmental organisations are only available 
, 
for the small and medium-sized finns under fixed conditions. All of these organisations work 
within the government's plan against poverty and unemployment. 
3.5.2 Obstacles to Financing SMEs in Jordan 
Despite of the multiplicity of financial sources in Jordan, small and medium-sized 
firms still suffer from lack of finance from the different sources. Commercial banks are also 
reluctant to provide finance for SMEs unless they can protect their interest. There is also 
limited competition in the banking sector and banks have not been under pressure to develop 
their lending to small firms (Hallberg, 2000). The lending of the specialised credit institutions 
and non-governmental organisation is also very restrictive. In this section, we will discuss the 
obstacles facing the commercial banks and the specialised credit institutions preventing them 
from providing loans to SMEs. 
The Commercial Banks 
Up to 42 percent of small and medium-sized firms in Jordan have received loans from 
formal sources of lending (Baydas, 1998). However, despite this there is still a lot to be done 
to help small and medium-sized enterprises. Many of problems and obstacles that prevent the 
banks from financing SMEs are outside their direct control, such as: the interest rate, which is 
controlled by the Central Bank of Jordan (between II- 17 percent); the firm's track record; the 
direct control of credit by the Central Bank; the high rate of required capital reserve; and rules 
and policies in the credit market that have created barriers between the banks and SMEs 
(Aqel, 1998). In addition, reasons for the failure of the commercial banks to provide loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises are as follows: 
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The cost of managing and executing a loan are the same whether it is a small 
loan or a large one. This means that management cost for small loans is 
comparatively high. 
The high risk facing SMIEs and the greater external uncertainty of the 
environment in which SMEs operate makes the banks reluctant to offer loans to 
small firms. 
The lack of collateral available to the SMEs to help obtain loans. The 
commercial banks usually request collateral, especially real-estate, to protect 
their interests. 
(iv) The difficulties that banks face in the case of loan defaults by SMEs, such as the 
valuation of collateral during the loan period. 
(v) Entrepreneurs avoid dealing with banks due to their own lack of understanding 
of banking, fear of their inability to pay back a loan, religious beliefs that 
prohibit charging a rate of interest, and they are jealous of their independence. 
Bird (2000) in his study of the banking sector in Jordan states, "Jordan has a fairly 
sophisticated banking sector although their credit policies and lending practices are rather 
restrictive" (p. 7). Bird comments that the banking sector does not participate in financing 
SMEs because; they banks perceive SMEs as 'self help' organisations, not real, available 
businesses; banks perceive that firms lack qualified management, sound business practice, 
record keeping, marketing, etc; banks do not see market opportunities in what is perceived as 
a high-risk sector; and banks lack an understanding of cooperatives as business enterprises 
and do not have qualified staffs that understand financing for cooperatives and SMEs. 
Haque (1999) identifies managerial problems as a reason why banks are reluctant to 
lend to SMEs. These include: a lack of innovation fostered by job permanency; an office- 
oriented work approach; rigid rules and regulation; a long decision-making process; an 
ability to work in a 'situational context'; training that emphasises a formal setting; and a rigid 
rate of interest. Baydas and Graham (1997) also identify six key issues that banks need to 
resolve; these are: conirnitment to repayment by borrowers; organisational structure; 
financial methodology; human resources; cost-effectiveness; and regulation and supervision. 
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Specialised Credit Institutions 
The establishment of specialised credit institutions was intended to bridge the finance 
gap between demand and supply, to address both poverty and unemployment problems and 
to create financial resources for SMEs. However, these institutions cannot obviate the risk of 
extending loans to SMEs because they do not use the collateral to protect their interests. The 
social objective of these institutions and the fact that they are governmentally financed 
creates the impression that the government supports the loans extended to small and medium- 
sized firms through these institutions. This impression encourages the borrowers to use the 
loans in different ways from that described in their original application form (Bassal, 1995). 
Further, the borrowers do not always feel that they have to repay the amount of loan to these 
institutions. This has affected the repayment rate, which is 7 8.5 percent for the Industrial 
Development Bank and around 74 percent for the Agricultural Credit Corporation in 1999. 
This compares with a default rate for the commercial banks of around 6 percent on average. 
3.5.3 Collateral Requirements 
As with most decisions, the more quality information the banks have, the better their 
decision will be. The 'seven C's' are considered by White (1990) to be the main infon-nation 
that banks require in their lending, as follows 
(i) Character: This is the borrower's ability and commitment to repay the loan. The bank 
can discover this characteristic from the track record of the borrower. The 
character is directly related to the question: will the borrower repay9 
(ii) Capacity: This is the borrower's experience and his capacity to manage his work 
smoothly. The relevant questions are: does the borrower have the 
wherewithal to repay the loan, and what is his main source of repayment? A 
clear answer to this question can be found in the cash flow analysis. 
(iii) Capital: This is the amount of money paid by borrower as his own shareholding in 
the total capital of the project, which offers a secure margin to protect the 
bank's rights. 
(iv) Conditions: Economic, industry, or firrn conditions play a strong role in the firm's 
nil ability to repay the loan. So the banks have to check if the cash flow from 
the operation is sensitive to changing conditions. Their next step will be to 
look at other sources of repayment. 
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(v) Customer relationships: These are the borrower's history with the bank and other credit 
institutions. This additional information can be used in the bank's decision. 
(vi) Competition: Competition plays a role in the credit decisions of the banking sector. The 
desire to attract good borrowers from other competitors or to keep the 
bank's good borrowers from going to other banks causes bankers to be more 
careful when making a credit decision. 
(vii) Collateral: The banks prefer to lend only to projects with a record of success, rather 
than new projects, due to their ability to provide the required collateral. The 
banks also look for the collateral to be the main protector of their interest in 
the event of default. 
The IMportance of Collateral 
Collateral is an asset pledged by the borrower to the lender, which the lender has the 
right to seize and sell should the borrower default on the loan repayments. Collateral is used to 
protect the lender against the credit risk. Collateral is an important feature of the banks' 
lending decision, and the banks usually extend loans to the borrowers who have the capacity, 
ability and commitment to repay the loan. Collateral is very important for both parties in the 
credit operation (Abu-Jobara, 1997). In this section we will discuss the importance of 
collateral from both the lender's and the borrower's points of view. 
The lender looks to the collateral as a very important protector of their rights, because 
it can protect them if the borrower's project fails or if the borrower refuses repayment. The 
importance of collateral can be summarised as follows. First, collateral must minimise the 
lender's losses by giving the lender total or partial protection of his resources against any risk 
involved. In case of default the lender has the right to seize the collateral and sell it. Second, 
collateral is a screening device. Pledging collateral means that the borrower could lose part of 
his property if he does not repay the money on time, so the borrower has an interest in 
repaying. The reluctance of a borrower to provide collateral could signal to the bank that the 
borrower is fully aware of the implications of making this pledge, and if he does provide 
collateral, then he is likely to do everything to avoid the loss of the pledged assets. Third, 
collateral indicates that the borrower intends to use the loan for the purpose stated in the loan 
application. Collateral can then increase the security margin for the banks. 
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Collateral is also important for the other side of the credit operation. The collateral 
shows that the borrower has the ability to repay money on time and encourages the banks to 
lend. Further, if the borrower has enough collateral he will be able to save capital by 
borrowing for his business. In addition, putting forward collateral can create more facilities 
for the borrower, such as a lower interest rate, and an increase in the grace period or the 
repayment schedule (Abu-Jobara, 1997). 
Kinds of Collateral in Jordan 
Hammoud (1993) and Najar (1997) set out the main kinds of collateral used in 
Jordan, and the characteristics of this collateral: 
(i) Securities: This kind of collateral should be completely owned by the borrower and be 
in the form of high-quality securities, due to their price stability. Banks 
usually lend less than 50 percent of the capital consideration against this kind 
of collateral, and seek to diversify these securities due to market risk. 
Goods: This kind of collateral is popular. The goods should be protected from 
damage by storage and not closely related to changes in demand and supply. 
(iii) Bills of exchange: These should be a first class bills and maturing in not more than six 
months. They should come from legal commercial operations and have a 
suitable profit margin. 
(iv) Real estate: This is the main and the best kind of collateral from the banks point of 
view. U sually, t he b orrower p ledges h is r eal e state tot he b ank f or aI oan. 
This kind of collateral raises some obstacles, such as declining mortgage 
value during the loan period, difficulties for the banks in trying to sell the 
real estate in event of default (especially if the mortgage is a co-ownership) 
and differing valuations of the estate. 
(v) Personal guarantee: This is divided into two parts. First, the person can have a loan and 
can guarantee it with his own salary or ordinary income. Second, if the 
person has a good reputation and good record in his commercial activities, he 
can take a loan on the basis of his reputation alone. 
Equipment: This collateral is for loans extended to factories that use capital equipment. 
The equipment should be in an activity with a high productivity. The 
problem facing banks with this type of collateral is depreciation. 
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Despite the multiplicity of sources of finance available, and the different kinds of 
collateral that might be used in Jordan, the small and medium-sized enterprises are often not 
able to obtain the requisite finance. This is because SMEs are unable to provide the required 
collateral by the commercial banks to protect the banks' interest. This means there is gap 
between the loans or funds that are demanded by SMEs and the funds that are supplied by the 
commercial banks. This known as the 'finance gap' in SMEs financial relation with the 
commercial banks. The finance gap can be defined simply as the deficit between the amount 
of financial resources demanded by SMEs and what is provided or supplied. 
Baydas (1998) finds that small firms demanded around JD 168 million in finance for 
176 thousand borrowers in 1995, whereas on the supply side the financial institutions 
supplied only JD 118 million for SMEs. This means there is a finance gap of around JD 50 
million. This study by Baydas (1998) derives these findings through interview survey 
methods of a randomly selected sample of 350 small and medium-sized enterprises across 
various sectors in the three most populated areas of Jordan. However, Aqal (1998) argues 
that if the commercial banks extended only one percent of their credit facilities to small and 
medium-sized enterprises then this gap would be bridged or closed. 
This gap is caused by two factors. Firstly, from the supply side, the commercial banks 
usually refuse to lend to SMEs for a long period in the form of long term loans, and always 
prefer I and and buildings as collateral (i e. real estate). The I ack of f easibility studies also 
affects the financing decisions of the banks, and limitation of the financial resources for the 
specialised credit institutions. Secondly, from the demand side, the main factor is the low 
level of income in small and medium-sized firms, which reduces the ability of these firms to 
finance themselves. The government has tried to address the finance gap by encouraging the 
commercial banks to provide loans to small and medium-sized firms through the Jordan Loan 
Guarantee Corporation (JLGQ. This was established in 1994 to execute a loan guarantee 
scheme for small and medium-sized firms in all sectors of activity. These guarantees are 
provided to firms that have a good cash flow analysis and a feasible project, but which might 
have not enough of the kind of collateral that is attractive to the cornmercial banks. 
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The definition of a small and medium-sized enterprise in Jordan is no easier than it is 
elsewhere, and there are multiplicities of different definitions. This has led the various 
government agencies and institutions to adopt their own definitions. The Department of 
Statistics in Jordan (DOS) definition, used in this chapter considers a firm to be small if it 
employs less than 5 workers, medium if it employs 5-19 workers and large if there are more 
than 20 workers. However, for the rest of this study we use the JLGC definition, which 
considers a firm to be small or medium-sized if it employs 50 or fewer workers. 
The role of SMEs in Jordan can be seen from the number of SMEs in each sector. 
More than three quarters of private firms in Jordan are small and medium-sized firms, and 
around 98 percent of firms in manufacturing sector are SMEs, while all of the firins in retail 
and agriculture sectors are SMEs. The importance of SMEs is also found in these firms share 
of employment, with 80 percent of the total labour force in SMEs. Despite this SMEs face 
the same problems as elsewhere. These include the availability and cost of capital, inflation, 
finance, government regulations and so on. While some of the problems faced by SMEs in 
Jordan are due to the structure of the economy, others are due to the nature of SMEs in 
Jordan, and to the government policy. 
The main sources of finance for SMEs in Jordan are: the commercial banks, 
specialised credit institutions and non-governmental organisations. Because the specialised 
credit i nstitutions a nd n on-governmental o rganisation a re working top rornote government 
policy and targeting special groups, then the commercial banks are considered to be the main 
source of finance for SMEs. However, the banks are usually reluctant to lend SWs, and this 
creates a finance gap in financing small and medium-sized firms. In recognition of the 
importance of SM[Es to the national economy, the Jordanian government established the 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation in 1994 to encourage the commercial banks to lend to 
SMEs. The reminder of this thesis is a study of how well these guarantees are able to bridge 
the finance gap. 
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Table 3.1: The Bolton Comn-dttee Definition of Small Firms 
Sector Definition 
Manufacturing 200 employee or less 
Construction, Mining and Quarrying 25 employee or less 
Retailing, Miscellaneous Turnover of f 50,000 or less 
Services, Motor Trade Turnover of f 100,000 or less 
Wholesale Trades Turnover of f 200,000 or less 
Road Transport Five vehicles or less 
Catering All, excluding multiplies and brewery, Managed houses 
Source: Storey. D, 1994. 
Table 3.2: Small Firms in Industrial Sector in Jordan, 1987-97 
Year Small Firms The Total Firms 
Number Annual Growth rate Share of Total Firms % Number Growth rate 
1987 7,933 - 81.2 9,766 - 
1988 10,428 31.5 86.7 12,033 23.2 
1989 10,909 4.6 80.9 13,485 12.1 
1990 13,109 20.2 89.1 14,713 9.1 
1991 13,141 0.2 85.6 15,348 4.3 
1992 14,899 13.4 81.6 18,260 19.0 
1993 16,540 11.0 87.1 18,980 3.9 
1994 16,526 -0.1 80.5 20,535 8.2 
1995 18,724 13.3 81.8 22,880 11.4 
1996 19,117 2.1 81.8 23,358 2.1 
1997 19,580 2.4 82.0 23,878 2.2 
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial survey, 1993-1997 
Table 3.3: Geographical Distribution of Small Firms in Industrial Sector, 1997 
Governorate Number of Industries 
Highlands & Jordan Valley 
Amman 8,713 44.5 
Irbid 3,524 18.0 
Zarqa 3,035 15.5 
Balqa 1,057 5.4 
Karak 548 2.8 
Jerash 392 2.0 
Madaba 450 2.3 
AjIoun 294 1.5 
Aqaba 352 1.8 
Tafielh 196 1.0 
Desert 
Mafraq 764 3.9 
Ma'an 255 1.3 
Total 19,580 100.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan, 1999. 
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Table 3.4: Employees in SMEs, in Private Sector, 1992 
Sector Total employees Employees in SMEs % 
Agriculture 49,602 49,602 100.0 
Industrial 114,526 56,459 49.3 
Construction 14,960 2,962 19.8 
Services 55,553 35,748 64.3 
Retail 75,375 72,355 96.0 
Total 260,409 217,126 83.4 
Source: Amari, et al 1995. 
Table 3.5: Employers in SME in the Industrial Sector, by Gender, 1996 
Labour Class 1-4 5-19 Up to 20 Total 
Firms Number 19,117 
% 81.8 
3,683 
15.8 
558 
2.4 
23,358 
100.0 
Total Number of Employee. 45,959 
% 33.1 
26,850 66,142 138,951 
19.3 47.6 100.0 
Male 45,367 25,059 59,661 130,087 
% 34.9 19.3 45.8 100.0 
Female 592 1,791 6,481 8,864 
% 6.7 20.2 73.1 100.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, 1998. 
Table 3.6: SME Share in Output, 1992 
Sector GDP (J. D. million) % 
(a) SMEs 939.7 27.0 
of which: Retail 279.0 8.0 
Agriculture 217.9 6.0 
Transportation and Communication 143.6 4.0 
Others 299.2 9.0 
(b) Large Firms 1,115.6 32.0 
of which: Manufacturing 380.9 11.0 
Transportation and Communication 273.2 8.0 
Mining 144.1 4.0 
Others 317.4 9.0 
(c) GDP 3,494.0 
Source: Amari, et al 1995. 
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Table 3.7: Average of Productivity in SMEs for Some Sectors, 1991 
Jordanian Dinar, Thousands 
Sector SMEs Large Firms Total Sector 
Agriculture 4.4 - 4.4 
Industrial 2.3 12 6.6 
Retail 3.3 - 3.3 
Services 20.3 7.9 6.5 
Transportation and Communication 4.4 11.3 7.3 
Construction 2.8 2.5 2.6 
Water and Electricity - 9.8 9.8 
Source: Amari, et al 1995 
Table 3.8: Small Firms Value Added and Their Share in Industrial Sector Value 
Added, 1986-94 
Million, Jordanian Dinar 
Year SMALL FIRMS Industrial Sector 
Value (J. D. million) Growth Rate % Sharing % Value(J. D. million) Growth Rate % 
1986 26.8 - 9.0 297.3 - 
1987 29.0 8.2 7.2 400.4 34.7 
1988 34.6 19.3 7.9 436.6 9.0 
1989 54.5 57.5 9.5 575.4 31.8 
1990 49.4 -9.4 8.3 595.4 3.5 
1991 55.6 12.6 9.4 590.9 -0.8 
1992 79.7 43.3 11.6 684.7 15.9 
1993 76.7 -3.8 10.0 766.8 12.0 
1994 47.7 -35.2 5.6 886.6 15.6 
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial survey, various issues. 
Table 3.9: Credit Facilities Extended by Commercial Banks According to the Economic 
Activities, 1987-99 
Jordanian Dinar, Million. 
Sector 
Year Agriculture Industrial Retail Services Total 
1987 40.0 220.7 363.7 684.8 1,309.2 
1988 47.2 221.4 402.5 742.2 1,418.3 
1989 47.4 239.0 391.5 833.6 1,511.5 
1990 53.7 236.9 407.8 946.3 1,644.6 
1991 49.8 250.5 465.9 998.1 1,764.3 
1992 54.4 285.8 525.1 1,139.4 2,004.7 
1993 65.4 285.8 631.8 1,658.3 2,741.3 
1994 75.5 471.6 798.6 1,902.7 3,248.4 
1995 75.7 548.3 970.4 2,111.3 3,705.7 
1996 79.5 610.6 1,035.7 2,194.5 3,920.3 
1997 93.3 590.5 1,064.5 2,231.4 3,979.7 
1998 115.3 701.8 1,104.7 2,363.5 4,285.3 
1999 117.3 765.3 1,127.0 2,456.4 4,466.0 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, vanous volumes. 
CHAPTER 4 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON LOAN GUARANTEE SCHEME 
4.1 Introduction 
Across the world, the primary source of external funds for small businesses is loans. 
Most of these loans are provided by commercial banks, so the commercial banks have a very 
important role in financing small firms. For the last few decades the credit market and, more 
generally, financial markets, have attracted considerable attention from econornists due to 
their role in the economy. The main reasons for this attention are described by Clemenz 
(1986) as follows. Firstly, credit markets have the ability to execute an important role in any 
developed economy through the sharing of risk and the allocation of financial resources. 
Secondly, some influential economists have noted that credit markets operate in a very 
distinct way compared to most other markets, and in many they cases exhibit inefficiency. 
Banks aim to maximize their profits, so they must simultaneously seek the highest 
return possible on loans and securities, reduce risk and make adequate provision for liquidity 
by holding liquid assets. Banks try to accomplish these goals in the following ways: they try 
to find borrowers who can pay a high rate of interest and are unlikely to default; they look for 
high-quality investments with a high rate of return; and they manage the liquidity of their 
assets so that they can satisfy the reserve assets requirement without bearing huge costs 
(Clemenz, 1986). However, these factors make the small firms' quest to borrow funds from 
banks difficult. This is not only because of a lack of information about the returns that can be 
made from small firms, but also due to the inability of these firms to pay high interest rates or 
to pledge sufficient collateral that may be requested by banks. It is because of these problems 
that governments may offer loan guarantee to the commercial banks in order to encourage 
them to lend to small and medium-sized enterprises. These loan guarantee schemes are the 
focus of this chapter. 
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This chapter discusses the theoretical background to the loan guarantee schemes that 
have arisen as a response to asymmetric information in the credit market. it will go on to 
discuss how collateral can solve the problem of asymmetric information, but also how loan 
guarantee schemes can act as an alternative to collateral. This chapter also presents and 
evaluates the empirical evidence on loan guarantee schemes. It provides a general survey of 
the main literature about loan guarantee schemes, their role and importance, and it considers 
the experience of the main developed countries in the field of loan guarantee schemes. 
4.2 Information and Small Firms Finance 
Despite the importance of the credit market and its ability to be the main source of 
finance f or S MEs, it is not possible to ignore the main problem facing commercial banks 
when offering loans to SMEs. This is the problem of asymmetric information in the credit 
market. This section will discuss the importance and the role of asymmetric information in 
the credit market, and the role of collateral as a solution to the asymmetric information 
problem. As Riding (1997) notes, "it is worth reviewing t he literature on credit r ationing 
because it is often invoked as justification for loan guarantee programmes" (p. 643). 
4.21 Asymmetric Information 
The small-business owner is likely to be significantly better informed about their 
business than any outsider, such as the bank. Indeed, the analysis of small business finance 
depends on the assumption that the owner of a small firm has more information about his 
firm and its performance than a bank. The situation may not be the c ase for large firms, 
especially for those with publicly-traded shares. This is because, as Storey ( 1994a) states, 
information about larger firms is collected by independent analysts and widely disseminated 
to a large group of potential and actual investors in the business. Such information is not so 
readily available about smaller firms. Thus, the problem for the banks is how to distinguish 
between good a nd b ad s mall f inns int he a bsence ofa ny r eliable i nformation, sot hat t he 
banks are wary about lending to small firms. 
Cowling and Sugden (1995), Binks et al. (1990), and Binks and Ennew (1996) 
illustrate how asymmetric information may lead to adverse selection (hidden borrower type) 
or moral hazard (hidden borrower effort). They define adverse selection as when a bank 
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cannot distinguish between two types of borrowers: the good risk and the bad risk. So in this 
case the bad borrower has an incentive to pretend to be a good borrower in order to benefit 
from more favourable lending conditions. However, this will not be optimal for the bank. To 
prevent this problem, banks may look for indicators or signals to reduce the uncertainty. 
Cowling and Sugden (1995) define moral hazard as situations in which "a borrower's success 
probability can be influenced by effort. In cases where effort cannot be monitored 
sufficiently, the borrowers may not put in the required effort" (p. 9 0). The upshot is that 
borrowers may default on loans. In response to this, the banks may design a loan contract that 
induces more effort from the borrower. Higher collateral requirements are consistent with 
this. However, with perfect information this would not be necessary. 
From the above discussion, we can see that asymmetric information in the credit 
market causes adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This can cause the financial 
market to fail. This is defined by NERA (1990) as the "failure of the financial markets to 
provide finance to apparently viable small firrns" (p. 15). NERA also mention other sources 
of financial market failure, which may occur due to the imperfections in banks' internal 
decision-making processes. For example, irrational bias and principal-agent problems. These 
means that some potentially profitable business opportunities do not take place. 
Binks et al. (1990) note that in the provision of bank finance to a small project, both 
parties typically sign a contract. If the bank wants to enter into this contract it will need 
certain information, and the bank must be sure of the following details. First, that the project 
is an appropriate one; second, that the firrn is capable of undertaking it; and third, that once 
the c ontract h as b een w ritten, t he f irm will dow hat ith as agreed todo to t he b est ofi ts 
abilities. So, we can see that the bank is always looking to avoid the problems posed by 
asymmetric information by designing the loan contract in an appropriate way. 
The idea that asymmetric information causes market failure was first proposed in 
Akerlof s (1970) paper on the 'lemons' principle. The paper illustrates the problem of 
adverse selection, which derives from asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, 
who are unable to distinguish between good from bad goods (i e. "peaches" from "lemons"). 
This will cause market failure. The reasoning is as follows. The market depends on the 
buyer's perceptions of the average quality of the goods. Because the buyer cannot distinguish 
between good and bad products, they will offer an average price, which will be more than the 
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bad product value and less than the good product value. As a result the sellers of bad 
products will receive a premium at the expense of those selling good products (see Kreps, 
1990). Further, this situation will affect all of the market activities, as the good-product 
sellers will stay out of the market, because the price is too low. It is inefficient, since if the 
good products could be identified, markets would exist in which both the good and bad goods 
would be sold, but at different prices. 
This idea can be applied to the credit market. Imagine the bank as the buyers of risk 
and the borrowers as the sellers. The sellers know the riskiness of their projects, but the bank 
have less or no information about the likely project perfon-nance. Credit rationing will be the 
natural outcome of this asymmetry of information, since the banks will know that their 
classifications of borrowers according to risk is imperfect and fear that setting a market 
clearing rate of interest may lead to a worsening, in terms of risk characteristics of the overall 
quality of borrowers. In such circumstances, as Akerlof (1970) notes "the difficulty of 
distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in the business world; this may indeed 
explain many economic institutions and may in fact to be one of the more important aspects 
of uncertainty" (p. 500). 
The earliest example in the literature of a study on imperfect information and 
financial markets is Jaffee and Russell (1976). In their paper they tried to develop a more 
specific model of how imperfect information and uncertainty can lead to rationing in loan 
markets. In their paper they define borrowers as "honest" and "dishonest" borrowers. Honest 
borrowers only accept the contracts that they expect to repay and they do in fact repay. 
Dishonest individuals, by contrast, default on loans whenever the costs to the borrower of 
default are sufficiently low. The paper constructs a setting where borrower default 
probabilities increase with loan size. Furthermore, for any given loan size, default 
probabilities differ across borrowers due to the factors lenders cannot observe, so the market 
interest rate incorporates a 'lemon premium'. Credit rationing in the form of restrictions on 
loan size can emerge for the following reason. Honest borrowers may prefer the restrictions 
because the smaller loan size may lower the market average default probability, reducing the 
lemons premium, dishonest borrowers have to follow a long type contract in order to reveal 
themselves. 
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The most influential paper in this area is the work by Stiglitz and Weiss (198 1). The 
exploitation of informational asymmetries leads to a form of credit rationing where the 
market denies funds to borrowers with characteristics identical to those receiving loans. In 
the equilibrium, some firms receive loans but the others are denied by the market. Both the 
borrowers and lenders "seek to maximize profits; the former through their choice of a 
project, the latter through the interest rate that is charged to borrowers and the collateral that 
is required of borrowers" (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, p. 393). 
The borrowers are two types, good-quality borrowers and bad-quality borrowers 
(those with riskier projects), so that projects have different probability distributions of return. 
In this case the interest rate may act as a screening device; since borrowers who are looking 
to pay a high interest rate may have the worse risk, ie. they do not worry about the interest 
payments if they default. A rise in the interest rate lowers the average borrower quality, and 
this will decrease the lender's expected return, so that the loan supply curve bend backwards. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) reach a very useful conclusion: "increasing the interest rate or 
increasing collateral requirements could increase the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, 
either by discouraging safer investors, or by inducing borrowers to invest in riskier projects, 
and therefore could decrease the banks profits, either by discouraging safe investors, or by 
inducing borrowers to invest in riskier projects, and therefore could decrease the banks 
profits. Hence, neither instrument will necessarily be used to equate the supply of loan able 
funds" (p. 408). 
De Meza and Webb (1987) examine the effects of asymmetric information on 
aggregate investment and on the financial structure of firms, by using a simple competitive 
model, under certain reasonable assumptions about the distribution of the project returns. The 
inability of banks to discover the characteristics of projects leads to more investment than is 
socially efficient. They assume that projects all have the same expected returns but differ in 
risks. The paper shows that in the presence of asymmetric information, the financial 
structures of firms and the efficiency properties of the level of investment depend upon the 
distribution of project returns. If all projects offer the same expected returns but differ in their 
risk, then equity is the favoured means of finance, and social efficiency obtains. This 
conclusion of de Meza and Webb (1987) conflicts with the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. The 
difference between the two papers as described in Kon and Storey (2000) is thus; "whereas 
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Stiglitz and Weiss assumptions lead to credit rationing, those of de Meza and Webb lead to 
oversupply"(p. 1). 
The de Meza and Webb (1990) paper is driven by the assumption that entrepreneurs 
differ in their ability, which results in relationships of first order stochastic dominance 
between their project returns. They find that capital market failure cannot be attributed to 
moral hazard for it is an inescapable consequence of severing the link between performance 
and reward and there is no reason for thinking that in its presence competitive markets yield 
an inefficient risk-return mix. Adverse selection does provide a reason why a market 
equilibrium involves too little risk sharing. Nevertheless, in the seemingly plausible class of 
models considered here, if a pooling equilibrium exists, there is always too much investment 
(de Meza and Webb, 1990). 
Many papers enlarge upon the basic ideas presented by Jaffe and Russell (1976), 
Stiglitiz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987). These include Greenwald et aL 
(1984), Bester (1985), Kanemoto (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Black and de Meza 
(1994), Boot and Thakor (1994), Drake and Holmes (1995), and Hellmann and Stiglitiz 
(2000). All of them consider that asymmetric infori-nation causes market failure in the credit 
market. After this simplified explanation of the background and review of asymmetric 
information and credit rationing, which still make the banks job to lend SMEs so difficult, 
because as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state, banks like to determine the borrowers who are 
likely to repay, but it is difficult to identify a good borrower due to asymmetric information, 
so the bank will use the interest rate and collateral as screening devices. The role of collateral 
in screening projects is now considered. 
4.22 Collateral 
Asymmetric information and the bank's inability to identify good borrowers' causes 
credit market failure. As mentioned above, one of the main ways to solve this failure is 
through collateral. Collateral is an asset pledge by the borrower to the lender, until the 
borrower p ays b ack t he loan. In case ofI oan d efault t he lender h as t he right to seize t he 
collateral and sell it. Collateral serves to protect the lender against the risk of default that may 
face the project. Collateral is defined by Mishkin (1997) as "property promised to the lender 
if the borrower defaults. It lessens the consequences of adverse selection because it reduces 
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the lenders losses in the event of a default on a loan, the lender can sell the collateral and use 
the proceeds to make up for losses on the loan" (p. 247). 
However, collateral has another role, since it is a signal that the borrower is high- 
quality, w ho isc ommitted toh is p roj ect a nd so merits h aving aI oan f rom t he b ank. T he 
entrepreneur has more infon-nation about the performance of his project than the bank, and so 
an entrepreneur who is willing to provide collateral is likely to be doing so because he knows 
that his project will succeed. Thus, collateral can also be considered as a signal (Storey, 
1994a). As Bester (1987) says, "Borrowers with high probability of default prefer contracts 
with higher interest payments and lower collateral than borrowers with a low default risk. 
The reason is that high risk borrowers are more likely to lose their collateral" (p. 893). Also, 
Besanko and Thakor (1987) support the idea that low risk borrowers choose contracts with 
low interest rate and high collateral. 
According to Storey (I 994a) the importance of collateral is as follows. Firstly, it 
limits the downside loss by providing an asset for the bank in the event of a project failure. 
Secondly, it keeps a strong level of commitment between the borrower and his project. 
Thirdly, it provides a signal to the banks that the entrepreneur believes the project is likely to 
succeed, otherwise he would not commit his personal resources to it. One of the other useful 
roles that collateral plays, as Besanko and Thakor (1987) report, is that collateral has a role in 
designing credit contracts, as it enables the banks to sort borrowers into risk classes. Low- 
risk borrowers, will choose a contract with a low interest rate and high collateral requirement, 
whereas high-risk borrowers choose the contract that has a high interest rate and low 
collateral requirement. Collateral offers facilitate cooperation between lenders and 
borrowers. Lenders are more willing to make loans secured by collateral, and good borrowers 
are willing to supply collateral as it may help them to get loans more easily and with a lower 
rate of interest. 
The remainder of this section briefly reviews the literature on collateral. Besanko and 
Thakor (1987) illustrate the role of market structure in credit allocation when there is 
infon-nation asymmetry. They find that the high-quality borrowers are willing to pledge more 
collateral when they try to get a loan, because collateral-associated costs produce different 
marginal rates of substitution. But this is contrary to the conventional view, which states that 
only low quality (more risky) borrowers should pledge more collateral. The same surprising 
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result has been found by Chan and Thakor (1987). Bester (1987), analysed the structure of 
the credit market equilibrium under imperfect information. He found that an increase in 
collateral has a positive effect on the probability of repayment, whereas an increase in the 
interest rate has a negative effect. The same result has been founded by Chan and Thakor 
(1987) a nd B esanko a nd T hakor ( 1987). B ester (1987) a Iso goes against t he c onventional 
wisdom, in saying that more risky borrowers should pledge more collateral. Berger and Udell 
(1990) a nalysed t he r elationship b etween c ollateral a nd credit r isk. T he risks t hey s tudied 
included the risk to the borrower, and the bank. They found that there is a positive 
relationship between collateral and risk for both agents, so that contract type depends on the 
information and risk observed by bank. 
Collateral is used to reduce the risks associated with adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Binks et A (1990) indicate in their study that the availability of sufficient 
collateral can counteract these problems. Kon and Storey (2000) say that the prime role of 
collateral is to compensate for the information imperfections of the bank. However, 
sometimes new and good entrepreneurs are looking for finance from conu-nercial banks to 
start-up or to develop their projects, but they have not enough or any collateral. Despite this, 
the project may have a good cash flow analysis which shows the borrowers ability to repay 
back the loan on time, but due to the absence or lack of collateral, which signals that the 
projects ability is not clear, then the bank will refuse to provide loans to this project. 
4.3 The Rationale for a Loan Guarantee Scheme 
It is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises especially in the developing 
countries to begin or to grow without access to credit, particularly from the commercial 
banks. The main factors that limit the access of SMEs are now considered. Castellanos 
(1997) illustrates three basic reasons to explain why banks may be biased against lending to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Firstly, SMEs have a higher rate of failure than the large 
firms, so they are seen as riskier. Secondly, the administrative costs of providing loans to 
SMEs are high, which reduces their profitability. Moreover, SMEs are often unable or 
unwilling to provide any kind of documentation to banks or to provide collateral. Thirdly, 
46with few exceptions, financial institutions have not developed alternative techniques for 
lending against the prospective cash flows of SMEs. There is some evidence that banks can 
use the techniques of informal finance to profitably serve even the smallest borrowers. 
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Nonetheless the supply of loans to SMEs is not sufficient, and there are important gaps in the 
coverage of these borrowers" (p. 35). 
Levitisky and Parasad (1989) consider similar reasons why banks are reluctant to lend 
to small and medium-sized enterprises. Balkenhol (1990) takes a different view. He says, "to 
gain better understanding of the banks reluctance to lend to small and medium-sized 
enterprises we need to take closer look of how bankers calculate profitability" (p. 246). He 
discusses four factors playing the main role in calculating profitability: the cost of resources, 
administrative costs, provisions against default and the lending rate. These factors are 
different if the bank provides a loan to a large f irm. since the administrative costs will be 
lower, and the provisions against default will also be lower, due to the higher default rate of 
SMEs. 
Governments have tried to overcome these problems by providing credit (loan) 
guarantees to banks. Seibel (1995) defines a loan guarantee scheme as a complement to 
direct credit and as an incentive in commercial lending to enterprises without sufficient 
collateral or track record. So, loan guarantee schemes are a substitute for collateral to 
overcome the lack of information, which makes financing SMEs through the commercial 
banks so difficult. Vogel and Adams (1997) argue that "collateral is seen as a substitute for 
informational imperfections" (p. 22). Also Seibel (1995) argues, "Credit guarantee may 
either be a substitute for collateral, or in some cases a security of last resort, in addition to 
collateral" (p. 172). See also Kanbur et al (1994) on this. It is because SMEs suffer from the 
lack of collateral, and due to the risk of financing small and medium-sized enterprises, so that 
it leads to a search for alternatives to protect the lender's rights. 
The objectives, the costs and benefits and the important issue of the additionality of 
the loan guarantee scheme are now considered. Despite the lack of information and studies in 
this area (see Vogel and Adams, 1997). 
4.3.1 Objectives of a Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Loan Guarantee Schemes (LGS) are set up to improve the corporate relationship 
between banks and the small and medium-sized enterprises, and to help the SMEs to receive 
the funding that they need. Riding (1997) reports that the main objective of a loan guarantee 
scheme is to assist small firms and not to subsidise risky fin-ns. While KPMG (1999) argue 
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that "the primary objective of all loan guarantee programmes is to redress a perceived flaw in 
the credit market. The desired outcome is to facilitate access to debt capital for firms" (p. 3). 
Levitsky and Parasad (1989) consider the following objectives of a loan guarantee scheme. 
Firstly, the main purpose of the scheme is to cover some portion of losses incurred when 
borrowers default on loans. This will encourage the financial institutions, especially the 
commercial banks, to lend to small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, a LGS provides 
guarantees against loans and promotes investment in fixed assets or working capital. Thirdly, 
the risk of loss is shared in specific proportion between the lender and scheme provider. 
Fourthly, the financial institutions and commercial banks seek to protect their rights by 
demanding securities or collateral, but the LGS reduces these requirements, making lending 
to SMEs much easier. 
These are general objectives for loan guarantee schemes, but each specific loan 
guarantee scheme may have its own objectives. For example, in the United Kingdom, when 
considering the reasons for establishing the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS), 
Harrison and Mason (1986), Storey (1994), Cowling (1995), Cowling and Clay (1995) and 
Cowling (1998) all make reference to the recommendations of the Wilson Committee of 
1979. Cowling and Clay (1995) state that the main objectives are: "Firstly, to facilitate an 
increase in the numbers of both business start-ups and expansions. Secondly, to encourage 
banks to shift away from asset-based lending towards a more involved customer-client 
relationship based on mutually beneficial infon-nation exchanges. Finally, a key policy goal 
was to generate jobs in a cost-effective manner. This was seen to be particularly important 
given that some 50% of employment in the UK is in small firms" (p. 142). 
4.3.2 Costs and Benefits ofLoan Guarantees 
The costs and benefits of a loan guarantee scheme are considered by Vogel and 
Adams (1997) and Camion and Cardone (1999). The cost of a loan guarantee scheme 
depends on three things. First, the cost of setting-up a new organization, including costs such 
as offices, equipment, employee salaries, and benefits and advertising the programme. The 
second is the cost of ftmding the subsidies; most of loans guarantee schemes involve hefty 
subsidies to sustain their operations. These subsidies may come through grants or 
concessionary-priced funds to establish the initial guarantee fund or to later replenish it. 
Finally, the lenders usually incur additional transaction costs to participate in the scheme, 
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such as having to prepare special reports on the portions of their loan portfolios covered by 
the loan guarantees. They also incur additional transaction costs when they make claims on 
defaulted loans covered by the scheme. In some cases the guaranteeing agency may 
unilaterally decide not to honour its guarantee unless the lender has pursued all legal 
remedies against the defaulting borrower. 
The benefit that the loan guarantee schemes offers is increased economic a ctivity. 
The purpose of a loan guarantee scheme is to encourage lenders to change their policies and 
provide more loans to SMEs, thus causing 'additional' lending and activity. Vogel and 
Adams (1997) argue that this 'additionality' might be expressed "either in the terms of 
number of clients, number of loans, or volume of funds lent for targeted purposes" (p. 26). 
They report that the 'additionality' is poorly measured since attributing it to a loan guarantee 
scheme is difficult, due to counterfactual and substitution problems. 
4.3.3 Additionality 
Loan guarantee schemes aim mainly to encourage the commercial banks to provide 
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. The success of these schemes, therefore, hinges 
on the extent to which guarantees cause additional lending to targeted groups, or more 
lending than would have occurred in the absence of the scheme. So, the extent of 
6 additionality' is thus extremely important in judging the effectiveness of the loan guarantee 
scheme subsidies. Roheds (1984) defines the 'additionality' as follows "It is used to convey a 
measure of something worthwhile happening which would not otherwise take place-caused, 
in this case, by the provision of a government guarantee. By providing that guarantee to a 
bank the government enables that bank to provide incremental lending to potentially viable 
businesses for which there would otherwise have been no way of providing the necessary 
finance" (p. 1). 
The simple example that used by Vogel and Adams (1997), may clarify the notion of 
additionality. Assume the purpose of a loan guarantee scheme is to stimulate lending to small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Further, assume that before the availability of the guarantee, 
lender X was making loans to ten SNEEs for a total E1,000. If, after participating in the loan 
guarantee schemeý lender X lent to twenty SMEs for a total of E2,000, one could conclude 
that the loan guarantee scheme was associated with additionality in both number of loans and 
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value of loans made to the target group. Additionality might likewise occur when another 
lender Y, who initially made no loans to SMEs, later lent a total of f-1,000 to ten SMEs under 
a loan guarantee scheme. 
In different evaluations of loan guarantee schemes two types of additionality are 
found. The first type is 'finance additionality'. This is whether the finance provided to the 
fin-n by the bank, and guaranteed under the scheme, would have been available from other 
commercial sources, or from the same sources in the absence of the loan guarantee scheme. 
Such finance, which would not be available through other sources, is defined as 'additional 
finance' (KPMG, 1999). It has two components: 
Full finance additionality: when a firm would not have been able to obtain any 
finance through alternative sources; and 
Partial finance additionality: when firm would have been able to obtain some of 
the finance provided borrowed other sources, but not the full amount borrowed 
through the LGS. 
The second type of additionality is 'economic additionality'. This is defined by 
NERA (1990) "the economic activities that generates by the scheme, which would not 
otherwise have taken place" (p, 60). Economic additionality depends on finance 
additionality, first of all, and depends on the characteristics of the business to which the loans 
were m ade. Always the e conornic additionality r esult appears in the level of employment, 
turnover and value added. 
One way to assess the finance additionality of a guarantee is to pose the following 
questions to the recipients of the guaranteed loans. Does the LGS represent a source of 
finance, which would not otherwise have been available to the firm or which would have 
been available only at a later date? Would the finance have been available but only on 
different terms? Have existing sources of finance been displaced by the LGS? The next step 
is to assess what would actually have been raised in the absence of the scheme. To measure 
the finance additionality (ADD) at the level of the firm, NERA (1990) define it in the 
following way: 
ADD=I(A+C-B)-. AjxIO0 
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where: A: Amount of loan guaranteed by LGS. 
B: Alternative finance, which would have been raised in the absence of guarantee. 
C: Other non-LGS finance raised of the same time as the LGS loan. 
Suppose it is found that LGS finance additionality is 80 percent additional at the level 
of the firm, then does this imply that the finance additionality at the level of the small firms 
sector or at the whole economy is 80 percent too? NERA (1990) discuss this point as follows; 
"assessing the impact of the LGS requires assumptions about both the supply of and demand 
for funds overall and their interaction. Let us assume that the volume of funds advanced by 
the banking system is limited only by lack of viable projects (where viable projects in 
banking terms exclude those projects which are sound but which lack the necessary security). 
In these circumstances lending under the LGS which is additional at the level of the firm will 
also be additional at the level of the small firms sector and economy, since it will be not have 
displaced other lending. If, however, bank lending was subject to some form of lending 
ceiling, then the allocation of funds to LGS projects might simply displace other forms of 
lending. Under these circumstances LGS lending which is additional at the level of the firm 
would not be additional at the economy level" (p. 46). 
Economic additionality depends in the first instance on finance additionality. So, if 
there is no finance additionality, there is no economic additionality, at the level of the firm 
that assimilates in the firm's turnover, profitability, value added and employment. Regarding 
the assessment of economic additionality at the level of the firm, NERA (1990) focused 
attention on LGS-induced changes in value added, turnover and employment, and they 
found, typically, that if there is some LGS finance additionality, then there will be also some 
additional turnover and employment at the level of the firm. 
With reference to economic additionality at the level of the small firrn sector and the 
economy, itw as f ound t hat t he I evel ofe conomic a dditionality at the I evel oft he f irm. is 
greater than on the level of the sector and economy as whole. This is due to the increase in 
turnover, value-added and the fact that, employment in the LGS supported firm may be at the 
expense of other firms elsewhere in the economy. Generally, additionality at the small firms' 
sector I evel r eflects t he extent tow hich t he LGS s upported firms a re in c ompetition w ith 
other small firms. Additionality at the level of the economy as a whole will be higher the 
more t he a ctivity oft he f irm. isj udged toI ead toi ncreased n et e xports or toi mprove t he 
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supply side perfon-nance of the economy through innovation or enhancement of labor supply. 
The absence of such effects does not, of course, imply that wider economic additionality is 
zero. Displacement presumably occurs because the LGS supported firm is able to offer a 
cheaper or better service or product to some purchasers (NERA, 1990, p. 47). 
Measurement of additionality and attributing it to a loan guarantee scheme is difficult, 
because of counterfactual and substitution problems. The term counterfactual refers to what 
the I ender would have done in the absence of loan guarantee scheme. It is impossible to 
know with certainty what might have occurred, but Vogel and Adams outline two subjective 
ways to deal with this issue. The first is to ask lenders, ex ante, what they would likely do 
regarding targeted lending with and without a loan guarantee. The other alternative is to ask 
the s ame q uestion ofp articipating I enders exp ost. Both a Iternatives a re v ulnerable tot he 
Hawthorne effect: lenders' responses may be influenced by what they think the interviewer 
wants to hear. Regarding the substitution problem, Vogel and Adams (1997) differentiate 
between two types of substitution. The first occurs within the lending institution. It is defined 
by Vogel and Adams as follows "a loan guarantee scheme may, for example, cause a bank to 
transfer p art or a 11 oft he q ualifying p ortion ofi ts e xisting I oan p ortfolio to the g uarantee 
programs and then expand its lending in no targeted area" (P. 27). The second type of 
substitution that occurs is among lenders: interlender substitution. In conclusion, Vogel and 
Adams (1997) argues that" the problems of substitution and the counterfactual could lead 
casual observers to conclude that a credit guarantee programme had a major impact on lender 
behavior when, in fact, the guarantee caused much less additionality in lending for targeted 
purposes" (p. 27). And they were unable -according to their opinion- to find any evaluation 
of loan guarantee scheme that correctly documents additionality. 
4.4 Empirical Evidence on Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Since there is very little, if any, evidence on loan guarantee schemes in developing 
countries, then the discussion focuses on the experienced of developed countries. This 
section will discuss the empirical evidence on loan guarantee schemes. This includes an 
outline studies examining these schemes from different aspects and from different countries. 
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4.4.1 Loan Guarantee Schemes in Developed Countries 
Before going on to consider the evaluation of loan guarantee schemes, it should be 
clear that the structure and operation of these guarantees, such as design of the scheme, risk 
sharing, guarantee fees, handling of claims and financing, are different from one country to 
another. These differences partly depend on the circumstances that the scheme was 
established for. As Riding (1997) argues, the objective of loan guarantee schemes is much 
the same everywhere; it is to facilitate the provision of capital to small viable firms. 
However, the schemes may differ in their design. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the main features of the loan guarantee schemes in some 
developed countries (UK, France, Germany, USA and Canada). The table also shows that all 
of t hese s chemes a re a im toe ncourage t he c ornmercial banks a nd f inancial i nstitutions to 
provide loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, so they are consistent in their objective. 
But, the schemes are different in practical sides such as the guaranteed amount that is 
between 70 - 85 percent in the UK scheme, while it's between 50 - 65 percent in the France 
scheme and its 80 percent in the Germany scheme. And they are different, for example, in the 
cost of the loan length of loan (for more details see Table 4.1). The asymmetries of the loan 
guarantee schemes practice is also in the developing countries as shown in Table 4.2. This 
table explains the main features of the guarantee schemes in four developing countries (India, 
Philippines, Ghana and Haiti) to show how these schemes are different in their design, but 
almost they are consistent in their source of fund, which depend in the government mainly 
(for more details see Table 4.2). 
This section will discuss the English and American experience of loan guarantee 
schemes. This is due to their long experience and well developed schemes in this field. There 
are several evaluations completed for these two schemes, which is different from the case for 
developing countries, as these suffer from the lack of evaluation studies. Vogel and Adams 
(1997) say, "Unfortunately, we were unable to find any evaluation of loan guarantee 
programs in low-income countries" (p. 26). Camion and Cardone (1999) argue that there is 
no comprehensive evaluation of loan guarantee as far as they know any where. Cressy (2000) 
reported that despite the "widespread use [of guarantees], only a few attempts have been 
made to evaluate the contribution of these schemes, especially in Europe. However, a number 
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of studies from the UK indicate that the loan guarantee schemes are of limited usefulness and 
the achievements of their stated objectives are generally questionable" (p. 25 1). 
The UK Experience 
In the United Kingdom, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) introduced the 
Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) in 1981. The scheme was established to 
bridge the gap in the market for small firm access to finance, and provides guarantee to 
encourage the commercial banks and financial institutions to provide loans to the SMEs. This 
is where the firms are unable to raise conventional finance for viable projects, due to the lack 
of collateral or insufficient track record. 
The establishment of a loan guarantee scheme followed the recommendations of the 
Wilson Committee (1979). The Committee found that the obtaining finance remained a 
problem for b oth t he sm all a nd medium-sized enterprises, even t hey n eed t hese funds f or 
start-up and for the expansion of their business. The Committee recommended the 
introduction of some form of government-based guarantee scheme. The justification, given in 
Cowling (1995) and (1998), was as follows. The first was because there were reasons to 
believe that competition between the banks in this area was insufficiently effective to ensure 
that viable small businesses always had the necessary access to sufficient funds on 
reasonable terms. The second was because that the public return from the activities of small 
firms was greater than the private benefit, due to their importance to job creation. It follows 
that some public subsidy was justified. 
Under the loan guarantee scheme the government guaranteed a high proportion of a 
loan obtained by an SME from a participating bank (see Table 4.1). In return, the small firm 
had to pay an interest rate to the government additional to the bank's own 'base-plus' small 
firm rate (Cowling and Clay, 1995). 
The Objective 
The objective of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) arises from the 
importance of the small business in areas such as employment and income in the UK- 
Another reason is the banks bias against lending to small firms, particularly when they don't 
have enough collateral or insufficient track records. In 1988, the National Audit Office 
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identified three objectives for the small firms' loan guarantee scheme in the United Kingdom 
as follows. Firstly, to facilitate an increase in the number of both business start-ups and 
expansions by bridging the 'equity' gap between the banks and firms. Secondly, to encourage 
banks to change their lending process. Finally, the scheme was introduced to provide a cost- 
effective j ob/wealth generation package (Cowling and Clay, 1995). Also, see Cowling (1995) 
and (1998) for more details. Levitsky and Prasad (1989) state that "one of the objectives of 
the UK scheme, and an objective not found in other countries, was to end the usual 
requirement of personal guarantees from small businesses seeking bank finance" (p. 36). 
The Operation 
A small firm that failed to obtain a conventional loan, either due to a lack of collateral 
or insufficient track record, or both, may be able to obtain finance under the Small Fin-ns 
Loan Guarantee Scheme. It enables high-street banks and other financial bodies to lend 
between E5,000 and E250,000 to new and existing businesses. The procedures of the SFLGS 
can be summarised as follows: when the lender receives a borrower's application for a loan, 
and it is found to be unsuitable for a conventional loan due to insufficient security, the lender 
will apply to the Department of Trade and Industry, so as to guarantee the loan. If the value 
of the loan is less than 00,000 certain banks and other lenders can grant the application by 
themselves without first referring it to the SFLGS. 
The DTI provides the lender with a guarantee for 70 or 85 percent of the total loan. In 
return for government backing, the borrower must pay the DTI an annual premium. In 
addition, Riding (1997) explains that the lender may require a pledge of real assets as 
security, and usually a lack of a fixed or floating charge on such assets. The security applies 
to the whole loan, and the borrower remains liable for the full debt. Lenders seek recovery, 
possibly through liquidation in the event of default (p. 661). The SFLGS loan cannot exceed 
7 years. 
The loan guarantees are provided to firms with less than 200 employees, in different 
activities covering many types of businesses. These include all manufacturing and 
construction firms and many services industries. Also, the finance is eligible for various 
purposes, such as developing a project, starting-up trading, expanding an existing business or 
improving efficiency. Ineligible purposes include buying a company's shares, buying-out a 
Review ofLiterature on Loan Guarantee Scheme 79 
member of a partnership, replacing existing loan and overdraft facilities or financing interest 
payment (DTI, 2000). 
Development ofSFLGS 
After the first three years working with small firms in the United Kingdom the 
scheme was adjusted to better meet the requirements of small firms. So from July 1984 the 
guarantee covered 70 percent of the loan value, instead of 80 percent during the first three 
years, and the premium rate, which was paid to the scheme increased to 5 percent on the 
outstanding balance of loans. 
There have been other adjustments to the small firms loan guarantee scheme from it's 
inception until now. These are shown in Table 4.3. In May 1986 the premium rate was 
decreased from 5 percent to 2.5 percent on the outstanding balance of loans. So as to 
encourage people to establish and expand businesses in the inner city areas, in January 1988 
the scheme introduced loans up to E15,000, which could be approved by the major 
participating lenders without referring them to the Department. In June of the same year, the 
maximum guarantee was increased to 85 percent for businesses based in, or wishing to be 
based in the inner city task force areas. To further encourage both the banks and a small firm, 
in April 1989 the value of the loan under the scheme was increased from E75,000 to 
fI 00ý000.0 ne year I ater, in A pril 1990, t he p remium rate decreased to2p ercent, a nd in 
1993 it was decreased again to I percent and decreased on the third time to be 0.5 percent for 
the loans under the scheme in the inner city. These were designed to encourage take-up of the 
scheme, which was fiagging. 
The 85 percent guarantee is available for loans up to f 250,000 to established 
business in inner city and for 2 years or more, but for other business still as before. In 1994 
the amount of loans, which did not need to be referred to the Department for a decision was 
increased to f 30,000. Finally, the premium rate was decreased to 1.5 percent for loans with 
variable interest rates, and 0.5 percent for loans with a fixed interest rate. 
Activities and Achievements 
The initial allocation of the scheme was E150 million; of which the government 
guaranteed 80 percent i e. f 120 million. As a result of its successful operation the allocation 
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was increased to E300 million in 1983. The scheme operates through the participating banks 
and other financial institutions, which numbered thirty in early 1983. These banks make a 
decision on the viability of projects, and final approval may then be given. Table 4.4 shows 
the volume of demand for the SFLGS guarantees in the first three years of its life (i e. 1981- 
84). There was a strong demand during this period, but varying across regions (see Table 
4.4). Asat3 I't March 1984,14,286 guaranteed loans h ad b een i ssued inr espect of f469 
million in bank lending. As shown in Table 4.4, the South East region has the greatest share 
of the loan guarantees, at around 38 percent, which is 5,365 guaranteed loans issued in 
respect of f 139 million of bank lending to this region. 
The distribution of loans by economic sector during the same period is shown in 
Table 4.5. This indicates that the manufacturing sector received the largest share, at around 
E6,250 million or 44 percent of total guarantees. The service sector was in the second place, 
with 39 percent, followed by the retail and construction sectors, at 15 and 2 percent 
respectively. Table 4.6 reports the activities of the small firms' loan guarantee scheme in six 
different phases from the initial start-up of the scheme until the year 2000. The average size 
of the SFLGS guaranteed loan has increased significantly in the last phase comparing to the 
previous two phases. This may be due to a decrease in the premium rate, which is 1.5 or 0.5, 
enabling the firms to implement larger projects. The average size of the loan that is 
guaranteed by the scheme is around E35,400. 
Finally, from its inception in June 1981 until the end of March 2000, the small firms' 
loan guarantee scheme has guaranteed accumulative total of 71,407 thousand loans with a 
value over F-2.5 billion. Table 4.7 illustrates their geographical distribution. It shows that 
London and the South East region took the largest share of total scheme actitivities, at around 
32 percent of the total loans. Northern Ireland has the lowest share of loans, receiving only 
around I percent. KPMG (1999) report that start-up firms have around 20 percent of the total 
guaranteed lending during the VI phase. Newly-established firms (0-2 years of age) have 9 
percent, and established firms (over 2 years) have 71 percent of the total guaranteed lending. 
Evaluation of SFLG 
The e valuation of aI oan guarantee sc herne i nvolves c hecking t hat t he s cherne h as 
achieved its objectives and deciding whether it is successful or not. This can lead to 
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adjustments in order to improve and develop the scheme, or it may be decided that it would 
be better to scrap it. This section will discuss the evaluation of the small firms' loan 
guarantee scheme in the United Kingdom. It will discuss three reports about the SFLGS, and 
will then discuss the main three evaluations of the scheme. 
In 1983, Rhodes reported on some early loan defaults and claims under the loan 
guarantee scheme. In his report, they studied the circumstances that gave rise to 48 of the 
first 50 claims made under the scheme. They began their study by reviewing bank files and 
distinguish a questionnaire to each loan default. The main conclusion of their report can be 
summarised by saying that the small businesses still suffered from limited understanding, and 
mistrust by their bankers. The level of failure rates in the early period of the scheme was one 
in every five loans. Regarding the effects of the scheme on the credit market, it was the first 
and only such source of finance, which meant that some borrowers and bankers were quick to 
accept it (Rhodes, 1983). 
Rhodes (I 984a) was hired by the government to study 150 businesses financed by the 
small business loan guarantee scheme. In all he visited 86 of 94 surviving businesses and 20 
of the 56 failed businesses, so this study considered both surviving and failed businesses. In 
the case of surviving businesses, it was followed by a visit to the businesses so as to discuss 
his conclusions. The main objective of this study were to: derive fresh and firmer evidence 
from a much wider, and therefore more valid sample, in order to achieve a more 'definitive' 
study in respect of 'additionality', banking practice, attitudes and trends; and to suggest ways 
in which the scheme might be improved and developed. 
The conclusions of this study were as follows. Firstly, they re-affirm the conclusions 
of his first report, which mentioned above. Secondly, he finds that the banks have a great 
deal to do in order to assist small businesses under the scheme umbrella and to give these 
firms more attention. Thirdly, the study explains that setting-up a business is somewhat 
nonconformist and small firms are not conformists generally. They need active assistance 
and they need discipline in their work, they need also to be assisted in understanding what 
help they require and what is available to these firms. Fourthly, he finds that the demand in 
the market for funds is unbalanced, and the supply inadequate. Finally, the survey shows that 
less than half of the scheme loans are truly 'additional', in the sense that the borrowers 
believe that they could not have raised the finance in any other way (Rhodes, 1984a). 
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In a separate study, Rhodes (1 984b) carries out a telephone survey of borrowers 
financed under the small businesses loan guarantee scheme. This was based on 100 
borrowers who obtained scheme loans during the first six months of 1983, and it was 
complementary to the previous survey for 1981 and 1982. The questionnaires were 
dispatched to the borrowers by the loan guarantee unit in the Department of Trade and 
Industry. The main finding of this study shows that around 46 percent of the total sample 
believe that the guaranteed loans the received was additional. And the scheme's biggest 
advantage from the borrowers' point of view is that personal guarantees are not required (for 
more details see Rhodes, 1984). 
In 1990 the National Economic Research Associates (NERA) prepared an evaluation 
of the loan guarantee scheme. This evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which LGS 
generated additional finance and economic activity for the small firms using the scheme. It 
also examined the economic principles, which supported the loan guarantee scheme, and its 
possible effect on the conduct of lenders. The study consisted of a sample of 125 firms who 
received loans under the SFLGS mainly between August and October 1986. This sample was 
divided into 100 surviving firms and 25 defaulting firms. It was selected at random from 260 
firms throughout the United Kingdom, which had loans under the guarantee scheme during 
this period. The survey approach for this study depended on separate interviews held with the 
proprietors of the firms and with the bank manager who advanced the LGS loan. The study 
also included a description of the main characteristics of the sample, compared with the 
underlying population in respect of the loan size, the location of the borrowers, the sector and 
the age of the firm. 
The study concentrated on examining the effect of the loan guarantee scheme on both 
finance and economic addionality. The conclusions of the evaluation were as follows: 
(i) The LGS generated both additional finance and economic activity within the 
firrns in the sample. Around 60 percent of firms could not have raised some or all 
of the finance they needed without the LGS. About half of finance raised (48 
percent) was judged to be additional. 
00 To reduce the costs, it is necessary to concentrate on reducing the administrative 
burden on firms, and attention should also be directed at reducing defaults. 
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To encourage people to use the scheme, an increase in the upper limit of the loan 
should be considered. 
In 1992 Planning, Economic and Development Consultants (pieda) prepared an 
evaluation of the loan guarantee scheme. This evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which 
loan guarantee scheme has generated additional economic activity and the extent to which it 
remedies market failure. The aim of this study is ahnost the same as the aim of NERA (1990) 
aim. The study methods consisted of a sample of 188 face-to-face survey of firms receiving 
guaranteed loans under Phase V of the scheme, a face-to-face or postal survey with the 
individual bank managers approving and administering the above loans, and a postal survey 
of companies receiving guaranteed loans under Phase IV (see Table 4.3). The main 
conclusion of the study is that the scheme exerts a positive effect on the level of lending to 
small firms. The study also leads to the conclusion that loan guarantee scheme is contributing 
to the alleviation of market failure in small business finance (Pieda, 1992). 
In 1999 KPMG carried out an evaluation of the small firms' loan guarantee scheme. 
The objectives of this evaluation were as follows: "to examine the degree to which the 
SFLGS has supported small firms with viable propositions in accessing finance, which under 
non-nal market criteria they would not have received. The objective of the evaluation is to test 
not only the validity of the rationale but also to measure the benefits that the programme has 
delivered, and establish whether the scheme respects value-for-money in public expenditure. 
The evaluation also considers whether the scheme addresses the problems of financing small 
firms, or if some other measures are needed" (KPMG, 1999, p. 9). 
The evaluation concentrated on the guaranteed loans provided under Phase VI, which 
started in July 1993 until the present (see Table 4.3). This evaluation used a number of 
methods, which can be summarised as follows. A review of the small firm financing 
literature and interviews with experts in the field; econometric analysis of the SFLGS 
database h eld byt he D TI a nd p roviding d ata on o ver 6 0,000 loans; I arge s cale t elephone 
surveys of 449 borrowers and 148 lenders' branches; and finally interviews with 50 
borrowers, 17 lenders' SFLGS units and 15 lender's bank branches. 
The c onclusions oft he study s how t hat a round 70 p ercent byn umber off irms, or 
around 60 percent of total value of loans, were additional finance. The economic impact was 
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as follows: 53 percent of firms used the guarantee to help finance new product services, 64 
percent to open new markets, 25 percent to develop a new process and 32 percent to 
introduce a se ctor leading-edge technology. A 11 of the above activities indicate that f irms 
could provide wider economic benefits. In the labour market, the impact of SFLGS is 
through the additional employment (created and safeguarded), which may be directly 
attributed to the scheme. On average, 2.4 jobs were created or safeguarded per firm in the 18 
months following the loan (KPMG, 1999). The net impact of the loan guarantee scheme on 
employment is summarised as in Table 4.8. 
KPMG (1999) summarized the main conclusions in the evaluation as follows: "The 
evaluation has provided evidence that the SFLGS has provided much needed financial 
support to a large number of small firms. The majority of this support has been found to be 
additional to that which would have been available from other sources, supporting the 
continuing rationale for the scheme. The economic benefits show that there is a strong case 
for SFLGS to continue to play a role, alongside other types of support, in meeting the 
particular need of SMEs which lack security but nevertheless have sound business 
propositions" (p. 145). However, as recommendations, it suggests improvements; including 
equalizing the guarantee level, trying to develop new lenders to operate the scheme, and 
developing new material to increase awareness of the SFLGS to the target group (KPMG, 
1999). 
The US Experience 
In the Small Business Act of July 30,1953, Congress created the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), whose function was to aid, counsel, assist and protect, in so far as 
possible, the interests of small business concerns. The SBA also came to make direct loans 
and loans in partnership with banks, and to provide loan guarantees to small firms. 
In 1968, section 7 (a) of the Small Business Act empowered the SBA to guarantee 
loans made by participating lending institutions to eligible small business. The main 
objective of this scheme was to help small businesses in the United States, so as to increase 
the financing level facing small businesses, provided by banks and financial institutions. 
However, this was made possible by reducing the risk of banks and financial institutions 
which made loans to small businesses easier (Levitsky and Prasad, 1989). Also according to 
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Ryan and Ludtke (1995), "The SBA programs are mainly guarantee programms. This means 
that the SBA enhances loans made by financial institutions by providing a guarantee that it 
will repurchase a previously agreed upon percent of the unpaid principal if the borrower 
defaults on the loan" (p. 1). 
According to the eligibility criteria a guarantee from the SBA is based on three 
measures: the size of the business, the nature of the business and the use of the fund. For the 
size oft he b usiness, t he s tandard s ize isb ased on e ither t he n umber ofe mployees ort he 
company's annual revenue. If the size standard is based on revenues, the average of the 
previous three years is used. In general, the size standards are: 
" Manufacturing - 500 or fewer employees 
" Retail - less than $5.0 million in annual sales. 
" Services - less than $ 5.0 million in annual sales. 
Wholesaling - 100 or fewer employees. 
" Special trade - less than $ 7.0 million in annual sales. 
" Building contractors - less than $ 17 million in annual sales. 
" Farming - less than $ 500,000 in annual sales. 
Once the size determination is made, the lender has to check if the business is eligible 
for SBA funding. Ineligible businesses tend to fall within one of the following areas: Non- 
profit organisations, including consumer cooperatives; gambling and illegal activities; 
speculative businesses that include dealing in commodity futures and real estate held for 
investment purposes; lending or investment concerns such as life insurance companies, 
investment companies, banks, finance companies and other businesses whose stock in trade 
is money; pyramid sales plans; applicants currently incarcerated and construction of any 
combined residential. The final of the three criteria is the use of fund. The SBA guarantees a 
loan if it used for one of the following purchases: raw materials or inventory; furniture or 
fixtures; machinery or equipment; land for construction; building construction; leasehold 
improvements; real-estate property; working capital needs and refinance of certain debt. 
The programme guarantees up to 90 percent of the loan amount, if the loan amount is 
over $ 155,000 with tenns greater that 10 years then the risk sharing will be 75 percent. But 
if the loan amount is over $ 155,000 with terms less than 10 years so it will be 85 percent, 
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and it will be 90 percent if the loan amount is $155,000 or less and for refinanced loans the 
risk sharing is 80 percent. 
The SBA offers guarantee fees depending on the size of the loan; Ryan and Ludtke 
(1995) say that "fees generally are one-quarter of I percent on short-term loans (12 months 
or less) and 2 percent on long-term loans (more than 12 months). On loans of $ 50,000 or 
less, the lender may retain one half of the guarantee fee or return it to the borrower. At the 
point of first disbursement of proceeds, the loan officer collects from the borrower the 
appropriate one-time guarantee fee of 2 percent of the amount of the guaranteed portion of 
the loan. The officer may not collect this guarantee fee from the borrower until the first 
disbursement is in the hands of the borrowers or until the disbursement has been sent to the 
designated recipient" (p. 42). These fees considered as the most straight forward way of 
protecting the SBA from the banks guaranteeing loans that would have received credit 
without SBA help. 
Regarding the evaluation of the SBA, there are two main articles which investigated 
this area; Rappaport and Wyatt (1993) and Haynes (1996). Rappaport and Wyatt (1993), 
aimed to provide an overview of the pool assembly process and the resultant securitisation of 
small business administration (SBA) loans. In summary its main conclusion was that the 
growth in the securitisation of SBA loans since 1985 indicates that access to this market 
serves both investors and lenders needs. This is due to the assumption that the customer has a 
high-income level. They also determined three advantages for the securitisation of SBA 
loans. Haynes (1996) reported that his article considered the financial capital market failure 
created by lenders' monopoly power in the financial capital market. The model in this study 
was derived to evaluate the lenders and borrowers attitudes in the financial capital market, 
and to compare the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without 
SBA loan guarantees. The main conclusions of this study were the "high-risk borrowers in 
high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving a SBA loan 
guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. So the SBA 
borrowers are higher risk borrowers than non-SBA borrowers, also he said that the SBA loan 
guarantee does mitigate the effect of financial market failure" (p. 460) 
According to the SBA evaluations, Pieda (1992) illustrate that in 1983 the US 
General Accounting office undertook a study to detennine the effects of the SBA loan 
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guarantee programme on the lending practices and financial institutions, and they found that 
the SBA guarantee increased the banks willingness to lend to new firms and fim-is with a 
lack of collateral or insufficient track record; and the SBA scheme is satisfying a significant 
portion of small firms long-term capital needs. Around 42 percent of fornis' loans over five 
years in maturity are SBA loans. A little formal evaluations of the credit guarantee 
programme have been done by the SBA itself. 
Only one major independent study by Rhyne in 1988, evaluates the SBA as a whole. 
According to SBA credit guarantee Rhyne analysis showed that default affects almost I in 4 
borrowers, almost ten times as often as comparable bank customers. The average long-run 
default is 23 percent. Rhyne also conducted a financial appraisal of the SBA loan programme 
and found that on average the estimated present value to the banks of the SBA portfolio was 
just below break-even level. She also found that the government subsidies to the programme 
amounting to 9 percent of the loan principale or II percent of SBA administrative expenses 
are included. Pieda (1992) reported that in two other studies the results showed there was 
significant growth performance on the firms' activities that received guaranteed loans by the 
SBA. 
4.4.2 The Impacts of Loan Guarantee Schemes 
It is not easy to evaluate the impact of a loan guarantee scheme. As Levitsky (1999) 
puts it: "The evaluation of the impact of [these] programmes is difficult and costly so that 
most conclusions are based on fragmented and anecdotal impressions. Some evidence is 
conflicting. There are evaluations that say that credit has little or no impact and fails to raise 
people out of the poverty in which they are trapped. Others have moved in the opposite 
direction - namely expanding from credit into non-credit supplementary activities justifying 
this by claiming that credit alone was insufficient to make significant impact on the incomes 
of the poorer beneficiaries" (p. 90). Green (2000) also reported that, despite the wide use of 
loan guarantee schemes (85 countries have a loan guarantee scheme), very little attempt has 
been made to evaluate the contribution of these. 
The importance of loan guarantee schemes was recognised in a speech by B. H. 
Brown, vice-president of Allied Lending Corporation. He stated that the loan guarantee 
scheme is an important source of long term capital for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
Review ofLiterature on Loan Guarantee Scheme 88 
and that these programmes reflect an excellent partnership between the public and private 
sectors (Riding, 1997). 
However, the main effects of the loan guarantee scheme, which are related, can be 
summarised as follows. These schemes have been helpful in providing loans to SMEs; 
creating additional lending to small and medium-sized enterprises; and creating confidence in 
small and medium-sized borrowers with high risk. These are because lenders can be sure that 
a large percentage of their money will be returned if some borrowers default, and these 
schemes also reduce the loss rate. This is defined as total claims for default paid out as a 
percentage of loans guaranteed (Levitsky and Parasad, 1989). The remainder of this section 
will give a brief account of the main empirical studies on loan guarantee schemes. 
The Cowling and Clay Study 
Cowling and Clay (1995) note that the UK Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) has 
undergone a series of adjustments in its operation and eligibility criteria since its inception in 
1981. The nature of this scheme and the changes made to it are described in section 4.4.2. 
The main objective of their paper is to identify the factors responsible for the changes in LGS 
take-up rates using time-series analysis. The model used in this study has its roots in basic 
utility theory, in as much as individual or groups of entrepreneurs take decisions based on a 
desire to maximize their utility. They assume that the entrepreneur will choose to start-up or 
continue in business if the utility derived from so doing exceeds the utility derived from other 
alternatives, which are waged employment or unemployment. The entrepreneurs are 
motivated by the financial returns from being in business. As such, entrepreneurs are 
assumed to earn a net income of Y per time period: 
(b Q (K*) 0,8) + (1 - b) Q (K, 0,8» 
Where b=I if firm/ entrepreneur is unconstrained in the capital market and b=0 if 
constrained. While K* is optimal capital and K sub-optimal. Here Q is real business revenue 
which is positively related to K, the amount of capital invested in the business and 0, which 
is the entrepreneur's ability to effectively manage the firm's resources, both financial and 
human capital. 6 is a demand parameter, and as such is also positively related to Q. 
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Estimating this relation using quarterly data over 1980s, they find that the most 
important factors in determining take-up rates are the scheme parameters itself These are the 
premium act which is significantly deterrent on take-up rates by raising the cost of borrowing 
to the firm, and increase in the proportion of the loan guaranteed by the government increase 
the take-up rates by effectively reducing the collateral constraint on small business. The 
evidence suggests that the government can directly influence take-up rates through its ability 
to adjust these two parameters. 
The Cowling SqLdy 
Cowling (1996) presents some preliminary tests of the sensitivity of take-up rates to 
changes in the two main scheme parameters, namely the guaranteed percentage and the 
premium paid to the government. This study outlines the rationale for the UK loan guarantee 
scheme, and presents some general statistics relating to the nature of the loans and the 
borrower type. He also presents evidence on failure of LGS borrowers. The modeling 
procedure adopted was to specify two Error Correction Models and estimate this using two- 
step OLS estimation. He focuses on the determinant of the equilibrium or long-run behaviour 
of LGS take-up and failure. The take-up equation is as follows: 
In LGS=Bo +B, In GUAR +B2 In PREM + B3 In RBASE + B4 In WAGE + B5 In R GDP 
where: LGS = nurnber of entrants on the scheme; GURA = proportion of the total loan 
amount guaranteed by the government to the lending bank; PREM = interest rate premium 
levied by the government on LGS firms on standard loans; RBASE = real interest rates 
deflated by real price index; WAGE = wages; and RGDP = Gross Domestic Product deflated 
by the real price index. The BO, BI, B2, B3, B4and B5 are the parameters to be estimated. 
The dynamic error-correction model is: 
A In LGS = BO + BECM, -, 
+ B2AInPREM+B 3AInGUR 
The ECM term gives the long-run relationship, while the A terms estimate the short- 
run coefficients. The model was estimated use aggregate quarterly data from 1982 - 92, so 
that there are only 40 observations. He also presented equivalent models for failure rates of 
LGS borrowers: 
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LnTYFR = Bo + B, InLGS + 
B2 In RBASE + B3 In INF + B4 InWAGE+B5 In RGDP + B6 In L OANSIZE 
AInTYFR=bo +b, ECM+b2AInTYFR+b3AInRGDP 
where: TYFR = 2- year failure rate of LGS entrants, measured from each quarter; 17VF = retail 
price index; and LOAN SIZE: The average size of loans issued measured quarterly in 
f"000's. 
The long-run relationships were tested using Augmented Dicky-Fuller tests to 
establish the order of integration. The conclusion from this was that all the variables can be 
considered. The main result of this study was that the take-up rates are particularly sensitive 
to changes in the guarantee percentage, the premium rate and to macroeconomic conditions, 
as measured by GDP changes. The results also suggest that failure can be significantly 
reduced by either reducing the guarantee or by imposing a very much higher premium. 
Furthermore, there is a strong and negative effect upon failure in times of macroeconomic 
expansion (Cowling, 1996). 
The Riding SLiLdy 
Riding (1997) reports an analysis of three issues pertaining to the provision of loan 
guarantees to small firms, as follows: An economic theory to examine the case for loan 
guarantee programme; a review of the Canadian Small Business Loan Act (SBLA) and 
design issues using agency theory; and the experience and lessons from loan guarantee 
schemes in other countries. 
The main point he discusses is the size of loan provided by banks in both the presence 
and absence of a loan guarantee. In this analysis, he adapts the approaches of de Meza and 
Webb (1987,1992) and Besanko, and Thakor (1987), who investigated the response of 
lenders to risk. His work is based on the following assumptions: A scale dimension is 
explicitly introduced by incorporating variables that reflect the size of loan, and fixed and 
variable dimensions of the lenders costs due to diligence and monitoring; a constraint that 
represents lenders upper limit on bad debt losses; and risk that is expressed as a probability of 
default, but does not differ across finns. 
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Riding (1997) finds, "The effect of the loan guarantee is two-fold. First, the guarantee 
reduces the lender's demand for collateral, making debt more generally accessible to firms, 
particularly small firms that lack the resources to pledge for security. Moreover, the lender 
assesses a lower rate of interest, recognizing that the business owner's return on investment 
is reduced by the amount of the fees. As a result, higher fees not only discourage owners 
from i nvesting, t hey r educe t he p rofits tot he lenders, d iscouraging t heir i nvolvernent" (p. 
648). 
The Camion and Cardone Stud 
In their study about the valuation and cost of programmes, Carnion and Cardone 
(1999) discuss the literature on imperfect information and the extent to which a loan 
guarantee can be a solution to the problem of asymmetric information. They focus on the 
main characteristics of loan guarantee programmes in European countries, especially in 
Spain. Their study assesses the effectiveness of the loan guarantee scheme in Spain, on which 
they argue there is no comprehensive evaluation of loan guarantee. They state three 
important questions that should be asked about loan guarantee schemes in assessing their 
effectiveness and efficiency in assisting SMEs. These questions are as follows: 
" Do the programmes significantly alter the firms' behaviour in the desired 
directions? 
" Are the benefits of these programmes greater than their costs? 
" Could the resources committed to loan guarantee schemes be used more 
effectively9 
According to the impact of credit guarantees they find that it is unclear and there is 
plenty of controversy by both theorists and practitioners. Since most programmes are 
subsidised, it is logical to expect that a comprehensive credit guarantee programme will be 
affected by severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Many skeptics conclude that 
guarantees represent subsidised credit loans dressed in new clothes. The main contributions 
of Carnion and Cardone (1999) are as follows. First, it contributes to the study of the cost- 
benefit side of government - sponsored loan programmes, which most of the existing 
literature has defined in terms of implicit subsidies rather than direct benefits. Second, it 
introduces a method for recognising the cost and calculating the values resulting from the 
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operating expenses of loan guarantees and the contribution of these for the success of the 
bank's loans. This methodological contribution provides opportunities for enriching the cost 
benefit-oriented studies on loan guarantee programmes. Finally, they suggest that other 
researchers should study other important parts of LGS, such as 'additionality' of the 
guarantees. 
The Kanbur et al. Stud 
Kanbur et al. (1994) focus on the utilisation of government-backed loan schemes for 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Malaysia. They argue that "the attempts to measure 
the effectiveness of these schemes have addressed such issues as whether or not they provide 
additional finance and their cost to the public purse" (p. 161). They base their study on the 
reports for the United Kingdom by Robson Rhodes (1984), NERA (1990) and Pieda (1992). 
The objectives of their study are as follows: 
Provide a brief overview of the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) of Malaysia. 
Identify a range of demand and supply factors affecting the utilisation of CGC's 
facilities. 
Develop a model by solving a reduce-form equation that indicates an equilibrium 
level of utilization of loan guarantees, which creates a balance between demand and 
supply factors. 
To realize their objectives, they isolated the factors determine the demand and supply 
of loan guarantees. Their hypothesis is that utilisation of the CGC's scheme has been 
determined by a number of factors. These factors, which are given below, include both 
demand (XI andX2) and Supply (X 15 X3, and X4). 
X, = cost of CGC compared to conventional bank loans. 
X2= availability of conventional bank credit. 
X3= default rate on CGC loans. 
X4 = claims paid. 
Letting: Y, = total utilisation of the CGC facilities (Demand side). 
Y2= total utilisation of the CGC facilities (Supply side). 
Then: Y1 =A (XP X2) 
Y2 = f2 
(XI 
ý 
X3 
ý 
XJ (2) 
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This means that the reduced-form estimating equation can be written in linear form as 
follows: 
Y=b +bX +bX +bX +bX +Ut (3) t01 It 2 21 3 3t 4 41 
Where bo, b I, b2, b3 and b4are parameters to be estimated, Ut is the error term which 
satisfies the standard assumption of the linear regression model, and t is time period. The 
equation was estimated using data for just 10 years (1984 to 1993), but on both statistical and 
economic criteria the results were poor. An alternative equation using the same explanatory 
variables was specified in first difference form. Yt (CHYt) was related to XI, change inX2 
(CHX2), changeinX3 (CHX3), and X4. Because X, and X4did not changed during the study 
period. Algebraically, the linear model is expressed as follows: 
CHY, =a+b, Xl+bCH, +b +b (4) 2 
X2 
3 
CHX3 J4 + ul 
Estimating model using ordinary least squares (OLS) with the same data gives: 
CIA t=1.92 - 0.93 X1 - 2.66 CHX2- 0.95 CHX3- 4.28 X4 (5) 
(3.16) (3.58) (2.17) (2.91) (2.33) 
R2= 0.85ý D. W = 2.34, n= 10 observation, t ratios in brackets. 
The paper highlights the importance of allowing the banks to earn a reasonable return 
on CGC loans, to encourage utilisation of the CGC's facilities. There has also a generally 
negative relationship between the availability of conventional bank credit and CGC loans, the 
latter should ideally be restricted to firms that cannot obtain private - sector funding. The 
importance of prompt and efficient settlement of default claims is also highlighted in the 
model. However, the results of the paper are tentative due to the limited available data. In the 
next section the loan guarantee schemes in developed countries are considered. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we found that the idea behind the loan guarantee schemes, is 
representative in asymmetric information in the credit market, which leads to credit rationing 
from commercial banks, because they cannot distinguish between good and bad borrowers 
(small and medium-sized enterprises especially). In this case banks use the rate of interest or 
collateral to protect their rights in case of borrowers default. But in other cases if the 
borrower has a good project and not enough or any collateral, then loan guarantee schemes 
appear to help SMEs to get the funds that they need and to help commercial banks to provide 
loans to these firms. 
The main objectives of the loan guarantee scheme all over the world is to help the 
small a nd m edium-sized f irms toa pply for t he f und t hey n eed from f inancial i nstitutions. 
Whilst the cost of these schemes represent in the cost of setting-up the organizations, cost of 
funding the subsidies and the additional transactions costs. But the benefits of the loan 
guarantee schemes can be found encouraging the lenders to change their policies and provide 
loans to the targeted groups. 
Due to the lack of evaluation studies for the loan guarantee scheme over the world, 
we examined the UK and the USA experiences in this field to know the main effects of the 
loan guarantee scheme in these countries. We found that the SFLGS in UK was generated 
both additional finance and economic activities within the firms in the sample, the scheme 
has provided much needed financial support to a large number of small firms. According the 
SBA loan guarantee, it increased the banks willingness to lend to new firms and there was a 
significant growth in performance for firms receiving the guaranteed loans by SBA. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Loan guarantee Schemes in Developing Countries 
(India, Philippines, Ghana and Haiti) 
India Philippines Ghana Haiti 
Eligibility Credit for both investment and SMIs in manufacturing and All small enterprises in SMEs, which are 51 % 
working capital (goods, services) services sectors with assets different sectors and capital owned and control by 
for small industries. between P 250,000 but not not exceeding cedi Haitian citizens. 
exceed P 2.5m for small firms. 100,000 
P 2.5 - 10 m for medium firms. 
Risk sharing 60% of the amount in default for 60% for small loans. 66 % of the total amount up 75% for firms up to 
extended, up to Rs 0.2 m. 40% for medium loans. to G500,000.60 % for 
050,000. 
Guarantee 0.5% per annum on aggregate 2% of guaranteed p ercentage of I% per annum calculated on 
fees credit up to Rs 250,000. the loan outstanding. maximum of the guaranteed. 
0.75% per annum for credit above 
Rs 250,000 (times yearly) 
Claims 
procedure 
Funding of The paid up capital is Rs 500m 
scheme (US$ 41.7 m) 
firms from G500,000- 
1.25m 
2% per annum on the 
guaranteed portion of 
outstanding loan. 
3-4 months to settle claims. Bank submits the claim Within 30 days of 
without any legal receiving the claim. 
proceeding. 
0 500,000 by that bank ob 
Ghana. 
Funding from the 
government resources, 
national and 
international a 
agencies. 
Source: Levitsky. J and Prasad. R, (1989), Credit Guarantee Scheme for Small and Medium Enterprises, World Bank, 
Washington. 
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Table 4.3: Arrangements/ Adjustments in SFLGS 
Phase Duration Guarantee percent Premium Rate Loan up to f 
1 6/81 to 5/84 80 3 75,000 
11 6/84 to 12/84 70 5 75,000 
111 1/85 to 3/86 70 5 75,000 
IV 4/86 to 3/89 70 or 85 2.5 75,000 or 15,000 
v 4/89 to 6/93 70 or 85 2.5 or 1 100,000 
vi 7/93 to present 70 or 85 1.5 or 0.5 100,000 or 250,000 
& 30,000 
Notes: 
1. The 85 percent guarantee in phase IV is available for loans on, or wishing to be based in inner 
city. 
2. The value of loan up to f 15,000 in phase IV is the loans which the participating lenders to 
approve loan applicants without referring to the department. 
3. The I percent premium rate in phase V available for loans on, or wishing to be based in inner city. 
4. The 0.5 percent premium rate in phase VI available for loans on, or wishing to be based in inner 
city, and for loans have fixed interest rate, which 1.5 percent is premium for loans have available 
interest rate. 
5. The value of loan up to f 30,000 in phase VI looks like f 15,000 in phase IV, and f 250,000 for 
loans to inner city. 
Source: KPMG, An Evaluation of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme, London, 1999. 
Table 4.4: Guarantees Issued at 31't March 1984 by Region 
The value in million f 
Area 1/7/81-31/3/82 
Number Value 
1/4/82-31/3/83 
Number Value 
1/4/83-31/3/84 
Number Value 
Total 
Number Value 
Scotland 211 6.0 327 9.1 438 13.7 976 28.8 
Wales 185 5.6 325 9.5 162 5.3 672 20.4 
North Eastern 106 3.2 269 8.6 244 6.9 619 18.7 
Yorkshire & Humberside 255 8.0 451 12.4 431 12.0 1,137 32.4 
East midlands 231 7.9 385 13.2 299 9.3 915 30.4 
South Eastern 1,268 46.1 2,245 81.6 1,852 65.5 5,365 139.2 
South West 306 10.5 589 18.4 399 11.8 1,294 40.7 
West Midlands 348 11.6 513 16.9 381 11.0 1,242 39.5 
North West 431 14.4 887 27.0 596 17.6 1,914 59.0 
Northern Ireland 10 .4 54 2.2 88 3.4 152 
6.0 
Total 3,351 113.7 6,045 198.9 4,890 156.5 14,286 469.1 
Source: Industrial Development Act, Annual report, various issues, London. 
Table 4.5: Guarantees Issued at 31" March 1984 by Sector 
The value in million f 
Sector 1/7/81-31/3/82 1/4/82- 31/3/83 1/4/83-31/3/84 Total 
Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value 
Manufacturing 1,572 59.6 2,610 97.3 2,068 73.3 6,250 230.2 
Construction 58 2.0 119 3.6 126 4.2 303 9.8 
Retail 471 12.2 647 23.9 716 17.8 2,134 53.9 
Other Services 1,250 39.9 2,369 74.1 1,980 61.2 5,599 175.2 
Total 3,351 113.7 6,045 198.9 4,890 156.5 14,286 469.1 
Source: Industrial Development Act, Annual report, various issues, London 
Review ofLiterature on Loan Guarantee Scheme 98 
Table 4.6: Guarantees Issues during the 6 phases of Arrangements in SFLGS 
Phase No. of Loans Value of loans (million pounds) Average size of loans, 000 pounds 
1 14,286 469.1 32.8 
11 1,117 37.0 33.1 
111 542 17.8 32.7 
IV 4,567 150.96 33.0 
V 11,866 305.88 25.8 
VI 39.029 1.544.542 39.6 
Total 71,407 2,525.288 35.4 
Source: Industrial Development Act, Annual report, various issues, London. 
Note: The Phases are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.7: Guarantees issued from 1/7/81 - 31/3/2000, Geographical Distribution 
Region Number Value (frn) 
Scotland 4,912 222,657 
Wales 3,589 113,686 
North East 3,093 95,990 
Yorkshire & Humberside 5,430 179,201 
East Midland & East 8,630 303,259 
London & South East 22,696 843,753 
South West 9,130 294,930 
West Midlands 6,218 203,805 
North West 7,054 234,292 
Northern Ireland 675 33,715 
Total 71,407 2525,288 
Source: Industrial Development Act, Annual report, 1999/2000, London 
Table 4.8: SFLGS Employment Impact in 18-month following loan 
Impact tage Employment 
Total employment in all SFLGS assisted firms 144,400 
Total employment all Surviving SFLGS assisted firms (created and safeguarded) 132,300 
Total employment in all surviving finance additional SFLGS firms (created and 39,700 
safeguarded) 
Total employment in all surviving finance additional SFLGS assisted firms less allowance 5,400 to 9,500 
for national displacement 
Net cost-per-job of all surviving finance additional SFLGS assisted firms after allowance ; E9,500 to f 16,600 
for national displacement 
Source: KPMG, An Evaluation of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme, London, 1999. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE LOAN GUARANTEE SCHEME IN JORDAN 
5.1 Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the commercial banks are extremely reluctant to 
provide loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, due to the high levels of uncertainty 
and high rates of mortality of these firms. Further, there has been an absence of public and 
private institutions to offer insurance against these risks, so that the financial institutions have 
been extremely conservative and risk averse in their lending to small and medium-sized 
businesses. These firms are very important to the Jordanian economy, and the establishment 
of the Loan Guarantee Scheme is an attempt to overcome these problems. The purpose of the 
scheme is to reduce the risk of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby 
encouraging the commercial banks to lend to these firms. 
The purpose on this chapter is to examine the operation on the Loan Guarantee 
Scheme in Jordan. This includes both the early Loan Guarantee Scheme, which started in 
1988 (and is now defunct), and the more recent Loan Guarantee Scheme that was established 
in 1994, and which forms the basis for study in this thesis. Both schemes seeked to encourage 
lending to small firms. The chapter describes the establishment of these schemes, their 
objectives and their operation. It also describes the problems that have arisen in attempting to 
guarantee the risk of banks against loan defaults by firms. 
5.2 The Early Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Preparation for a loan guarantee scheme started in the mid 1980s. This was the Loan 
Guarantee for Enterprise Development Project (LGP). It was established in August 1988 
through the signing of an Agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, acting 
through the Ministry of Planning, and United States of America, acting through the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to the Agreement, 
USAID would provide a grant, starting at US$ 2.5 million and reaching a total of US$ 10 
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million over a period of four years. The Industrial Development Bank (IDB), which was set 
up in 1965 by the government to provide finance for firms in the mining and manufacturing 
sector, was designated as the executing agency for the loan guarantee project (JLGC, 1994). 
The goals behind the establishment of the Loan Guarantee Project, as stated in 
USAID (1988), were as follows. Firstly, to increase the levels of employment and income of 
small enterprises in Jordan. Secondly, to increase the ability of the local entrepreneurs to 
establish and expand enterprises. Thirdly, to improve the efficiency of enterprises. Fourthly, 
encourage firms to produce and sell goods and services in foreign markets, thereby earning 
foreign exchange to help case foreign exchange constraints. Finally, the purpose was to 
increase the capacity and the confidence of commercial banks and other financial institutions 
to make loans to small businesses in a self-sustaining and profitable manner. This could be 
through intensive training for loan officers at the participating institutions, in cash-flow 
analysis and other small business lending techniques. 
In practice, the LGP looked to develop small enterprises in general, and in particular 
to develop small enterprises owned by females and those operating outside the Amman 
Greater Municipality. This would be accomplished through several methods, including the 
encouragement of licensed banks to finance such projects by providing loan guarantees, and 
training bank loan officers in credit management and small project evaluation. While USAID 
initially agreed US$ 10 million over 4 years, in 1989 this was changed to US$ 7 million. Of 
this, US$ 1.5 million was for technical assistance, training and research, and the remaining 
US$ 5.5 million for loan guarantees to be managed by the Industrial Development Bank. 
Unfortunately, only a small percentage of the US$ 1.5 million grant was taken up for training 
and research, so much of it was returned to USAID. 
5. Zl The Operation of the LGP 
The A greement b etween t he Hashemite Kingdom ofJ ordan a nd U SAID s tipulated 
that the loans provided by the banks and guaranteed by the LGP should be used by small 
enterprises in the private sector. In addition, it was agreed that the amount of loan for any one 
firm should not more than JD 20,000 and on short-term conditions. Each bank that was 
interested in participating in the LGP had to sign a separate agreement concerning the way in 
which it operated. The terms included the guarantee ceiling, the guarantee ratio and the 
guarantee fees that would be charged to the bank (these concepts are considered more fully 
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below). The agreement required the participating banks to pay 0.5 percent as commission on 
any loan guarantee that was utilised as part of the ceiling, and to pay I percent for any 
unutilised loans up to the total of the ceiling. The guaranteed ratio was 75 percent of the loan 
value if the loan was less than JD 10,000, or if the borrower was female. In other cases the 
guaranteed ratio was a less generous 50 percent. 
The LGP started in October 1990, and during the period up to September 1993 the 
number of guaranteed loans (as in Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation files) reached 326, to 
a total value of around JD 3.4 million. The scheme included 10 participating banks, and the 
distribution of the guaranteed loans between the participating banks is shown in Table 5.1. 
We can see from the table that the Housing Bank (which is the most popular bank in Jordan 
with 110 branches) provided 36 percent of total loans that were guaranteed by the LGP. The 
Industrial Development Bank (IDB), that was designated as the executing agency of the LGP 
provided 20 percent of the total loans, and the rest were distributed between the other eight 
banks (see Table 5.1). 
Distribution of the guaranteed loans by gender shows that 91 percent of borrowers 
were males and only 9 percent were females. The geographical distribution of the loans 
shows that the Greater Amman Municipality got 48 percent of the loans, while the rest of the 
country got the other 52 percent. These are despite the purpose of the LGP to concentrate on 
small enterprises either owned by females or operating outside of Amman. Table 5.2 shows 
the distribution of guaranteed loans by economic sector. It indicates that around 45 percent of 
the total guaranteed loans were granted to the manufacturing sector, 31 percent to the service 
sector, followed by 23 and I percent respectively to the agriculture and retail sectors. This 
distribution reflects the nature of the IDB, which had traditionally concentrated on providing 
loans to the manufacturing sector. 
5.22 Problems of the LGP 
Unfortunately, t he p erformance oft he LGP w as b elow e xpectation in t en-ns oft he 
number and the value of guaranteed loans. Out of 1,650 loans expected under the Agreement 
between Jordan and USAID, only 326 loans were guaranteed by the end of the fourth year. 
This is only around 20 percent of the target. It was the first time that loan guarantees had 
been used in Jordan, and the scheme also had a number of problems and difficulties. These 
are given in Salah (1998) as follows: 
Loan Guarantee Scheme in Jordan 102 
(i) The LGP did not reach its goals in terms of the number and value of 
guaranteed loans. This was related to management problems at the IDB, 
which did not give priority to the LGP scheme. 
(ii) The banks were not able to tap the entire guarantee ceiling that was dedicated 
for them, related to the weakness of the marketing strategy for the guarantees. 
(iii) The LGP lending did not fulfil the Agreement signed between Jordan and 
USAID. This is clear from the geographical and gender analysis for the 
guaranteed loans mentioned above. 
The commercial banks insisted on real-estate collateral in addition to the LGP 
guarantee, so that in effect there was no difference between the loans 
guaranteed by the LGP and other loans. 
(V) The economic conditions during the life of the LGP were poor, including the 
Second Gulf War and the financial crisis in Jordan in 1988/89. 
5.3 The Loan Guarantee Scheme 
In order to eliminate the difficulties that faced the LGP and to expand the reach of the 
guarantees to all SMEs (instead of just small firms), the Council of Ministers of the Jordanian 
Government decided the following at its meeting of 14 th August 1993: 
To establish a public shareholding company with capital of JD 7 million to 
guarantee loans to small and medium-size enterprises. The share capital would 
be provided by the Central Bank of Jordan, the financial institutions, 
insurance companies, the Amman Chamber of Industry and the Amman 
Chamber of Commerce, as well as some other institutions. 
(ii) The contribution of JD 3 million from the Central Bank of Jordan would be 
paid for from a grant originally provided to the government by USAID. 
Transfer all of the LGP accounts and assets to the Central Bank of Jordan in 
preparation for the establishment of the new company to guarantee the loans. 
This would be known as the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation. 
The main purpose of the new Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) was to encourage the 
commercial banks to provide loans to both small and medium-sized enterprises, especially 
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those firms suffering from a lack of collateral. The Loan Guarantee Scheme had both 
economic and social aims, as set out in JLGC (1994) and Salah (1998) as follows: 
G) To encourage the entrepreneur to invest in projects with sound cash flows and 
economic viability. 
(ii) Increase total factor productivity, by establishing new small and medium- 
sized enterprises. 
(iii) Reduce imports and help the country to save its foreign reserves. 
(iv) Encourage firms to increase their production and open-up new markets. 
(v) Reduce unemployment, especially as SMEs tend to be more labour intensive. 
(vi) Encourage the commercial banks to extend loans to projects in the less 
developed regions of Jordan. 
(vii) Encourage the banks to extend loans to the firms that are owned or managed 
by females, so as to increase the female participation rate. 
5.3.1 The JLGC 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC) was established in April 1994 to 
administer the new Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS). It is a limited public shareholding 
company with capital of JD 7 million, increased to JD 10 million in 1995 (approximately 
US$ 14 million). T here are 23 founders oft he JL GC, which i nclude t he C entral B ank of 
Jordan, representing the Jordanian Government (with share of JD 4.8 million granted by 
USAID), three other government institutions, 15 commercial banks, two insurance 
companies, the Chamber of Commerce and the Jordan Mortgage Refinance Company. Table 
5.3 lists all JLGC shareholders and their respective holdings as at the end of 2000. 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation was the first venture of its kind in Jordan to 
guarantee b ank I oans to f irms b ased onac ash-flow a ssessment r ather t han t he t raditional 
collateral. Since its inception, JLGC seeks to cover the risk associated with lending by the 
commercial banks to small and medium-sized firms in Jordan, whether these are in 
manufacturing, agriculture, retail, services or related to handcrafts or professional activities. 
The objectives of the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation are as follows (JLGC, 1994): 
Provision of guarantees under the LGS necessary to fully or partially cover 
loans of different types and terms granted by banks and financial institutions 
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for small and medium-sized enterprises. Loans can be for the purpose of start- 
up, expansion and for raising the productive and marketing capacity of firms, 
with the aim of creating job opportunities and saving on foreign reserves. 
Provision of export credit guarantees for pre-shipment and post-shipment, and 
the provision of guarantees to cover the export risks of any economic sector. 
Undertaking re-guarantees (or reinsurance) to cover all or any of the risks 
associated with the guaranteed loans provided by the Corporation. 
(iv) Conducting economic feasibility studies and project evaluations, as well as 
reviews of its operations and policy amendment in the light line of issues 
affecting the economic developments of Jordan. 
(v) Development, and implementation of innovative and/or traditional methods of 
production, as well as offering training on their utilisation in all related 
aspects. 
The most important objective of the JLGC is to overcome difficulties encountered by 
owners of potentially productive projects that are unable to provide adequate conventional 
collateral to get the required financing from commercial banks. The Corporation offers 
guarantees to financial institutions participating in the Loan Guarantee Scheme to encourage 
them to extend the required credit to projects, as long as the individual loan guaranteed by 
the Corporation does not exceed JD 100,000 and the number of workers in the firm does not 
exceed 50 employees. The aim is to encourage new projects, which will create new job 
opportunities, reinforce the productive base of the national economy, and provide potential 
for earning and saving on foreign currency. 
5.3.2 The Amman Agreement 
The procedure by which the Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) operates was set out in 
the Amman Agreement, which was signed between the JLGC and the participating banks. 
This Agreement sets out the duties of the parties (ie. the JLGC and banks), as well as 
determining the guarantee fees, the guarantee ceilings and the procedure for handling claims 
under the guarantee scheme. This section describes each of these features of the Amman 
Agreement, as follows (JLGC, 1994). 
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JLGC Duties: The main duties of the JLGC are to determine a specific ceiling for 
each bank in respect of the loans that are covered by the guarantee scheme. The ceiling 
includes the total guaranteed amount of loans granted to SMEs by the commercial banks. In 
respect of loan defaults the JLGC must pay the amount of the guarantee to the bank within a 
maximum of three months from the date that a bank requests payment. The JLGC must 
ensure that the banks provide the necessary documents to the JLGC and that the remedial 
procedures are in line with what is stated in the Agreement. The JLGC must also offer the 
necessary training free-of-charge for the credit officers involved in the scheme and working 
in the commercial banks. 
Duties of the Banks: The main duties of the banks are as follows: 
(i) Receive loan applications, evaluate them and adhere to the generally-accepted 
banking rules when advancing loans. This includes those set out in the 
Amman Agreement. It is necessary for the banks to take into consideration the 
reputation and character of the borrower, and any other factors that may affect 
decision making with regard to approving the credit. 
The banks must offer help to prospective borrowers through evaluating their 
proj ects, a nd h elp p repare t he n ecessary d ata for t heir a pplications, s uch as 
projections of project cash flows. 
Take all necessary measures that guarantee loan repayment, such as life 
insurance on the borrower or insurance on the project, except if the two parties 
agree on alternative arrangements. 
(iv) Gather information from the JLGC on the borrower before moving ahead with 
the implementation procedures, by filling-out an inquiry application form 
(Form 101, see Appendix 5.1). 
(v) Provide the JLGC with notification of the approval of a loan through filling- 
out a summary of the loan granted by the bank notification of approval form 
(Form 102, see Appendix 5.2). This gives a summary of the loan offered by 
the bank, and has to be completed within seven days from the date the bank 
approves the loan. 
(vi) Maintain a separate . file for each borrower, and undertake follow-up 
procedures, whether office or field-related, through site visits to firms to 
ascertain that the funds have been used for the purpose for which they were 
advanced. 
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(vii) Provision of periodic quarterly reports on the guaranteed loans (Fonn 103, see 
Appendix 5.3), giving all quarterly lending activities by the bank. In addition, 
a monthly report must be lodged (Form 104, see Appendix 5.4), which sets 
out all due instalments that are unpaid. 
(viii) The bank is committed to provide any other reports that are requested by the 
JLGC on the loans covered by the scheme. It also needs to choose qualified 
employees, who are responsible for the management of the guaranteed loans. 
The Guarantee Fees: The Amman Agreement detenrnines that each commercial bank 
shall pay to the JLGC an annual fee of 1.5 percent of total guarantee ceiling allocated to that 
bank. Each bank must settle the guarantee fee payment quarterly. If the bank fails to make 
payment covering the guarantee fees for a period of one month from their due date, the 
Corporation shall have the right to suspend the validity of the agreement for a period of two 
months. If the commercial banks do not pay the fees, the JLGC has the right to cancel the 
agreement with the bank. When the bank wishes to conclude a new guarantee agreement with 
the JLGC, or if it wants to reactivate the previous agreement that has been cancelled, it must 
repay the guarantee fees due thereon. In addition, it must pay a penalty equal to I percent of 
the t otal d ue f ees, p lus interest. T he r ate ofi nterest isd etermined ina ccordance with t he 
prevailing interest rate on credit facilities. 
The Guarantee Ceilin : According to the Amman Agreement, the JLGC has the right 
to cancel the unutilised portion of the guarantee ceiling at any time without giving the 
reasons for such cancellation. In this case the utilised portion of the ceiling shall remain 
covered by the terms of the Amman Agreement. Also, the bank has the right to request the 
reduction of the ceiling which it has been allocated. Any amendment is enforced as at the 
beginning of the next calendar quarter. The bank can also increase the ceiling of the 
guarantees at any time through consultation between the two parties, and such an increase 
shall be enforced directly. The JLGC shall have the right to refrain from guaranteeing any 
new loans should the economic or financial situation of the JLGC require such a measure. 
Claims under the Guarantee and Collection: The Agreement designates that any loan 
is considered 'non-performing' or 'a default' if the borrower fails to pay the full due amount 
of a loan instalment for a period of 180 consecutive days. In such an event, a claim may be 
subrnitted by the bank to the JLGC, with accompanying documents. These include 
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photocopies of the loan contract between the bank and the borrower, and all statements and 
documents that reflect the efforts exerted for the collection of the defaulted loan instalment. 
Forms must also be completed (Forms 105 and 105/A, see Appendix 5.5 and 5.6). On 
satisfactory completion of these, the JLGC reimburses the bank for the guaranteed amount, 
which the bank then credits to a separate account "Security against credit facilities". This 
amount cannot be used to offset any portion of the corresponding non-performing loans, 
except after exhaustion of all collection efforts. At the same time, banks must undertake all 
legal and judicial measures. After a non-performing period of one year, the JLGC has the 
right severally or jointly with the bank to carry out the necessary measures to collect the non- 
performing debts. In this case, the bank shall deliver all subsequent documents relating to the 
said debts to the JLGC. 
Other Matters: The Amman Agreement includes some general issues, such as the 
JLGC's right to evaluate and follow-up on the loans provided by the bank and make 
necessary recommendations and remarks in that regard. The JLGC also has the right to reject 
any potential guarantee in the line with its policy, and it has the right to request additional 
information or documents about the borrower from the commercial bank. 
5.3.3 The Operation of the JLGC 
The purpose of this section is to explain how the LGS operates in practice. The 
standards which the commercial banks should apply are set out in Amman Agreement, and 
from time to time we refer to these. The Agreement determines the standards and measures 
necessary to organise the lending and guarantee operation. These standards are definitional 
and quite technical in nature, but they can considered as follows: 
Qualifying Borrower: Any natural or corporate individual operating in Jordan and in private 
enterprise. 
Qualifying Loans for Guarantee: The Loan Guarantee Scheme will guarantee the risk of 
loans advanced to small and medium-sized firms in manufacturing, agriculture, 
services and retail, including professional activities such as doctors, lawyers, 
engineers and consultants. Thenumberof employees mustnotexceed 50, andthe 
maximum limit for the loan granted by banks is JD 100,000. 
Non-Qualifying Loans: Loans granted to importers, profit-sharing trade operations or 
consumer purchase and sale transactions (known as Murabaha). Guarantees also do 
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not cover loans granted to existing credit portfolios of the financial institutions or for 
the renewal or extension. The JLGC does not cover I oans whose terms are not in 
conformity with the generally accepted rules for lending. 
Guarantee Ratio: The scheme guarantees the risks of loans in accordance with the following 
coverage ratios: 
9 75 percent of the outstanding balance of the loan plus the accrued interest that 
up to a maximum amount of JD 40,000. 
50 percent of the outstanding balance of the loan plus the accrued interest for 
loans in the range JD 40,000 to JD 100,000. 
Financial Analysis: The bank must conduct a financial analysis, including the project cash 
flow and must keep this in the borrower's file. This file, as far as possible, should 
include the budget and the profit and loss statement for the applicant. The bank must 
also analyse these statements with the aim of exploring the sources for loan 
repayment. In 1997, a Counselling Services Unit was set up as a part of JLGC to help 
small and medium-sized firms define project feasibility and cash-flow adequacy. The 
work of the Unit has resulted in enhanced co-operation with the banks. 
Loan Term, Usage, Method of Repayment, Interest Rate and Rescheduling: Loans may be of 
a short or medium term, provided the repayment period of the loan does not exceed 
six years, inclusive of a maximum grace period of one year. The grace period (ie. the 
period in which no repayment is necessary) is determined in accordance with the 
following: if the term of the loan is one year or less the grace period is three months; 
if the term of the loan is one to three years the grace period is six months; and if the 
term of the loan exceeds three years the grace period is one year. The loan can be 
used for financing start-up projects, working capital or for the purchase of fixed 
assets. Overdrafts are not considered suitable for guarantee. Guaranteed loans must be 
repaid by monthly or quarterly instalments that may be determined in accordance 
with the cash flow analysis and future projections. The interest rate is equal the rate 
set by the commercial banks. The banks are prohibited from collecting loan interest 
upfront. For rescheduling, a bank must obtain the approval of the JLGC prior to the 
rescheduling and/or extending the maturity date of any guaranteed loan. 
Claims Duefor Repayment and Repayment Procedures: The outstanding balance of the loan 
shall be considered as due for repayment under the guarantee terms after a lapse of 
180 days from the date of the last instalment that the borrower has paid. Steps to be 
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implemented for the collection and repayment of the due and unpaid amounts of any 
loan include the following: visits paid to the work site of the borrower; study of his 
financial position; production of evidence of measures required for the collection of 
funds have already been taken (whether through sending of letters of claims and 
notices to guarantors); and any other legal steps that may be necessitated by common 
judgement to collect the due and unpaid loans. The documents that are to be 
submitted with any claim, as mentioned in the previous section. 
5.4 Incentives to Participate in the LGS Agreement 
The reluctance of the commercial banks to provide loans to small and medium-sized 
enterprises was the main reason for the establishing of the Loan Guarantee Scheme in Jordan. 
Hence, the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation and Central Bank of Jordan have to give 
some incentives to the commercial banks to encourage them to provide more loans to small 
and medium-sized firms. This is in addition to the guarantee itself, for which the banks must 
pay a fee. The incentives provided by the JLGC and the Central Bank of Jordan can be 
considered here in tem. Those provided by the JLGC are as follows: 
Provision of liquidity to banks. In case of loan default the Corporation settles 
the guarantee amount within three months of the claim. This enables banks to 
reinvest these amounts in their credit activities. 
Encourage the banks to move away from the overdraft loans in their credit 
practice, which is a move consistent with the direction of monetary policy. 
(iii) Induce banks to adopt new credit programmes that were not previously used, 
such as housing loans and loans for taxi cars, which are covered by the 
Corporation's guarantees. 
(iv) Motivate banks to provide medium-terrn loans where the Corporation 
guarantees loans for six years, including a one-year grace period. 
(v) Provision of necessary training to the banks' credit officers on procedures and 
the management of loan. 
(vi) Expansion of the client base with whom the commercial banks conventially 
deal, and in particular small and medium-sized enterprises who do not have 
adequate collateral. 
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The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) is the representative of the Jordanian Government 
on the JLGC. It also gives some incentives to the commercial banks, so as to encourage these 
banks to extend more credit to SMEs. These incentives are as follows (JLGC, 1997): 
Since November 1995, the commercial banks do not have to place reserves at 
the Central Bank in relation to expected defaults. 
Since December 1996, the commercial banks are able to reduce their reserves 
held at the Central Bank in relation to the guaranteed loans, which also 
improves their liquidity. 
Such measures encourage banks to expand credit to SMEs and seek guarantees from 
the J LGC. In fact, t hese s teps h ave I ed toane xpansion of t he s cheme activities a nd toa 
widening of its client base, as well as allowing greater bank participation in the programme 
as the risks have lessened. 
5.5 The Activities of the Loan Guarantee Scheme 
The primary objective of the JLGC is to encourage the commercial banks to provide 
loans to the small and medium-sized enterprises. Loans can be partially, or in some cases, 
fully guaranteed. There were 19 participating banks in the loan guarantee agreement by the 
end of 1999, and the total guarantee ceiling of these banks was around JD 26 million. Loan 
guarantees are provided directly to the banks, and are available for start-ups and other 
projects. The purpose of this section is to consider the operation of the scheme over the 
period 1994-99. 
5.5.1 Applications Received 
The number of applications received from the participating banks since the scheme 
inception on 28 th August 1994 until the end of 1999 stood at 2,606, amounting JD 50 million. 
The guarantee amount was JD 27 million. During the period the JLGC received 41,166,264, 
567ý 731 and 837 applications for the years 1994 through to 1999 respectively. This is shown 
in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.4. This increase in the applications received by the scheme was a 
non-nal result of the JLGC efforts to market the LGS services, both to encourage the 
commercial banks to lend to SMEs and to encourage fin-ns to apply for funds from the banks. 
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The applications increased sharply in each year, but in 1999 the growth rate in applications 
on the previous year was only 15 percent (see Figure 5.1). 
Table 5.4 also shows the number of applications according to the status of the loan, 
over the period 1994-99. This table shows that around 86 percent of the total loan 
applications received are executed, to a total value of J. D. 42.5 million. Of this, the scheme 
guaranteed J. D. 22.5 million (see Figure 5.2). The table also shows a high ratio of loans 
cancelled by banks, at around 11 percent of the total applications received (ie. 283 out of 
2,606). These cancellations were due to the borrowers' inability to meet the loan 
requirements. Only around 3 percent of applications are rejected by the LGS. The reasons for 
this are related to insufficient initial information, the intended use of the loans, the client's 
financial position, or simply because the Corporation was not convinced that the project was 
viable. The JLGC also rejected applications because the applicant was heavily indebted, 
engaged in litigation, or had defaulted in the repayment of the previous LGP scheme. 
The total loan ceiling and total utilisation by the commercial banks are also shown in 
Table 5.4. In 1994 the total ceiling for all of the participating commercial banks was J. D 3.6 
million, but only 5 percent (J. D 0.2 million) of this ceiling was utilised by the banks. This 
reflects the operation of the scheme for only three months in 1994. However, in 1995 the 
total ceiling was increased to J. D 3.9 million, but only 13 percent of the ceiling was Utilised 
by the commercial banks. The table shows a steady increase in the total ceiling over the 
period 1994-99. In 1999 it was J. D 25.6 million, but by which time only one-quarter of the 
total ceiling was utilised by the banks participating in the scheme. This growth in the total 
ceiling and utilisation reflects the JLGC efforts in marketing its services to the banks (see 
Figure 5.3). However, what stands out is the general under-utilisation of the loan guarantees 
by, the banks. This seems to be a serious problem with the scheme, and it is taken up ftirther 
below. 
5.5.2 Distribution of the Guaranteed Loans 
This section considers the distribution of the guaranteed loans that were executed 
over the period 1994-99, according to the following characteristics: economic sector, 
geographical location, banks identity, status of borrower, number of employees and the 
purpose of the loan. In total 2,244 loans amounting to J. D 42.5 million are considered (see 
Table 5.4). These loans have an average value of around J. D 19,000. Further, the LGS 
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guaranteed J. D 22.5 million of the loans, which means that around 53 percent of the total 
loan value was guaranteed by the JLGC. 
Economic Sector 
The distribution of guaranteed loans by sector is shown in Table 5.5 and illustrated in 
Figure 5.4. It shows the service sector received the lion's share of the guaranteed loans, ie. 
1,503 loans or around 67 percent of total guaranteed loans. The average value of these loans 
was around J. D 18,700. The next greatest share is in manufacturing, which received 563 
loans or around 24 percent. The average loan value in manufacturing is J. D 19,300. The retail 
sector had 160 loans (7 percent) the average value of which was J. D 19,600, and the 
agriculture sector received 45 loans (2 percent), with an average value of J. D 20,800. 
The distribution of guaranteed loans by economic sector according to year is also 
shown in Table 5.5. It shows an important switch occurring over time, away from 
manufacturing and towards services (see Figure 5.4 also). In 1994 the LGS guaranteed only 
28 loans, but the majority of these (57 percent) were in manufacturing. In the next year the 
share of this sector was 53 percent, but in 1996 it had only 34 percent, and by 1999 it share 
was only 12 percent (see Table 5.5). The large share of the manufacturing sector in the LGS 
activities early on reflects the history of the loan guarantees in Jordan. The Loan Guarantee 
Project that was managed by the IDB led firms to believe that the LGS was aimed at the 
manufacturing sector. Firms began to recognise that this was not the case, but the switch to 
the service sector also arose because of the difficulties of entry into the manufacturing sector. 
It also reflected the greater opportunities for service activities after the Peace Treaty between 
Jordan and Israel in 1994. At this time, entrepreneurs expected to find new markets in the 
Palestinian areas for manufacturing, but their hopes proved false. 
The service sector share in the total loans increased yearly (see Table 5.5). In 1994 its 
share was only 29 percent of the total loans, but in 1995 it increased sharply to 40 percent 
and the average value increased as well from J. D 15,000 to J. D 17,000. By 1999 the service 
sector share had around 81 percent of the total loans provided by the banks and guaranteed 
by LGS. The average value of a loan was around J. D 19,000 (see Table 5.5). This shows that 
the scheme is now predominantly aimed at the service sector. Generally, this distribution of 
the guaranteed loans by economic sector reflects the nature of the Jordanian economy, which 
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is a service economy. Also, service activities are much easier to enter through relatively 
small-scale start-up projects. 
The loans granted to the agriculture sector are also shown in Table 5.5. In 1994 and 
1995 this sector share was 14 and 7 percent respectively. After this time, it was no more than 
5 percent of the total loans guaranteed, and in 1999 it was only I percent. The average value 
of a loan to agriculture is between J. D 15,500 and J. D 24,300, so that these loans are much 
larger. The low proportion granted to the agriculture sector reflects the lack of cultivatable 
land, which is only 7.8 percent of the total land area. This has been compounded by a lack of 
rainfall in the last decade, and by the reluctance of entrepreneurs to invest in this sector. 
Finally, the retail sector started to take up guaranteed loans from 1996. Its share since then 
has been in the range 6-II percent. The average value of the loan was similar to the 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
Geographical Location 
As in all developing countries, most of the economic activities are centralised in the 
capital and one or two main cities. Table 5.6 shows the geographical distribution of the loans 
between the twelve governorates of Jordan. These are loans provided to SMEs, guaranteed 
by the LGS and granted over the period 1994-99. In this table it can be seen that more than 
half (58 percent) the loans were to firms located in Amman (1,302 loans out of 2,244 loans). 
The total value of these loans is around J. D 26 million, and the average value is around J. D 
2000. The other 42 percent of the loans are located in the other eleven governorates (see 
Figure 5.5). Most of these loans are to firms located in Irbid (16 percent of total number of 
loans), Aqaba (7 percent), Zarqa (6 percent), and Balqa (4 percent). The other 9 percent of 
loans went to the other seven governorates (Figure 5.5). This distribution of loans is 
compatible with the population distribution and density (see Chapter 2), and with the 
distribution of SMEs between governorates (see Chapter 3). Table 5.6 also shows the average 
loan value in each governorate. It was J. D 20,000 in Amman, but the highest average was 
around J. D 27,700 in Karak and the lowest was J. D 7,900 in Tafelah. 
The Banks 
The distribution of the guaranteed loans by the participating commercial banks is 
shown in Table 5.7. Again, this covers the period 1994-99. It shows that 20 banks 
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participated in the LGS (but only 19 banks after 1998 due to the bankruptcy of the Amman 
Bank). The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance granted 510 loans, which is 22 percent of 
total loans by number and 19 percent by value. The total value of the loans granted by the 
Housing Bank was around J. D 8.2 million, which means that the average value of the 
guaranteed loan provided by this bank was J. D 16,000. The Cairo Amman Bank and 
Industrial Development Bank each provided around II percent of the loans (see Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7 shows that more than half (58 percent) of the total value of guaranteed 
loans were granted by five banks only. These banks perhaps represent the most popular 
banks in Jordan. (ie. they have 235 branches out of 547 total bank branches spread in 
Jordan). A Iso, t his t able s hows that three f oreign b anks (A. N. ZG rindlays, C itibank a nd 
HSBQ have the lowest participation rates with the LGS; they granted only 0.5 percent of the 
total value of loans guaranteed by the scheme over the period 1994-99. 
Table 5.8 shows that the total value of the credit facilities extended by the 
commercial banks in Jordan in each year over the period 1994-99. It also shows the total 
value of the guaranteed loans extended to SMEs by the JLGC. The guaranteed loans 
consisted of only 0.02 percent of the total credit facilities extended by the banks in 1994. It 
increased to reach 0.3 percent by 1999, so that overall the total guaranteed loans during the 
period 1994-99 is around 0.18 percent of the total credit facilities provided by the 
commercial banks. This is consistent with the SFLGS in UK, where lending under the 
scheme represented only a small percentage of overall bank lending (KPMG, 1999). Over its 
life, the SFLGS has fluctuated between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent of total bank lending. 
Status of Borrower 
During the period 1994-99, a total of 1,609 guaranteed loans or 72 percent were 
granted to male borrowers, while females received 196 loans or around 9 percent of the total 
guaranteed loans. Despite the similar number of males and females in total population, this 
situation reflects the oriental characteristics and conservative nature of Jordanian society. It 
means that males have the main role in life and they are more prevalent than females in 
economic activities. Legal entities (Companies with three or more partners) received 342 
loans, constituting around 15 percent of the total loans and individuals received 97 loans or 4 
percent of the total guaranteed loans (see Table 5.9 and Figure 5.6). 
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Number of Employees 
The total number of employees in the firms that received guaranteed loans during the 
period 1994-99 is around 10,176. This means that the average number of employees for each 
loan is 5 workers (there are 2,244). The distribution of the total employees between economic 
sectors is shown in Table 5.10. The manufacturing sector employs 5,898 workers, which is 
around 58 percent of the total employees in firms receiving guaranteed loans. The average 
number of workers in each manufacturing project is 11. The service sector has around 33 
percent of the total employees, with the average of only 2 workers for each loan project. This 
low average of workers is due to the nature of the firms in this sector. Retail sector employs 5 
percent of the employees, and the agriculture employs 4 percent. Table 5.11 shows the 
distribution of the employees in finns receiving guaranteed loans between the governorates. 
It can be seen that around 66 percent of the total employees are in firms working in Amman, 
which is because most of the economic activity is concentrated in this city. The average 
number of employees in the firms located in Amman is 5 employees. Irbid has 9 percent of 
these employees, 8 percent in Zarqa and 5 percent in each of Balqa and Aqaba. The other 7 
percent of the total workers are located in the other seven governorates. 
Ppn2ose of Loan 
The Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) categorises the purpose of guaranteed loans into 
main three categories: start-up projects, working capital aims and capital purchases. Table 
5.12 shows the distribution of the guarantees by the purpose of the loan over the period 1994- 
99. There are 1,260 loans provided start-up projects, which is around 56 percent of the total 
loans. Loans provided to these increased yearly until 1998, but it was decreased from 412 to 
383 loans in 1999. Working capital accounts for 19 percent of guarantees and capital 
purchases for 25 percent. 
5.5.3 Portfolio of Defaulted Loans 
By the end of 1999 there were 119 claims for non-performing or default loans that 
were guaranteed by the Loan Guarantee Scheme. This is only around 5 percent of the total 
loans guaranteed by the scheme. The Corporation compensated the banks for 78 of the loans 
(66 percent), of which 19 were over 1994-97,20 in 1998 and 39 in 1999. However, it 
rejected the bank's claim in 16 cases, while 25 defaults are still under consideration or 
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rescheduling. Table 5.13 shows the total amount of compensation paid by the JLGC to cover 
the default loans was JD 985,347. The amount recovered from the firms is JD 281,437, to set 
aside this compensation. The ratio of defaulted loans guaranteed by LGS is calculated by 
dividing the net amount paid for the default loans, which is JD 703,910, to the guaranteed 
amount of the executed loans, which is JD 17,900,000. So, in 1999 the default ratio for the 
JLGC loans was only around 4 percent, compared to 3.2 percent in 1998. These seem to be 
very acceptable loan default ratio, and compare extremely well with the commercial banks. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The initial Jordanian experience of the loan guarantees was in 1988 with the Loan 
Guarantee Projects. However, this failed for a number reasons. This attention that has been 
given to the loan guarantee scheme since late 1980s reflects the Jordanian government care 
and support for the small and medium-sized enterprises. The recent loan guarantee scheme 
started at 1994, and it is executed and managed by the private sector to overcome the 
problems that faced the early scheme in Jordan. 
The main objectives of the loan guarantee scheme was to encourage the commercial 
banks to provide loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. It also aims to encourage the 
entrepreneur to invest in projects that depends on cash flow analysis and has economic 
feasibility, and the scheme aims to encourage the banks to provide loans to the firms that 
owned by female, so as to increase the women share in the economic activities. The JLGC 
was prepared an agreement to arrange its relationship with the commercial banks so as to 
guarantee and insure the risk that faced the commercial banks to provide loans to SMEs. 
The scheme guaranteed around 86 percent of the total applications that the scheme 
received from the commercial banks over the period 1994-99. Services sector has the lion's 
share of the LGS activities. The distribution of the guaranteed loans between the economic 
sectors exactly represents and reflecting the economic sectors situation in the Jordanian 
economy, which is a service economy. Also the distribution of the guaranteed loans 
according to the geographical locations confirmed the advantages that the projects in 
Amman have, around 60 percent of the projects received guaranteed loans are located in 
Amman. But the LGS share in the total credit facilities still negligible as all of the loans 
guarantee schemes all over the world. 
Loan Guarantee Scheme in Jordan 
Table 5.1: Loans Provided by the LGP from Oct 1990 - Sept 1993 
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Bank Guarantee Ceilings 
JD 1000's No. of Loans 
Guaranteed Loans 
Loans provided JD ('000s) Loans Guaranteed JD ('000s) 
Housing Bank 1,000 119 1,267 688 
Union Bank for Investment & Saving 50 5 78 39 
Amman Bank for Investment 100 8 126 76 
Industrial Development Bank 300 64 534 300 
Cairo Amman Bank 50 7 63 35 
ABC Bank 200 30 411 164 
Bank of Jordan 150 14 161 82 
Jordan Gulf Bank 200 32 314 147 
Jordan-Kuwait Bank 250 37 365 218 
PhiladelDhia Bank for Investment 50 10 81 29 
Total 2,350 326 3,400 1,778 
Source: Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation Files, Amman, 1994. 
Table 5.2: Distribution of the Guaranteed Loans by Economic Sectors Oct 1990 - Sept1993 
Sector No. of Loans % Value of Loans Provided JD 1000's 
Manufacturing 155 45 1707 
Services 107 31 962 
Retail 2 1 33 
Agriculture 77 23 882 
Total 341* 100.0 3,584 
Source: Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation Files, Amman, 1994. 
Note: The number of loans includes 15 loans that were cancelled by the project 
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Table 5.3: JLGC Shareholders at the End of 2000 
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Name of Shareholder No of Shares % of Shares to Total Authorised Capital 
Central Bank of Jordan 4,775,000 47.75 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance 525,000 5.25 
Cities and villages Development Bank 525,000 5.25 
Social Security Corporation 525,000 5.25 
Industrial Development Bank 450,000 4.50 
Egyptian Arab land Bank/Jordan 375,000 3.75 
Arab Bank PLC 350,000 3.50 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 300,000 3.00 
Jordan National Bank 250,000 2.50 
Bank of Jordan 225,000 2.25 
Amman Chamber of Commerce 200,000 2.00 
Jordan Investment and Finance Bank 150,000 1.50 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 150,000 1.50 
Philadelphia Investment Bank 150,000 1.50 
Arab Insurance Company 150,000 1.50 
Jordan Gulf Bank 150,000 1.50 
Middle East Investment Bank 125,000 1.25 
Jordan Mortgage Refinance Company 125,000 1.25 
Cairo Amman Bank 100,000 1.00 
Arab Jordan investment Bank 100,000 1.00 
Union Bank for Saving & Investment 100,000 1.00 
The National Ahliya Insurance Co. 100,000 1.00 
Export and Finance Bank 100,000 1.00 
Total 10,000,000 100.00 
Source: JLGC, Annual Report, Amman, 2000. 
Table 5.4: Applications Received and Total Loan Ceiling, 1994-99 
JD, Millions 
Guaranteed Cancelled Loans Rejected Loans Total Total Ceiling Total 
Year Loans by Banks by LGS Utilisation 
No. of Loans 28 10 3 41 
1994 Loan Provided 0.58 0.2 0.07 0.85 3.6 0.2 
Guaranteed Amount 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.21 
No. of Loans 131 28 7 166 
1995 Loan Provided 2.77 0.6 0.2 3.57 3.9 0.5 
Guaranteed Amount 0.64 0.3 0.03 0.97 
No. of Loans 216 44 4 264 
1996 Loan Provided 4.4 0.8 0.08 5.3 5.9 1.1 
Guaranteed Amount 1.8 0.3 0.01 2.1 
No. of Loans 508 52 7 567 
1997 Loan Provided 8.8 1.2 0.1 10.1 11.2 2.9 
Guaranteed Amount 3.6 0.8 0.04 4.4 
No. of Loans 665 52 14 731 
1998 Loan Provided 12.4 1.2 0.3 13.9 24.0 6.4 
Guaranteed Amount 7.8 0.7 0.2 8.7 
No. of Loans 696 97 44 837 
1999 Loan Provided 13 2.2 1.0 16.2 25.6 6.6 
Guaranteed Amount 8.5 1.4 0.6 10.5 
No. of Loans 2244 283 79 2606 
Total Loan Provided 42.5 6.0 1.5 50.0 --- --- 
Guaranteed Amount 22.5 3.6 0.9 27.0 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years. 
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Table 5.5: The Distribution of Guaranteed Loans by Economic Sector, 1994-99 
Year Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
No. of Loans 16 8 0 4 28 
1994 % 57 29 0 14 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 403.5 121.0 0 62.0 568.5 
Mean JD '000's 25.2 15.1 0 15.5 20.3 
No. of Loans 70 52 0 9 131 
1995 % 53 40 0 7 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 1,694.3 917.2 0 172.7 2,784.2 
Mean JD '000's 24.2 17.6 0 19.2 21.3 
No. of Loans 73 130 2 11 216 
1996 % 34 60 1 5 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 1,598.2 2,477.0 43.8 267.0 4,386.0 
Mean JD '000's 21.9 19.1 21.9 24.3 20.3 
No. of Loans 153 303 41 11 508 
1997 % 30 60 8 2 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 2,445.7 5,261.0 824.9 264.6 8,796.2 
Mean JD '000's 16.0 17.4 20.1 24.1 17.3 
No. of Loans 141 448 70 6 665 
1998 % 21 67 11 1 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 2,402.2 8,661.8 1,229.7 108.0 12,401.7 
Mean JD '000's 17.0 19.3 17.6 18.0 18.6 
No. of Loans 83 562 47 4 696 
1999 % 12 81 6 1 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 1,783.0 10,693.8 1,045.1 63.7 13,585.6 
Mean JD '000's 21.5 19.0 22.2 15.9 19.5 
No. of Loans 536 1503 160 45 2244 
Total % 24 67 7 2 100 
Value of Loans JD'OOO's 10,326.9 28,131.8 3,143.5 938.0 42,540.2 
Mean JD '000's 19.3 18.7 19.6 20.8 19.0 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years. 
Table 5.6: Distribution of Guaranteed Loans by Governorates during 1994-99 
Total 
Governorate 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 No. % Value JD* mean JD* 
Amman 16 80 123 272 354 457 1302 58 26,038.7 19.9 
Irbid 3 12 32 76 130 108 361 16 5,912.1 16.4 
Zarqa 5 14 13 27 40 33 132 6 2,513.6 19.0 
Balqa 4 13 15 28 17 21 98 4 1,849.6 18.9 
Karak 0 5 1 6 7 8 27 1 748.4 27.7 
Jerash 0 1 0 4 4 7 16 1 366.6 22.9 
Madaba 0 1 4 17 25 10 57 2.5 743.6 13.0 
Ajloun 0 1 3 10 5 8 27 1 586.5 21.7 
Aqaba 0 0 16 60 70 13 159 7 2,646.6 16.6 
Tafelah 0 1 0 0 1 5 7 0.5 55.8 7.9 
Mafraq 0 3 7 8 7 16 41 2 836.7 20.4 
Ma'an 0 0 2 0 5 10 17 1 242.1 14.2 
Total 28 131 216 508 665 696 2244 100 42,540.2 19.0 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years 
*Value of loans and the average of loans by JD thousands 
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Table 5.7: Distribution of Guaranteed loans by Banks, 1994-99 
Bank name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 No. % 
Total 
Value JD* mean JD* 
The Housing Bank 1 30 58 204 155 62 510 23 8,225.1 16.1 
Industrial Development Bank 4 19 16 84 90 24 237 11 4,820.2 20.3 
Cairo Amman Bank 0 7 6 11 103 121 248 11 4,018.9 16.2 
Arab Land Bank 6 10 2 8 168 194 8.6 3,927.3 20.2 
Bank of Jordan 2 6 2 13 29 137 189 8.4 3,752.3 19.9 
Arab Banking Corporation ABC 5 19 40 33 40 9 146 6.5 3,533.0 24.2 
Union Bank for S&I 0 0 4 41 75 45 165 7.4 3,279.6 19.9 
Arab Bank PLC 0 4 5 32 30 71 3.2 3,250.4 45.8 
Jordan National Bank 0 5 11 1 23 71 111 4.9 2,157.3 19.4 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 5 8 35 46 6 10 110 4.9 1,685.9 15.3 
Export and Finance Bank 0 0 0 9 8 3 20 30 1,043.0 52.2 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 0 3 5 14 10 7 39 1.7 849.2 21.8 
Middle East Investment Bank 1 2 14 23 31 4 75 3.3 789.9 10.5 
Jordan Gulf Bank 0 14 16 5 1 3 39 1.7 545.1 14.0 
A. N. Z Grindlays 0 1 1 8 7 1 18 0.8 215.5 12.0 
Jordan Investment& Finance Bank 3 1 0 1 0 1 6 0.3 215.0 35.8 
Amman Bank** 1 6 1 0 55 0 63 2.8 165.5 2.6 
Philadelphia Investment Bank 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.1 52.0 26.0 
The British Bank of M. E. (HSBC) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 15.0 15.0 
Citibank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 28 131 216 508 665 696 2244 100 42,540.2 19.0 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years 
*Value of loans and the average of loans by JD thousands 
** Amman Bank was bankrupted at the end of 1998. 
Table 5.8: Total Credit Facilities and the Guaranteed Loans, 1994-99 
Jordanian Dinar, Million. 
Year Total Credit Facilities Provided by Loans Provided to SMEs and % 
Commercial Banks Guaranteed by the LGC 
1994 3,284 0.57 0.02 
1995 3,706 2.78 0.08 
1996 3,920 4.39 0.11 
1997 3,979 8.80 0.22 
1998 4,285 12.40 0.29 
1999 4,466 13.59 0.30 
Total 23,640 42.54 0.18 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years. 
Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Reports, Various Issues. 
Table 5.9: Distribution of Guaranteed Loans By borrower Status during 1994-99 
Status 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
No. % 
Male 14 80 153 366 481 515 1609 72 
Female 2 8 18 32 56 80 196 9 
Legal Entity 12 41 42 89 97 61 342 15 
Individuals - 2 
3 21 31 40 97 4 
-- Total ------- 28 131 216 508 665 696 2244 100 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years 
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Table 5.10: Total Number of Employees and Its Distribution between Sectors 
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Sector No. of Employees % No. of Loans average of workers 
Manufacturing 5,898 58 536 11 
Agriculture 422 33 45 9 
Services 3,306 5 1,503 2 
Trade 550 4 160 3 
Total 10,176 100 2,244 5 
Source: JLGC, UnpubTshed data, Amman, for different years 
Table 5.11: Total Number of Employees and Its Distribution between Governorates 
Governorate No. of Employees % No. of Loans average of workers 
Amman 6,761 66 1,302 5 
Irbid 903 9 361 3 
Zarqa 757 8 132 6 
Balqa 537 5 98 5 
Karak 126 1 27 5 
Jerash 56 0.5 16 4 
Madaba 214 2 57 4 
Ajloun 86 1 27 3 
Aqaba 524 5 159 3 
Tafelah 10 0.25 7 1 
Mafraq 183 2 41 4 
Ma'an 19 0.25 17 1 
Total 10,176 100 2,244 5 
S; urce: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years 
Table 5.12: Distributions of Guaranteed Loans by Purpose of Loans, 1994-99 
Year Start-up Working Capital Capital Purchases Total 
1994 9 11 8 28 
1995 43 53 35 131 
1996 93 84 39 216 
1997 320 91 97 508 
1998 412 73 180 665 
1999 383 104 209 696 
Total 1,260 416 568 2,244 
Source: JLGC, Unpublished data, Amman, for different years 
Table 5.13: Portfolio of Defaulted Loans during 1994-99 
Defaulted loans guaranteed by JLGC 1994-1997 1998 1999 Total 
No. 19 out of 883 20 out of 665 39outof696 78 out of 2244 
Value of Compensation J. D. 279,671 257,188 448,488 985,347 
Amount Recovered J. D. 38,290 91,378 151,769 281,437 
Net Position J. D. -241,381 -165,810 -296,719 -703,910 
Source: JLGC, Sixth Annual Report, Amman, 1999. 
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Figure 5.1: Inquiry of Applications Received during 1994 - 99 
Figure 5.2: Total amount of Provided Loans and Guaranteed Amount during 1994-99 
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Figure 5.3: Ceiling of the Commercial Banks 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Guaranteed Loans by Economic Sectors 1994-99 
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of Guaranteed Loans by Governorates 1994-99 
Figure 5.6: Distribution of the Guaranteed loans by Borrower Status 1994-99 
CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
6.1 Introduction 
This s tudy can be c onsidered asp ioneering research int he f ield ofI oan guarantee 
schemes, both in Jordan and in the context of developing countries. The principal objective 
of this study is to evaluate the effects of the Jordanian loan guarantee scheme to establish its 
role in improving the supply of funds for SMEs. The research aims to measure the scheme's 
economic impacts, and to suggest policies and procedures for improving the loan guarantee 
scheme. The principal method used is a survey of recipient firms of the guarantees. A period 
of about four months was spent in Jordan carrying out this fieldwork, and the objectives were 
three-fold: to collect all possible and available primary information on the sample projects 
and firms receiving loan guarantees; to gather all available related secondary information 
pertaining to the research work; and to conduct a survey questionnaire of the participating 
commercial banks. 
This chapter presents and discusses the previous approaches to evaluate loan 
guarantee schemes, in order to learn from their experience. The chapter also describes the 
procedures for data collection through the questionnaire, and considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach. It sets out the frameworks for drawing-up the firm and bank 
questionnaires, and the issues that arose with their implementation. It also describes the 
method of data analysis to be carried out in the next chapter. Generally, the chapter discusses 
the main issues involved in survey design, data collection and data analysis. 
6.2 Previous Approaches 
In all countries it is common that loan guarantee schemes support viable small and 
medium-sized enterprises that do not have sufficient conventional collateral when they seek 
loans, especially from the commercial banks. The loan guarantees typically cover part of the 
bank's risk on the loan provided to these firms in the event of default. In effect, the schemes 
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are insurance schemes for the commercial banks in case of loan default. It is one of the more 
important indirect subsidies that are provided to the small and medium-sized enterprises, so 
that it is vital important to measure the benefits and costs of these schemes to ensure that they 
have delivered to the target group, ie. increased lending to SMEs. This ensures the proper use 
of public funds. This section considers the previous methods that have been used to evaluate 
the impact of such schemes in order to learn from their experience. It also considers the 
problems that arise in evaluation. 
6. Zl Previous Studies 
Despite the widespread use of loan guarantee schemes, very few attempts have been 
made toe valuate t he c ontribution of t hese s chernes. C ressy (2000) n otes t hat m ost oft he 
evaluation studies of loan guarantee schemes have been carried out in Europe. For example, 
there have been a number of studies that have evaluated the contribution of the UK Small 
Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme since it was introduced in 198 1. There are also some 
evaluations of all schemes. However, in the case of low-income countries, Vogel and Adams 
(1997) state that they were unable to find any evaluation of loan guarantee programmes. 
Thus, in reviewing the previous studies, we must rely on British and American experience. 
In this section, we will focus on the methods used to evaluate the Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) in the UK. This is due to the following reasons. Firstly, the easy 
access to evaluation studies on the SFLGS. Secondly, the SFLGS is close to the Jordanian 
Loan Guarantee Scheme. Finally, the evaluations of the American scheme are not separately 
identified by the Small Business Association, so that it is difficult to disentangle its effects. 
The evaluation studies of the UK scheme are by NERA (1990), PIEDA (1992) and KPMG 
(1999). These cover differ phases of the SFLGS, although the methodologies adopted in 
these three evaluations are similar, most likely to ensure that useful comparisons can be made 
over time. The OECD small and medium enterprises Outlook Report (2000) points out that 
"the goals of evaluation may thus be different but complementary and call for different 
evaluation methods and tools. The stock of evaluation tools and methodologies is extensive, 
including cost-benefit analysis, economic impact analysis, micro-level econometric analysis, 
peer review, survey of programme participants, and case studies. Certain methodologies are 
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best associated with given types of programmes or instruments" (p. 26). However, in 
practice, these evaluations almost uniformly rely on questionnaire surveys of recipient firms. 
The NERA Study 
The NERA study of 1990 aimed to assess the 'additionality' that is generated by the 
scheme, ie. the extra activity generated by banks and fin-ns that would not otherwise have 
occurred (see Chapter 4). This additionality may be in two forms; either economic, which is 
the economic activities generated by the scheme, which would not otherwise have taken 
place, or financial, which is the finance provided to the firm by the bank, and guaranteed 
under the scheme that would not have been available from other commercial sources or from 
the same sources in the absence of the loan guarantee scheme. The NERA evaluation was 
based on a thorough analysis of a sample of 125 loans guaranteed by the scheme in surviving 
firms. These surving firms were selected at random from the total 260 firms throughout the 
UK that had a loan guarantee sanctioned under Phase IV of the scheme between August and 
October 1986 (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). The survey approach for this study depended on 
interviews, both with the proprietors of the firms and with the bank manager that advanced 
the guaranteed loan. 
The general structure of the interviews with the recipient firms began by examining 
the steps leading up to the application for the guaranteed loan; the possibility of any 
alternative finance having been available; and the reasons for choosing SFLGS finance. At 
the next stage of the interview, they tried to build up a picture of the firm's progress and 
activities since receiving the guaranteed loan and to establish what would have happened to 
the firm in the absence of the scheme. Finally, they noted the firm's views on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the scheme, and any suggestions for improvements which might help 
future applicants and improve the operation of the scheme. 
The interviews with the bank branch managers tried to explore the reasons why the 
managers had resorted to the SFLGS in specific cases, and what, if anything, they might have 
been prepared to lend in the absence of the scheme. The interviewers were interested in the 
banks' opinions on what finance might have been available to the firms from other sources 
had the scheme not existed. This was followed by review of bank lending policy, especially 
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to small firms, and an assessment of the ways in which institutional factors affect the success 
of the scheme. Finally, the bank managers' views on the scheme and their suggestions for 
improvements were also sought. 
The PIEDA Study 
The second evaluation of the scheme was carried out by the Planning, Economic and 
Development C onsultants P IEDA, in 1992. T hey examined Phase Voft he s cheme (from 
1989 to 1993), and again an important objective of the evaluation was to measure the scheme 
'additionality', as well as the displacement of other activity by firms and the wider economic 
impacts of the scheme. They use a combination of survey techniques, including face-to-face 
surveys of companies receiving guaranteed loans, face-to-face and postal surveys with the 
bank managers approving and administering the loans, and a postal survey of the companies 
receiving guaranteed loans under the previous phase of the scheme (ie. Phase IV). 
The face-to-face questionnaires for the company and bank managers were similar to 
those applied in the previous research by NERA. This was to ensure that useful comparisons 
could be made between 'additionality' levels at this study time and at the time of the previous 
study. Displacement effects were assessed by asking companies questions on the location of 
the product markets into which they sold and the identity of the firms' main competitors. The 
total eligible sample under Phase V was 18 8 firms and 123 bank branches. The response rates 
for both samples were around 75 percent. A further postal survey of firrns received loans 
under Phase IV was also undertaken. This survey was designed to collect more factual 
information, particularly on the wider and longer term impact of the loan guarantee scheme 
on economic performance. 
The KPMG SjjLdy 
The most recent evaluation of the Small Finns Loan Guarantee Scheme was by KPMG in 
1999. This study covered Phase VI of the scheme (from 1993 to present), and it used a 
number of methods to investigate the impacts of the scheme. These included: a review of the 
small firm financing literature and interviews with experts in the field; an econometric 
investigation of the determinants of defaults cases, finance and economic additionality based 
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upon the SFLGS database; a large-scale telephone survey of 449 borrowers and 148 lenders' 
branches; and interviews with 50 borrowers, 17 lenders' SFLGS units (credit officers in the 
commercial banks dealing with the SFLGS) and 15 lender's branches. 
The KPMG study examines the SFLGS and its use in terms of the take-up of loans 
and the types of loans provided. The analysis is based on the SFLGS database, held by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and it provides a comparison of the use of the scheme in 
the current phase (ie. Phase VI) and previous phases. The large-scale telephone survey of 
borrowers considered a number of important issues, such as financing requirements, 
alternative financing possibilities, awareness of the scheme, reasons for the use of the 
scheme, and the understanding of mechanics of the scheme operation. The interviews with 
the lenders identified the policy of the lenders towards the SFLGS. Further information about 
the firms, as well as the lenders' views on the scheme is provided by a large-scale telephone 
survey of banks. An econometric analysis (ie. probit and logit models) identifies the types of 
firms that are more likely to default and the factors that influence the duration of the loan. 
This analysis also identifies the determinants of 'additionality' (either financial or economic) 
of the SFLGS loans. 
Overview 
It can be observed that the methods used in all of the evaluations of the UK Small 
Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme are similar, relying on interviews with firms and banks. 
Hence, the questionnaire survey is the most popular method to evaluate the SFLGS in UK, 
and this is because the assessment involves highly-complex issues such as 'additionality' and 
displacement, which require personal interviews with the borrowers and lenders. PIEDA 
(1992) argue that the information contained in the SFLGS database is not sufficient by itself 
to address these issues. The consistency in the methods used makes comparison easier, but 
the main differences between the studies are the sample sizes from one evaluation to another. 
With regard to the method of data analysis, the evaluations depend on a descriptive 
analysis of the data collected through the interview. NERA (1990) produce a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics of the sample, an assessment of financial and economic 
additionality and an analysis of the determinants of additionality. For the bank survey, NERA 
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obtained evidence on financial market effects and on bank lending practices. The analysis by 
PIEDA is also descriptive, but the KPMG study used both descriptive and econometric 
methods. The descriptive analysis is used for the data that collected from borrowers and 
lenders, while the econometric analysis is used both on the SFLGS database and on the data 
collected through the survey. 
One way in which studies differ is their focus, both according to the issues that are 
addressed and the nature of the programme or policy measure that are evaluated. For NERA 
(1990), the main objective for the evaluation is to assess the extent to which the loan 
guarantee scheme generated additional finance and economic activity by the small firms 
using the scheme. They also examine the wider economic effects of the loan guarantee 
scheme, and the possible effects of the scheme on the conduct of lenders. The fundamental 
aim of the PIEDA study (1992) is to assess the extent to which the loan guarantee scheme 
has generated additional economic activity and remedied market failure. More specifically, 
the study considers whether there is a continuing need for the loan guarantee scheme, and if 
so, why the banks are unable to meet the needs of small business. Indeed, whether the 
scheme is truly additional and how the scheme might be improved. 
The objective of the evaluation by KPMG (1999) is to examine the degree to which 
the SFLGS has supported small firms with viable propositions in accessing finance that 
under normal market criteria they would not have received. The evaluation tests not only the 
validity of the rationale behind the scheme, but it measures the benefits that the programme 
has delivered and whether the scheme represents value-for-money for public expenditure. 
The evaluation also considers whether the scheme addresses the problem of financing small 
firms, or if some other measures are needed. 
6.22 Problems in Evaluation 
An important difficulty in evaluating the loan guarantee scheme is the problem of 
accessing data on overall bank lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. This 
information is confidential to banks, and it means that we are unable to ascertain whether the 
banks' lending has changed as a result of the introduction of the scheme. This means that the 
evaluations tend to be carried at the including firm level through interview survey. The 
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survey approach has two main advantages. It means we can collect information on the loans 
and projects that is otherwise difficult to obtain, because of bank confidentiality constraints. 
It also means that more qualitative issues, and other more difficult issues such as project 
additionality, can be addressed. The remainder of this section concentrates on the problems 
and difficulties that confront us when evaluating the loan guarantee scheme in Jordan. 
The main difficulties which faced this study can be summarized as follows. The 
Jordanian loan guarantee scheme was established in 1994, but this does not allow us enough 
data to evaluate the longer-term impacts of the scheme. The information which the JLGC has 
about the firms is also not enough, as it does not include details about the firm after receiving 
the guaranteed loan, due to a lack of follow-up for these projects. The scheme believes that it 
is up to the bank to monitor these firms after receiving the loans, while the bank believes that 
is up to the JLGC to carry out this task. The JLGC relies on the information that is provided 
by the commercial banks to make a decision, but the commercial banks consider some of this 
information to be confidential. 
The other problems that we face in this study are related to the commercial banks. 
These include the commercial confidentiality of bank lending, in that the banks refuse to 
provide any of this information about their borrowers under any circumstances. This problem 
makes our mission to collect the data about the firms from the commercial banks branches 
virtually impossible. Thus, it was not easy to find the data that can help us to achieve the 
objectives of our study. A further problem relates to the unwillingness of the commercial 
banks to provide details of the total credit facilities provided to small and medium-sized 
enterprises before the scheme starts and after it carries out its task, so as to assess the scheme 
impact on its overall lending (see Chapter 3). Specific requests were made by this study to 
the commercial banks' and to the Central Bank of Jordan, but in both cases they refused to 
provide any of these data, because it is secret information. 
Another problem faced by the study is that some borrowers do not even know if their 
loan is guaranteed by the JLGC. This is due to the abuse of the guarantee scheme by the 
commercial banks that provide the guarantees without telling the firms in order to boost their 
own lending profile. Finally, as elsewhere cooperation from the respondents to provide us 
with the needed information was sometimes weak. This is because the firms don't always 
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trust the researchers to maintain the confidentiality of any data supplied, and their fear that it 
will be passed on to the Tax Department. They also do not believe that they will get any 
benefits from the results of the research. Such beliefs push some borrowers to refuse to 
respond, while others show reluctance to give their answers quickly, indicating that they do 
not want to fully cooperate. Some of the cooperative borrowers, as we will see in the analysis 
of the sample firms below, do not answer any questions related to their income, profit, sales 
turnover and similar information. Also, there is the problem that comes from having 
incomplete addresses of the firms that received guaranteed loans supported by the scheme. 
6.3 Methodology of this Study 
A total period of about four months was spent in Jordan on account of fieldwork. The 
objective of this section is to illustrate in detail the study approach, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the approach, and to outline the firm and bank questionnaires that were used 
for collecting the data. Finally, the section considers the methods of analysis that are used to 
examine the data in the next chapter. 
6 3.1 The Approachfor this Study 
The main objectives of this study are to evaluate the effect of the Jordanian loan 
guarantee scheme on SMEs, and to measure the scheme 'additionality' and the economic 
impacts of the scheme. In order to realise this target and to overcome the problems outlined 
above, the researcher believes that a well-designed questionnaire is the best instrument. This 
is because the data on the scheme provided by the JLGC is insufficient for a full evaluation, 
while the commercial banks refused to provide any data to us on their lending activities. To 
overcome these and the other problems mentioned in the previous section, the only feasible 
source of such information is from the recipients of the guaranteed loans. This also provides 
an opportunity to discover the firms' views on the loan guarantee scheme. The questionnaire 
is the most suitable tool to make measurement of additionality, because the data from the 
JLGC and the commercial banks do not provide any reliable indicators about whether a 
project or a loan would otherwise go ahead. Finally, the recipients of the guaranteed loans 
know better than anybody else about the economic effect of the loan on their business. This 
approach for data collection and information gathering is an adaptation of the UK experience 
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for evaluating the loan guarantee scheme, as we have seen in NERA, PIEDA and KPMG. In 
the evaluation of the UK scheme, which has been operating for more than two decades, the 
questionnaire survey of recipients is widely used, event hough data from the scheme and 
from the commercial banks is more readily accessible. 
Ideally, data on the borrowers should be collected from the commercial banks, as in 
the UK evaluation studies, but it was impossible to adopt the same approach due to the 
commercial confidentiality of this information from the banks' point of view, and also 
because of their mistrust of research generally. The banking system in Jordan is also not 
comparable with the UK banking system, as it less well developed, and while the researcher 
promised to treat any information provided as strictly confidential, and to report it in an 
aggregate form only to protect the identify of the borrowers, no agreement could be reached. 
Some of the commercial banks are shareholders in the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation, 
but these still refused to give any information about their borrowers. However, the researcher 
undertook to arrange face-to-face interviews with the credit managers in the main offices of 
the banks, and this gave us their general views on the scheme. 
For the firms, face-to-face interview questionnaires were used. This is better than a 
postal questionnaire, because of the impossibility of making an interview with any person in 
Jordan through the post, as it is rejected culturally. It is, indeed difficult for anybody to 
accept being interviewed by postal questionnaire without knowing and dealing personally 
with the interviewer. Operation of the face-to-face questionnaire as a suitable instrument for 
data collection is supported by the literature. For example, Wren (1999) reports that 
"conventional evaluations of business support measures rely on questionnaire survey of 
recipient firms in order to establish the direct benefits of policy" (see OECD (2000) and 
Venetoklis (2000a), for more details). 
To assess the impact of loan guarantees it is necessary to determine the 
'counterfactual position', that is, what the borrower would have done without the loan, and 
then to compare this with what was done with the loan (Camino and Cardone, (1999)). The 
determination of the counterfactual position helps deten-nine the additionality of the scheme. 
There are many ways to determine the counterfactual, such as a control group, but this is 
difficult in Jordan because of the lack of infon-nation available about the other firms. Further, 
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if firms were chosen randomly then there was a high chance that they would refuse to 
provide any data. Venetoklis (2000a) also found that the selection of the control group is not 
an easy exercise; logically the treatment and the control group must be as similar as possible. 
Venetoklis (2000a) states that "in the case of firms receiving subsidies it is really hard to 
build the control group due to a couple of reasons. First, we can not use the random 
distribution of subsidies because aid is distributed under certain pre-defined criteria. Second, 
there is a high heterogeneity among all firms" (p. 18). Another method to determine the 
counterfactual is by the econometric techniques (see Wren and Storey (2002), for more 
details). However, this is also difficult due to insufficient information about the firms that 
received t he g uaranteed loans. Finally, t he c ounterfactual c an bed etermined byt he d irect 
interview with the recipients firms of the guarantees, and this is the approach used here. This 
is the most suitable way to deten-nine the scheme effect and the additionality of the I oan 
guarantee scheme. 
6.3.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Approach 
A face-to-face interview questionnaire has several advantages, and a few 
disadvantages. The advantages can be summarised as follows (see Sekaran, 1992): 
(i) In-depth exploration of certain issues, which are difficult to determine in other 
ways, eg. the 'counterfactual' and the loan 'additionality'. 
(ii) The researcher has the chance to explain the questions to avoid any 
misunderstanding, and people may be more co-operative when all they have to 
do is talk. In this situation, the researcher and the respondent may feel more 
relaxed and give more reliable information. 
(iii) By using this method, the researcher can guarantee that the m. aj ority of the 
questions will be answered. It gives a chance for illiterate people to be 
involved and not to be tempted to throw the questionnaire away because they 
cannot read it. 
Ov) It gives the researcher the chance to understand the small businesses more 
intimately because of the face-to-face contact involved. 
(v) It helps to create an atmosphere of confidence between the parties, ie. the 
researcher and the owner-manager. This may avoid the caution of 
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entrepreneurs when completing official forms, and lower their suspicion that 
there is a ny relationship w ith t he t ax a uthorities. It gives t he r espondents a 
greater sense of security, in that they have not formalised their views by 
committing information. to paper. 
(vi) It gives the respondent the feeling that there is some interest being shown in 
them and their role in society. 
In order to collect the appropriate and necessary information for achieving the 
objective of the study, the questionnaire survey technique was used. It is reasonable to 
believe that a questionnaire is the most convenient and efficient way to obtain the 
information needed, and this has been indicated by other researchers. Barnett (199 1) reports 
the a dvantage oft his t echnique bys tating t hat t he w ritten q uestionnaire ist ypically more 
efficient and practical, and it allows for the use of a large sample. Also, see Wren (1999). 
The main disadvantage of the face-to-face interview is that with a wide geographical 
area and a large sample it can be very difficult to achieve good coverage (Sekaran, 1992). 
This problem was solved in our study because we only concentrate on the main five 
governorates. The assistance provided by the JLGC also helped. Other disadvantages of this 
method are that firms may not be able to recall events belonging to the guaranteed loan; they 
might recall but make mistakes; they might not be able to articulate events in the firm due to 
the guaranteed loan; and they might seek to deliberately mislead. 
6.3.3 The Firm Questionnaire 
According to Sekaran (1992), "a questionnaire is a pre-formulated written set of 
questions to which respondents record their answers, usually within rather closely defined 
alternatives" (p. 200). Consequently, a number of criteria were used in designing the 
questionnaire for this study. The questions must be objective, should cover the widest range 
of possible answers reflecting different circumstances and should not be ambiguous. 
The finn questionnaire was constructed and designed to elicit information specific to 
this study. The questionnaire in English is given in Appendix 6.1. It was then translated into 
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Arabic. The Arabic version is given in Appendix 6.2. The questionnaire has eight sections, 
and these are as follows: 
1. Section A. The interviewee: including questions on the name, job title of the 
respondents, experience and level of educational attainment. 
11. Section B. The firm: the main information on the firm, such as legal status, 
organisation of the firm, the field of activity, the age of the firm, the number of 
employees, the firm activity and the problems is facing the firm. 
III. Section C. The start-up of the firm: the main information about the financial 
issues at the start-up stage, such as the capital used, sources of finance, 
difficulties in obtaining finance, whether this was the first time the firm had 
received a loan guaranteed by the JLGC and information about any loans 
received prior to the guaranteed loan. 
IV. Section D. The take-up of JLGC support: details about the number of guaranteed 
loans received by the firm. The following questions (until the end of the 
questionnaire) then related to the most recent loan that guaranteed by the JLGC. 
The questions include the first approach to the JLGC for this loan, reasons cited 
by bank to take a guaranteed loan, time needed until funds became available for 
the project and the rate of interest and other terms of the guaranteed loan. 
V. Section E. The financing of the projec : including questions about the most recent 
guaranteed loan, any other sources of finance used to fund the project, the use of 
the guaranteed loan, collateral pledged for the loan, bank advice and guidance 
after providing the loans. Other questions relate to the loan 'additionality' from 
the fin-n's point of view, and whether the guaranteed loan helped the firm obtain 
other finance after the loan. 
VI. Section F. The economic effects of the project: questions about the economic 
effects of the project funded by the guaranteed loan. Whether the project led to 
the opening-up of new markets, the development of new products, services or 
processes, the introduction of a leading-edge technology, an increase in exports 
or the creation of a new source of supply. The rest of this section concentrates 
on the changes in the firm's total assets, sales turnover and the number of 
employees one year before the loan and two years after the loan. 
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VII. Section G. Feedback on the loan guarantee scheme: this section was designed to 
elicit the firm's view on the services provided by the JLGC. It includes 
questions about the problems faced by the firm when applying for the 
guaranteed loan, advantages or disadvantages of these loans, the changes they 
would like to see in the administrative procedures and any general comments. 
VIII. Section H. Interviewer's remarks: including some of the demographic data such 
as the age, gender, location, nature of premises and the presentation of premises. 
The questions themselves were mostly multiple choice, in order to ease and speed-up 
the answering process, but covering a wide range of possible responses. Answering these 
questions should not only be much quicker, but it was anticipated that should evoke a higher 
response rate. Some of the other questions were open-ended, so that the respondents were not 
restricted in the answers or comments they may have wished to make. It was considered that 
the questionnaire may be too long, but the lack of information about firms that had received 
the guaranteed loans made this inevitable. The design of the questionnaire was inspired 
mainly by those used by KPMG (1999), and partly by the NERA (1990) and PIEDA (1992) 
studies. The intention was to learn from their experience, and to gain some benefits from 
these questionnaires, which were well tested. The lack of such studies, not only in Jordan but 
in most of the developing countries, encouraged the researcher to learn from the UK 
experience, because the SFLGS scheme is close to the Jordanian scheme. 
The questionnaire (in Arabic) was piloted two times in order to make sure that the 
questions were easily understood. The first test was made by distributing five drafts of the 
questionnaire to Arab students in Newcastle. The second test was made by sending the 
questionnaire to the JLGC for some of their credit officers to check that the questions would 
be easily understood by different borrowers according to their experience. Amendments were 
made following these two tests, in order to make the questionnaire clearer. The final format 
was therefore established according to the maximum feasible amount of testing. It is this 
questionnaire that is given in Appendix 6.2 (in Arabic) and in Appendix 6.1 (in English). 
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6.3.4 The Bank Questionnaire 
The bank questionnaire in English is given in Appendix 6.3. It was not translated into 
Arabic, because the bank managers are familiar with English. The structure of the 
questionnaire focuses on the following areas: general information about the bank, the bank's 
view on lending to SMEs, the circumstances in which the bank offers a loan guarantee, the 
procedures for applying for a guaranteed loan compared with a normal loan, the additionality 
of the guarantee, and finally whether the loan guarantee scheme changed the bank's 
behaviour in its lending policy to SMEs. It was considered that a short straightforward 
questionnaire would be better received by the banks on the understanding that the managers 
would be busy and their time valuable. One of the senior managers of the JLGC confirmed 
this when I sent him a copy of the questionnaire to comment upon. A letter in English from 
the dissertation supervisor was attached to each questionnaire to give a reassurance of 
confidentiality to the credit managers, and to reinforce the academic nature of the study (see 
Appendix 6.3). 
The total number of banks participating in the loan guarantee scheme is nineteen, but 
questionnaire was delivered to only five banks. The researcher chose the five banks 
randomly, and followed the JLGC's advice to include both the cooperative and non- 
cooperative banks, in order to understand the views and opinions of both types of banks. The 
contact and interview arrangements with the credit managers in the commercial banks were 
orgam'sed through the JLGC management, because it was felt that this method would be 
more successful. 
6.4 Structure of the Firm Sample 
The population of firms for this study are small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Jordan that received loans from commercial banks over the period 1994-99 guaranteed by the 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation. Details of the firms were obtained from the JLGC. 
These details were released to the study as the researcher was a member of the JLGC's 
Studies and Research Department over 1997-99. The JLGC gave information on the 
borrower's name, the loan value, the guaranteed amount, the bank's name, the value of 
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collateral, and the contact details for the firm, including the telephone number (where 
connected) and the firm address (but the latter not in some cases). 
To achieve the study aims we had to choose a representative sample from the total 
population of guarantee recipients in order to minimise costs and to save time. The following 
three criteria were used: the firms had taken a loan from a commercial bank which was 
guaranteed by the JLGC over the period 1994-99; the firms were located either in Amman, 
Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa or Aqaba, as these are the main business areas of Jordan (more than 90 
percent of the guaranteed loans by JLGC are located in these governorates); and special 
attention had to be paid to the firms in the manufacturing sector, because this sector is the 
focus of development and government interest. Thus, the sample was both random and 
stratified. The period until the end of 1999 was chosen because one of the important aims of 
the study is to measure the impact of the scheme, and it takes at least 18 months after the 
receipt of the loan for the effects to appear (NERA, 1990). 
6.4.1 Sample Selection 
From the data supplied by the JLGC, the total number of firms receiving guaranteed 
loans during the study period 1994-99 was 2,244, of which 2,052 were in the five main 
governorates. The desired achieved sample for the study is 150 firms. This is considered a 
suitable number of firms to be representative of the overall population. It is probable that any 
increase in this sample size will not affect the representativeness of the results of the study, 
as the SMEs have reasonably homogeneous characteristics. The information about the firms 
that the researcher received from the JLGC for the five governorates (Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, 
Balqa and Aqaba) was distributed between the four main economic sectors: manufacturing, 
services, retail and agriculture. 
Table 6.1 shows the sample selection both by location and by economic sector. This 
table shows that the capital city Amman had 1,302 firms in the four main sectors, which is 
around 63 percent of firms receiving guaranteed loans in the five main governorates. As a 
result the total sample size for Amman was set at 75 firms, which is fifty percent of the total 
sample. In Irbid, there were 3 61 firms (18 percent) which had received guaranteed loans, and 
the sample was set at 30 firms. The number of finns sampled in the other three governorates, 
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Zarqa, Balqa and Aqaba was 132,98, and 159 respectively, and a sample of 15 firms was 
taken for each of these. The sample was also stratified by economic sector. Given the focus 
on manufacturing referred to above, half the sampled firms (ie. 75) were in this sector. In 
total, we sought an achieved sample of 52 in services, 13 in retail and 10 in agriculture. This 
led to the pattern of sampling shown in Table 6.1, which partly reflects the total number of 
firms within each cell of the total. For each cell, the firms were selected randomly. 
6.4.2 Achieved Sample 
In order to achieve the required sample of 150 firms, the researcher contacted 214 
firms. After selecting the sample firms, the fieldwork began in Amman. The researcher 
approached the borrowers by telephone, explaining the aims of the research and arranging an 
appointment with each borrower in order to fill-out the questionnaire. For the first few days, 
the cooperation from the respondents was weak. The problem was explained to the JLGC 
General Manager, who wrote a letter, informing the borrowers that the JLGC was fully aware 
of this study and asking them to cooperate with the researcher in order to make 
improvements oft he sc heme w hich would be ofb enefit tot he s cheme in t he future. T he 
JLGC also asked two of its staff members to help the researcher with data collection. This 
support from the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation improved the respondents' cooperation 
substantially, because the researcher introduced himself as from the JLGC. On arriving at 
interview, the researcher gave a covering letter (in Arabic) to the firm explaining the nature 
of the study. The firm was also given the letter from the JLGC. In addition two other letters 
were given to the firm, a letter (in English) from the dissertation supervisor and a letter (in 
Arabic) from the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Science at the 
Hashernite University. These letters were intended to give reassurance of confidentiality and 
to reinforce the academic nature of the study (see Appendix 6.4). If the firm agreed to 
participate then the questionnaire was filled-out. On average a questionnaire took around one 
hour to be filled-out. 
Table 6.2 shows the sought and achieved samples in each governorate and sector. In 
Amman, the researcher aimed to fill-out 75 questionnaires, but distributed 94 questionnaires 
in order to achieve 75 (35 from the manufacturing sector, 30 from the services sector, and 5 
each from the retail and agriculture sectors). The non-participating firms in this area 
numbered around 20 percent of the total questionnaires distributed. These fin-ns refused to 
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fill-out a questionnaire as they did not wish to cooperate. In Irbid the researcher distributed 
49 questionnaires to achieve the required sample, which is 30 firms, but the actual achieved 
sample was only 24 firms (9 in of each manufacturing and services and 3 in each of retail and 
the agriculture sectors). For both Zarqa and Balqa, the required sample was 15 fin-ns, and this 
was achieved (see Table 6.2). The non-participating firms in these governorates were 32 and 
37 percent respectively. From the 214 questionnaires distributed in the five governorates 142 
were completed which is around 95 percent of the sought sample. Table 6.2 shows that 
overall the required sample was broadly achieved, both by location and by economic sector. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the previous approaches that have been used to evaluate 
loan guarantee schemes, especially in the UK. It was found that the approach depended on 
the kind of information or data to be collected from the recipients of the loan guarantees and 
from the commercial bank, but generally they relied on interviews with senior managers of 
firms. The purpose of the previous evaluations was to assess the additionality that was 
generated by the schemes. The chapter has also outlined the problems that arose regarding 
contact and communication with the guaranteed loan recipients and the commercial banks. 
The methodology of this study, described in this chapter, is based on the information 
collected directly from the recipients of the guaranteed loans through questionnaire survey. 
This reflects the lack of information available about both the loans and the recipients of 
guarantees from the JLGC, and an unwillingness of the banks to provide any data about their 
borrowers, due to commercial confidentiality constraints. 
In order to achieve the aims of this research and to collect the suitable information the 
study relies on face-to-face interviews with firms and banks using a structured questionnaire. 
This instrument has several advantages. The respondents are more cooperative, 
misunderstandings may be more easily avoided, while it provides information additionality 
and the scheme effects. The chapter presents the firm and bank questionnaires to be used as 
part of this work, and the criteria for the sample selection from the total population of firms 
receiving loan guarantees. The response rate to the sample was 66 percent, so that 214 
questionnaires were collected of which 142 were completed. These focus on Amman and the 
manufacturing sector. In the next chapter we present the survey results, and in Chapter 8 we 
undertake some statistical analysis of the 
data. 
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Table 6.1: The Sample Selection 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Sample 35 30 5 5 75 
Amman Population 336 830 123 13 1302 
Sample 12 10 5 3 30 
Irbid Population 35 284 33 9 361 
Sample 8 4 3 0 15 
Zarqa Population 28 93 9 2 132 
Sample 7 6 0 2 15 
Balqa Population 25 60 4 9 98 
Sample 13 2 0 0 15 
Aqaba Population 108 39 12 0 159 
Sample 75 52 13 10 150 
Total Population 532 1306 181 33 2052 
Note: The total number of firrns in receipt of guaranteed loans during 1994-1999 was 2244 in Jordan, but 
there were 2052 in five governorates. 
Service sector include all other activities in this sector except retail. 
Table 6.2: Achieved Sample 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total Non Participants 
Achieved 35 30 5 5 75 
Amman Sought 35 30 5 5 75 19 (20%) 
Achieved 9 9 3 24 
Irbid Sought 12 5 3 30 19 (44%) 
Achieved 8 4 3 0 15 
Zarqa Sought 8 4 3 0 15 7 (32%) 
Achieved 7 6 0 2 15 
Balqa Sought 7 6 0 2 15 9 (37%) 
Achieved 11 2 0 0 13 
Aqaba Sought 13 2 0 0 15 10 (40%) 
Achieved 70 51 11 10 142 
Total Sought 75 52 13 10 150 64 (31%) 
CHAPTER 7 
THE SURVEY RIFSULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the analysis and presentation of the data collected as 
part of the survey of 142 firms. This is the sample of firms drawn from the population of 
2,052 firms receiving loan guarantees over the period 1994-99 and distributed across the five 
main governorates of Jordan (Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa and Aqaba). The collection of this 
data was described in Chapter 6. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and examine the 
following kinds of issues: general information about the interviewees; information about the 
firms taking-up guaranteed loans; details of loans taken-up prior to JLGC support; the 
characteristics and financing of the project; the economic effects of the project; additional 
information, including feedback on the operation of the scheme; and the view of commercial 
banks on the loan guarantee scheme. The importance of this chapter is to reflect directly the 
view point of the recipients of the loan guarantees on the impacts and efforts of the scheme. 
The q ualitative a nalysis of t he c hapter isb ased on ac ross-tabulation oft he v ariables a nd 
responses that appear in the questionnaire, distributed according to the four main economic 
sectors. This enables us to focus special attention on the manufacturing sector, reflecting its 
special significance, but also to examine the effect of the scheme across the three sectors. 
The econometric analysis of the survey data is carried out in Chapter 8, where the 
variables are given labels (see Appendix Table 8.1). In order to help relate the different 
analysis (ie. in this chapter and the next), and to cross-reference the material, the variables 
are also referred to in capital letters in the tables of this chapter. For example, TITLE refers to 
the job title of the interviewee (see Table 7.1, Appendix Table 8.1). Not all of the survey data 
is subsequently included in the statistical analysis; especially where the data is subjective in 
nature, so that some of the variables do not have labels, while others subsequently are 
excluded because they prove not to be very useful. Unless specifically indicated, the term 
'firm' is used to describe the plant that was surveyed, even though there may be other plants 
within the same group. 
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7.2 Demographic Data on Interviewees 
This section describes the demographic characteristics of the sample respondents, 
including such factors as job title, educational attainment, gender and age. This type of 
information is very useful in order to determine the nature of small and medium-sized firms 
in Jordan that take up loan guarantees. The information is summarized in Table 7.1. 
7.2.1 Job Title 
The vast majority of the respondents were general managers, around 90 percent, 
whilst only 3 percent were sales managers and 4 percent were financial managers (see Table 
7.1). This is consistent with the main characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Jordan and elsewhere. The owners of the SMEs are also the managers, as the type and scale 
of the activities do not require specially-qualified managers (see Chapter 3). All the 
interviewees in both the retail and agriculture sectors are both managers and owners. This 
reflects the nature and culture of work in these sectors. Interviewees in the manufacturing 
sector have different job titles, 86 percent are general managers, 4 percent are financial 
managers and 3 percent each sales managers and partners. Despite the low percentage of 
other job titles, this reflects the complexity and variety of work in this sector compared with 
the other sectors, and its requirements for different kind of qualification (see Table 7.1). 
7.22 Educational Attainment 
Table 7.1 shows that more than half of the respondents are qualified with a first 
degree or higher (BSc, MSc and PhD), while those who were illiterate or had not completed 
secondary schools represented 44 percent. The majority of interviewees in all sectors had a 
first degree at least, so that they are generally high-quality firms. Around half of the 
interviewees in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors have a secondary school diploma 
or less, but this drops to around one third in the service and retail sectors. This reflects the 
fact that the majority of SWs in Jordan are family businesses, and the researcher observed 
during his survey work that the interviewees often left school in order to inherit the family 
business. Also Table 7.1 shows the very low percentage of interviewees that gained a higher 
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degree (MSc or PhD). In Jordan, as elsewhere, it is not necessary to have an extremely high 
level of educational attainment in order to manage a small or medium-sized enterprise. 
7.2.3 Gender 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the participation of Jordanian women in the labour 
force is relatively low. Also, the questionnaire findings presented in Table 7.1 show that the 
participation of women in entrepreneurship is as low as 10 percent. This may reflect the 
predominance of the social values in Jordanian society, which does not encourage women to 
practice ownership. It is apparent that women prefer to work in the service and 
manufacturing sectors (Five Year Plan, 1993-1997); 15 p ercent of the interviewees in the 
service sector are female and they represent around 10 percent in the manufacturing sector. 
Overall, 90 percent of the interviewees are male. All of the interviewees in the agriculture 
sector are male, which is probably due to the physical nature of work in this sector, and that 
land tends to be inherited by males. 
7.2.4 Age and Experience 
More than one third (33 percent) of the sample interviewees were under 40 years of 
age, but those between 41 - 50 years old represent more than half of the interviewees in our 
sample firms (56 percent). This is not representative, as the majority of the population is less 
than forty years old (see Figure 7.1). It is apparent from Table 7.1 that in each sector most of 
the interviewees are in the age group 41 - 50 years. The average age for the interviewees in 
the sample is around 45 years old, but 45,44,47 and 51 years old for the interviewees in the 
manufacturing, services, retail and agriculture sectors respectively (for more details see 
Figure 7.1). The highest age density among male interviewee is in the 41 - 50 age group, 
whilst among women it is in the 25 - 40 age group. This may indicate that the majority of the 
respondents, whether male or female, were young (but not very young), which reflects the 
characteristics of the Jordanian population (see Chapter 2). The average year of experience of 
interviewees in the sample firms is around 15 years. This is little different between sectors (it 
is 16 years for interviewees in manufacturing and agriculture and 15 and 14 years in the 
service and retail sectors respectively). 
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7.3 Characteristics of the Sample Firms 
The purpose of this section is to present some background information about the 
nature of the sample firms, such as their legal status, organisation, location, date of start-up, 
size of firm, main competitors and the constraints facing the sample firms. 
7.3.1 The Legal Status, Organisation and Location of Firms 
The legal status of the sample firms is shown in Table 7.2. Overall, it tells us that 
roughly t wo-thirds (65 percent) oft he f inns a re s ole t raders. T his isr epresentative oft he 
Jordanian economy as a whole, where more than 70 percent of the firms are sole traders. 
Another 27p ercent of t he s ample f irms a re p artnerships, and t he r emaining 8p ercent a re 
privately owned, where the difference between partnership and private ownership is that the 
latter are registered as private shareholding firms. 
If the pattern is examined across the different activities, then we see that a much 
higher proportion of the manufacturing firms are either in partnership or private ownership. 
This because these firms are generally much larger in scale (see Table 7.2). Finns in retail or 
agriculture are n early a lways s ole t raders, w hile a round aq uarter oft he s ervice firms are 
partnerships, again reflecting a larger scale of operation. 
The legal status of firms is closely associated with the organisational structure of the 
firm. Table 7.2 shows that nearly 90 percent of the sample firms are single-plant 
establishments. This is relatively lower for manufacturing, where 10 percent of fin-ris are 
multi-plant operations and 6 percent of firms are part of a larger group. In the case of retail 
and agriculture all the firms are single plant, while 92 percent of the service fmns are also 
single plant. Table 7.2 shows that around half of the sample firms (52 percent) are located in 
Amman, while 17 percent of the sample is in Irbid, II percent in each of Zarqa and Balqa, 
and only 9 percent of the sample fin-ris is located in Aqaba. 
7.3.2 The Start-Up Date of Firms 
The start-up date of the firms is shown in Table 7.3. This table shows both the start- 
up date of the plant that was surveyed, and its start-up date at the present site. These give a 
very sin-fflar pattern because there is relatively little relocation. Table 7.3 also shows that 
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around two-thirds of the sample fin-ns started in the 1990s, and another 23 percent started in 
the 1980s, so that only 10 percent of firms started prior to this time. This means that all the 
sample firms are relatively new enterprises. 
7.3.3 The Size of the Firm 
Questions were asked to assess the size of the firms, including its number in 
employment and sales turnover. Table 7.4 shows that around one-third of the sample firms 
employed less than five workers, whilst 80 percent of the firms in the sample employed less 
than 20 workers. The average nwnber of employees in the sample firms is only 12. In the 
manufacturing sector around 20 percent of the sample firms employed less than five workers, 
and around a half of the employees in this sector were located in the firms that employed 
between 10 to 50 workers (Table 7.4), so that these firms are larger. All of the sample firms 
in the retail sector employed less than 10 workers, as did 70 percent of the firms in both the 
agriculture and service sectors. 
A second question was asked to assess the size of the firms according to their sales 
turnover. The results are also presented in Table 7.4. The majority of the sample firms (65 
percent) had current sales turnover of between J. D 26 thousand and I million, whilst around 
20 percent of them had a turnover of less than J. D 25 thousand. In general, it is very rare to 
find a small or medium-sized firm with a current sales turnover of more than J. D I million, 
and Table 7.4 shows only 3 percent of the sample firms are in this category. Table 7.4 shows 
that 5 percent of the firms in the manufacturing sector have sales of more than J. D 1 million, 
and 22p ercent off inns h ave s ales of more t han J. D 3 00 t housand. T his I ast f igure is 10 
percent in agriculture and only 4 percent in the service sector, but zero in the retail sector. 
This is related to the size of the activities. 
It is apparent from Figure 7.2 that around 80 percent of the sample firms provided 
between 75 - 100 percent of their sales to the local market, while more than 90 percent of 
firms provide more than a half of their sales to the local market. Only one-third of firms sell 
more than 50 percent of their output to the national market (excluding the local market), and 
only 10 percent of the firins provide more than 10 percent of their sales to the international 
market (all of which are in the manufacturing and service sectors). This is because the vast 
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majority of SMEs depend on the local market due to the high cost of selling in national and 
intemational markets. 
7.3.4 The Constraints Facing Firms 
Firrns were also quizzed on the major constraints facing them. Table 7.5 illustrates 
the main constraints and problems that face the firms in our sample. The main problems are 
placed in order from the most important to the least important from the interviewee's point of 
view. It is apparent that 'competition' is the most important problem with 70 percent of the 
sample firms pointing to this, while only 9 percent consider the 'low level of technology' that 
they use as a problem. An explanation of the most important constraints facing the firms is 
now given. These are given in Table 7.5. 
Competition: The overwhelming problem perceived by respondents is competition in price 
and marketing. In fact, competition accounted for as much as 68 percent of the responses. 
They felt that their businesses suffered mainly from small firms competition in Jordan (77 
percent), followed by larger firms in Jordan (19 percent) and imports (19 percent) (see 
Appendix Table 7.1). The main causes of local competition (either for small or large firms) 
may be due to the policy of the free-market economics, which leads to a high level of 
competition. However, some of the respondents quoted that the competition they face is 
normal and not severe, whilst some stressed strongly the heavy burden of competition. 
Approximately two-thirds of manufacturing, retail and agriculture interviewees complained 
about competition in price and marketing. 
Lack of Finance: This was the second most common constraint that SMEs in Jordan 
experienced in their view. This problem was felt by around 60 percent of the sample fin-ns. It 
may indicate that there are not enough loans available, which could be used by owner- 
managers to develop their businesses, and possibly indicates a 'finance gap' in the credit 
market. Some respondents described the current loan conditions as "slavery conditions", 
because of high interest rates and high collateral requirements. The agriculture sector had the 
higher proportion of firms reporting that they suffer from a lack of finance, and accounted 
around 80 percent of the sample firms, followed by services (63 percent) and manufacturing 
(57 percent). 
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Labour Market: Around 42 percent of the sample firms said that they experienced problems 
with the labour market, including a lack of skilled labour. The majority of the interviewees 
who complained about this were from the manufacturing sector (50 percent). 
Government Regulations: Government regulations were the fourth-ranked factor perceived as 
problematic. More than 25 percent of the respondents cited this. Government regulations on 
trade in national and international currencies, taxation, bureaucracy in the implementation of 
the law and custom duty procedures were the subjects raised by the interviewees. These 
problem areas perhaps should be made the subject of specific study to assess how systems 
and methods could be modified to be more supportive of small firms. One-third of 
interviewees complained about government regulations in the manufacturing and service 
sectors, but only 9 percent in the retail sector. However, in the agriculture sector none of the 
respondents c omplained a bout g overnment r egulations. T his isd ue to the s upport t hat t he 
government has always provided in order to encourage the production of agricultural 
products, and to help counter other problems in this sector. 
Other Constraints: Finally, the other constraints facing the firms are marketing (25 percent of 
interviewees complain that this is a serious problem), the price of raw materials (15 percent) 
and the lack of appropriate of technology (9 percent). 
7.4 The Start-Up of the Firms 
In this section we will discuss the start-up capital of the firms in our sample and the 
principal financial resources. This will help clarify some of the potential factors affecting the 
firms' relationships with the commercial banks. 
7.4.1 Start-Up of the Firm 
The upper portion of Table 7.6 shows the start-up capital of the sample firms, 
according to that reported by interviewees. It can be seen that around one-third (32 percent) 
of the sample firms were started-up with capital sums between J. D 10 thousand and J. D 40 
thousand, 27 percent of the firms had less than J. D 10 thousand to start-up, while more than 
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40 percent of the firms used more than J. D 40 thousand to start-up. Firms with loans of less 
than J. D 40 thousand get a higher proportion of the loan guaranteed by the JLGC. 
Interviewees in the manufacturing sector were the largest group which stated that they 
used more than J. D 100 thousand to start-up their firms, accounting for as much as 25 percent 
of these firms, followed by services (18 percent) and agriculture sector (10 percent). This is 
because the cost of start-up for firms in the manufacturing sector is greater than in any other 
sector, and because they are larger in scale. However, Table 7.6 shows that around half of the 
sample firms (46 percent) in the retail sector used less than J. D 10 thousand to start-up. 
7.4.2 The Financial Resourcesfor Start-Up 
The financing of small and medium-sized enterprises in Jordan was expected to be 
mainly from private sources, self-financing or from relatives. Previous research, such as Al- 
Mahrouq (1999), has shown that the financial institutions offer conditions which are not 
found to be suitable to many entrepreneurs in SMEs. Also, the commercial banks are 
reluctant to provide loans to SMEs due to the high rate of risk. The phenomena of limited 
dealing between small firms and commercial banks (or formalised systems of raising 
funding) do not only affect Jordan but also the advanced countries. As Storey (1994), Haque 
(1999) and Aqel (1998) describe, this may be viewed as discrimination against SM[Es. 
The interviewees were asked about their financial resources for start-up. The majority 
of the sample firms indicated that their main source of funds was self financing. It can be 
seen from Table 7.6 that self financing accounts for around 29 percent of the sample firms as 
the only source for start-up capital. Around 32 percent of interviewees said that self financing 
and bank loans combined were the sources for financing their start-up. Around one-fifth (19 
percent) of respondents were reliant on private resources for start-up (self-financing and 
relatives or friends), while private sources and banks came next in priority at 6 percent and 
banks came fifth (5 percent). Dependence on ordinary shares (partner and investors) took the 
lowest priority among the respondents (only 1 percent). 
As Table 7.6 shows, firms in the agriculture sector depended on self-finance, the 
banks and private sources for financing the start-up of their busin esses. Firms in the 
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manufacturing sector used all of the sources mentioned, including partners and investors 
which reflect the financial problems facing small manufacturing and how they fall back upon 
a greater range of sources of finance. In the important start-up stage of a firm's life cycle, 
more than a half (56 percent) of the respondents stated that they did not face any difficulties 
in obtaining financial support for starting their businesses (see Table 7.6). In the agriculture 
sector, 80 percent said they had no problem, whilst half of the manufacturing firms (50 
percent) found it difficult to obtain finance at the start-up stage (see Table 7.6). This table 
also illustrates that 30 percent of the sample firms received their first guaranteed loan by the 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGQ for start-up. In the retail and agriculture sectors 
only 18 and 10 percent respectively received the guaranteed loan for start-up, compared with 
one-third of respondents (33 percent) in each of the manufacturing and service sectors. 
7.5 Loans Prior to JLGC Support 
Questions were asked to find out whether the firrns received loans from commercial 
banks or any other sources before the first loan that was guaranteed by the JLGC. Table 7.7 
shows that one-third (36 percent) of interviewees received loans from other sources before 
the guaranteed loan, while for another third (34 percent) of respondents the guaranteed loan 
was the first loan that they received. The question was not applicable to the other 30 percent 
of interviewees, as they received the guaranteed loan at the start-up stage (Table 7.7). 
It is predominantly retail firms who received loans from banks or other sources before 
the guarantee loan, accounting for 45 percent of the sample firms in the retail sector, while 40 
percent of the firms in the agriculture sector had received loans and one-third each of the 
manufacturing and service sectors. The remainder of Table 7.7 concentrates on those firms 
that received loans before the guaranteed loan by JLGC, ie. the 36 percent or 51 sample 
firrns. It is evident from the table that 31 percent of the firms (ie. 31 percent of 51 firms) used 
the loans received prior to the JLGC support for working-capital purposes, whilst around 24 
percent used them for each of start-up, capital purchases and financing new products or 
services. Them ost interesting point is that the majority of the firms in the manufacturing 
sector used the loans for two purposes working capital (42 percent) and financing new 
products or services (25 percent), while 39 percent of loans were used for capital purchases 
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in the service sector. Sixty and 50 percent of loans (prior JLGC support) in the retail and 
agriculture sectors were used for start-up purposes (see Table 7.7). 
Finns were also asked about what security they pledged to receive the loans. More 
than a half of the f irms that received loans prior to JLGC support (54 percent) used real- 
estate assets as securities for these loans, while 25 percent of respondents used another 
guarantor as security followed by goods and equipment (19 percent), as in Table 7.7. Only 
one interviewee in the service sector said he didn't pledge any type of security, and he 
reported that: 
"As you see the location of myfirm is close to my bank branch. I have been dealing with this 
branch for 15 years or more and I have a very good relationship with the manager of the 
branch. They can notice my activities and they can hear and know about my reputation in 
the market, so I don't need to insure the loan. The branch manager told me that he would 
transfer my application form to the AGC to guaranteed the loan without any other kind of 
securities, and he would do this because I am a friend of his and he knows my work well, 
even though the amount of the loan was JD 10,000 ". 
It can be seen from Table 7.7, that only firms in the manufacturing and service sectors 
used goods and equipments as a security for borrowing from the commercial banks, around 
13 percent in manufacturing and 33 percent in service sector 
According to Table 7.7, the value of collateral pledged to insure the banks rights was 
more than the value of the loan for 58 percent of the sample firms, while for 21 percent the 
value of collateral was less than the value of the loan, and only for 19 percent of the total 
sample firms were the amounts equal. The answer to the questions about the kind and value 
of collateral used as security for the loans from the commercial banks reflects the importance 
of real-estate as a major type of collateral in the Jordanian credit market. For example, AqeI 
(1998) and Al-Mahrouq (1999) report that more than two-thirds of loans provided to SMEs 
by commercial banks in Jordan were secured by real-estate assets to insure the banks rights, 
and most likely the value of real-estate assets were more than the value of the loan. 
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7.6 The Take-Up of JLGC Support 
It is useful to discuss the basis for the take-up of JLGC support to clarify the firms' 
experience with the guaranteed loans. This is achieved by discussing the awareness of JLGC 
loans, the purpose of the JLGC loans, the loan and project size, and the arrangement of the 
most recent JLGC loan. 
7.6.1 Awareness ofJLGC Loans 
Table 7.8 shows that more than three-quarters (77 percent) of the sample firms were 
first aware of the JLGC guarantees through the commercial banks, while 22 percent of our 
sample firms stated that they heard about the JLGC loans through one of the following: 
family and friends (8 percent), a colleague in the firm (6 percent), another business (3 
percent) or Chamber of Commerce/Industry body (3 percent). Finally, just 2 percent of 
respondents found out about the JLGC loans through others sources, such as an 
advertisement in a newspapers or magazine. This means that none of the respondents became 
aware of JLGC loan through the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation itself This is a 
reflection of the JLGC marketing policy, which is clearly not active enough and not getting 
through to the relevant businesses. A lot more work must be done in this area if the target 
businesses are to benefit. Firrns in all of the economic sectors were aware of JLGC loans 
through their bank (more than two-thirds of the sample firrns confirmed this). 
Half of the interviewees (50 percent) found themselves more likely to seek a bank 
loan once they became aware of the existence of the JLGC, whilst the rest said that 
awareness of the JLGC had made no difference to them. Thus, the first impression gained is 
that the JLGC supports borrowers plans to use commercial banks as sources of finance (see 
Table 7.8). 
It was asked whether the sample firrns, had approached their bank or the JLGC itself 
when they had applied for JLGC support. Only 15 percent of respondents had approached the 
JLGC directly and this was because they had heard about the JLGC from sources rather than 
their bank (22 percent of firms were in this category). This confirms the problem with the 
scheme's marketing strategy. It was also confirmed by the fact that more than 70 percent of 
the firms first approach was to the bank, and that they discussed a normal bank loan before 
the guaranteed loan by the JLGC- The interviewees went to their bank seeking a loan and 
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when it became clear that they were unable to meet the bank's conditions, the bank staff had 
then about the JLGC as a way of support, if they found the project to be a feasible and 
successful project (see Table 7.8). 
7.6.2 Purpose of A GC Loans 
The sample consists of 142 firms in total and they received 154 loans guaranteed by 
the JLGC, which means that 12 firms (8 percent) received two guaranteed loans. Table 7.9 
shows that all firms in the retail and agriculture sectors only received one guaranteed loan, 
while more than 10 percent of respondents in the manufacturing sector received two 
guaranteed loans, followed by 8 percent in the service sector. The purpose of the first 
guaranteed loan received by sample firms is explained in Table 7.9. More than one-third (37 
percent) ofi nterviewees u sed t he f irst I oan f or capital purchases, a nd 30p ercent oft hese 
loans were used for start-up or the financing of new products or services. 
According to Table 7.9, most of the first guaranteed loans in agriculture were used for 
working capital (60 percent), whilst the vast majority of guaranteed loans in both the retail 
and service sectors were used for capital purchases and working capital. However, one-third 
of the first guaranteed loans in the manufacturing sector were used for start-up purposes, and 
more than one-third (39 percent) for capital purchases. 
More than a half (58 percent) of the sample firms that received a second guaranteed 
loan used it for capital purchases, while the remainder (42 percent) used it for working 
capital. As mentioned above, the second guaranteed loans were received only by firms in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. Two-thirds of firms in the manufacturing sector used the 
second guaranteed loans for capital purchases, while half of the loans were used for the same 
purpose in the service sector (see Table 7.9). In the remainder of this chapter the discussion 
focuses on the most recent loans received by the sample firms. This means that for 12 fin-ns 
we refer to the second loan received. 
7.6.3 Size ofLoans and Projects 
Table 7.10 shows that more than two-thirds (69 percent) of the most recent loans 
were used for capital purchases and working capital. Whilst 28 percent of respondents used 
the loans for starting-up their businesses, and only 3 interviewees (2 percent) stated that their 
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most recent guaranteed loan was used for financing new products or services. This reflects a 
lack of innovation or ability of SMEs to introduce new products or services. 
The most recent loans that were used to finance new products or services were in the 
manufacturing sector (two of the total loans) and only one was in the retail sector, as Table 
7.10 shows. In spite of the low percentage of these firms in the manufacturing sector, it gives 
an indication that this sector is relatively better at innovation and introducing new products or 
services in order to enter new markets. However, small and medium-sized firms in all sectors 
need more encouragement to involve by the provision of financial support. Table 7.10 shows 
that more than 30 percent of sample f irms in the manufacturing sector h ad used the most 
recent loans to start-up their project; this presurnably is because the manufacturing sector is 
more flexible in allowing new firms to enter it. 
The average amount of the most recent loans guaranteed by JLGC; the size of the 
project for different purposes; and the ratio of the loan size to the project size are shown in 
Table 7.11. The average loan amount used for start-up in the manufacturing sector was 
around J. D 20 thousand, while the lowest average value of the loan for start-up purposes was 
little different and in the service sector, at around J. D 18 thousand. The average amount of 
guaranteed loan used for start-up is between J. D 18 thousand in the service sector to 30 
thousand in the agriculture sector. The manufacturing sector used the highest average amount 
of recent guaranteed loans for purposes other than start-up-for capital purchases the average 
value was around J. D 26 thousand, while it was around J. D 15 thousand on average for the 
other sectors as shown in Table 7.11. The average amount of loan for working capital 
purposes was around J. D 38 thousand in the manufacturing, but only J. D 23 thousand in the 
service sector and J. D 14 and J. D 13 thousand for loans in the retail and agriculture sectors 
respectively. 
The average size of the project that the firms were trying to finance is also shown in 
Table 7.11. Generally, the size of the project in the manufacturing sector is greater than that 
in other sectors. The exceptions are start-up projects in the agriculture sector, the average 
being around J-D 80 thousand, while the lowest project size is for start-ups in retail at around 
J. D 17 thousand on average (see Table 7.11). 
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Table 7.11 also shows the ratio of the average loan size to the average project size, 
which reflects the percentage of what the borrower needed, and that was partially covered by 
the guarantee. In the case of start-ups, the highest ratio of loan to project size is in the service 
sector at around 50 percent, but the lowest is in the agriculture sector at 38 percent. This is 
the lowest ratio not only for start-up projects, but for all sectors and all purposes. This is due 
to the high level of risk in the agriculture sector and the lack of information available about 
firms' performance at this critical stage. Therefore, banks are reluctant to cover all of the 
project needs, and they let the borrower participate in financing the project as far as possible, 
so as to reduce the moral hazard for borrowers. 
Projects concerned with a capital purchase have the greatest ratio of loan to project 
size. The highest ratio is 100 percent in the agriculture sector, and the lowest ratio is in the 
service sector at around 70 percent. The projects involving working capital have ratios of 75 
percent in the manufacturing sector and 60 percent in the retail sector. This reflects the fact 
that the banks and financial institutions prefer to provide loans to firms that are looking for 
projects related to capital purchases or working capital, because the firms at this stage have 
enough indicators about their performance. The maximum ratio of loan to project size is not 
more than 50 percent in projects concerned with start-up or the financing of new products or 
services. This reflects the lack of information about the firms in the start-up stage, and the 
uncertainty about products that are seeking new markets. These are factors which contribute 
to the high cost of innovation in SMEs. 
7.6.4 Arranging the Loans 
In the case of the most recent loans that were guaranteed by the JLGC the vast 
majority of the sample firms (82 percent) had approached their bank first, while only 18 
percent approached the JLGC directly (see Table 7.12). Table 7.12 gives the responses to the 
question: "Why did the firm take a JLGC loan? " Around half of the interviewees (48 percent) 
justified their need to take a guaranteed loan as being due to the lack of collateral that can be 
pledged to the banks. Some other respondents (26 percent) replied that they had taken the 
guaranteed loan following their bank's request and policy. Thirteen percent of the sample 
firms said that they had taken the guaranteed loans because of insufficient track records, and 
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only 6 percent replied they used the guaranteed loans for other reasons. One of them 
summarised these reasons as follows: 
"Just to encourage the banks to lend us we pledge collateral, equal to more than the value of 
the amount of the loan. And we requestedfrom the bank to transfer our loans to the JLGC to 
get its guarantee for the loan, so the total value of security (real-estate collateral and the 
JLGC guarantee) was around 200 percent of the amount of the loan, so we use the JLGC 
guaranteesjust to encourage the bank to lend us. " 
More than one-third (40 percent) of the sample firms in the agriculture sector did not 
know the reasons that they had received a guaranteed loan, since they had enough collateral. 
This reflects a lack of trust by the commercial banks in the agriculture sector generally. This 
was shown in Chapter 3, where the total credit facilities provided to this sector is the lowest 
compared with the other sectors, and the banks just transfer applications to the JLGC. Table 
7.12 also shows that around three quarters (75 percent) of the sample firms reported that the 
guaranteed loans took more than three weeks to arrange. Seven percent of the interviewees 
found that the loans need less than a week to arrange, and half of them said that the loans 
needed three to five weeks. 
The survey result shows that around 90 percent of the respondents reported that the 
rate of interest on the guaranteed loans was between 10 and 15 percent, as shown in Table 
7.12. This result is consistent with the Central Bank of Jordan (2000) report, which states the 
average interest rate in the Jordanian credit market is between 10 - 15 percent. Only 9 
percent of interviewees said the interest rate was less than 10 percent. All firms in the retail 
and agriculture sectors were charged between 13-15 percent, but 14 percent and 6 percent of 
interviewees in the manufacturing and service sectors respectively paid less than 10 percent. 
This is because these firms received their guaranteed loans from the Industrial Development 
Bank (IDB), which is funded by the government to support SMEs in the manufacturing 
sector and some activities in the service sector. This is under special conditions, so that the 
interest rate is lower than the rate for the commercial banks. Overall, Table 7.12 shows that 
three-quarters of the respondents believed that the interest rate on the guaranteed loan was 
the same as the market rate for (77 percent), while 13 percent believe that the interest rate on 
these loans was higher, and only 8 percent had the opposite view point. 
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7.7 Financing of the Project 
The purpose of this section is to give an idea about the finance of the projects 
receiving JLGC loan guarantees. This includes details on the administration of the bank 
loans, the size of the guaranteed loan, the sources of finance, the security offered, the 
additionality of the guarantee and subsequent finance after the guaranteed loan. As 
mentioned above the focus of the discussion is on the most recent loan. 
7.7.1 Administration o the Bank Loan f 
Table 7.13 shows the administration of the bank loan, and whether the firms prepared 
any documents to support their application. Nearly 70 percent of the interviewees reported 
that the commercial banks asked them for a business plan or a feasibility study, or possibly 
both. However, one-quarter of the firms reported that the business plan was enough for the 
banks to provide them with the loan and to secure a guarantee, and 13 percent said a 
feasibility study was sufficient alone. Around one-quarter of the sample firms did not prepare 
any special documents. A cash-flow statement was rarely prepared for the guaranteed loan, 
since only 5 percent of total sample prepared one. This is because the cash-flow concept is a 
new idea in Jordan, and the vast majority of entrepreneurs do not know what it is nor how to 
prepare it. 
Table 7.13 shows that three-quarters (76 percent) of the firrns in the service sector 
prepared a business plan or a feasibility study, or both, according to the commercial banks' 
request. Two-thirds of firms in the manufacturing sector were asked by the commercial banks 
to prepare any or both of the above documents. It can be observed from the table that the 
firms in the retail and agriculture sector were asked to prepare a business plan only, due to 
the s implicity of the work in these two sectors compared w ith work in the o ther sectors. 
However, firms in manufacturing were more able to prepare a cash-flow statement compared 
with the other sectors (5 firms out of a7 firms), despite the low number of firms that 
prepared a cash-flow statement in total. This reflects the ability of this sector to adopt broader 
approaches to obtain more funds, and it explains this sector's liability to develop its 
accounting and financial systems and regulations in order to pursue this. 
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The vast majority of the interviewees believed (70 percent) that the preparation of a 
business plan, feasibility study or a cash-flow statement helped them to secure the guaranteed 
loan (see Table 7.13). This was lower in manufacturing (66 percent), but more important in 
retail (82 percent) and services (76 percent). However, the commercial banks' follow-up 
activities were not good enough from the interviewee's point of view. More than two-thirds 
(60 percent) of the sample firms said they did not receive ongoing advice and guidance after 
receiving the guaranteed loan (see Table 7.13). The manufacturing sector had the lion's share 
of advice and guidance (44 percent received such support), and this may partly be explained 
by the lack of default cases in this sector. In the agriculture sector, no ongoing bank guidance 
was received, which can lead to firms having a higher rate of default (Salah, 1998). 
7.7.2 The Size of the Loan Guaranteed 
Table 7.14 shows that the average size of loan is J. D 22,600. However, more than 
one-third (39 percent) of the sample firms receiving a guarantee had a loan of less than J. D 
10 thousand. Around 24 percent of the guaranteed loans were between J. D 10-20 thousand, 
and 25 percent of respondents said that the value of their loan was between J. D 20-40 
thousand. Only 12 percent (17 loans) of the guaranteed loans were more than J. D 40 
thousand, and they averaged around J. D 65 thousand. The JLGC guarantees 50 percent of 
these large loans above J. D 40 thousand, so that the other 88 percent of loans received 
guarantees of 75 percent of the loan value (see Table 7.14). The vast majority of the loans of 
over J. D 40 thousand are to the manufacturing sector (65 percent). As a result, Table 7.14 
shows that the size of guaranteed loans provided to the manufacturing sector is larger than 
the value of loans provided to any other sector. In manufacturing, 54 percent of loans are less 
than J. D 20 thousand, compared with roughly two-thirds in the other sectors. Excluding the 
manufacturing sector, t he JL GC guarantees 75p ercent oft he I oans t hat were provided to 
more than 90 percent of the firins. In manufacturing, it is 84 percent. 
7.7.3 Other Sources of Finance 
It is useful to know if the sample firms used any other sources of fi inance in addition 
to the guaranteed loan. Table 7.15 shows that 58 percent of the sample firms used finance 
from other sources in order to cover the project's requirements, whereas 41 percent of 
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interviewees found that the guaranteed loan was enough for the project (one percent of cases 
are missing). The manufacturing sector had less recourse to other finance. Around a half of 
the manufacturing firms use other additional financial sources to execute their projects (47 
percent), compared with at least 60 percent in the other sectors. This means that projects 
within this sector are more able to access all of the amount that they require, presumably due 
to the good feasibility and performance of their projects. 
The sources of the other finance used by the sample firms are also shown in Table 
7.15. Of those cases using other sources of finance, the vast majority (93 percent) used their 
own sources (self financing). Only 3 percent of firms used family and friends' or other banks 
as a source. All of the firms in the retail and agriculture sector used their own sources, if the 
guaranteed loan did not cover all of the project's need (see Table 7.15). 
The reasons why the loan did not cover all of the project's requirements is explored in 
Table 7.15 (ie. why the firm required other sources of finance). According to the 
interviewees, around half of the sample found that the bank refused to lend them any more. 
Around 34 percent of interviewees did not require more funds for their projects, as they were 
depending on their own sources to cover the project's need. Only 6 percent of the sample 
firms believed that the reason for the loan's inability to cover all the project's need was due 
to a lack of collateral. However, some borrowers believed that the banks refused to provide 
more to them due to a lack of collateral, even though they thought they had sufficient 
collateral. The manufacturing sector accounts for over 90 percent of firms who believe that 
lack of collateral is the only reason for the loan being inadequate to cover the whole of the 
project's need. This again partly reflects the greater awareness of this sector compared with 
the other sectors. 
7.7.4 The Securityfor the Guaranteed Loans 
Even where the loans provided by banks to the sample firms are guaranteed by the 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation, Table 7.16 shows that around 80 percent of firms still 
extended collateral for the guaranteed loans. This is very surprising, as the guarantees are 
meant to go to firms that do not have any or inadequate collateral. Around 90 percent of 
manufacturing sector firms extended collateral for the guaranteed loans, followed by the 
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retail sector (82 percent), the service sector (75 percent) and agriculture (60 percent). Around 
two-thirds (61 percent) of the firms that extended collateral used real-estate collateral for 
their loans. This reflects the importance of this kind of collateral. Usually the value of real- 
estate is greater than the value of the loan, and lenders prefer this kind of collateral to protect 
their rights. 'Another guarantor' was used as a second kind of collateral (23 percent), 
followed by 'goods and equipment' (14 percent) (see Table 7.16). 
Manufacturing f ollows as imilar p attern tot hat of a 11 fin-ns. Ani mportant p oint to 
notice from Table 7.16 is that the firms in the service sector are the lowest users of real- 
estate, as the most important kind of collateral. Only 36 percent of the firms in this sector use 
real-estate, while around one-third use 'another guarantor' as security, and a further one-third 
use 'goods and equipment'. Firms in the retail and agriculture sectors do not used 'goods and 
equipment' at all as collateral. This is due to a lack of equipment to pledge; thus they prefer 
to use real-estate and 'another guarantor' as collateral, because it is easier to provide. 
Table 7.16 also shows that 68 percent of the sample firms said that the value of 
collateral was more than the value of the loan, while 19 percent found that the value of 
collateral was less, followed by 13 percent of respondents who said that the value of 
collateral was equal to the loan value. In the manufacturing sector around one-quarter of 
respondents believe that the value of collateral is lower than the value of the loans. This is 
higher than in other sectors, and it probably reflects the more successful performance of 
firms in this sector, which makes it less risky for the commercial banks. Also, some of the 
firms in this sector may have a long-term relationship with their bank. 
7.7.5 'Additionality'of the Guarantee 
This section provides an analysis of the finance 'additionality' from the interviewees' 
point of view. This is the extra finance that the borrower received due to the existence of 
JLGC, which the firm would not have received in the absence of the guarantee. In our survey 
we asked the firms how much extra bank loan they think they received due to the existence 
of the loan guarantee. The interviewees' answers are categorized in Table 7.17. More than 
one-third (36 percent) of the firms believe that the guarantee did not offer any additionality at 
all, which means that they would have received the same amount of the loan even in absence 
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of the JLGC. Around 21 percent of respondents believed the additionality was between I- 
25 percent of the total loan value, 15 percent believe it was between 25 - 50 percent and 6 
percent believe it was between 50 - 75 percent. Only around 10 percent of the firms believe 
the additional finance was greater than 75 percent of the loan value, and of these full finance 
additionality (ie. 100 percent) occurred in around 8 percent of fin-ns. This means that 92 
percent of the firms received only partial additionality, or none at all. 
There is little difference in finance additionality between the manufacturing and 
service sector. In each case, around one-third of firms said the guarantee had no effect on the 
loan size at all, while about another third of firms put this at between I and 50 percent of the 
loan value. This contrasts with the retail sector, where over half said the guarantee had no 
effect, and 91 percent said it was no greater than 50 percent on the loan size. In agriculture, 
the guarantee seemed to have a greater effect, with half of firms saying that at least half the 
loan depended on the guarantee. 
The interviewees were asked whether or not in their opinion the commercial banks 
would have been interested in lending in the absence of the loan guarantee scheme. This is 
another way at getting the finance additionality of the project. Table 7.17 shows that only 
around one-third (29 percent) of the sample firms thought that the bank would not have lent 
in the absence of the guarantee. This could be due to a lack of collateral or insufficient track 
record with the banks. Thus, around two-thirds of respondents (70 percent) think they would 
have been able to receive loans from the commercial banks in the absence of the guarantee 
scheme. This situation is similar in all sectors, as shown in Table 7.17. 
The above point about finance additionality was confirmed when we asked the 
interviewees to make a choice between three sentences best-describing their situation when 
the firm applied for the guaranteed loan. Table 7.17 shows that 28 percent of the total sample 
firms found that the loan guaranteed by the JLGC was the only option available for them at 
that time. This is followed by 27 percent of firms who said "other sources of finance were 
available but they would only have covered part of the amount provided by JLGC". Around 
41 percent replied that the sentence which best-described their situation was that "other 
sources of finance were available and would have covered the full amount available through 
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the JLGC guaranteed loan, but they still preferred the JLGC support". This is consistent with 
our other evidence reported above. 
If other sources of funds were available, either for a part or for the full amount of the 
loan, the firms were asked why they needed to take-up the guaranteed loan? Around two- 
thirds of the firms said that the bank transferred their applications to the JLGC due to the 
bank's requirements but without infonning them, while only around 20 percent of firms took 
up the guaranteed loan either due to a lack of collateral (10 percent) or because they had no 
collateral (10 percent). This lack of information and transparency would seem to be a serious 
deficiency with the scheme. 
7.7.6 Subsequent Finance after the Guaranteed Loan 
This section investigates whether the borrower has looked for finance subsequent to 
the project for which it received the guaranteed loan. It also examines if the guarantee was 
helpful to the firm in obtaining other loans from commercial banks, or if it made progress 
easier. Table 7.18 shows that only 31 percent of the sample firms (44 firms) received extra 
finance since the guaranteed loan. The retail sector had the lowest number of firms (18 
percent) looking for extra finance, which reflects the limited needs of these firms and the 
relatively small scale of activities in this sector. 
Obtaining subsequent finance was very easy for 39 percent of the total interviewees, 
as Table 7.18 shows. Only II percent of the firms found it very difficult to obtain other 
finance. In the manufacturing sector 13 of 22 firms (58 percent) found that the obtaining for 
subsequent finance was relatively easier after the guaranteed loan. All of the retail sector 
firms obtaining subsequent finance since the guaranteed loan found it very easy, although 
there are only two cases. Table 7.18 also illustrates that around 90 percent of the firms that 
obtained other finance (ie. 90 percent of 44 firms) found that the guaranteed loan was helpful 
to them, so that only 10 percent of firms said that the guaranteed loan did not help obtain new 
finance. All of the firms saying it was not helpful were in the manufacturing sector. 
7.8 The Economic Effects of the Project 
This section reports the findings on the most important economic effects of the 
projects that were supported by JLGC guaranteed loans. This includes the projects' effect on 
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the total assets, sales turnover and the firm employment levels. These are based on responses 
given by the interviewees (i. e. not from financial data). 
7.8.1 The Project's Effects 
The most important effects of the projects can be seen from Table 7.19. The 
interviewees were asked whether the project led to any of the following: the opening-up of 
new markets, the development of new products or services, the development of new 
processes, leading-edge technology, an increase in exports or the creation of a new source of 
supply. More than half of the projects in the sample led to the opening-up of new markets (59 
percent) and the development of new products or services (54 percent). Forty-eight percent 
created new sources of supply, while more than one-third of the projects led to new 
development processes (41 percent) or leading-edge technologies (35 percent). Only ten 
percent of projects lead to an increase in exports, which is consistent with the concentration 
of these firms in local and national markets (see Table 7.19 and section 7.3). 
It is interesting to note that in the retail sector more than two-thirds of projects led to 
the development ofn ew p roducts ors ervices, b ecause t he f irms in t his s ector f ace strong 
competition from one another. Therefore they are always on the look-out for new products to 
market. The manufacturing projects concentrate on developing new processes (53 percent) 
and leading-edge technology (46 percent). This is due to the multi-process and technical 
systems necessary in this sector, compared with say the retail sector, where only around 10 
percent of the projects led to the development of new processes and did not lead to leading- 
edge technology at all. Table 7.19 shows that projects in the manufacturing sector were much 
more likely to lead to an increase in exports. This fits in well with the previous information 
about the sales of these firms in international markets (see section 7.3). 
7.8.2 The Effect on Total Assets 
The total assets (including land) of the firms one year before they received the most 
recent guaranteed loan are shown in Table 7.20. Around 20 percent of sample firms did not 
have any assets, because they had not yet started-up. Of those that had started, one-quarter 
had assets between J. D I- 25 thousand, and a further quarter had assets of between J. D 100 
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- 500 thousand. Assets in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors were greater than those 
in the other sectors. Around 50 percent of these finns had assets of more than J. D 100 
thousand, while it iso nly about o ne-third int he s ervice se ctor. T he maximum a mount of 
assets in the retail sector was around J. D 100 thousand (see Table 7.20). 
The assets can be expected to change due to the effect of the project that was financed 
by the guaranteed loan. Table 7.21 shows the changes in the firms' assets two years and three 
years after the date of the loan. Overall, the average amount of total assets a year before the 
loan was around J. D 136 thousand, but the average change in total assets was J. D 53 
thousand after two years and J. D 95 thousand after three years. These appear to be strong 
effect. H owever, ona verage, o nly J. D 22t housand (23 p ercent) oft he change after t hree 
years was due to the project, according to the interviewees' responses. Table 7.21 also shows 
that the average assets for the manufacturing sector, both before and after the loan, were 
greater than that for other sectors. The change in assets in this sector due to the project was 
26.6 percent, which is around J. D 27 thousand (ie. 26.6 percent of J. D 101.2 thousand). The 
smallest effects are in the retail sector, at 13 percent or J. D 6 thousands. 
7.8.3 The Effect on Sales Turnover 
It is also useful to have some idea of the most recent project on sales turnover. The 
turnover one year before the loan is shown in Table 7.20. Again, 20 percent of firms had not 
yet started. Around 43 percent of respondents replied that their sales turnover was between 
J. D I- 100 thousand and the remainder (38 percent) had a turnover of more than J. D 100 
thousand. Around 50 percent of the firm's turnover was more than J. D 100 thousand in both 
manufacturing and agriculture, while it is only one-third in the service and retail sectors. 
Average sales t urnover one year before the I oan was a round J. D 121 thousand on 
average for all firms, while the average change in turnover after two years of the loan was 
nearly J. D 39 thousand and around J-D 70 thousand after three years (Table 7.21). The table 
also shows that the average change in sales due to the project were roughly one-sixth of total 
change after three years (ie. 16.7 percent). The manufacturing sector has the highest value of 
sales t urnover b efore a nd a fter t he proj ect, a nd it w as a ffected byt he c hange int he s ales 
turnover m ore than a ny o ther sector. According to the interviewees' responses, around 20 
percent of the average sales change in manufacturing was due to the project, while this figure 
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was not more than 15 percent in any other sector. Again, firms' turnover in the retail sector 
has the lowest effect of the project after three years, at only 11 percent, which is equal to J. D 
4 thousand. 
7.8.4 The Effect on Employment Level 
Employment is one of the most important measurements of the economic impact 
because of high unemployment. Table 7.20 shows that half of the sample firms (47 percent) 
employed between I-5 employees one year before the loan, while nearly one-third (30 
percent) employed between 6- 20 workers, followed by 8 percent of firms which employed 
more than 20 workers. Firms in the retail sector did not employ more than 5 workers. In the 
manufacturing sector 13 percent of firms employed more than 20. 
The average number of employees in the sample firms one year before the loan was 
around 7.7 workers, but this changed to 10.2 workers two years after the loan, and then to 
11.9 workers after three years (Table 7.21). The average change was 4.2 workers, but only 
one of these jobs depended on the project that was supported by the JLGC. This table shows 
that the average number of workers one year before the loan in the manufacturing sector was 
II workers, which is greater than for the other sectors. It is followed by 5 employees in the 
service sector, 3 workers in agriculture and 2 workers in the retail sector. Also, the average 
change of employment in the manufacturing sector three years after the loan was greater than 
for other sectors. The change due to the supported project was 1.6 jobs in manufacturing and 
one job in the agriculture sector. 
Due to the importance of employment in small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
interviewees were asked about the nature of the jobs that were attributable to the project three 
years after its implementation. A breakdown between the jobs 'created' and 'retained' is 
shown in Table 7.22. It shows that around 21 percent of respondents did not create any new 
jobs, while 46 percent of the sample firms created I-5 jobs. Only 8 percent created 6- 10 
jobs and 6 percent created 11 - 50 jobs. The manufacturing sector was able to create more 
jobs. Table 7.22 shows that 37 percent of the firms in manufacturing created more than 5 
jobs, but in the service sector only 14 percent did the same. This suggests that the 
manufacturing sector's ability to create jobs is greater than that for other sectors. 
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Regarding the jobs that are retained due to the project, 64 percent of firms reported 
that they didn't retain any jobs. Of those retaining jobs, most retained a very small number 
(generally less than 6 jobs). The manufacturing sector was able to retain a greater number of 
jobs, which a gain perhaps shows the greater ability of the manufacturing sector to help in 
solving the unemployment problem. Fifty-seven percent of manufacturers said they retained 
some jobs, of which a quarter retained more than 5 jobs. Firms were also asked whether their 
new employees had previously experience of the firm's activity. It was found that around 57 
percent of firms (ie. 73 of 129 firms responding) provided jobs for workers without any 
experience. Of those firms responding 43 percent (ie. 56 out of 129 firms) only employed 
new workers with experience. The manufacturing and agriculture sectors tend to employ 
more people without experience compared with other sectors. 
7.9 Feedback on the Loan Guarantee Scheme 
This section looks at the difficulties encountered by f inns in receipt of guaranteed 
loans, the advantages and disadvantages of these loans, and the changes that the borrowers 
would like to see in the way that both the banks and the loan guarantee scheme operate. 
These comments might help improve the scheme for future applicants. The section also 
presents interviewees' general comments about the guaranteed loans. This feedback is based 
on both structured and open-ended questions. 
7.9.1 Difficulties Encountered with the Scheme 
Table 7.23 lists the main difficulties encountered by the sample firms with the 
scheme. These are in response to structured questions. It is encouraging that nearly two- 
thirds (60 percent) of the firms did not face any difficulties at all, according to their 
responses. However, for others, meeting the asset security condition is the most important 
problem, with around one-third (32 percent) of the firms citing it as a serious difficulty. This 
reflects the main problem facing small and medium-sized enterprises (ie. lack of collateral) 
when they seek finance from commercial banks. Banks tend to concentrate on the value of 
these assets, which they require to be greater than the amount of the loan. Filling-out the 
application form and the administrative process was not a big problem for our sample, as 
only one percent of respondents cited it as a difficulty. However, it should be remembered 
that around 70 percent were unaware that they had a guarantee. Likewise, preparing a 
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business plan, feasibility study or cash-flow statement was a problem for only around 7 
percent of the respondents. 
Finns in the manufacturing sector faced more difficulties than fin-ns in other sectors. 
Forty percent of manufacturers found it difficult to meet asset security condition, and around 
6 percent of these firms found it difficult to prepare a business plan, feasibility study or cash- 
flow statement. This might reflect the greater need of these f=s for more funds. The vast 
majority of the firms in the retail sector did not have any difficulties at all, and only 9 percent 
found itd ifficult to meet t he a sset s ecurity c ondition. A gain, it may reflect t he I oan s ize, 
which is smaller in this sector. The interviewees were also asked how helpful the bank was in 
securing the guaranteed loan. Table 7.23 shows that 81 percent of the sample firms thought 
the bank was helpful or very helpful, while only 3 percent found it very unhelpful. These are 
positive effects. 
7.9.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Guaranteed Loans 
The firms were also asked about whether the guaranteed loan had advantages over 
other commercial bank finance. The possible responses are given in Table 7.24, and firms 
could select more than one. The collateral pledged to the bank for the guaranteed loan is less 
than that required for a normal commercial bank loan, and according to 35 percent of 
respondents this was an advantage of the scheme. The grace period for the guaranteed loan 
was also an advantage, and was cited by 25 percent of respondents, while 22 percent found 
that the longer repayment period was an advantage. Other advantages were the larger 
available loan size (17 percent), the lower interest rate (9 percent) and the lower 
administrative cost of the scheme (3 percent). 
During the research survey it was rare for interviewees to reply to any open-ended 
questions, because they tended to lack confidence in their ability, and instead preferred to 
choose answers from structured questions. However, we asked the interviewees if they found 
any disadvantages with the guaranteed loans. Only 41 interviewees responded out of the 142 
firms, so that the majority could not find any disadvantages. The most important 
disadvantage, mentioned by 21 of the borrowers, was that they did not feel that there was any 
difference between the guaranteed loan and a normal loan. Other disadvantages mentioned 
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were that the grace period was not long enough, the monthly payment was too high, the 
administrative cost was the same as the commercial loans, and there is no any guidance or 
follow-up from the JLGC. 
7.9.3 Feedback on the Bank 
The feedback on the commercial banks relied on open-ended questions. However, as 
we mentioned above, the interviewees often did not reply to such questions, so that we do not 
have high responses to these questions. As such, their answers are summarized below in the 
form of bullet points. The most important criticisms of the commercial banks were as 
follows: 
e The b anks d id n ot c are enough about t he t rack r ecord oft he b orrower, so t hat 
when the borrower had a good track record with the bank, the banks still asked for 
collateral. 
* Some borrowers did not know that their loan was guaranteed by the JLGC from 
the first day, but discovered it after few months. This is because the banks did not 
explain to the borrowers about the JLGC services and how they can use it. 
9 The borrowers did not feel that the guarantee loans were any different to other 
bank loans, and did offer any benefit to them. 
9 The banks tried to pass on to the finns the fees that they paid to the JLGC as part 
of the scheme. 
e The loan guarantee s cherne w as abused by the banks, as they used it as quick 
source of cash in the event of loan default. They did not really care about small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
7.9.4 Feedback on the JLGC 
The feedback on the JLGC also relied on open-ended questions. The changes that the 
interviewees considered would be useful to the procedures of the JLGC in the future 
operation of the loan guarantee scheme were as follows: 
* The Jordan Loan Guarantee Scheme should deal directly with the borrowers' right 
from the start of the loan application process. Some borrowers reported that their 
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guarantee had run for a few years but that they had never met with any of the 7-- 
JLGC scheme staff or received any information about the scheme. 
The JLGC did not care enough about the business plan, feasibility study or cash 
flow statements, and usually left everything for the banks to decide. If the bank 
was s atisfied w ith t he d ocuments t hat t he borrowers p rovided, t hen so was t he 
JLGC. 
The marketing activities for the scheme were very weak. The scheme should 
reach the enterprises directly, so that the JLGC does not need to wait for the bank 
to market the scheme's services. 
Some borrowers said that JLGC did not provide any services to SMEs, and they 
felt that the scheme just provided services to the commercial banks. They did not 
feel any difference between the guaranteed loans and other loans, so that the role 
of JLGC is still unclear to the borrowers. 
The JLGC work concentrates on the capital city, Amman. This will enhance the 
pattern of uneven development that the other governorates suffer from. 
Ninety percent of fin-ns said they were able to pay I-3 percent of the loan 
amount as a fee to the JLGC instead of pledge real estate collateral. Because they 
are paying fees to the Central Government, around 1.6 percent of the value of real 
estate collateral that they pledged to the commercial banks. 
7.10 The Survey of Commercial Banks 
As well as the questionnaire survey of loan recipients, the study also carried out a 
survey of a small number of commercial banks, in order to get their point of view on the loan 
guarantee scheme. These interviews were conducted with the credit managers of five out of 
the 19 banks participating in the scheme. All of these banks signed the Amman Agreement 
with the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation in 1994 or 1995. The commercial bank 
questionnaire was discussed and presented in Chapter 6. Only one of the interviewee didn't 
give us the precise number of the credit facilities that is provided by his bank at 1999, but for 
the other banks the total credit facilities they provided in 1999 was between J. D 142 million 
and J. D 580 million. They reported that not more than 25 percent of their total credit facilities 
were provided to small and medium-sized firms and of these only up to 30 percent received a 
guarantee under the loan guarantee scheme. The SNEs seek funds from the commercial 
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banks for two main reasons, working capital and start-up purposes. This result is consistent 
with the survey of loan guarantee recipients. 
The banks told us that they put forward a firm for the guaranteed loan if the firm has a 
viable project, but does not have enough collateral or a sufficient history with the commercial 
bank, or if the firm perceived as high risk. In these cases the bank looks for more security and 
insurance, which is given by the JLGC. However, they reported that the most important 
factor to ask the firms to apply for the guaranteed loan is the lack of conventional collateral. 
So it is clear that collateral has a main role in the commercial bank's decision to provide 
loans to small and medium-size projects. Further, it is the main source of security for the 
loans even when guaranteed under the loan guarantee scheme. These are consistent with the 
firm survey results. 
The documents that banks request from the firms applying for a normal loan 
concentrate on the business plan and feasibility study. These are generally the same 
documents requested from the firms if they apply for a guaranteed loan, even though the loan 
guarantee scheme encourages the firms to prepare a cash-flow analysis in addition to the 
other two kinds of documents. The scheme also asks for other documents (see Chapter 5), but 
these are not always seen to be so important, and indeed the banks sometimes did not give 
much attention to these documents at all, and the banks reported that the documents prepared 
by firms were often of a poor quality. Nonetheless, according to the banks the scheme always 
encourages the commercial banks to apply credit policy that gives priority to a project's 
economic feasibility and to a cash-flow analysis, and not to concentrate solely on 
conventional collateral. Thus, it is not surprising that the commercial banks told us that the 
only difference between a normal small firm loan and a JLGC guaranteed loan is the fact that 
the total value of collateral is less than that pledged for a normal loan. 
According to the banks, they do not think that the recipient of the guaranteed loan 
performs any different to that at a firm receiving a normal loan. All of the banks said that the 
existence of the loan guarantee scheme encourages the commercial banks to make more 
loans tos mall f irms, b ut t hat itw as n ot m uch ast hey e xpected. T his w as b ecause oft he 
bureaucracy and form-filling involved in administering the scheme. When we asked the 
credit managers about the proportion of the guaranteed loans and how many would have been 
provided if the scheme did not existed, one of the managers reported that his bank would 
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provide the same loans even if the scheme did not exist at all, suggesting no finance 
additionality. The others reported that they would provide at least two-thirds of the loans in 
the absence of the guarantee. 
The commercial banks were also asked about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
loan guarantee scheme. The advantages were as follows. It ignores the conventional 
collateral requirement, so that if a project is a 'good' one and has a certain profitability then it 
is funded. A second advantage is the provision of liquidity to b anks, in the event of I oan 
default. The scheme settles the guarantee amount within three months of the claim. The other 
advantage is the incentives that the commercial banks can receive from the Central Bank of 
Jordan (see Chapter 5). One of the credit mangers reported that these advantages are the main 
reasons for some of the banks to participate in the loan guarantee scheme. 
The disadvantages are that the loan guarantees take long time to progress, especially 
in the case of compensation when the borrower defaults. A lot of documents are requested by 
the scheme, and a lot of forms need to be filled-in by the borrower. A second disadvantage is 
the ineffective marketing strategy for the scheme. The credit officers reported that the 
borrowers often seem to have no idea at all about the scheme, and some firms refuse the 
guarantee because they do not want a third part involved in their loan contract. Thirdly, some 
banks feel that in the case of loan defaults the loan guarantee scheme keeps searching until 
they find a mistake that has been made by the bank, and against the Amman Agreement, so 
as not to pay any compensation to the bank. This greatly diminishes the bank's confidence in 
the scheme. Finally, the banks also report that scheme decision on guaranteed loans depends 
more or less solely on the banks decision, rather than a separate study or evaluation of the 
proj ect. 
The changes that the commercial banks believe are necessary to make the loan 
guarantee scheme more effective are: to reduce the quantity of documents requested from the 
borrower and the reports and forrns requested from the banks in case of default; market the 
scheme and carry out fieldwork to develop the scheme and to evaluate it; to trust the banks 
and the borrowers more; and to make it easier to progress claims in the event of default. 
Finally, the last point discussed at interview was to find out the extent to which 
participation in the loan guarantee scheme changed the bank's behaviour in lending to SNffis. 
The interviewee responses varied from one to another, but we can summarise them as 
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follows: Participation in the loan guarantee scheme gives the banks more range to lend to 
SMEs in different sectors than was possible before. Not many changes in the banks' 
behaviour took place due to the scheme, because the scheme was still relatively new and the 
banks' experience with it is not substantial. The changes were not great because of the 
bureaucratic nature of the scheme, which made the banks wary of participating in the 
scheme. Generally, because of this and the difficulties in receiving compensation in the event 
of default the banks only lent to firms they would otherwise have lent to. 
7.11 Conclusions 
The survey of JLGC guarantee loan recipients gives evidence on the characteristics of 
the scheme and its effects. In particular, it gives information on the status of the interviewees, 
the firms, the start-up stage, the take-up the JLGC support and the nature of projects, and the 
economic effects of the JLGC-supported projects. Demographic data on the interviewees' 
shows that 90 percent of them are managers and for half of them they have a first degree. 
Only 10 percent of sample participants in the scheme are women. The approximate age of a 
respondent is around 45 years on average, with 15 years experience. Characteristics of the 
sample firms show that around two-thirds of the firms were sole-trader and the majority of 
these firms were single-plants. Only few firms of this sample considered as old firms, 
because most of the sample firms were established in the last two decades. 
The start-up stage capital used by the sample firms was generally less than J. D 100 
thousand, indicating that the firms are generally small size. Also at this stage apparent that 
the self-finance and commercial banks were the principal financial sources for capital at the 
start-up stage. Despite the lack of the firms that have a history with commercial banks. The 
loans that were received from commercial banks before the JLGC support were used for 
working capital purposes, and around half of these loans were used real-estate assets as a 
security for loan as expected the value of these security were more than the values of the 
loan. 
Most of these guaranteed loans used for capital purchases, start-up stage and working 
capital. The vast majority of sample firms made aware about the loan guarantee scheme by 
their banks. This reflects the borrowers' lack of infort-nation about the loan guarantee 
scheme. Around 80 percent of the guaranteed loans recipients still extended conventional 
collateral for the guaranteed loan. This is very surprising, as the guarantees are meant to go to 
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firms that do not have any or inadequate collateral. In addition to the conventional collateral, 
commercial banks requested from the sample firms to prepare some other documents such as 
feasibility study or business plan or both of them. But the commercial banks still caring more 
about the conventional collateral despite of the loan guaranteed by JLGC, and the documents 
that supported the project successful. This means that the JLGC was fall to adopt a credit 
policy that gives a priority to the firms that have a viable project; even they have not enough 
collateral. 
The survey analysis shows that more than one-third of the sample firms didn't receive 
financial additionality at all, while 8 percent of the firms received full additionality (100 
percent of the value of the loan was extra). Also one-third of the interviewees will never get the 
loan from the commercial banks in the absence of JLGC, which also help them to apply for 
subsequent finance after the guaranteed loan. The other effects of the guaranteed loan on the 
project that financed by the guaranteed loan are assimilate in open-up new markets, 
development new products or services and development of new process. Around one-quarter of 
the changes in total assets, one-third of changes in sales turnover and one-quarter of changes in 
employees after three years were due to the project that funded by guaranteed loan, which 
means the guaranteed loan was create some economic effects. 
Here, we can observe that the loan guarantee scheme has some positive effects on the 
firms that received a guaranteed loans, but it is still need to do more because the scheme fall in 
two main points which are the conventional collateral that still requested by the banks despite 
the loan is guaranteed by the JLGC. And the scheme did not adopt the credit policy completely 
or s uccessfully. Sot he sc heme f aces s ome d ifficulties a nd s ome i mprovements tobedoi ts 
mission. Finally, the survey analysis of the commercial banks shows that the changes in the 
banks' behaviour in lending to SMEs were not great, due to the bureaucratic nature of the 
scheme, and difficulties in receiving compensation in the event of default, the banks only lent 
to the firms they would otherwise have lent to. 
Having described the nature of the sample survey of firms and the nature of the data 
at our disposal, in the next chapter we utilize this data to undertake some econometric analysis. 
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Table 7.1: Status of Interviewee 
Manufacturinci Services Retail Aqriculture Total 
Manager 61 (86) 47 (92) 11 (100) 10 (100) 129 (90) 
Sales Manager 2 (3) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
Financial Manager 5 (8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (4) 
Partner 2 (3) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
PhD 2 (3) 3 (6) 0 (0) 1 (10) 6 (4) 
Master degree 3 (4) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (3) 
First degree 32 (46) 26 (51) 7 (64) 4 (40) 69 (49) 
A level or less 33 (47) 20 (39) 4 (36) 5 (50) 62 (44) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Gender (GENDER) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Male 64 (91) 44 (86) 10 (91) 10 (100) 128 (90) 
Female 6 (9) 7 (14) 1 (9) 0 (0) 14 (10) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Approximate age (AGE-INT) 45 44 47 51 45 
Years Experience (EXPER) 16 14 15 16 15 
Table 7.2: Legal Status Organisation and Location of Firms 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Legal status (LEGAL) No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%) No ( %) 
Sole-trader 36 51 36 71 10 91 10 100 92 65 
Partnership 24 34 14 27 1 9 0 0 39 27 
Private ownership 10 15 1 2 0 0 0 0 11 8 
Total 70 100 51 100 11 100 10 100 142 100 
Organisation (ORG) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No (%) 
Single-Plant 59 84 47 92 10 91 10 100 126 89 
Multi-Plant 7 10 3 6 0 0 0 0 10 7 
Part of Large group 4 6 1 2 1 9 0 0 6 4 
Total 70 100 51 100 11 100 10 100 142 100 
Location (LOCATE) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
_ 
Amman 35 50 30 58 5 46 5 50 75 52 
Irbid 9 13 9 18 3 27 3 30 24 17 
Zarqa 8 11 4 8 3 27 0 0 15 11 
Balqa 7 10 6 12 0 0 2 20 15 11 
Aqaba 11 16 2 4 0 0 0 0 13 9 
Total 70 100 51 100 11 100 10 100 142 100 
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Table 7.3: Age of the Firms 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Start-up Date of Firm 
Year (AGE) No. No. No. No. No N 
1996-1999 25 (36) 21 (41) 3 (27) 1 (10) 50 (35) 
1990-1995 21 (30) 13 (25) 6 (55) 5 (50) 45 (32) 
1980-1989 17 (24) 11 (22) 1 (9) 4 (40) 33 (23) 
1960-1979 3 (4) 6 (12) 1 (9) 0 (0) 10 (7) 
1946-1960 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1.5) 
Pre-war 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1.5) 
n/known 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 100 
- 
Start-up Date of Firm at this Site 
Year No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. M No (%) 
1996-1999 27 (39) 21 (41) 3 (27) 1 (10) 50 (35) 
1990-1995 22 (31) 13 (25) 6 (55) 5 (50) 45 (32) 
1980-1989 16 (23) 12 (24) 1 (9) 4 (40) 33 (23) 
1960-1979 4 (4) 5 (10) 1 (9) 0 (0) 10 (7) 
1946-1960 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1.5) 
Pre-war 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1.5) 
n/known 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Note: There is no variable label for the start-up date at this site as it more or less identical to the AGE variable. 
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Table 7.4: Size of the Firm 
Employment size of p lants (EMP) 
Manufacturing Services Retail Ag riculture Total 
No. of 
employees No. No. No . 
No 
. 
No. No. of employees Mean 
0-4 15 (21) 22 (43) 7 (64) 4 (40) 48 (34) 133 3 
5-9 15 (22) 15 (29) 4 (36) 3 (30) 37 (26) 230 6 
10-19 17 (24) 11 (22) 0 (0) 2 (20) 30 (21) 418 14 
20-50 20 (20) 2 (4) 0 (0) 1 (10) 23 (16) 658 29 
More than 50 3 (4) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 320 80 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 1759 12 
Sales turnover of plants ( TURN) 
Sector 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
I ul I IvVU) 
(J D'OOOs) No. N No. No. No. No. Total (JD, 000) Mean 
Less 25 11 (16) 11 (22) 1 (9) 3 (30) 26 (18) 392 15 
26-75 10 (14) 14 (27) 2 (18) 2 (20) 28 (20) 1,276 46 
76-150 12 (17) 8 (16) 4 (36) 0 (0) 24 (17) 2,665 ill 
151 -300 14 (20) 9 (17) 1 (9) 2 (20) 26 (18) 5,950 229 
301 -1,000 12 (17) 1 (2) 0 (0) 1 (10) 14 (10) 7,420 530 
1,000 - 2,000 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1,500 1,500 
More 2,000 2 (3) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (2) 7,800 2,600 
Missing 8 (11) 7 (14) 3 (28) 2 (20) 20 (14) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 27003 190 
Table 7.5: Constraints Facing Firms 
Manufacturing Services Retail Ag riculture Total 
Nature of Constraints No. N No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Price Competition 51 (73) 30 (59) 8 (73) 7 (70) 96 (68) 
Lack of Finance 40 (57) 32 (63) 5 (45) 8 (80) 85 (60) 
Labour Market 36 (51) 19 (37) 2 (18) 3 (30) 60 (42) 
Government Regulations 22 (31) 15 (29) 1 (9) 0 (0) 38 (27) 
Marketing 21 (30) 7 (14) 1 (9) 6 (60) 35 (25) 
Price of Raw Materials 16 (23) 5 (10) 0 (0) 1 (10) 22 (15) 
Technology 7 (10) 4 (8) 0 (0) 2 (20) 13 (9) 
Other 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Note: The interviewee can choose more one answer. 
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Table7.6: Start-Up of the Firm 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
- Start-Up Capital (JD 000's) (CAP) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Up to 10 20 (29) 12 (23) 5 (46) 1 (10) 38 (27) 
10 to 40 20 (29) 20 (39) 2 (18) 4 (40) 46 (32) 
40 to 100 12 (17) 10 (20) 4 (36) 4 (40) 30 (21) 
More than 100 18 (25) 9 (18) 0 (0) 1 (10) 28 (20) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Principal financial resources No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Self finance and banks 22 (32) 16 (31) 5 (46) 3 (30) 46 (32) 
Self finance 22 (31) 15 (29) 4 (36) 1 (10) 42 (29) 
Self finance and relatives or friends 9 (13) 11 (22) 2 (18) 5 (50) 27 (19) 
Self finance, relatives or friends and banks 5 (7) 3 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (6) 
Banks 2 (3) 5 (10) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (5) 
Relatives or friends 4 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (10) 5 (3) 
Self finance and partners or investors 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 
Partner or investors 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Other 3 (4) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
Total 70 (68) 51 69 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Difficult to obtain financial support No. (%) No. (%) No, (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Yes 35 (50) 21 (41) 5 (45) 2 (20) 63 (44) 
No 35 (50) 30 (59) 6 (55) 8 (80) 79 (56) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Yes 23 (33) 17 (33) 2 (18) 1 (10) 43 (30) 
No 47 (67) 34 (67) 9 (82) 9 (90) 99 (70) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.7: Loans Prior to JLGC Support 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Receipt of bank loan? (PL1) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Yes 24 (51) 18 (53) 5 (56) 4 (44) 51 (52) 
No 23 (49) 16 (47) 4 (44) 5 (56) 48 (48) 
Not applicable 23 --- 17 --- 2 --- 1 --- 43 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Not applicable 46 --- 33 --- 6 --- 6 91 --- 
Working capital 10 (42) 4 (22) 1 (20) 1 (25) 16 (31) 
Start-up 3 (13) 4 (22) 3 (60) 2 (50) 12 (24) 
Capital purchases 4 (17) 7 (39) 1 (20) 0 (0) 12 (24) 
New products or services 6 (25) 3 (17) 0 (0) 1 (25) 10 (19) 
Other (Building) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Type of security for loan (PL5) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. No. (%) 
Not applicable 46 --- 33 --- 6 --- 6 91 --- 
Real-estate assets 16 (67) 6 (33) 4 (80) 2 (50) 28 (54) 
Other guarantor 5 (21) 5 (28) 1 (20) 2 (50) 13 (25) 
Goods and Equipment 3 (12) 6 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (19) 
None 0 (0) 1 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Value of collateral (PL6) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
More than the loan 17 (71) 7 (38) 4 (80) 2 (50) 30 (58) 
Less than the loan 3 (12) 5 (28) 1 (20) 2 (50) 11 (21) 
Of equal amount 4 (17) 5 (28) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (19) 
Missing 0 (0) 1 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) 
Not applicable 46 --- 33 --- 6 --- 6 --- 91 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Note: The variables PL2 and PL3 are given in Appendix Table 8.1. 
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Table 7.8 Awareness of JLGC Loans 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Aqriculture Total 
How did you first become aware of 
Bank 54 (77) 40 (78) 8 (73) 8 (80) 110 (77) 
Family and friends 6 (9) 4 (8) 1 (9) 0 (0) 11 (8) 
Colleague in firm 2 (3) 4 (8) 2 (18) 0 (0) 8 (6) 
Another business 2 (3) 2 (4) 0 (0) 1 (10) 5 (3) 
Chamber of Commerce/ Industry body 5 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (3) 
Other 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (10) 2 (2) 
Missing 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Did awareness of JLGC make you 
more likely seek bank loan? (NEG3) No. (%) No. M No. M No. M No. 
Yes 36 (51) 25 (49) 5 (45) 5 (50) 71 (50) 
No 34 (49) 25 (49) 6 (55) 5 (50) 70 (49) 
Missing 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 100 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Did you first approach: No. N No. N No. N No. N No. M 
Bank 63 (90) 40 (78) 8 (73) 10 (100) 121 (85) 
JLGC 7 (10) 11 (22) 3 (27) 0 (0) 21 (15) 
Total 70 (100) 51 100 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
When visiting bank did you first discuss a 
normal loan before a JLGC guaranteed loan? No. N No. M No. M No. N No. M 
Yes 51 (72) 36 (70) 7 (64) 8 (80) 102 (71) 
No 12 (18) 4 (10) 1 (9) 2 (20) 19 (14) 
Not applicable 7 (10) 11 (20) 3 (27) 0 (0) 21 (15) 
Total 70 (100) 51 100 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100)_ 
Note: The variables NEGI and NEG4 are given in Table 7.12; and NEG5 and NEG6 are given in Table 7.13. 
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Table 7.9: Number and Purpose of JLGC Loans Received by Firm 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Aqriculture Total 
One 62 (89) 47 (92) 11 (100) 10 (100) 130 (92) 
Two 8 (11) 4 (8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 12 (8) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Purpose of first JLGC loan No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Capital Purchase 27 (39) 20 (39) 4 (36) 2 (20) 53 (37) 
Start-Up 23 (33) 15 (29) 2 (19) 2 (20) 42 (30) 
Working capital 17 (24) 16 (32) 4 (36) 6 (60) 43 (30) 
New products or service 2 (3) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 3 (2) 
Missing 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Capital purchase 5 (63) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (58) 
Working capital 3 (37) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (42) 
Total 8 (100) 4 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 12 (100) 
Note: The variables LG2 and LG3 are given in Table 7.11; variable LG4 is given in Table 7.10; variable LG5 is given in Appendix 
Table 8.1; LG6 and LG7 are given in Table 7.15; LG8 is given in Appendix Table 8.1; variables LG9 and LGIO are given in 
Table 7.12; variable LGI I is given in Table 7.14; variables LG12, LG13 and LG14 are given in Table 7.16 and variable LG15 
is given in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.10: Purpose of Most Recent JLGC Loan 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Aqriculture Total 
Start-Up 22 (32) 14 (27) 2 (18) 2 (20) 40 (28) 
Capital purchase 28 (40) 21 (41) 4 (36) 2 (20) 55 (39) 
Working capital 17 (24) 16 (32) 4 (36) 6 (60) 43 (30) 
New products / services 2 (3) 0 (0) 1 (10) 0 (0) 3 (2) 
Missing 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.11: Average Size of Most Recent JLGC Loans 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture 
Amount of JLGC loan (JD 000's) (LG2) Mean c. v Mean c. v Mean C. v Mean C. v 
Start-Up 19.8 0.82 17.9 0.81 26.5 1.25 30.0 0.71 
Capital purchase 25.9 0.97 19.0 1.01 11.8 0.78 17.5 0.2 
Working capital 37.6 0.92 23.3 0.71 13.9 0.58 12.8 1.16 
New products / services 24.3 0.25 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Start-Up 69.0 1.06 42.6 0.94 55.0 1.16 80.0 0.71 
Capital purchase 37.9 0.99 36.1 1.3 17.8 0.6 17.5 0.01 
Working capital 50.2 0.88 53.1 1.47 27.8 0.65 23.6 1.19 
New products / services 60.0 0.23 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Start-Up 45.0 0.6 50.0 0.4 40.0 0.35 38.0 0.0 
Capital purchase 78.0 0.4 68.0 0.37 73.0 0.44 1.0 0.0 
Working capital 75.0 0.33 71.0 0.42 60.0 0.45 61.0 0.56 
New products / services 43.0 0.47 0.0 0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table 7.12: Arrangement of the Most Recent JLGC Loan 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Did you first approach: (NEG 1) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. M 
Bank 61 (87) 38 (75) 8 (73) 10 (100) 117 (82) 
JLGC 9 (13) 13 (25) 3 (27) 0 (0) 25 (18) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Why did firm take a JLGC loan: (NEG4) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Lack of collateral 37 (52) 24 (47) 2 (18) 5 (50) 68 (48) 
Insufficient track of record 8 (11) 9 (18) 1 (10) 0 (0) 18 (13) 
Bank request 20 (29) 13 (25) 3 (27) 1 (10) 37 (26) 
Other 2 (3) 2 (4) 3 (27) 0 (0) 6 (4) 
Not known 3 (4) 3 (6) 2 (18) 4 (40) 12 (8) 
Missing 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Time taken to arrange loan No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
less than a week 5 (7) 2 (4) 2 (18) 1 (10) 10 (7) 
1-2 weeks 11 (16) 11 (22) 3 (27) 1 (10) 26 (18) 
3- 5 weeks 32 (46) 23 (45) 5 (46) 5 (50) 65 (46) 
more than 5 weeks 22 (31) 15 (29) 1 (9) 3 (30) 41 (29) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
10% or less 10 (14) 3 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (9) 
10% to 12% 20 (28) 4 (8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 24 (17) 
13% to 15% 39 (56) 44 (86) 11 (100) 10 (100) 104 (73) 
More than 15% 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 100 142 (100) 
Higher 12 (17) 6 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 18 (13) 
Same 48 (69) 41 (80) 10 (90) 10 (100) 109 (77) 
Lower 8 (11) 4 (8) 1 (10) 0 (0) 13 (8) 
Missing 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.13: Administration of JLGC Loan 
Manufacturing Services Retail Ag riculture Total 
Were the following prepared for loan: (NEG5) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No . 
(%) No. 
. 
(%) 
- 
Business plan 14 (20) 11 (22) 5 (46) 5 (50) 35 (25) 
Feasibility study 10 (14) 7 (14) 0 (0) 1 (10) 18 (13) 
Business plan and feasibility study 19 (27) 21 (40) 3 (27) 2 (20) 45 (31) 
Cash flow statement 5 (7) 1 (2) 1 (9) 0 (0) 7 (5) 
None of the above 22 (32) 11 (22) 2 (18) 2 (20) 37 (26) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Did this help secure guarantee: (NEG6) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Yes 46 (66) 38 (75) 9 (82) 7 (70) 100 (70) 
Yes 31 (44) 13 (25) 2 (18) 0 (0) 46 (32) 
No 39 (56) 38 (75) 9 (82) 10 (100) 96 (68) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Table 7.14: Size of the Loan and Guarantee Percentage 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total Total amount of 
1---- 1 1r, % AAAW-1i 
10 or less 23 (33) 22 (43) 6 (55) 4 (40) 55 (39) 383.0 
10 to 20 15 (21) 13 (25) 2 (18) 4 (40) 34 (24) 535.2 
20 to 40 21 (30) 12 (24) 2 (18) 1 (10) 36 (25) 1,180.0 
More than 40 11 (16) 4 (8) 1 (9) 1 (10) 17 (12) 1,115.0 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 3,213.2 
75 percent 59 (84) 47 (92) 10 (91) 9 (90) 125 (88) 
50 percent 11 (16) 4 (8) 1 (9) 1 (10) 17 (12) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.15: Other Sources of Finance for the Project 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Yes 33 (47) 37 (73) 7 (64) 6 (60) 83 (58) 
No 36 (51) 14 (27) 4 (36) 4 (40) 58 (41) 
Missing 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (1000 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Source of other finance (LG7) No. (%) No. (%) ý No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Self financing 30 (88) 34 (92) 7 (100) 6 (100) 77 (93) 
Family and friends 1 (3) 2 (5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (3) 
Other banks 2 (6) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (3) 
Not applicable 36 --- 14 --- 4 --- 4 --- 58 --- 
Missing 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Bank refused to provide more 14 (41) 18 (49) 6 (86) 2 (40) 40 (48) 
More funding not required 10 (29) 15 (41) 1 (14) 3 (60) 29 (34) 
Lack of the collateral 8 (24) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (11) 
Not applicable 36 --- 14 --- 4 --- 4 --- 58 --- 
Missing 2 (6) 3 (7) 0 (0) 1 (20) 6 (7) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Yes 69 (99) 51 (100) 11 (100) 9 (90) 140 (99) 
No 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (10) 2 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Table 7.16: Collateral for the Guaranteed Loan 
Manufacturina Services Retail Aariculture Total 
Yes 62 (89) 38 (75) 9 (82) 6 (60) 115 (81) 
No 8 (11) 13 (25) 2 (18) 4 (40) 27 (19) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
The kind of collateral (LG13) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Real estate 46 (74) 14 (36) 6 (67) 4 (80) 70 (61) 
Another guarantor 10 (16) 12 (32) 3 (33) 2 (20) 27 (23) 
Goods and equipment 4 (7) 12 (32) 0 (0) 0 (0) 16 (14) 
Other 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 
Not applicable 8 --- 13 --- 2 --- 4 --- 27 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
The value of collateral (LG14) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
More than the loan 42 (68) 24 (63) 7 (78) 5 (83) 78 (68) 
The same 6 (10) 8 (21) 1 (11) 0 (0) 15 (13) 
Less than the loan 14 (22) 6 (16) 1 (11) 1 (17) 22 (19) 
Not applicable 8 --- 13 --- 2 - 4 -- 27 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.17: 'Additionality' of Guarantee 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Value of extra bank loan due to guarantee: No. No. No. No. No. 
Zero 24 (33) 19 (37) 6 (55) 3 (30) 52 (36) 
1% to 25% 16 (23) 10 (20) 3 (27) 1 (10) 30 (21) 
25% to 50% 11 (16) 8 (15) 1 (9) 1 (10) 21 (15) 
50% to 75% 4 (6) 2 (4) 0 (0) 2 (20) 8 (6) 
75% to 99% 3 (4) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (00) 4 (2) 
100% 6 (9) 1 (2) 1 (9) 2 (20) 10 (8) 
Missing 6 (9) 10 (20) 0 (0) 1 (10) 17 (12) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Would bank have lent in absence of 
Yes 47 (67) 37 (73) 8 (73) 8 (80) 100 (70) 
No 22 (31) 14 (27) 3 (27) 2 (20) 41 (29) 
Missing 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
What sentence best describes firm's situation No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
a- "The JLGC was the only option available" 21 (30) 14 (27) 4 (36) 1 (10) 40 (28) 
b- "Other sources were available but they would 
only have covered part of the amount provided by 
JLGC" 20 (29) 13 (25) 2 (18) 4 (40) 39 (27) 
c- "Other sources of finance were available to me, 
that would have covered the full amount available 
through the JLGC guaranteed loan, but I still 
prefer the JLGC" 28 (40) 21 42 4 (36) 5 (50) 58 (41) 
Missing 1 (1) 3 (6) 1 (10) 0 (0) 5 (4) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 100 142 (100) 
If other sources were available (b or c) why did the 
firm take up the guaranteed loan: (REQUEST) No. No. No. No. No. (%) 
Bank requirement without informing the firm 32 (64) 29 (76) 6 (75) 6 (67) 73 (70) 
The firm didn't have enough collateral 7 (14) 2 (5) 0 (0) 2 (22) 11 (10) 
The firm didn't have any collateral 7 (14) 2 (5) 0 (0) 1 (11) 10 (10) 
Not applicable 20 --- 13 --- 3 --- 1 --- 37 --- 
Missing 4 (8) 5 (14) 2 (25) 0 (0) 11 (10) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.18: Subsequent Finance after Loan 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Additional bank finance since loan: 
(NEWFINI) No. (%) No. No. No. No. 
Yes 22 (31) 16 (31) 2 (18) 4 (40) 44 (31) 
No 48 (69) 35 (69) 9 (82) 6 (60) 98 (69) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Ease with which other finance obtained: 
(NEWFIN2) No. No. (%) No. No. (%) No. 
1: Very easy 6 (27) 7 (44) 2 (100) 2 (50) 17 (39) 
2 7 (31) 4 (24) 0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (25) 
3 3 (14) 2 (13) 0 (0) 1 (25) 6 (14) 
4 3 (14) 1 (6) 0 (0) 1 (25) 5 (11) 
5 Very difficult 3 (14) 2 (13) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (11) 
Not applicable 48 --- 35 --- 9 --- 6 --- 98 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
IIU. k /Ul 114v. ý /Uj I lu. I /U) INU. k /Ul INV. k /Vj 
Yes 17 (77) 16 (100) 2 (100) 4 (100) 39 (89) 
No 5 (23) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (11) 
Not applicable 48 --- 35 --- 9 --- 6 --- 98 --- 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.19: Most Important Effect of the Project 
Manufacturinci Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Yes 45 (64) 28 (55) 5 (45) 6 (60) 84 (59) 
No 25 (36) 22 (43) 6 (55) 4 (40) 57 (40) 
Missing 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Development new product or service (EFFECT2) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Yes 38 (54) 33 (65) 8 (73) 5 (50) 84 (59) 
No 32 (46) 17 (33) 3 (27) 5 (50) 57 (40 ) 
Missing 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Yes 37 (53) 17 (33) 1 (9) 4 (40) 59 (41) 
No 33 (47) 34 (67) 9 (82) 6 (60) 82 (58) 
Missing 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Yes 32 (46) 16 (31) 0 (0) 1 (10) 49 (35) 
No 38 (54) 33 (65) 11 (100) 9 (90) 91 (64) 
Missing 0 (0) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Increase the exports (EFFECT5) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Yes 12 (17) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (10) 
No 58 (83) 47 (92) 11 (100) 10 (100) 126 (89) 
Missing 0 (0) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Yes 30 (43) 25 (49) 9 (82) 4 (40) 68 (48) 
No 40 (57) 24 (47) 2 (18) 6 (60) 72 (51) 
Missing 0 (0) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Table 7.20: Characteristics of Firms Year before the Loan 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Assets (JD 000's) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. N.. 
Zero 13 (19) 12 (24) 2 (18) 0 (0) 27 (19) 
1 to 25 14 (20) 14 (26) 2 (18) 1 (10) 31 (22) 
25 to 50 7 (10) 5 (10) 1 (9) 0 (0) 13 (9) 
50 to 100 7 (10) 4 (8) 6 (55) 4 (40) 21 (15) 
100 to 500 23 (33) 12 (24) 0 (0) 4 (40) 39 (27) 
More than 500 6 (8) 4 (8) 0 (0) 1 (10) 11 (8) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Sales turnover (JD 000's) No. N No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. N 
Zero 13 (18) 12 (23) 2 (18) 0 (00) 27 (19) 
1 to 25 13 (18) 12 (23) 1 (9) 4 (40) 30 (21) 
25 to 50 9 (13) 4 (9) 0 (0) 1 (10) 14 (10) 
50 to 100 6 (9) 8 (16) 4 (37) 0 (0) 18 (12) 
100 to 500 18 (26) 9 (18) 1 (9) 4 (40) 32 (23) 
More than 500 11 (16) 6 (11) 3 (27) 1 (10) 21 (15) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 100 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Zero 10 (14) 8 (16) 1 (9) 2 (20) 21 (15) 
1 to 5 24 (34) 26 (51) 10 (91) 7 (70) 67 (47) 
6 to 10 14 (20) 12 (23) 0 (0) 1 (10) 27 (19) 
11 to 20 13 (19) 3 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 16 (11) 
21 to 50 5 (7) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (5) 
More than 50 4 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Table 7.21: Change in Firms Characteristics after Loan 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Aqriculture Total 
Average assets before loan 169.1 2.05 108.7 1.92 49.0 0.77 146.1 0.97 136.1 2.04 
Two year change in assets 52.7 1.58 60 1.69 28.1 1.34 40.8 1.95 52.6 1.66 
Three years change in assets 101.2 1.79 98.6 1.93 45.7 1.08 89.0 1.76 95.0 1.86 
Change due to project after three years 26.6 0.96 20.0 1.20 13.0 0.46 20.0 1.00 23.0 1.07 
Sales turnover (JD 000's) (ADDSALES) Mean C. V Mean C. V Mean C. V Mean C. V Mean C. V 
Average turnover before loan 157.1 2.17 91.6 2.83 52.3 1.00 81.7 1.29 121.1 2.39 
Two year change in turnover 54.7 2.30 22.7 1.66 21.8 1.05 28.6 1.94 39.1 2.41 
Three years change in turnover 92.4 2.00 44.4 1.00 35.8 0.68 63.8 1.56 69.3 2.06 
Change due to project after three years 19.1 3.64 15.3 1.46 11.2 1.00 14.7 1.13 16.7 2.72 
Employment (ADDEMP) Mean C-V Mean C-V Mean C-V Mean C. V Mean C. V 
Average of employment before loan 11.2 1.45 5.1 1.40 2.1 0.50 3.2 0.66 7.7 1.50 
Two year change in employment 3.40 1.33 1.7 1.00 0.8 1.00 2.5 1.33 2.5 1.50 
Three years change in employment 6.00 1.67 2.6 1.00 1.2 1.00 4.6 1.80 4.2 1.25 
_ýhange 
due to project after three years 25.0 3.85 19.0 2.00 7.0 1.22 20.0 1.45 19.0 3.89 
Note: The change due to the project is based on the firrns' responses on ' additional ity'. 
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Table 7.22: Jobs Created and Retained in the Firm 
Manufacturinq Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Zero 13 (19) 12 (24) 4 (36) 0 (0) 29 (21) 
1 to 5 20 (28) 31 (60) 7 (64) 8 (80) 66 (46) 
6 to 10 19 (27) 6 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 25 (18) 
11 to 20 5 (7) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (4) 
21 to 50 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (10) 3 (2) 
Missing 11 (16) 1 (2) 0 (0) 1 (10) 13 (9) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Zero 31 (43) 44 (86) 9 (82) 7 (70) 91 (64) 
1 to 5 21 (30) 5 (10) 2 (18) 2 (20) 30 (21) 
6 to 10 6 (9) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (5) 
11 to 20 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Missing 11 (16) 1 (2) 0 (0) 1 (10) 13 (9) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
s in new jobs without previous experience 
Zero 21 (30) 25 (49) 7 (64) 3 (30) 56 (39) 
1 to 5 29 (41) 23 (45) 4 (36) 5 (50) 61 (44) 
6 to 10 6 (9) 2 (4) 0 (0) 1 (10) 9 (6) 
11 to 20 3 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (2) 
Missing 11 (16) 1 (2) 0 (0) 1 (10) 13 (9) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Table 7.23 Firms Experience of Loan Guarantee Process 
Manufacturing Services Retail Ag riculture Total 
Did firm encounter any difficulties with: No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Filling in the application form 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
Preparing a business plan/feasibility study 
cash flow statement 4 (6) 6 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 10 (7) 
Meeting asset security condition 28 (40) 13 (25) 1 (9) 4 (40) 46 (32) 
No difficulties 38 (54) 31 (61) 10 (91) 6 (60) 85 (60) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
How helpful was the bank in securing the loan? No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
1 Very helpful 18 (25) 21 (41) 4 (36) 5 (50) 48 (34) 
2 34 (49) 22 (43) 7 (64) 4 (40) 67 (47) 
3 13 (19) 7 (14) 0 (0) 1 (10) 21 (15) 
4 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 
5: Very unhelpful 3 (4) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (1000 142 (100) 
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Table 7.24: Advantages of the Guaranteed Loan 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Advantages of guaranteed loan over other commercial bank finance 
The value of the loan 10 (14) 11 (22) 1 (9) 2 (20) 24 (17) 
The grace period 15 (21) 15 (29) 4 (36) 1 (10) 35 (25) 
Al M, 
The collateral 18 (26) 26 (51) 2 (18) 4 (40) 50 (35) 
The repayment period 13 (19) 14 (27) 1 (9) 3 (30) 31 (22) 
ro - 
........... 
J1 
............. 
The cost of the loan 2 (3) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (3) 
The interest rate 9 (13) 3 (6) 1 (9) 0 (0) 13 (9) 
Note: The table shows the answers responding 'yes'. 
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Figure 7.1 Age of Interviewee 
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Figure 7.2: Sales of Firms in Different Markets 
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CHAPTER 8 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
SURVEY RESULTS 
8.1 Introduction 
The vast majority of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) start their 
operations without anyfinancial institutional help at all. However, theyfind it difficult to 
grow without access to credit. Restrictions on access stem from the perceived high risks on 
the part of potential lenders, lack of information, high transaction costs, and lack of a track 
record, collateral and adequate documentation, plus ignorance and prejudice. Governments 
have attempted to overcome some of these problems by establishing credit guarantee 
schemes. The common objective of the schemes is to share risk with the banks, so that when 
a borrower defaults on a loan, and thus incurs a loss for the lender, the bank will be 
compensated for all, or part, of the loss involved. Such schemes also seek to help the 
borrowers who have good projects but cannot offer as much collateral as the banks require. A 
successful guarantee scheme must contribute to lowering the cost of loans and make it easier 
for firms to apply for these. Such as scheme should not increase the administrative burden for 
the borrower, and should help to reduce the costs of extending credit. 
There have been very few attempts to evaluate loan guarantee schemes despite their 
widespread use; 85 countries in the world have a loan guarantee scheme according to Green 
(2000). This chapter provides a more rigorous analysis of the survey data collected on the 
loan guarantee scheme in Jordan in order to discover its effect on SMEs. These data and their 
method of collection have been described in the previous two chapters. Overall, this 
represents the first attempt to rigorously evaluate a loan guarantee scheme, not only in 
Jordan, but also in low-income countries more generally; Vogel and Adams (1997) state that 
"unfortunately, we were unable to find any evaluation of loan guarantee programmes in low- 
income countries". Cressy (2000) finds that few attempts have been made to evaluate the 
contribution of these schemes, of which most relate to Europe. As far as Carnion and 
Cardone (1999) know, there is no comprehensive evaluation of loan guarantee schemes. 
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This chapter undertakes a detailed statistical analysis of the data obtained from the 
survey. It represents a development of the purely descriptive analysis of the survey data in 
Chapter 7. It has the advantage of utilising regression techniques, which enables many of the 
variables to be considered together, in order to identify the key effects. An OECD (2000) 
report says that the combination of evaluation tools and approaches (both qualitative and 
quantitiave) is required for maximum coverage of the evaluation process, for increasing the 
credibility of evaluation results and by extension the policy recommendations that emerge 
from such on exercise. The purpose is to consider the effect of different firm characteristics 
on the take-up and effect of the projects receiving guaranteed loans from the JLGC- It 
includes an empirical analysis of such things as the factors affecting the firm's approach to 
the JLGC, the value of the guaranteed loan, the 'additionality' of the guarantee and the 
effects of the project. However, some of the analysis of this chapter is from the firms' view- 
point, because it relies on subjective data gathered from the survey. More is said about this in 
Chapter 9. 
8.2 The Variables 
The data relate to 142 finns that were interviewed as part of the survey of fin'ns, in the 
five main governorates of Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa and Aqaba (see Chapter 6). The 
quantitative analysis of these data does not allow us to use all of the variables in the survey. 
This is because some data are not relevant to the empirical analysis in this chapter, some of 
the variables are highly subjective in nature and others have a large number of missing cases. 
However, Chapter 7 includes a qualitative analysis for all of the variables gathered from the 
survey. The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a quantitative examination, which 
improves on the analysis of Chapter 7. The variables used in this chapter are divided into six 
broad groups, and these are considered below. Full details of each variable within these six 
groups are given in Appendix Table 8.1, which should be read alongside the text. There are 
potentially 142 observations on each variable, but due to non-response there are some 
missing observations, which are indicated below. 
(A) Demouqphic data 
These data relate to the interviewees of the survey firms. They are categorized as 
follows: job title of interviewee (TITLE), education level (EDUC), gender (GENDER), age of 
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interviewee (AGE-M) and experience of interviewee (EXPER). These data are known for 
all 142 firms, except for the experience of the interviewee, which has two missing 
observations. In the case of the job title (TITLE) there are four statuses, and each of these is 
considered as an individual variable. They are: general manager (TITM), sales manager 
(TITLE2), financial manager (TITLE3) and partner in the firm (TITLE4). The age and 
experience of interviewee are measured in years. 
(B) Characteristics of the sample finns 
The characteristics of the sample firms refer to the legal status of the firm (LEGAL), 
the organization of the firm (ORG), the location of the firm (LOCATE), the age of the firm 
(AGE), the finn's principal activity (SECTOR), the number of employees (EMP), sales 
turnover (TURN) and capital used for start-up (CAP). These are known for all 142 
observations except for the current sales turnover (TURN), which is known for 122 firms. In 
the case of the legal status (LEGAL) there are three statuses: sole-trader (LEGAL]), 
partnership (LEGAL2) and private ownership (LEGAL3). The organization of the firm also 
has three statuses: single plant (ORGI), multi-plant (ORG2) and part of a large group 
(ORG3). Finally, the firm's principal activity has four statuses: manufacturing (SECTOR]), 
services (SECTOR2), retail (SECTOR3) and agriculture (SECTOR4). 
(C) Loans prior to JLGC sgppo 
To investigate the effect of the loans prior to the JLGC support, we asked the sample 
firm§ a bout w hether t hey had e ver r eceived I oans from c ornmercial b anks b efore the f irst 
loan guaranteed by JLGC (PLI). This variable is available for 99 observations, because the 
other 43 firms had no history with commercial banks and they used the first loan supported 
by the JLGC for start-up. In addition, this group of variables includes the number of loans 
received from commercial banks before the guaranteed loan (PL2), the amount of these loans 
(PL3), the purpose of the previous loans (PL4), assets pledged as collateral for the previous 
loans (PL5) and the value of the collateral compared with the value of the loan (PL6). 
While 99 firms had some history prior to the JLGC loan, only 51 of these received 
loans from the commercial banks before the guaranteed loan. However, the variable labeled 
(PL2) is known only for 46 observations, which means there are 5 missing observations, 
I 
while (PL3) is known for 45 observations. Unfortunately, with regard to quantitative 
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information s uch as i ncome, s ales, a ssets and so o n, t he i nterviewees w ere w orried about 
divulging such information, so there are some missing cases on such questions, and so these 
are not included. With regard to the purpose of the previous loans and the kinds of collateral 
pledged for these loans there are 51 observations. There are 50 observations on the value of 
collateral compared with the value of the loan. 
In the case of the purpose of the previous loan obtained from the commercial banks, 
data are categorised into five statuses: loan f or start-up (PL4.1), capital p urchase (PL4.2), 
working capital (PL4.3), financing new products/services (PL4.4) and other purposes 
(PL4.5). Assets pledged as collateral (PL5), are sub-divided into four statuses: real estate 
(PL5.1), goods and equipment (PL5.2), other guarantor (PL5.3) and if they did not pledge 
any collateral at all (PL5.4). The value of collateral compared with the value of the I oan 
(PL6) is sub-divided into three statuses: more than the value of the loan (PL6 1), less than the 
value of the loan (PL6.2) and equal to the value of the loan (PL63). 
(D) Negotiation of the loan 
The analysis of the loan guarantee focuses on the most recent loan obtained from the 
JLGC. For this loan, we know if the firm approached the JLGC directly or through the bank 
(NEGI), how the firm first heard of the loan guarantee scheme (NEG2), and if knowledge of 
the guarantee provided by JLGC made the firm more likely to seek a bank loan (NEG3). This 
group of variables also includes the reasons given to the firm by the bank as to why it should 
take out a guaranteed loan (NEG4), and which kind of documents the firm had prepared 
(NEG5). The firm's approach, whether to the JLGC or the bank, and the kind of documents 
prepared for the loan are known for 142 observations; the other variables are known for 141 
observations. 
In the case of how the firm heard of the guarantee (NEG2), there are six statuses: the 
bank (NEG2.1), colleague/member of staff (NEG2.2), family and friends (NEG2.3), other 
businesses (NEG2.4), chamber of commerce/industry (NEG2.5) and other sources (NEG2.6). 
The reasons given to the firm to take a guaranteed loan (NEG4) has five statuses: lack of 
collateral (NEG4.1), insufficient track record (NEG4.2), bank's request (NEG4.3), other 
reasons (NEG4.4) and unknown reasons (NEG4.5). In the case of the documents prepared by 
the borrower in order to get the guaranteed loan (NEG5), there are five statuses: business 
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plan (NEG5.1), feasibility study (NEG5.2), cash-flow analysis (NEG5.3), business plan and 
feasibility study (NEG5.4) and if the borrower did not prepare any documents at all 
(NEG5.5). 
(E) Characteristics of the guaranteed loan 
These data are concerned with the characteristics of the most recent guaranteed loan 
and are categorized as follows: the number of guaranteed loans that the firm has received 
(LGI), the amount of the guaranteed loan (LG2), and the size of the project financed by the 
guaranteed loan (LG3). They are all known for each case, except LG3, for which there are 
seven missing observations. The purpose of the project (LG4) has four statuses: start-up 
(LG4.1), capital purchase (LG4.2), working capital (LG4.3) and finance of new products or 
services (LG4.4). The bank that provided the most recent guaranteed loan (LG5) is sub- 
divided into seventeen statuses each representing the name of the bank participating in the 
loan guarantee scheme. For example, if the guaranteed loan is provided by the Housing Bank 
then the variable is labeled as LG5.1, and so on for all of the participating banks (see 
Appendix Table 8.2). This variable is known for all 142 observations. 
This group of variables includes some information on the finance used to fund the 
project in addition to the guaranteed loan. Whether they used sources of finance (LG6) is 
known for 141 observations, but in fact only 84 did so. The source of the other finance (LG7) 
is known for 83 of these 84 observations. The other 57 firms did not use other sources of 
finance, but for these there are three statuses: self finance (LG7.1), family and friends 
(LG7.2) and other banks (LG7.3). There is also a variable related to the amount of the other 
finance (LG8) and this is known for 81 observations out of the 84 who used other sources of 
finance. The rate of interest (LG9) is one of the main characteristics of the guaranteed loan. A 
comparison is also made between the rate of interest on the guaranteed loan and the interest 
rate on other banks loans (LGIO). It is sub-divided into three statuses: higher than the rate on 
other bank loans (LGIO. 1), lower (LGIO. 2) and no difference (LGIO. 3). The percentage of 
the loan covered by the JLGC (LGI I) has two statuses: 75 percent of the loan (LGI IJ) and 
50 percent (LGII. 2). These last three variables are known in all cases, except LGIO, for 
which there are a couple of missing observations. 
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As regards the collateral provided to the bank the following variables were 
constructed: the provision of collateral (LG12) and the type of collateral (LG13). The former 
binary variable LG12 is known in all cases, but LG13 is known for 115 observations because 
27 observations did not provide any collateral for the guaranteed loans. These data were sub- 
divided into four statuses: real estate (LG13.1), equipment and goods (LG13.2), another 
guarantor (LG13.3) and another kind of collateral (LG13.4). Another variable relates the 
value of the collateral to the value of the loan (LG14), which has three statuses: equal to the 
loan (LG14.1), more than the loan (LG14.2) and less than the loan (LG14.3). This is known 
for 115 observations. 
The last five variables in this group are: whether the bank is provided ongoing advice 
and guidance after the borrower received the guaranteed loan (LG15), whether the project 
received the guarantee at the higher rate (LG16), the value of collateral for the guaranteed 
loans according to the JLGC (LGI 7), the ratio of the guaranteed loan to the project size 
(LG18) and the ratio of the collateral value to the project size (LG19). All of these variables 
are known for 142 observations except LG19, which is constructed from LGI 7 and LG3, but 
for which there are seven missing values for the project size (LG3). 
(F) Firms' -performance 
The variables in this group indicate the firm's performance related to the project 
funded by the guaranteed loan. The variables are: the firm believes that the bank would have 
lent to them if the guarantee was not available (ADD), and the reasons that the firm chose the 
JLGC loan (REQUEST). This last variable is known for 94 observations because there are 
eight missing observations and because 40 firms believed that the JLGC was the only source 
of support they needed. Of the 94 firms some of them chose the JLGC support due to the 
bank's request (REQUESTI) and the others did so by their own request (REQUEST2). 
Concerning the effect of the project financed by the guaranteed loan (EFFECT), there are six 
statuses: if the project opened-up new markets (EFFECTI), if the project developed new 
products or services (EFFECT2), developed new processes (EFFECT3), introduced leading- 
edge technology (EFFECT4), increased exports (EFFECT5) and created a new source of 
supply (EFFECT6). The first three of these are known for 141 observations, while the rest 
are known for 140 observations. 
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The project's effects on the firm's assets are described using the following variables: 
the difference between the assets two years after the guaranteed loan and one year before the 
loan (ASSETCHG), the percentage change in the firm's total assets that reflect the impact of 
the project according to the firm (ASSETADD), and change in the value of the total assets due 
to the effect of the project according to the firm (ASSETCHGADD). The ASSETCHG 
variable has four missing cases, while the other two variables each have 10 missing cases. 
Similar variables are constructed for each of the firm's sales turnover and the firm's number 
of employees. There are SALECHG, SALEADD and SALECHGADD for turnover. There are 
known for 126,113 and III cases respectively. For employees the variables are EMPCHG, 
EMPADD and EMPCHGADD, which are known for 142,125 and 125 firms respectively. 
8.3 Model Estimation 
To improve on the cross-tabulation of the previous chapter, we now employ 
regression techniques. A big advantage of this is that it gives the evaluator an indication of 
probable casual relationships between variables, and it allows him to make inferences about 
these relationships, but within a multivariate setting. It also allows the direction and the 
magnitude of changes to be established. The data are categorical in nature and they can be 
expressed as probabilities, so that in order to achieve the research objectives, we explored 
several models, but the most suitable of these was the Linear Probability Model (LPM). An 
alternative to this is the logit model, but it seemed to perform no better, while being more 
difficult to interpret. The choice of the LPM was despite some potential problems that are 
associated with it, which are given in Gujarati (1995) as follows: non-normality of the errors; 
heteroscedasticity; the possibility that the predicted values of the dependent variable lie 
outside the 0-1 range; and the generally lower R2 values. However, Gujarati (1995) reports 
that these problems are surmountable. The use of LPM in this study has the following good 
features: it is used quite extensively because of its simplicity and it is easier to interpret. In 
addition, as we mentioned above, it does not seem to give inferior results. To simplify the 
presentation, the parsimonious versions of the results are given, which includes only those 
variables that are significant at about the 15 percent level. 
There are 142 firms included in the survey, which means that each variable should 
have this number of observations. However, as we have seen there are some missing cases 
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due to non-response, especially for the variables that concern financial matters, such as 
income, profit, sales and so on. In order to solve this problem, we created a dummy variable 
for each term with missing observations. These dummy variables are included in the 
regression, so that it can be run for the maximum number of observations. For example, the 
variable on the experience of interviewees EAPER is known for 140 observations, which 
means that there are two missing observations. In this case, we include dummy variable 
EXPERM that equals I if EXPER is missing, but which otherwise is zero. This means we can 
in principle run each regression for all 142 observations. Another feature of the data is non- 
applicable cases, which is when the interviewee is unable to answer a question because it is 
not relevant. For example, for the variable relating to the receipt of previous bank loans, PLI, 
only 99 firrns were able to answer this question because the other 43 firms are new start-ups, 
and therefore have no history with the commercial banks. In these cases we estimate the 
LPM model for the applicable cases only. 
As a further point, many of the variables are categorical in nature, and this means we 
are also confronted with the problem of a dummy-variable trap. For example, the firms' 
principal activity, SECTOR, has four statuses: manufacturing, services, retail and agriculture 
(SECTOR] to SECTOR4). If we include these variables in one of the models then we have to 
drop one of the statuses. Usually, where the variables can be ranked then this is the lowest 
ranked status, or if not then it is the least important category with a small number of non-zero 
observations. For example, in the case of SECTOR then we drop SECTOR4, because only 
seven percent of the total sample is in this category (ie. agriculture). Appendix Tables 8.2 
examine whether there is a problem of multi-collinearity between the variables by examining 
the correlation coefficient for each of the six groups. However, as the tables indicate we do 
not believe that this is a serious problem. Further, in our analysis we use a number of 
variables that could each be considered as measuring the size of the firm. These include the 
firm employment size (EMP), the finn sales turnover (TURN), the capital used for start-up 
(CAP), the loan size (LG2) and the project size (LG3). The correlation coefficients between 
these are shown in Table 8.1. It shows that there is some correlation between EMP and 
TURN and between LG2 and LG3, but our results suggest that this is not a serious problem. 
The remainder of this chapter presents the econometric analysis of the data described 
above. The chapter is divided to three main sections. Firstly, it examines the fin-ns' 
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experience prior to the project, and leading up to the time that it gets the loan. Secondly it 
discusses the factors influencing the nature of the loan. Finally, it explores the 'additionality' 
of the guarantee. For the econometric analysis in this study we used the STATA 7 package as 
the most suitable statistical package. Since we use the linear probability model, a robust 
estimator is used and the t-ratios that are reported are based on heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors. 
8.4 Prior to the Project 
The following discussion presents the empirical results for the period prior to the 
project. It examines the general factors affecting the firm's approach and whether the firm's 
history with the commercial banks had any role in this. It also examines the reasons for the 
firm taking a guaranteed loan and the documents needed and prepared for these loans. 
However, the theme of this section is to explain the main factors affecting the firm's 
approach to the JLGC and the firms' preparation for securing the guaranteed loan. 
8.4.1 The Approach to the JLGC 
This section illustrates the effect of the interviewee demographic data (group A of 
variables) and the sample firms characteristics (group B of variables) on the firm's approach 
to the JLGC, both separately and together. In order to know if any of these variables affects 
the firm's approach, according to the demographic data or firm characteristics, the discussion 
will concentrate on the most recent loan. Table 8.2 presents the effect of the demographic 
data and firm characteristics on whether the firm's first approach for a guaranteed loan was 
through the bank or directly to the JLGC. The dependent variable is NEGI, ie. whether the 
firm first approached the JLGC (NEGI=I) or bank (NEGI=O). The first model (I) in Table 
8.2 gives the relationship between this and the demographic data; the second model (11) with 
the characteristic data; and the third model (III) examines both of these together. They show 
that there are not big differences between the coefficients of demographic data whether in 
model I or 111, and likewise for the variables for the firm characteristics between II and III. 
Model (IV) gives the parsimonious version of model III and we focus on this result. It 
shows that if the interviewee was a manager of the firm (TITLE] to TITLE3), the firm is 
more likely to approach the JLGC directly. This is consistent with the main character of 
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SMEs, that the majority of the managers are the owners as well, and they are usually looking 
for new channels to develop their firms. One of the other significant variables is the gender 
of the interviewee (GENDER), so that if the interviewee is male, then the firm is more likely 
to apply f or the g uaranteed loan directly t hrough the JLGC. This result sits well with the 
traditional background in Jordanian society, in which males usually have more access to 
different sources of funding, as they are more able to search for financial services. Females 
have obstacles when looking for funds for their projects in a conservative society, as the 
banks prefer to lend to men. 
The experience of the interviewee (EXPER) is negatively related to the firm's 
approach to the JLGC. This means that if the interviewee has more experience of the small- 
firms sector, they are less likely to approach the JLGC. This might be due to the track record 
that a borrower can build during his long experience, and the relations established with the 
commercial banks during this time. Thus, such a borrower does not need to go through the 
JLGC for the guaranteed loan, and prefers to approach the bank directly. The less- 
experienced borrower is more likely to approach the JLGC first, due to their lack of 
experience and insufficient track record. 
Both sole-trader and partnership firms (LEGAL] and LEGAL2) are more likely to 
approach the JLGC directly, compared with privately-owned firms. Independent firms also 
seem more likely to approach the JLGC, whether they are single plant (ORGI) or multi-plant 
(ORG2). Finally, firms in agriculture sector (SECTOR4) are less likely to approach to the 
JLGC. Once these variables are included there is no evidence that other variables are 
significant, whether measuring the size of the plant (EMP, Y'URN, and CAP) or its age 
(AGE). Also, the results suggest that the firms in the service and retail sectors are more likely 
to approach the JLGC than are firms in manufacturing (but the difference is not significant). 
This comes as a result of the fact that firms are more developed in this sector, of which the 
majority is located in Amman. We also notice that the logit model does not give superior 
results to the LPM model. This is shown by comparing the LPM models (I to IV) in Table 
8.2 with the logit results for the same models as in Appendix Table 8.3. 
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8.4.2 Previous Loans 
The firm's history and previous relationship with the commercial banks is potentially 
an important factor in a bank's decision to lend the small firms. So, it was important to 
measure the effect of the previous loans, received by the firms before the guaranteed loan, on 
the firm's approach to the JLGC or to the bank. The estimation in Table 8.3 examines this 
effect. These exclude the new start-up firms, so that there are a total 99 observations. Model 
V examines the effect of the main three variables, (PLI, PL2, PL3) on the nature of the 
firm's approach (NEGI). However, none of these variables is significant. This remains the 
case when the demographic variables are included (model V& IV). Since this is based on a 
small number of observations the table also repeats the results for model IV from Table 8.2. 
In this model some of the demographic variables are insignificant, even thought they are 
significant in Table 8.2. This is no doubt because we are excluding the start-up plants. 
Table 8.4 examines the effect of previous loan experience on the firm's decision to 
approach the JLGC. It examines the purpose of the previous loan (PL4), the asset collateral 
pledge (PL5) and the value of collateral (PL6). It includes only those firms receiving 
previous loans, so that there are 51 observations. The demographic variables from the 
parsimonious version of model IV are also included. In the case of model VII all the 
variables are insignificant. In the case of model VIII all forms of collateral (real estate, goods 
and e quipments, and another guarantor) make t he firms I ess I ikely to approach the JL GC 
directly. However, model IX shows that the greater is the total value of collateral pledged the 
more likely the firms to approach the JLGC. This is might be a signal that these are actually 
better firms and more confident in seeking other sources of finance. 
8.4.3 Reasons to take the Guaranteed Loans 
In our survey, according to the firms, there were three main reasons why the bank 
suggested that the firm should take a guaranteed loan: a lack of collateral, insufficient track 
record and due to the bank request (ie. no specific reason was given). Table 8.5 examines 
interviewee demographics and firm characteristics for firms receiving guaranteed loans and 
falling into each of these three categories. It shows the full and parsimonious version of each 
model, but we focus on the latter only. 
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Model XinT able 8.5 sh ows t he c haracteristics oft hose f irms t hat h ave aI ack of 
collateral. If the interviewee is a general manager then he is more likely to not have enough 
collateral. This is consistent with a manager (who may also be the owner) who may be more 
forthcoming about his fin-n than other respondents. The coefficient (t-value) of the variables 
EDUC and GENDER are 0.091 (1.75) and 0.230 (1.89) respectively, as shown in Table 8.5. 
This means that if the interviewee was more educated and was a male then he is also likely to 
have a lack of collateral. This might reflect the fact that these borrowers are more 
entrepreneurial and able to approach the JLGC even though they have insufficient collateral. 
Model X also shows that if the firm is a single plant (ORGI) it is less likely to have 
enough collateral, and will therefore apply for a guaranteed loan. This result is consistent 
with the fact that the single-plant SMEs have less assets, which directly affects their ability to 
provide enough collateral to commercial banks. Finns located in Amman are also less likely 
to have enough collateral. However, it suggests that the borrowers may try to use their 
location to get the funds they need. In particular, firms in Amman are more able to glean 
information about the services and support provided by the JLGC, compared with the firms 
elsewhere. Finally, firms in the retail sector have less of a problem with collateral. This might 
be because they have smaller loans (see Chapter 7), and their retail goods act as collateral. 
However, the size and age of the firm (measured by CAP and AGE) are insignificant, so that 
they have no impact on whether the collateral is sufficient or not. 
The characteristics of those firrns that do not have a sufficient track record are shown 
in model XI of Table 8.5. If the interviewee is a sales manager then the firm is more likely to 
have an insufficient track record, possibly for the same reason as before. The coefficient (t- 
value) of variables EDUC and GENDER are -0.081 (2.55) and -0.216 (1.66) respectively (see 
Table 8.5). This means that if the interviewee is less educated or is a female then they are 
more likely to have no track record. This is plausible as these borrowers are less likely to 
have a history with the commercial banks, and they are also less likely to search for different 
and new sources of funds, due to their inability and other social obstacles (ie. less educated 
and female). Model XI also shows that finns in private ownership and services are less likely 
to have a track record. In the case of services, this is because it is easier for the new 
entrepreneurs to enter to this sector (see Chapter 2). However, the size of the firm (whether 
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measured by sales turnover TURN, or employment EMP) is negatively related to the 
dependent variable. Thus, smaller firms have more of a problem with a track record. 
Model XII in Table 8.5 shows the characteristics of those firms that were requested 
by the commercial banks to take a guaranteed loan, but where no specific reason was given. 
The older is the interviewee then he is less likely to be requested by the bank to take a 
guaranteed loan. This is most likely because he has more experience, so there may be no 
specific reason for the bank not to lend to such borrowers. Model XII also shows that the 
bank will request the borrowers to take a guaranteed loan if they are not a single-plant firm or 
located outside Amman. This means that firms located in Amman fare better than those in the 
other governorates, which may be due to the accessibility to the sources of finance and more 
readily-available information about these firms; something which might make them appear 
less risky. Again, the size of the firm (whether measured by EMP or CAP) is negatively 
related to the dependent variable, but'it is not significant. Thus, overall the smaller micro- 
firms (generally with less than 5 employees) have a much greater problem in obtaining 
finance due to a lack of collateral or due to insufficient track record. 
8.4.4 Documents Preparedfor the Guaranteed Loan 
Usually, commercial banks ask firms to prepare certain documents when they apply 
for a loan. This provides information about their ability to repay the amount of the loan on 
time. The documents that are usually requested are business plans, feasibility studies and 
cash-flow analyses, as well as other documents such as licenses. The banks might request all 
or some of the above docw-nents. Table 8.6 examines the interviewee demographics and firm 
characteristics for those receiving guaranteed loans and falling into each of three categories 
(ie. business plan, feasibility study, or any document including the first two). It shows the full 
and parsimonious version of each model, but again we focus on the latter only. 
Model XIII in Table 8.6 shows the characteristics of those firms that have prepared a 
business plan. If the interviewee is a financial manager then he is more likely to prepare a 
plan, which probably reflects the ability of these borrowers to understand the concept of a 
business plan, and how it can help in applying for a guaranteed loan. An interviewee with 
more experience is more likely to prepare a business plan, which may be because they have 
Quantitative Analysis of the Survey Results 208 
more experience in dealing with the commercial banks. However, if the interviewee is male, 
the legal status of the firm is a partnership or the firm is located in Amman, then they are less 
likely to prepare a business plan. This is because all of these reflect the ability of the firms to 
pledge the conventional collateral, which is considered the best insurance for these loans. For 
example, if the borrower is a male or the legal status is a partnership then the firm generally 
able to pledge enough collateral due to high assets, so that a business plan is not needed. 
The characteristics of the firms that have prepared the feasibility study for the 
guaranteed loan are shown as model XIV in Table 8.6. The significant interviewee 
demographic variables are the same as for model X111. However, in the case of the firm 
characteristics, the sole-traders are more likely to prepare a feasibility study, but if the firm is 
a part of a large group then it is less likely to do so. Again, these may be because the firms 
are less or more able to extend sufficient collateral when they apply for a loan from 
commercial banks (see Table 8.5). The age of the firm AGE and the capital used for start-up 
CAP are negatively related to the dependent variable. This means that if the firm is younger 
or used less capital for start-up then it will be required to prepare a feasibility study in order 
to receive a guaranteed loan. This reflects the problems facing young and small start-up 
firms. 
Around 30 percent of firms prepared a business plan and a feasibility study. To 
maximize the number of observations, model XV in Table 8.6 examines the characteristics of 
those fin-ns preparing any document (including a business plan or a feasibility study). The 
table shows that 74 percent of firms prepared a document (105 out of 142 finm), but only 56 
percent of firms prepared a business plan and 44 percent prepared a feasibility study. Exactly 
the same demographic variables are significant in model XV as in models XIII and XIV, but 
few of the firm characteristics are significant. If the firm is in the service sector then it is less 
likely to prepare any document. This is because their activities can be much more clearly 
observed by banks than those in other sectors. Finally, if the capital used for start-up was 
low, then the firms were required to prepare more documents. The size of the firm, whether 
measured by EMP or TURN, is negatively related to the dependent variable, but again it is 
not significant. 
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8.5 The Guaranteed Loan 
This section analyses the characteristics affecting the value of the loan receiving a 
guarantee. It examines the factors which are associated with larger or smaller loans. It also 
examines whether the identity of the participating bank affects the loan value. In addition, it 
analyses the factors affecting the rate of interest and the value of collateral. 
8.5.1 Factors Affecting the Loan Size 
The factors affecting the value of the loan is analysed in several stages in Table 8.7. 
Initially, the effect of the interviewee demographic data (group A of variables) and the firm's 
characteristics (group B of variables) are examined (model XVI). We then consider adding 
other variables on the loan characteristics (group E of variables). Firstly, the guarantee ratio 
(L GI 6) and the value of collateral (L GI 7), shown as model XVIL Secondly, for the purpose 
of the loan (LG4), shown as model XVIII. However, there is a possibility that the value of 
collateral and the guarantee ratio may be endogenous to the value of the loan, and thus the 
possibility that the coefficients on these variables may be subject to simultaneity bias. 
Finally, for all of variables together (model XIX), together with the parsimonious version of 
this model. 
The results suggest that where the purpose is not to finance a new product or service 
(LG4.4), the loan is larger in size on average, at anywhere between J. D 13,000 to J. D 16,000. 
However, if the variable LG16 is included for those firms receiving a guarantee at the higher 
rate (ie. loans above J. D 40,000) then these terms (LG4) are no longer significant, suggesting 
that it is these other purposes that tend to get the larger loans. The results in model XIX also 
suggest that the loan size is positively related to the value of collateral (LGI 7). This is 
perhaps not surprising, and comparison with model XVI suggests that the inclusion of LG16 
and LGI 7 do not materially affect obtained coefficients on the other variables (see models 
XVI and XVII). However, the term for financial managers (TITLE3) in model XVI is 
significant, but this is because they tend to be employed in larger firms. 
Given the above effects model XIX in Table 8.7 shows that the value of the 
guaranteed loan decreases as the age of the borrower increases. This means that the banks are 
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more likely to provide larger loans (each receiving a guarantee) to younger entrepreneurs, 
which is consistent with the JLGC target group and general policy towards encouraging 
young entrepreneurs. It is also consistent with bank policies for maximizing profit, as they 
prefer to lend to younger borrowers with lower health risks, because they are more able to 
provide life insurance polices as security. The table also shows that sole traders receive 
smaller loans on average (LEGAL]), but that firrns located in Amman get larger loans 
(LOCATE). Not surprisingly, larger firms, as measured by EMP or CAP, also get larger 
loans. 
8.5.2 The Participating Banks 
This section examines whether some of the commercial banks are associated with 
larger or smaller loans. This is interesting as it potentially illustrates how the banks' credit 
policies may differ from one bank to another. Table 8.8 analyses this in several stages. 
Initially it shows in model XX the effect of the bank's identity and the purpose of the loan on 
the size of the loan receiving a guarantee. The significant demographic and firm 
characteristic variables in model XXI, are then added, and then finally we add the guarantee 
ratio (LG16) and the value of collateral (LG17) in addition to all of the previous variables. 
This is model YXII, for which the parsimonious version is also given in Table 8.8. Again, the 
results in Table 8.8 show that there are significant variations in the size of the loan from 
different banks, but that there is no consistent pattern. Some banks are associated with larger 
loans, and others with smaller loans. However, it also shows that the purpose of the loan is 
not a factor in the size of the loan. The rest of significant variables affecting the size of the 
loan in model XXII are the same exactly as in model XIX in Table 8.7. 
8.5.3 The Rate of Interest 
This section examines the factors affecting the rate of interest on the guaranteed loan. 
Table 8.9 analyses the interviewee demographics, the firm characteristics, the purpose of the 
loan, the bank identity and some other variables on the rate of interest. These other variables 
include the project size (LG3), the ratio of the loan to project size (LG18), the loan size 
(LG16), the value of collateral (LG17) and whether a firm had previously received a loan 
from a commercial bank (PLI). It gives the full and parsimonious version of this model, but 
again we focus on the latter. Here there is a possibility that the rate of interest may be 
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endogenous to the value of the loan, and thus the possibility that the coefficients on these 
variables may be subject to simultaneity bias. 
Table 8.9 shows that older interviewees are more likely to pay a higher interest rate. 
This means that younger borrowers not only receive larger loans, but they pay a relatively 
lower rate of interest. This might be due to the lower health risk of younger borrowers. The 
more-experienced interviewees are also more likely to receive a lower interest rate, 
something that illustrates the importance of experience in the provision of loans to SMEs. 
Sole traders and service-sector firms are also more likely to receive a guaranteed loan with a 
lower rate of interest. It was mentioned above that the activities in the service sector are more 
readily observable, which means lending to these firms can be made with greater confidence. 
The size of the firm (measured by TURN) is negatively related to the interest rate, because 
this reflects the firm's ability to repay the loan on time, and it makes lending to these firms 
more secure. However, both the project size and the loan size have no effect on the interest 
rate, so that it is the firm size that matters. 
Table 8.9 shows that if the purpose of the project is for start-up or for capital purchase 
the firm pays a lower interest rate on average. This result shows the importance of clearly- 
defined project, so that projects concerned with working capital pay a higher interest rate. 
Table 8.9 shows that there are significant variations in the interest rate charged by different 
banks, but that there is no consistent pattern between different types of bank. It also shows 
that there is a negative relationship between the rate of interest and the ratio of the loan to the 
project size (LG18). This result is consistent with the view that an increase in this ratio 
increases the borrower's own funding of the project, which makes the loan a less risky for the 
bank. Usually, when the borrower's financial stake increases the bank's willingness to lend 
also increases (JLGC, 1994). Besanko and Thakor (1987) report that low-risk borrowers 
choose contracts with a lower interest rate, but a higher level of collateral requirement. This 
supports this, but we now investigate the issue of collateral. 
8.5.4 The Collateral 
The main ob . ective of the loan guarantee scheme 9 is to encourage the commercial 
banks to provide loans to the viable small and medium-sized enterprises that do not have 
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enough collateral. But as we have seen in Chapter 7 the firms still pledge collateral for the 
guaranteed loans. In this section we analyse the effect of the interviewee demographics, the 
firm characteristics, the purpose of the guaranteed loan, the bank identity and some other 
variables on the value of the collateral pledged for the guaranteed loan (LGI 7). This is shown 
in Table 8.10 as model XXIV. We also examine the effect of these variables on the ratio of 
collateral to the total project size (LG19). This is shown as model XXV. Again, we focus on 
the parsimonious version of the models. 
Model XXIV shows that very few variables have an effect on the level of collateral. If 
the interviewee is a financial manager then he is more likely to pledge substantial more 
collateral for the guaranteed loan. This is probably a size-related effect, as financial managers 
work in larger firms. The level of educational attainment is negatively related to the value of 
collateral, but as mentioned before, this is probably a signal to the bank that the borrower has 
a good understanding of how to manage and use the loan (it is a 'demand' factor). However, 
if the borrower is male, then he is more likely to pledge more collateral for the guaranteed 
loan, which is because males in Jordanian society are more likely to own property (a 'supply' 
factor). This result suggests that the JLGC has to care more for female borrowers, because 
they can not necessarily provide the collateral required by banks. The value of collateral 
decreases as the age of the firm increases, so that newer firms have to pledge more collateral 
even if the loan is guaranteed by the JLGC. This increases the onus on young firms. The only 
other significant variable in the model is the number of employees, which can again be taken 
as an indicator of firm size. When a firm is larger then it is more likely to pledge more 
collateral for the guaranteed loan. This shows that the commercial banks are still looking to 
secure their rights even the loans under consideration are guaranteed by the JLGC. 
Model XXV in Table 8.10 shows the effect of the same variables on the ratio'of 
collateral to the project size (LG19). The results are very different to before. None of the 
demographic or characteristics variables are significant. Some of the banks participating in 
the scheme clearly require a higher proportion of the loan to be secured. The only variable to 
be significant is the ratio of loan size to the project size. This has a positive relationship, 
suggesting that banks require a higher level of security where the value of the loan is for a 
greater proportion of the total project size. This seems quite plausible. 
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8.6 Finance Additionality 
One of the main issues for any type of scheme providing finance to firms is whether 
the finance would have been available from other sources or not. Finance, which would not 
be available through others sources is defined as 'finance additionality' (see Chapter 4). This 
section examines the loan finance 'additionality'. It examines the effect of the interviewee 
demographics (group A of variables), the firm characteristics (group B of variables) and 
some other variables on whether the firm believes that the bank would have lent to them if 
the guarantee had not been available (ADD) (ie. ADD= 1: 'additional'; ADD =0: 'non- 
additional'). This is model XXVI, and Table 8.11 shows the full and parsimonious versions 
of the results. 
Table 8.11 shows that if the interviewee has a high level of education (EDUC) then in 
his or her opinion the provision of loan finance is more likely to have depended on the 
guarantee. This may reflect the fact that educational advantage has helped the borrower to 
take advantage of the scheme or it could be that these people are more sophisticated in their 
answers (ie. an interview bias). Interviewees with a long experience (EAPER) indicate that 
the guarantee is less likely to be additional, so they could have got finance elsewhere. These 
borrowers may have a sufficient track record and be more knowledgeable about the sources 
of funding available. Guarantees to private ownership firms (LEGAL3) are more likely be 
additional, and when the firm is a single plant enterprise (ORGI) the guarantee is also more 
likely to be additional. These kinds of plant may have more limited access to finance. Model 
XXVI in Table 8.11 also shows that older firms (AGE) seem to get more benefit from the 
loan guarantee scheme. Firms in the manufacturing sector (SECTOR]) are also more likely to 
have f inancial a dditionality. T hese may h ave more n eed for funds t han the f irms in o ther 
sectors, as they are larger in size (see Chapter 7). This is an important result, as the 
manufacturing sector has a key role in the Jordanian economy, and much attention is paid to 
it by the JLGC. The size of the firm (measured by the capital used for start-up CAP) is 
negatively related to the additionality variable, so that interestingly the finance additionality 
is greater the smaller is the size of the firm at start-up. There is evidence that the current size 
of firm (TURN) is also significant and negative, while there is also evidence for the project 
size ( see below). 
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The remainder of Table 8.11 shows the effect of a number of other variables on 
finance a dditionality (ADD). It shows that if the firm approached the JLGC directly for a 
guaranteed loan (NEGI) then they are less likely to have needed the guarantee. Thus, the 
direct approach seems to be a bad signal. The size of the project (LG3) has a negative 
relationship with the additionality variable, so that smaller projects are more likely to need a 
guarantee. This is in addition to the size of the firms. The value of collateral (LG17) also 
shows a negative relationship, which is encouraging, as the more collateral projects have the 
less they are in need of a guarantee. This is in line with the JLGC's objective which is to 
encourage the banks to lend to SMEs without sufficient collateral. The other variables are for 
the purpose of the guaranteed loan (LG4). All of the included variables have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, suggesting that guarantees for projects concerning 
with new products and services (LG4.4) are less likely to be additional. 
The factors influencing the level of additionality of the SFLGS in UK according to 
the K PMG s tudy (1999) a re as f ollows: geographical r egion, s ources off inance, markets, 
competition, firm-level objectives, personal characteristics, legal form and loan size. The 
main findings is that none of these variables is significantly related (at 5 percent level) to the 
level of finance additionality. At 10 percent level, two variables were significant: larger firms 
(measured by sales) lower finance additionality, which similar to our study; and firms facing 
regional competitors had more finance additionality. However, in our study we have found a 
range of other effects related to demographic data, firm characteristics and variables 
including the loan size, the purpose of the loan, the project size, the value of collateral, the 
history of receiving loans from banks and the firm's approach to the loan guaranteed 
corporation (we don't have data on regional competition as it is difficult to obtain in Jordan). 
Tbus, we are able to obtain a much richer set of results. 
8.7 The Economic Effect of the Project 
The finance additionality may lead to 'economic additionality', which are economic 
effects of the project that would not otherwise occur without the guarantee. These include 
such things as the opening-up of new markets, new products and services, new processes, the 
introduction of leading-edge technologies, an increase in exports and new sources of supply. 
They also include other effects on the level of firm activity, such as on sales turnover, total 
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assets or employment (see Chapter 4). Together, these are the main indicators of the 
economic effects of the loan guarantee scheme. The following discussion presents the 
empirical results for those effects, beginning with the first six effects identified above. 
8.7.1 The Effects of the Project 
This section analyses the interviewee demographics, firm characteristics and some 
other variables on each of the following effects of the project: opening-up of new markets 
(EFFECTI); developing new products and services (EFFECT2); developing new processes 
(EFFECT3); the introduction of leading-edge technologies (EFFECT4); increases in exports 
(EFFECT5); and the creation of new sources of supply (EFFECT6). The parsimonious 
results for each of these are given in Table 8.12. As well as the variables indicated above, it 
includes a regressor for the finance additionality (ADD) of the project. This variable has little 
effect on the other estimates obtained, and this can be seen from results without the 
additionality term, which are given in Appendix Table 8.4. 
0-pening-Lip of new markets (LFFECTI): Model XXVII of Table 8.12 shows that if 
the interviewee has a long experience (EXPER) then he or she is less likely to open-up a new 
market. This might be because the interviewee already has an established share of the market, 
and sees no need for new markets. However, partnership firrns (LEGAL2) or firms located in 
Amman (LOCATE) are more able to open new markets. The first of these reflects the more 
dynamic nature of partnership firms (it was found above that they are able to access greater 
finance), while for firms in Amman it may reflect the greater market opportunities (see 
Chapter 2). However, newer firms (AGE) are less able to open-up new markets because they 
probably have less capacity and they are focusing on their existing markets, while firms in 
manufacturing (SECTOR]) are more able to open-up new markets, possibly reflecting greater 
competition in this sector. Likewise, smaller firms (measured by EMP) are more likely to 
open-up new markets, possibly due to competition (see Chapter 7). The additionality variable 
(ADD) has a positive relationship with the dependent variable, but it is only mildly 
significant. It means that if the borrower believes that the loan was made because of the 
guarantee then he or she is more likely to open-up new markets. 
New products and services (LFFECT2): Model XXVIII of Table 8.12 shows that the 
interviewees with a higher level of educational attainment (EDUC) are more likely to 
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develop new products or services. This reflects the ability of such interviewee to realise the 
advantages of developing their product or service and to be more innovative. Firms in the 
service or retail sectors (SECTOR2 and SECTOR3) are also more able to develop new 
products or services, possibly due to the lower costs of introducing these. The size of the firm 
(measured by EMP) has a significant positive coefficient, which means that larger firms are 
more likely to develop new products or services. This is also the case for projects receiving 
larger loans (LG2), suggesting that scale considerations are important. However, firms that 
pledged more collateral are less likely to develop new products or services, possibly 
reflecting the more risk averse nature of these firms. The additionality of the guarantee 
(ADD) is insignificant, so that projects depending on the guarantee are no more likely to have 
introduced a new products or services. 
New processes (LFFECD3 : Model XXIX of Table 8.12 shows that if the interviewee 
is a partner (TITLE4) then he or she is more likely to develop new processes. It is also more 
likely the better educated is the interviewee (EDUC), and the younger is the interviewee 
(AGE-17Q). The results also suggest that single-plant firms (ORGI) are more able to develop 
new processes, as are firms in the manufacturing sector (SECTOR]). This no doubt result 
reflects the higher level of technology used in this sector, and interestingly it also seems to be 
associated with single-plant firms. The size of the firm (whether measured by EMP or CAP) 
is positively related to the development of new, but as may be expected start-ups is less likely 
to. Finally, if the loan that the firm received was additional, then it is more likely to develop 
new processes, suggesting that this is an important effect of the loan guarantee scheme. 
Leading-edge technologies (EFFECL4 interviewee is ý: Model XXX shows that if the 
a financial manager then the project is less likely to introduce a new level of technology. 
These managers work in larger firms, and it may be that they already have a high level of 
technology, or possibly that there are less dynamic. The more educated borrower (EDUC) is 
more likely introduce a new technology, while borrowers with a long experience (EXPER) 
are less likely to, possibly because they see no reason to change and are suspicious of new 
technology. Finns in the manufacturing sector (SECTORI) are more I ikely to introduce a 
new technology, while the firms in the retail sector (SECTOR3) are less likely to, because 
they do not need a high level of technology. Also, when the number of employees decreases 
(EMP) the firm is more likely to use new technology, supporting the idea that it is associated 
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with smaller and more dynamic firms. Model XXX also shows that the firms that approach 
the JLGC directly (NEGI) are more likely to introduce a new technology, and the size of the 
loan and project are also positively related to the dependent variable. This suggests that new 
technology is associated with larger projects in smaller firms, but they are no more likely to 
occur in projects that are additional. 
Ex-Ports (EFFECT5): In model XXXI relatively few of the variables are significant. It 
shows that if the interviewee is a financial manager (TITLE3) then the firm is less likely to 
increase its exports due to the project. This is worrying, as firms with financial managers 
tend to be larger in size. A multi-plant firm (ORG2) is also less likely to increase its exports 
as a result of the project. However, a firm in the manufacturing sector (SECTOR]) is more 
likely to increase its exports, no doubt because it aspires to be in foreign markets more than 
firms in other sectors (see Chapter 7). Model XXXI also shows that the size of the loan 
(LG2) is positively related to an increase in exports, but that the additionality of the guarantee 
does not affect this. 
New sources of sLipply (LFFECM: Finally, model XXXII of Table 8.12 shows that 
if the interviewee is a manager or a financial manager (TITLE3) then he or she is less likely 
to c reate an ew s ource ofs upply, a nd this isa Iso t he c ase f or t hose t hat a re m ore h ighly 
educated (EDUC). Firms in the retail sector (SECTOR3) are more able to create a new source 
of supply, which is plausible, as these firms are looking to provide different kinds of goods or 
services and can do so at relatively low cost. The size of the loan (LG2) and the size of 
project (LG3) are positively related to new sources of supply, but larger firms (EMP) are less 
likely to, so that again it is larger projects in smaller firms that count. The additionality 
variable (ADD) is insignificant. 
Overall, these results indicate many interesting and plausible results concerning the 
effects of projects implemented by SMEs in Jordan. These represent new results, and they 
suggest that smaller firms with larger projects or loans are much more dynamic, and are 
having a range of desirable effects. However, the loan guarantee is generally insignificant, 
and really only has an effect in opening-up new markets and developing new processes. 
Nevertheless, these are important effects. 
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8.7.2 The Effects on Firm Activity 
We now investigate the effect of the project on the firm's activities, comprising its 
assets, sales turnover and its employment level. In so doing, we examine the change in these 
activity variables that the firm attributes directly to the project (so that we ignore other 
changes in the firm's activities that are not attributable to the project). This measures the 
change in the firm's activity from one year before the guaranteed loan until two years 
afterwards, so that the interpretation of the coefficients is now different. The purpose is to 
identify the characteristics of those projects that have larger or smaller changes in activity. 
However, for completeness, in Appendix Table 8.5 the total change in the firrns' activity 
over the same period is examined, whether due to the project or not. As can be seen, these 
produce rather different results, but they are not preferred, as they include effects that are not 
due to the project. Throughout, we again include the term ADD for the finance additionality 
of the loan guarantee, and we focus on the parsimonious results. 
Change in assets: The dependent variable in the case is the change in the firms assets 
(ASSTCHGADD), measured in J. D 000's, but multiplied by the percentage of this change that 
the interviewee attributes to the project (but not necessarily the loan or the guarantee). Model 
XXXIII of Table S. 13 gives the results. It shows that if the interviewee is male (GENDER) 
then the greater will be the asset change, suggesting that male entrepreneurs are able to get 
more benefits from the project. The experience of the interviewee (EXPER) is negatively 
related to the asset change, which again supports the idea that new and younger borrowers 
are able to get greater advantages. The size of the firm (whether measured by EMP or YURN) 
is positively related to the asset change. These support the JLGC's aim to help the young, 
new and smaller borrowers. This result is confirmed by the negative relationship between the 
asset change and partnership firms (LEGAL2) and multi-plant firms (ORG2). Both of these 
tend to be larger in size. The loan additionality variable (ADD) is insignificant, although in 
the full regression it is mildly significant but negative. However, there could be 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in this model, which is perhaps suggested 
by the relatively high value of the R2but relatively low t-ratios on the individual explanatory 
variables. 
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Change in sales turnover: The dependent variable in this case is measured in a similar 
fashion to before, but for sales turnover, and given in J. D 000's. The results are shown as 
model XXXIV in Table 8.13 and there is a similar pattern to the asset change model. It 
reveals that if the interviewee is a financial manager (TITLE3) then the greater is the change 
in sales, although smaller the greater is the level of educational attainment (EDUC). 
However, both of these are significant at the 10 percent level only. Male interviewees 
(GENDER) are associated with greater turnover changes, and this supports the earlier results 
on asset changes. However, interviewees with a long experience (EXPER) or in older fin'ns 
(AGE) have smaller changes in sales. This confirms our earlier results that these are less 
dynamic firms. However, larger firms (whether measured by EMP or TURN) have greater 
sales changes. Model XXXIV also indicates a range of other effects. A firm that has a history 
with the commercial banks (PLI) is less likely to increase its turnover, as is a larger project 
(LG3). However, the size of the loan (LG2) and the value of collateral (LGI 7) are positively 
related to the sales change. The additionality of the guarantee has no effect on the sales. 
In the KPMG study, there are three terms that show a positive relationship with the 
change in sales turnover due to the guaranteed loan: personal capital output (ie. the initial 
start-up capital of owner), new markets and new products. These last two seem self- 
explanatory. The variables that have a negative relationship with an increase in sales turnover 
are related to market share, whether at the UK or European levels, but none of these variables 
are included in our study, although we find a large range of effects from variables that were 
not used in the KPMG study. 
Change in number of employees: Again, the dependent variable in this case is 
measured in a similar fashion to before, and it is equal to the increase (or decrease) in the 
number of employees attributable to the project two years after its implementation. The 
findings of model XXXV of Table 8.13 show that the change in employment is negatively 
related to the level of educational attaim-nent (EDUC). This is consistent with earlier results, 
as these individuals seem more able to use new processes and new technology in their 
operations, which are less labour intensive. Male interviewees (GENDER) and sole-trader 
firms (LEGAL]) are also less likely to have a positive change in the number of employees, 
the latter no doubt because these owners are reluctant to expand the firm beyond the personal 
span of control. This result is consistent with the results of the KPMG study. Regarding the 
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location (LOCATE), model XXXV shows that firms located in Amman have a greater 
employment change, although firms in services or retail (SECTOR2 and SECTOR3) are less 
likely to do so. This supports the view that firms in the manufacturing sector create more jobs 
than other sectors, which is supported by the qualitative results in Chapter 7. The KPMG 
study did not identify any sector effects. 
The results show that the employment change is positively related to the employment 
size of the firm (EMP). Thus, surprisingly, larger firms seem to grow more. This is consistent 
with the results for sales turnover. However, once allowance is made for the effect of 
employment size, then there is a negative relationship between employment growth and 
turnover (TURN). This suggests that is the larger but relatively inefficient or low-value 
activity firms (ie. high employment but small turnover) that put on most jobs. The negative 
relationship with turnover is also found in the KPMG study (they do not include a term for 
employment). 
As regards the purpose of the loan, firms engaged in capital purchases or working 
capital (LG4.2 and LG4.3) have lower employment change than those who use the loan for 
start up. The firms that have a history with the commercial banks (PLI) are less likely to 
have positive employment change, although the reason for this is not known. The K PMG 
study found that the age of the firm had a positive relationship with the employment change, 
although in our study age is not significant (AGE), and the initial start-up capital of the owner 
also had a positive relationship, but again in our study it is insignificant (CAP). The 
additionality of the guarantee (ADD) has no effect on the employment change in this study, 
suggesting that projects relying on the guarantee are no more likely to increase or lose jobs. 
8.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the quantitative analysis of the survey results using 
regression analysis. It examines issues such as firm's approach to the JLGC, the size of the 
guaranteed loan, the finance 'additionality' of the guarantee and the effects of the project. 
Overall, the analysis provides a consistent set of results that indicate many interesting 
findings on the operation of the loan guarantee scheme. In particular, it shows that there are 
seven broad groups of firms and entrepreneurs that have difficulty in obtaining bank finance 
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and where the scheme seems to have had its main effects; these are: smaller firms, 
manufacturing firms, firms outside Amman, newer fin-ns, younger borrowers, less-educated 
borrowers and female borrowers. We conclude by summarizing the main results in respect of 
each of these broad groups. 
Smaller firms: The results suggest that the smaller-micro firms (generally less than 
five workers) have a much greater problem in obtaining finance due to a lack of collateral or 
due to an insufficient track record. These firms are more risky, and the results show that they 
have to prepare more documents to prove their ability to repay the loan on time. This risk 
causes the banks to charge these firms significantly higher interest rates. The results also 
show that these smaller firms (in terms of capital employed; see page 213) were not able to 
receive the funds from the commercial banks in the absence of the loan guarantee scheme, 
which means that the finance additionality is greater, so that they are more likely to need a 
guarantee. As regards the economic effects of the projects implemented by these firms, it can 
be observed that they are significantly more likely to open up new markets, but less likely to 
develop new products or services. Finally, the smaller is the firm then the lower is the sales 
turnover change, while the growth in assets and employment are not affected by the size of 
the firm. 
Manufacturing firms: The manufacturing sector has a key role in the Jordanian 
economy, and much attention is paid to this sector by the government and the JLGC. This is 
perhaps reflected in the fact that the manufacturing firms are significantly more likely to 
apply for a guaranteed loan directly through the JLGC. These firms are more likely to 
prepare a feasibility study, and the results show that they are more likely to need a guarantee. 
In terms of the econornic effects of the projects implemented by these firms, we find that 
they are more likely to open-up new markets, develop new processes, introduce a new 
technology and increase exports. However, if a firm is in manufacturing then the greater is 
the employee change, but the change in assets and sales turnover are no different than for 
other finus. Overall, projects implemented by manufacturing firms have a great range of 
effects than firms in other s ectors, which no doubt reflects the key r ole attributed to this 
sector in the Jordanian economy. 
Firms outside Amman: Generally, the level of development outside Amman is less 
than the level of development inside Amman, which makes firms outside Amman more 
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risky. This is reflected in the results from the quantitative analysis. The commercial banks are 
significantly more likely to request that a borrower takes a guarantee loan if they are located 
outside Amman, despite having conventional collateral that comparable to firms inside 
Amman. Further, the size of loans received by firms outside Amman is significantly smaller. 
To put this another way, it could be argued that firms inside Amman have more information 
on the services of the JLGC and are able to extract larger loans. As regards the economic 
effects of the projects implemented by the firms outside Amman, it can be observed that they 
are less likely to open-up new markets, but otherwise there are no significant differences. 
Finally, fin-ns located outside Amman are less likely to create new jobs but there are no 
effects on assets or on sales change. 
Newer firms: The results suggest that the newer firms are more likely to be required 
to prepare a feasibility study in order to receive a guaranteed loan. This is in addition to the 
collateral that they have to pledge for the loan, even though the loan is guaranteed by the 
JLGC. However, the newer firms do not believe that the guarantee is additional, as they have 
sufficient collateral to obtain a loan elsewhere. The results show that the newer firms are less 
likely to open-up new markets, but they are more likely to have a significantly greater change 
in sales. The change in assets and employment are not affected by the age of the firm. 
Younger borrowers: In the case of younger entrepreneurs, the results show that they 
are more likely to apply for a guaranteed loan directly through the JLGC. For this they have 
to p repare more d ocuments, b ut t hey are a ble tor eceive I arger I oans a nd p ay ar elatively 
lower rate of interest. These borrowers are more likely to develop new processes, but there 
are no significantly different, economic effects and changes in the firm's employment, assets 
or sales turnover. The guarantees also do not appear to be additional. 
Less-educated borrowers: The results show that the less-educated borrowers do not 
have problems associated with a lack of collateral, but they have an insufficient track record 
that in akes o btaining f inance r elatively d ifficult. D ue tot he a vailability of c ollateral, they 
believe that provision of a loan is less likely to depend on a guarantee. Their projects are 
significantly less likely to have the following economic effects: develop new products or 
services, develop new processes and introduce new technologies, but they can have a new 
source of supply due to the project. The results also show that the lower is level of 
educational attainment the greater is sales and employee change. 
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Female borrowers: In the case of female borrowers, the results show that female 
entrepreneurs are less likely to apply for a guaranteed loan directly through the JLGC. They 
do not have a problem in obtaining sufficient collateral, but their problem in obtaining 
finance is a lack of track record. The commercial banks request these borrowers to prepare 
many kinds of documents to demonstrate their ability to repay the loan. As regards the 
economic effects of the projects implemented by such borrowers, it can be observed that they 
are no significant differences, but the results show that if the borrower is female then the 
lower is the asset and sales change, while the change in the number of employees is greater. 
Overall, these results indicate a number of client groups experiencing difficulties in 
obtaining bank finance. Apart from the smaller firms, these problems do not appear to arise 
from a lack of collateral, but because of an insufficient track record, which makes the banks 
reluctant to lend to them. This not only applies to newer firms and younger borrowers, but 
also to less-educated and female borrowers. These borrowers often dismiss the importance of 
the loan guarantee scheme, arguing that they have sufficient collateral and they would have 
been able to obtain a loan in any event (ie. The loan guarantee scheme was non-additional). 
However, this may reflect these borrowers' lack of understanding of the financial system, in 
which a lack of track record plays a very important role. Thus, we believe the additionality of 
the scheme is greater for these borrowers than their responses would suggest. 
In the case of other important client groups of firm (ie. Smaller firms, manufacturing 
firms and firms outside Amman) we find that there is generally good additionality, enabling 
these firms to obtain loan finance that would not otherwise have obtained. Their projects also 
seem to be having many important effects. In these senses, the results that we report for the 
loan guarantee scheme are encouraging. 
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Table 8.1: Correlation Coefficients of the Firm Size 
EMP TURN CAP LG2 LG3 
EMP 1.0000 
TURN 0.6381 1.0000 
CAP 0.2624 0.2848 1.0000 
LG2 0.4836 0.4618 0.3403 1.0000 
LG3 0.3181 0.2673 0.3829 0.5477 1.0000 
Note: EMP = number of firm employees; TURN = sales turnover of firm; CAP = capital used for start-up; LG2 
= loan size; and LG3 = project scale. 
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Table 8.2: Factors Determining the Approach to the JLGC 
Model I Model 11 Model III Model IV 
NEG I Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
TITLE] 0.245 (3.43) --- 0.251 (2.30) 0.302 (3.32) 
TITLE2 0.286 (1.28) --- 0.273 (1.12) 0.387 (1.68) 
TITLE3 0.191 (0.96) --- 0.353 (1.48) 0.405 (2.29) 
EDUC 0.068 (1.24) --- 0.048 (0.93) --- 
0 E GENDER 0.197 (1.97) --- 0.253 (2.18) 0.263 (2.30) Q 
a AGE_JNT 0.003 (0.86) --- 0.005 (1-38) 0.005 (1.45) 
EXPER -0.007 (1.66) --- -0.009 (1.88) -0.01 (2.53) 
EXPERM 0.403 (1.18) --- 0.475 (1.26) 0.613 (1.99) 
LEGAL] --- 0.170 (2.38) 0.255 (2.74) 0.243 (3.02) 
LEGAL2 --- -0.245 (2.70) 0.306 (2.93) 0.305 (3.26) U. ORGI --- 0.233 (2.61) 0.223 (2.25) 0.254 (3.06) 
E ORG2 --- 0.199 (1.22) 0.189 (1.08) 0.199 (1.29) 
0 LOCATE --- 0.057 (0.77) 0.071 (0.91) --- 
AGE --- -0-003 (0.08) -0.010 (0.29) --- 
SECTOR] --- 0.128 (1.97) 0.211 (2.34) 0.216 (3.01) 0 
SECTOR2 --- 0.250 (3.27) 0.312 (3.37) 0.316 (3.84) 
U) SECTOR3 --- 0.302 (2.18) 0.319 (2.12) 0.322 (2.20) 
EMP --- 0.005 (1.50) 0.003 (0.92) --- 
TURN --- -0.0001 (1.44) -0.0001 (1.09) --- 
CAP --- 0.002 (0.06) -0.017 (0.45) --- 
TURNM --- 0.095 (0.86) 0.081 (0.75) --- 
Constant -0.382 (2.09) -0.477 (2.43) -1.186 (3.50) -1.164 (3.84) 
N 142 142 142 142 
F 3.84 2.24 1.58 2.37 
R2 0.07 0.11 0.37 0.15 
Notes: The dependent variable is NEGI; ie. whether the firm first approached the JLGC (NEGI=I) or a 
bank (NEGI =0). Models I to III estimate different versions, and model IV gives the parsimonious 
results for model 111. The t-ratios are based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.3: Approach to JLGC: Previous Loans 
Model V Model V& IV Model IV 
0 NEG1 Coef t Coef t Coef t 
CL PLI 0.044 (0.25) 0.092 (0.46) --- 
0 
, 02 W PL2 -0.038 (0.33) -0.054 (0.39) --- u 
PL3 -0.0003 (0.98) 0.0002 (0.32) --- 
PL2M 0.51 (0.54) 0.665 (0.55) --- 
PL3M -0.214 (2.84) -0.192 (2.03) --- 
TITLE] 0.106 (0.41) 0.035 (0.34) 
E TITLE2 --- 0.195 (0.51) 0.103 (0.42) 
z TITLE3 --- --- --- 
GENDER --- 0.230 (1.45) 0.219 (1.38) 
U) AGE-INT 0.007 1.44 0.007 (1.50) 
EXPER -0.008 (1.56) -0.008 (1.68) 
EXPERM 0.501 (1.18) 0.466 (1.17) 
LEGAL] 0.225 (2.40) 0.212 (2.24) 
ir- 0 "E E LEGAL2 --- 0.308 (2.62) 0.297 (2.70) Im 
Z ORGI --- 0.290 (1.97) 0.292 (2.31) 
U) 0 ORG2 --- 0.190 (0.89) 0.218 (1.16) 
SECTOR] --- 0.235 (2.54) 0.226 (2.60) 
SECTOR2 --- 0.343 (3.13) 0.344 (3.24) 
SECTOR3 --- 0.290 (1.78) 0.289 (1.81) 
Constant 0.208 (3.44) -1.097 (2.32) -0.960 (3.05) 
N 99 99 99 
F --- --- 2.32 
R20.01 0.13 0.13 
Notes: The dependent variable in each case is NEGI; ie. whether the firm first approached the JLGC 
(NEGI= 1) ora bank (NEGI =0). There are 99 observations, as the regressions e xclude those 
firms that received the JLGC guaranteed loan for start-up, and which have no history of previous 
loans. Model V estimates the firm's history with commercial banks on the first approach. Models 
V& IV estimates the firm's history with the parsimonious version of model 111. Model IV re- 
estimates the model shown in Table 8.2, but with 99 observations. TITLE3 is dropped as there 
are no non-zero observations. The t-ratios are based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.4: Approach to JLGC: Collateral for Previous Loans 
Model VII Model Vill Model IX 
NEG1 Coef t Coef t Coef t 
PL4.1 0.069 (0.33) --- -- - ir- 
0 PL4.2 0.028 (0.17) --- 0. CL PL4.3 0.214 (0.97) --- -- - 
PL4.4 0.352 (1.29) --- -- - 
PL5.1 --- -0.577 (2.84) --- 
.2 r PL5.2 --- -0.819 (4.56) --- . 
PL5.3 --- -0.661 (4.10) --- 
72 
J, 0 
Z PL6.1 --- --- 0.344 (2.22) m 
> PL6.2 --- 0.452 (2.33) (L) E PL6.3 --- --- --- 0 
(0 PL6. IM --- -6.148 (2.21) 
TITLE] -0.015 (0.12) 0.165 (1.03) 0.317 (1.88) 
E TITLE2 0.381 (1.18) 0.549 (1.60) 0.576 (2.20) 
TITLE3 --- --- --- 
GENDER 0.008 (0.03) 0.129 (0.51) 0.102 (0.42) 
A GE-INT 0.011 (1.40) 0.008 (1.08) 0.006 (0.80) 
EXPER -0.008 (0.85) -0.008 (0.99) -0.013 (1.56) m 
EXPERM 0.630 (0.77) 0.421 (0.66) 1.209 (1.55) 
LEGALI 0.086 (0.47) 0.116 (0.76) 0.099 (0.68) 
; r- 0 
EE LEGAL2 0.154 (0.04) 0.206 (1.04) 0.239 (1.35) 
ORGI 0.222 (0.47) 0.324 (1.59) -0.079 (1.90) 
ORG2 -0,112 (0.64) -0.067 (0.36) 0.448 (0.46) 
SECTOR] 0.298 (1.28) 0.343 (1.65) 0.447 (1.68) 
SECTOR2 0.415 (1.95) 0.402 (2.03) 0.437 (2.11) 
SECTOR3 0.355 (1.18) 0.257 (1.06) 0.348 (1.30) 
Constant -0.920 (1.29) -0.419 (0.57) -1.439 (1.91) 
N 51 51 51 
F 
R2 0.28 0.31 0.36 
Notes: The dependent variable in each case is NEGI; ie. whether the firm first approached the JLGC 
(NEGI= I) or a bank (NEGI =0). There are 51 observations, as the regressions include only those 
firins in receipt of a previous loan. TITLE3 is dropped as there are no non-zero 
observations. PL4 is the purpose of the previous loan; PL5 is the kind of assets pledged as 
collateral for the previous loan; and PL6 is the value of the collateral. The t-ratios are based 
on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.5: Reasons to Take a Guaranteed Loan 
No track record (NEG 4.2) Bank request (NEG 4-3) 
Model X Model X1 Model XII 
Coef. Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. t Coef. 
TITLEI 0.178 (0.92) 0.216 (1.62) -0.104 (0.52) --- 0.196 (0.65) 
TITLE2 -0.154 (0.53) --- -0.336 (1.52) -0.160 (2.38) 0.518 (1.34) 
TITLE3 0.082 (0.27) -0.255 (1.07) --- 0.431 (1.09) CL 
EDUC 0.129 (2.43) 0.091 (1.75) -0.080 (2.32) -0.081 (2.55) -0.028 (0.58) 
o GENDER 0.173 (1.12) 0.230 (1.89) -0.210 (1.51) -0.216 (1.66) 0.050 (0.35) E 
0 A GE-INT 0.005 (0.93) --- 0.003 (0.99) --- -0.005 (1.12) Q 
EXPER 0.004 (0.66) --- -0.003 (0.69) -0.003 (0.58) 
EXPERM -0.054 (0.09) --- 0.139 (0.33) --- 0.110 (0.25) 
LEGAL] 0.055 (0.29) --- -0.280 (1.78) -0.263 (1.82) 0.164 (1.40) 
f LEGAL2 0.006 (0.03) --- -0.284 (1.82) -0.229 (1.61) 0.262 (2.12) 
ORGI 0.267 (1.75) 0.219 (1.99) -0-065 (0.49) --- -0.333 (1.54) 
ORG2 0.139 (0.61) --- 0.079 (0.45) --- -0.287 (1.14) E LOCATE 0.268 (2.69) 0.202 (2.49) 0.043 (0.66) --- -0.201 (2.30) 
AGE -0.071 (1.40) 0.016 (0.48) --- 0.024 (0-55) 
SECTORI 0.125 (0.67) --- 0.088 (1.38) --- 0.100 (0.72) 
SECTOR2 0.006 (0.03) --- 0.166 (2.22) 0.095 (1.46) 0.113 (0.90) 
SECTOR3 -0.242 (1.16) -0.333 (2.73) 0.086 (0.76) --- 0.192 (1.01) 
EMP 0.0001 (0.04) --- -0.001 (0.62) --- -0-0003 (0.11) 
TURN 9.99E-06 (0.09) --- -0.0001 (1.23) -0.0001 (1.91) 0.0001 (0.43) 
CAP -0-015 (0.36) --- 0.033 (1.18) --- -0.021 (0.50) 
L) TURNM -0.246 (2-05) --- -0.023 (0.27) -0.017 (0.22) 0.025 (0.21) 
Constant -0.590 (1.27) -0.35 (2.00) 0.557 (1-32) 0.679 (3.14) 0.447 (0.97) 
-0.007 (1.86) 
-0.264 (2.02) 
-0.167 (2.28) 
0.877 (4.33) 
n 68 68 18 18 37 37 
N 141 141 141 141 141 141 
F 13.96 6.52 1.04 1.75 3.14 4.75 
R20.22 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.09 
Note: The dependent variables are NEG4.1 for model X, NEG4.2 for model XI and NEG4.3 for model X11. The parsimonious version of each 
model is also given, but only those variables significant at 15% level are included. N= total number of observations and n= number of 
observations where the borrowers response was equal to 1; otherwise zero. There was a missing case in each regression, so N= 14 1. The 
t-ratios are based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.6: Documents Prepared for the Guaranteed Loan 
Business plan Feasibility study Any document 
G5.2 or NEG5.4) (NEG5.1 to NEG5.4) 
Model X111 Model XIV Model XV 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
TITLE] -0.562 (2.42) -0.458 (3.00) -0.268 (1.26) -0.357 (2.08) -0.598 (4.69) -0.385 (3.49) m 
C TITLE2 0.799 (2.94) -0.720 (4.36) -0.458 (1.88) -0.615 (3.36) -0.896 (4.15) -0.739 (2.44) 
0 
-;: TITLE3 -0.005 (0.01) --- 0.202 (0.63) --- -0-01 (0.05) --- 
CL EDUC 0.018 (0.34) --- -0-010 (0.17) --- 0.044 (0.97) --- 
00 GENDER -0-113 (1.70) -0.244 (1.95) -0.245 (1.75) -0.236 (1.75) -0.387 (4.00) -0.392 (3.77) 
E 
00 AGE-INT -0.006 (1.27) --- -0.003 (0.58) --- -0.005 (1.26) --- 0 EXPER 0.016 (2.50) 0.017 (3.77) 0.017 (2.98) 0.017 (3.83) 0.02 (3.73) 0.015 (4.10) 
EXPERM -0.659 (1.21) -0.882 (2.36) -0.876 (1.75) -0.791 (2.18) -1.207 (2.65) -0.815 (2.55) 
LEGAL] 0.06 (0.46) --- 0.152 (0.90) 0.197 (2.39) 0.068 (0.42) --- 0 
E LEGAL2 -0.179 (1.23) -0.268 (2.97) -0.045 (0.25) --- -0.019 (0.11) --- 
ORGI 0.09 (0.47) --- 0.29 (2.21) 0.283 (2.66) 0.172 (0.77) --- 
ORG2 0.261 (0.97) --- 0.233 (1.53) 0.193 (1.51) 0.378 (1.38) 
E LOCA TE -0.238 (2.75) -0.205 (2.57) 0.008 (0.09) --- -0.069 (0.84) --- 
AGE 0.037 (0.86) --- -0.106 (2.48) -0.111 (3.25) -0.038 (0.95) --- 
SECTORI -0.186 (1.11) --- 0.188 (0.92) 0.179 (2.46) -0.126 (0.93) 
0 
SECTOR2 -0.25 (1.51) --- 0.034 (0.17) --- -0.277 (2.08) -0.135 (1.82) 
SECTOR3 -0.125 (0.56) --- -0.174 (0.76) --- -0.164 (0.88) --- 
U) EMP 0.001 (0.43) --- -0.003 (0.47) --- -0.002 (0.33) --- 
I. A 0 TURN -0.0001 (0.69) --- -0.0001 (0.43) --- -0.0001 (0.88) --- 
CAP -0.073 (1.77) --- -0.066 (1.88) -0.074 (2.22) -0.058 (1.45) -0.092 (2.78) 
o TURNM 0.197 (1.74) --- -0.098 (0.73) --- 0.196 (2.19) --- 
Constant 1.536 (3.56) 1.078 (5.66) 0.710 (1.71) 0.609 (2.72) 1.686 (4.68) 1.440 (9.77) 
n 80 80 62 62 105 105 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 
F 11.48 4.69 31.83 37.53 6.04 7.11 
R2 0.33 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.23 
Note: For model XIII the dependent variable is NEG5.1 or NEG5.4 ("Business plan" or "Business plan & Feasibility study"); for model 
XlVit is NEG5.2or NEG5.4 ("Feasibility study" and" Business plan& Feasibility study"); and for model XVitisNEG5.1. to 
NEG5.4 (Business plan, Feasibility study, cash flow analysis or "Business plan and Feasibility study"). The parsimonious version of 
the models also given including only those variables significant at 15% level. N= number of observations and n= number of 
observations where the borrowers response equal to 1; otherwise zero. The t-ratios are based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.7: Value of the Guaranteed Loan 
Model XVI Model XVII I Model XVIII Model XIX 
LG2 
TITLE] -3.070 (0.55) -6.737 (1.14) -5.571 (0.88) 
a TITLE2 -7.911 (0.79) 0.568 (0.07) -11.823 (1.12) 0 
,;: TITLE3 35.349 (2.02) 13.732 (0.82) 31.871 (1.81) 
0. EDUC -0.550 (0.33) -0.039 (0.03) -0.302 (0.15) 
Im 
0 GENDER -1.863 (0.39) -0.751 (0.26) -1.902 (0.39) E 
0 AGE-INT -0.440 (2.75) -0.234 (2.08) -0.408 (2.60) a EXPER 0.165 (0.85) 0.145 (1.17) 0.105 (0.51) 
Coef. t Coef. tI Coef. t Coef. t Coef. 
-10.381 (1.48) 
-4.505 (0.49) 
10.126 (0.60) 
0.226 (0.14) 
-0.995 (0.33) 
-0.205 (1.92) 
0.109 (0.85) 
-8.325 (0.54) EXPERM -18.548 (0.96) -10.483 (0.69) -14.287 (0.69) 
LEGAL] 
LEGAL2 
ORGI 
ORG2 
LOCATE 
*J 
0 U) AGE 
0) j SECTOR] 
U. 
Ma SECTOR2 
SECTOR3 
EMP 
TURN 
CAP 
TURNM 
LG16 
LG17 
LG4.1 
LG4.2 
LG4.3 
LG4. IM 
Constant 
-18.753 (2.24) -13.573 (2.05) 
-13.939 (1.54) -8.941 (1.24) 
-8.687 (0.94) 2.595 (0.36) 
-10.651 (1.03) 0.453 (0.06) 
4.436 (1.45) 2.756 (1.26) 
0.551 (0.27) 0.864 (0.54) 
-3.343 (0.59) 0.574 (0.18) 
-0.505 (0.09) 2.418 (0.77) 
-0.680 (0.09) 1.369 (0.41) 
0.366 (2.69) 0.224 (2.39) 
0.003 (0.62) -0.005 (1.92) 
4.001 (2.77) 3.027 (2.74) 
1.291 (0.37) -0.002 (0.00) 
--- 33.031 (8.98) 
--- 0.037 (2.56) 
52.555 (3.36) 6.665 (2.04) 
-19.028 (2.39) 
-14.037 (1.60) 
-7.794 (0.82) 
-9.570 (0.88) 
5.745 (1.90) 
0.615 (0.26) 
-1.778 (0.29) 
0.101 (0.02) 
1.397 (0.19) 
0.369 (2.60) 
0.003 (0.56) 
3.713 (2.44) 
0.377 (0.11) 
14-531 (2.12) 
12.825 (2.26) 
16.083 (2.70) 
-388.526 (2.65) 
38.353 (2.28) 
-13.445 (2.10) 
-8.737 (1.23) 
2.760 (0.39) 
0.918 (0.11) 
3.781 (1.79) 
-0.607 (0.33) 
2.775 (0.64) 
3.093 (0.93) 
2.610 (0.75) 
0.219 (2.29) 
-0.005 (1.72) 
2.684 (2.31) 
-0727 (0.30) 
32.595 (8.26) 
0.037 (2.92) 
6.605 (0.98) 
6.121 (0.98) 
9.380 (1.41) 
-206.149 (1.26) 
21.659 (1.57) 
-0.202 (2.25) 
-7.321 (3-15) 
4.857 (3.05) 
0.190 (2.77) 
2.157 (1.53) 
34.474 (6.04) 
0.045 (3.90) 
9.615 (3-05) 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
F 11.30 22.40 6.11 10.68 33.14 
R2 0.57 0.77 0.58 0.78 0.73 
Note: The dependent variable in each case is LG2, which is the value of the loan guaranteed by JLGC measured by J. D 000's. Model 
XVI estimates the effect of demographic data and characteristics of the sample firms on the value of the loan Model XVII also 
includes whether the guaranteed ratio is 50% or 75% and the value of collateral, while model XVIII includes the purpose of the 
project in addition to the variables in model XVI. Model XIX includes all of the variables together and it gives the 
parsimonious version of also, only variables significant at 15% level are included. LG4 is the purpose of the guaranteed loan. 
LG16 is the size of the loan and LGI 7 is the value of collateral. The models in this table are estimated using OLS. 
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Table 8.8: Value of the Guaranteed Loan: Participating Banks 
Model XX Model XXI Model XXII 
LG2 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Housing Bank -7.247 (1.77) 4.197 (0.60) -5.022 (1-15) -- - 
Union Bank -23.791 (11.11) -3.822 (0.57) -12.626 (3.11) -7.813 (3.93) 
Industrial Development Bank 0.237 (0.04) 6.396 (0.74) -7.546 (1.40) -- - 
Cairo Amman Bank -1.389 (0.14) 8.861 (0.83) -9.746 (2.57) 
Arab Bank Association -11.645 (2.72) -8.471 (1.43) -13.511 (3-95) -7.806 (3.37) 
Jordan GuýfBank -26.000 -11.540 (1.54) -15.873 (3.14) -11.211 (6.68) 
Jordan Kuwait Bank -7.405 (0.99) 1.990 (0.45) -6.092 (1.44) -- - 
Jordan Bank -14.755 (2.76) -0.146 (0.02) -7.111 (1.21) -- - 
Jordan Investment Bank 8.497 (2.22) 15.728 (3.00) -7.749 (0.90) -- - 
Middle East Bank -23.752 (12.68) -8.132 (1.33) -16.993 (3.37) -10.727 (3.94) 
Arab Bank -2.378 (0.25) -1.068 (0.14) -11.785 (4-07) -- - 
Arab Land Bank -10.550 (1.28) 4.970 (0.47) -12.106 (2.66) -5.719 (2.31) 
National Bank -16-068 (3.43) -4.295 (0.63) -11.122 (2.73) -3.778 (1.51) 
Arab Investment Bank 45.834 (10.00) 21.932 (3.47) -6.274 (1.47) -- - 
Grindlays Bank -28.755 (5.39) 2.868 (0-36) -10.831 (2.45) -2.530 (1.46) 
Export and Finance Bank 1.748 (0.75) 2.121 (0.26) 4.192 (0.74) -- - 
LG4.1 Start-Up -5.648 (1.16) 15.141 (3.06) 6.875 (1-57) -- - 
LG4.2 Capital purchases 0.186 (0.04) 15.546 (3.25) 7.214 (1.79) -- - 
LG4.3 Working capital 4.941 (0.94) 17.718 (3.01) 10.137 (2.10) 
LG4.1M -7.879 (0.08) -438.144 (3.46) -223.575 (2-06) -- - 
AGE-INT --- -0.374 (2.39) -0.173 (1.86) -0.146 (1.51) 
LEGALI --- -9.734 (2.53) -8.080 (3.17) -7.995 (3.56) 
LOCA TE 9.131 (2.67) 4.021 (1.77) 4.251 (2-36) 
EMP --- 0.560 (3.69) 0.211 (2.75) 0.259 (3.80) 
CAP --- 2.917 (1.51) 1.395 (0-87) 
LG16 --- 34.392 (5.65) 34.143 (6.36) 
LGI 7 --- 0.043 (3.33) 0.043 (3.69) 
Constant 29.814 (6.65) 9.550 (1.08) 21.424 (3.48) 24.332 (4.55) 
N 142 142 142 142 
F 1.25 4.46 13.35 27.21 
R20.18 0.50 0.76 0.75 
Note: The dependent variable in each case is LG2; which is the size of the loan receiving a guarantee from the JLGC. Model XX 
estimates the effect of the p urpose of the guaranteed I oan and t he bank i dentity on t he s ize of the I oan. M odel X XI also 
includes some demographic and firm characteristics that are significant in model XIX in Table 8.7. Model XXII includes LG16 
and LG17 in addition the variables in model XXI and finally it gives the parsimonious version of as well. LG4 purpose of the 
guaranteed loan, LG16 is the size of the loan, and LG17 is the value of collateral. The models in this table are estimated using 
OLS. 
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Table 8.9: The Rate of Interest on the Guaranteed Loans 
Model XXIII 
LG9 Coef. Coef 
TITLEI 0.007 (0.61) --- 
TITLE2 0.005 (0.40) --- 
CL TITLE3 0.002 (0.15) --- 1! 
.5 EDUC -0.001 (0.79) --- tm co 0a GENDER 0.001 (0.25) --- E 
0 AGE-INT 0.0002 (1.54) 0.0002 EXPER -0.0002 (1.43) -0.0002 
EXPERM 0.006 (0.33) 0.004 
LEGAL] -0.006 (1.17) -0.005 LEGAL2 -0.003 (0.65) --- ORGI -0.007 (1.03) --- 
0 
ORG2 -0.010 (1.34) --- 0 E LOCATE 0.002 (0.85) --- AGE -0.001 (0.64) --- SECTOR] 0.0002 (0.07) 
CL 
E SECTOR2 -0.005 (1.75) -0.006 
m SECTOR3 -0.002 (0.45) --- Cn EMP 0.0001 (0.75) --- TURN -0.000004 (1.28) -0.000004 CAP 0.0002 (0.15) --- TURNM 0.002 (0.84) -0.0004 
Start-Up LG4.1 -0.017 (1.96) -0.006 Capital purchases LG4.2 -0.011 (1.39) -0.004 Working capital LG4.3 -0.009 (1.18) --- DummyLG4. ]M 0.324 (1.59) 0.085 
Housing Bank -0.008 (1.14) --- 
Union Bank -0.009 (1.29) --- 
Industrial Development Bank -0.038 (5.74) -0.029 
Cairo Amman Bank -0.023 (2.27) -0.013 
Arab Bank Association -0.009 (1.46) 
Jordan Gut(Bank -0.019 (2.35) -0.006 E Jordan Kuwait Bank -0.009 (1.27) --- 
CL 
E 
M Jordan Bank -0.016 (2.08) -0.008 
.3 L_ CO Jordan Investment Bank -0-013 (1.37) -0.007 
so_ Middle East Bank -0.010 (1.39) -0.004 cu 
CL 
CL 
Arab Bank -0.011 (1.56) -0.007 U) Arab Land Bank -0.013 (1.32) --- 
NationalBank -0.008 (1.18) --- 
Arab Investment Bank 0.019 (1.17) 0.016 
Grindlays Bank 0.003 (0.33) --- 
Export and Finance Bank -0.006 (0.76) --- 
LG3 (Project size) -0.00002 (1.05) --- 
LG3M 0.011 (1.13) --- 
LG18 (Loan size to project size) -0.008 (2.47) -0.004 
LG16 (Size of loan) 0.00004 (0.01) --- 
LGI 7 (Value of collateral) 0.00001 (0.42) --- 
PL I (Receiving loan previously) 0.0004 (0.72) --- 
Constant 0.168 (8.86) 0.146 
(2.06) 
(1.77) 
(0.34) 
(2.41) 
(3.68) 
(2.53) 
(0.20) 
(2.43) 
(1.85) 
(2.77) 
(11.68) 
(2.15) 
(2.57) 
(3.93) 
(1.78) 
(1.89) 
(1.89) 
(1.79) 
(3.10) 
(37.65) 
N 142 142 
F 6.20 14.81 
R2 0.76 0.71 
Note: The dependent variable in each case is LG9, which is the rate of interest. The full model and the 
parsimonious version of the full model are shown. The models in this table are estimated using 
OLS. 
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Table 8.10: The Value of Collateral for the Guaranteed Loans 
pTendent Variable LG17 LG19 
_. Model XXIV Model XXV 
Coef t Coef t Coef. t Coef 
TITLEI -19.34 (0.41) --- -0.200 (0.28) 
TITLE2 -36.64 (0.36) --- 0.965 (0.65) :E 
0. TITLE3 196.07 (1.32) 268.41 (2.17) 1.643 (0.85) 
EDUC -13.32 (1.29) -11.16 (1.64) -0.328 (1.28) 
00 GENDER 19.97 (0.62) 23.71 (1.82) -0.804 (0.79) E AGE-INT 0.32 (0.30) --- 0.008 (0.33) 0) a EXPER 0.19 (0.10) --- 0.013 (0.28) 
EXPERM -52.07 (0.28) --- -2.215 (0.52) 
LEGALI 32.98 (0.57) --- 0.739 (0.82) --- 
LEGAL2 36.64 (0.62) --- 0.445 (0.48) --- 
ORGI 58-05 (1.09) --- 0.625 (0.75) 
U) 
ORG2 14.76 (0.25) --- 0.270 (0.30) --- 0 
U) 
LOCA TE 7.66 (0.26) --- -0.493 (0.69) --- 
.U r 
AGE -21.08 (1.25) -15.95 (1.99) -0.254 (0.70) --- ' SECTORI -41.72 (0.78) --- 0.391 (0.32) 
. 
4.1 CL E SECTOR2 -21.51 (0.45) --- 0.114 (0.10) 0 
to M C U) 
SECTOR3 -23.33 (0.43) --- 0.044 (0.03) --- 
M EMP 1.96 (1.29) 2.10 (2.35) -0,002 (0.07) 
.C L) TURN 0.02 (0.42) --- 0.000 (0.28) --- 
CAP 6.50 (0.49) --- 0.092 (0.29) --- 
TURNM 10.96 (0.42) --- -0.187 (0.39) --- 
LG4.1 Start-Up -23.62 (0.27) --- -0.648 (0.35) --- 
LG4.2 Capital purchases 31.56 (0.38) --- -0.245 (0.15) --- 
LG4.3 Working capital -9-85 (0.12) -0.733 (0.48) --- 
LG4. IM -64.66 (0.03) --- -- - --- 
Housing Bank 28.62 (0.39) --- 1.802 (2.30) 
Union Bank -2.48 (0.04) --- 0.663 (0.58) --- 
Industrial Development Bank 73.82 (0.80) --- 2.504 (1.32) 0.813 (1.66) 
J Cairo Amman Bank -13.41 (0.18) --- 1.625 (1.28) --- 
Arab Bank Association -8.00 (0.13) --- 1.677 (1.62) --- 
Jordan Gut(Bank -56.75 (0.66) --- 0.392 (0.32) --- 
cE Jordan Kuwait Bank 22.65 (0.39) --- 1.560 (1.25) 
ME Jordan Bank 57.69 (0.76) --- 2.903 (1.89) 1.024 (5.05) 
Jordan Investment Bank 173.67 (1.31) --- 3.707 (1.82) 2.215 (1.93) 
`E 0 Middle East Bank 33.93 (0.50) --- 2.496 (2.03) --- M CL Arab Bank 75.63 (0.94) --- 2.756 (1.45) --- 
Arab Land Bank 55.02 (0.60) --- 1.994 (1.66) 
NationalBank 25.64 (0.43) --- 3.800 (2.12) 1.954 (1.85) 
Arab Investment Bank 127.27 (0.86) -0.017 (0.02) --- 
Grindlays Bank 2.64 (0.03) --- -- - --- 
Export and Finance Bank -23.93 (0.28) --- -- - --- 
LG3 (Project size) 0.22 (0.85) --- 0.002 (0.37) --- 
LG3M 37.63 (0.48) --- 
LG18 (Loan size to project size) -13.80 (0.55) --- 1.405 (1.07) 0.949 (1.57) 
LG16 (Loan size) 24.53 (0.55) --- -0.196 (0.25) --- 
LG9 (Rate of interest) 704.51 (0.43) --- 9.536 (0.27) --- 
PLI (Receiving loans previously) -1.61 (0.38) --- -0,093 (0.67) --- 
NEGI (Firrns approach to JLGQ -15.49 (0.36) --- 0.305 (0.28) 
Constant -122.70 (0.41) 58.22 (2.88) -2.013 (0.31) 0.511 (1.76) 
N 142 142 135 135 
F 1.60 3.02 0.64 2.78 
R20.46 0.34 0.23 0.11 
Note: The dependent variable in model XXIV is LGI, which is the value of collateral. It estimates the effect of different variables on the value of 
collateral, and it gives the parsimonious version as well. The variables NEG5.1 to NEG5.4 were included In model XXIV, but dropped because 
they were insignificant. The dependent variable in model XXV is LG19, which is the ratio of collateral to the project size for which these a total 
of 135 observations. It estimates the effect of different variables on the ratio, and it gives the parsimonious version only those variables 
significant at 15% level are included. The variables LG4. IM and LG3M were not included in model XXVI as there were no missing cases for 
the 135 observations. The Arab Investment Bank and Grindlays Bank were not also included as they were not present in the for 135 
observations. The models in this table are estimated using OLS. 
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Table 8.11: Finance Additionality 
Model XXVI 
ADD Coef Coef 
TITLE] 0.187 (0.96) --- 
TITLE2 0.139 (0.54) --- 
TITLE3 0.356 (1.10) --- 
CL EDUC 0.233 (1.80) 0.250 (2.27) 
m L- tm GENDER 0.044 (0.77) --- 
0 
E AGE-INT 0.005 (1.19) --- 
E"ER -0.017 (3.33) -0.015 (3-81) 
EM'ERM 1.648 (3.62) 1.503 (4.18) 
LEGAL] -0.516 (3.32) -0-520 (4.26) 
LEGAL2 -0.475 (3.16) -0.502 (3.97) f ORGI 0.268 (2.22) 0.210 (2.09) 
U- 
W ORG2 0.157 (0.89) --- 
. r- LOCATE 0.028 (0.30) 
0 A GE 0.058 (1.22) 0.068 (1.71) 
SECTORI 0.188 (1.09) 0.114 (1.51) 
SECTOR2 0.086 (0.50) --- 
SECTOR3 0.101 (0.54) 
EMP -0.001 (0.03) --- 
C. ) TURN -0.001 (1.34) --- 
CAP -0.089 (2.39) -0.086 (2.44) 
TURNM -0.157 (1.51) --- 
PLI (Receiving loan previously) -0.014 (0.79) --- 
NEGI (Firms approach) 0.110 (0.95) 0.155 (1.46) 
LG2 (Loan size) -0.002 (0.82) 
LG3 (Project size) -0.001 (0.93) -0.001 (2-00) 
LG3M -0.346 (1.55) -0.494 (2.51) 
LG4.1 (Start-up) 0.667 (2.60) 0.543 (3.22) 
LG4.2 (Capital purchases) 0.664 (3.24) 0.651 (3.84) 
LG4.3 (Working capital) 0.689 (3.25) 0.615 (3-58) 
LG4. IM -16.647 (3.05) -14.846 (3.54) 
LGI 7 (Value of collateral) -0.001 (1.15) -0.001 (1.96) 
Constant -1.501 (2.88) -0.932 (3.63) 
N 141 141 
F 2.10 3.86 
R20.38 0.35 
Note: The dependent variable in each case is ADD, which is whether the firm's believes that the bank will lend 
to them if the guarantee were not available ie. I= 'additional' and 0= 'non-additional. There was one 
non-response. The t-ratios are based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.12: The Economic Effects of the Project 
Dependent Variable EFFECTI EFFECT2 EFFECT3 EFFECT4 EFFECT5 EFFECT6 
Model XXV11 Model XXV111 Model XXIX Model XXX Model XXXI Model XXXII 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T Coef. T Coef. t Coef. T 
TITLE] --- --- -0.544 (2.43) --- --- -0.280 (1.69) m . 6.0 TITLE2 --- --- -0.399 (1.40) --- --- 
TITLE3 --- --- -1-062 (3.95) -0.510 (1.95) -0.474 (3-05) -0-591 (1.92) 
CL X EDUC --- 0.173 (3.66) 0.079 (1.40) 0.114 (2.09) --- -0-106 (2.27) m GENDER --- --- 
0 E A GE-INT --- --- -0-009 (2.17) --- --- --- 
4) EXPER -0-006 (1-32) --- --- -0-006 (1.51) --- --- 
EXPERM 0.360 (0-76) --- --- 1.291 (3.69) --- 
LEGAL] 
LEGAL2 0.175 
E ORGI --- --- 0.186 (1.68) --- --- --- M ORG2 --- --- --- --- -0.161 (3.06) --- 
'53 LOCA TE 0.213 --- --- --- --- --- (2.58) 
0 AGE 0.063 (1.74) --- --- --- --- --- 0 
SECTOR] 0.141 (1.70) --- 0.196 (2.31) 0.184 (2.15) 0.156 (2.93) 
SECTOR2 --- 0.153 (1.77) --- --- --- --- 4) 
*0 
0 SECTOR3 --- 0.293 (1.99) --- -0.293 (3.69) --- 0.378 (3.03) so EMP -0.007 (3.71) 0.006 (3.06) 0.008 (3.43) -0.004 (1.36) --- -0.005 (2.13) 
L) TURN --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CAP --- --- 0.097 (2.70) 
TURNM --- --- --- 
PLI 
NEGI --- --- 0.250 (2.43) --- --- 
LG2 --- 0.004 (2.14) --- 0.007 (3.27) 0.004 (2.49) 0.004 (1.52) 
LG3 --- --- --- 0.002 (1.74) --- 0.002 (2.22) 
LG3M --- --- --- 0.024 (0.11) --- -0.204 (1.03) 
LG4.1 --- --- -0.162 (1.80) -0.540 (3.53) --- --- 
LG4.2 --- --- --- -0.348 (2.29) --- 
LG4.3 --- --- --- -0.499 (3.27) --- -- - 
LG4. IM --- --- 0.368 (0.50) 11.555 (3.09) --- -- - 
LG17 --- -0.001 (1.85) --- --- --- -- - 
ADD 0.111 (1.24) -0.047 (0.54) 0.138 (1.44) 0.067 (0.74) -0.025 (0.49) 0.058 (0.64) 
ADDM -0.744 (0.96) 0.892 (1.21) -0.592 (0.74) 0.154 (0.20) 0.077 (0.18) 0.175 (0.22) 
Constant 0.380 (3.34) 0.113 (1.09) 0.654 (1.93) 0.380 (2.07) -0.035 (1.07) 0.782 (3.87) 
N 141 141 141 140 140 140 
F 2.48 3.22 3.67 4.12 3.32 2.54 
R20.16 0.18 0.29 0.38 0.15 0.18 
Note: The dependent variables record the effects of the project as follows: EFFECT] (opening-up of new markets), EFFECT2 (new 
products or service), EFFECT3 (new processes), EFFECT4 (leading-edge technology), EFFECT5 (increase in exports) and 
EFFECT6 (new source of supply). The parsimonious versions of the full models excluding the ADD term are shown in Appendix 
Table 8.4. In the first three models there is one non-response, and in the other model there are two non-responses. The t-ratios are 
based on heteroskedasticity errors. 
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Table 8.13: Effects of Firm Activity Due to Project 
Dep endent Variable ASSTCHGADD SALECHGADD EMPCHGADD 
Model XXXIH Model XXXIV Model XXXV 
Coef t Coef t Coef. t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
TITLEI 0.37 (0-02) --- -0.16 (0.04) --- 0.63 (1-06) --- 
0 TITLE2 45-07 (0.56) --- -9.31 (0.98) 2.12 (1.65) --- :E 
0. TITLE3 132.14 (1.62) --- 10.57 (1.17) 15-39 (1.63) -0-12 (0.11) --- 2.1 EDUC -12-23 (1.47) --- -2.39 (1.85) -1-97 (1.63) -0.33 (2.16) -0.28 (2.31) cm m Od GENDER 32.79 (1.88) 36-80 (1-83) 6.91 (2.31) 6.27 (2.29) -0.66 (1.12) -0.77 (1.33) E AGE-INT 0.12 (0.26) --- -0.03 (0.30) --- 0.01 (0-98) 0 a EXPER -1.01 (1.47) -1.12 (1-57) -0.19 (1.48) -0.14 (1.57) -0.01 (0.33) --- 
EXPERM 74.72 (1.23) 64.41 (1.14) 10-13 (0-97) 9.21 (1-22) 2.46 (1.75) --- 
LEGAL] -25.47 (0.76) --- -6.31 (1-23) --- -0.51 (0.99) -0.60 (1.75) 
LEGAL2 -54.65 (1.34) -30.96 (1.66) -10-97 (1-92) -6.47 (2.41) 0.24 (0.39) --- 
ir ORGI -5.82 (0.24) --- 3.52 (1.22) --- -0.08 (0.08) --- 
0 ORG2 -34.76 (1.11) -40.34 (1.53) -0.14 (0.03) --- -0.83 (0.75) --- 
LOCA TE 4.45 (0.49) 2.39 (1.16) --- 0.28 (0.99) 0.40 (1.84) 
0 AGE -5.54 (0.67) --- -2.58 (1.70) -2.43 (1.79) 0.03 (0.23) --- W 
.2 
SECTORI -2.12 (0.14) --- 2.82 (0.79) --- -0.32 (0.90) 
U) SECTOR2 17.44 (1.16) --- 3.04 (0.84) --- -0.73 (1.87) -0.37 (1.59) .r 
(D SECTOR3 6.01 (0.42) --- 3.72 (1.01) --- -0.93 (2.36) -0.56 (2.40) 
EMP 1.21 (1.19) 1.56 (1.40) 0.24 (2.22) 0.21 (2.24) 0.02 (2.48) 0.02 (2.82) 
TURN 0.04 (1.40) 0.08 (1.59) 0.01 (2.86) 0.01 (2.47) -0.01 (1.84) -0.01 (2.40) 
AP -7.11 (1.14) --- -0.08 (0.07) --- 0.01 (0.07) --- 
TURNM 8.58 (0.51) 15.21 (1.08) 2.34 (0.82) 1.06 (0.43) 0.37 (0.76) 0.34 (0.76) 
PLI -1.37 (0.56) --- -0.74 (2.00) -0.37 (1.47) -0.06 (0.94) -0.09 (2.47) 
NEGI 9.11 (0.73) --- -1.71 (0.76) ---- 0.07 (0.24) --- 
LG2 0.36 (0.66) 0.13 (1.74) 0.14 (1.85) 0.01 (0.29) --- 
LG3 0.13 (0.54) --- -0.05 (2.02) -0.03 (1.56) 0.01 (0.39) 
LG3M 8.18 (0.27) 21.60 (1.57) 24.61 (2.19) -0.52 (0.80) 
LG4.1 35.38 (0.81) --- 7.64 (1.34) --- -0.35 (0.47) --- 
LG4.2 43.18 (1.10) --- 5.99 (1.21) --- -0.85 (1.34) -0.75 (2.08) 
LG4.3 32.25 (0.98) 3.72 (0.84) --- -1.25 (2.32) -1.03 (2.86) 
LG4. IM -921.43 (0.97) --- --- --- --- --- 
LGI 7 0.01 (0.08) --- 0.03 (2.09) 0.03 (2.26) 0.01 (0.11) --- 
ADD -17.78 (1.55) -7.97 (0.84) -0.05 (0.02) 0.94 (0.45) 0.22 (0.87) 0.20 (0.93) 
ADDM --- --- --- -2.54 (1.02) -2.26 (1.12) 
Constant 4.33 (0.07) -18.66 (1.04) 3.88 (0.38) 5.87 (1.27) 1.96 (1.43) 2.79 (2-54) 
N 122 122 ill ill 125 125 
F 4.54 10.26 8.16 15.57 1.37 1.96 
R2 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.74 0.32 0.23 
Note: The dependent variables are ASSTCHGADD (= ASSTCHG multiplied by the percentage of change in assets due to the project in the firm's 
view) in model XXXIII, SALECHGADD (= SALECHG multiplied by the percentage of change in sales due to the project in the firm's 
view) inm odel XXXIV and EMPCHGADD (= EMPCHG multiplied by the p ercentage of c hange in number of employees due to the 
project in the firm's view) in model Y-XXV. Each m ode] shows the full a nd parsimonious versions. A DDM is not i ncluded in models 
XXXIII and XYXIV, as there were no missing cases for the 122 and III observations. Likewise LG4. IM is not included in models 
XXXIV and XXXV because there were no missing cases for the III and 125 observations. The models in this table are estimated using 
OLS. 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECONEWENDATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC) was established in 1994 to cover the 
risks associated with loans extended by commercial banks to small and medium-sized firms 
in Jordan, whether these firms are in manufacturing, agriculture, services or retail. It seeks to 
improve the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to borrow from the banks 
to implement viable projects, especially where these firms do not meet the conventional 
requirements for collateral. This inability of SMEs to provide collateral makes the banks 
extremely conservative and risk averse in their lending to these small firrns. The loan 
guarantee scheme provides the commercial banks with guarantees to cover 50 or 75 percent 
of outstanding balance of a loan to an eligible SME. It also offers the commercial banks 
liquidity in the case of loan default, where the scheme settles the guarantee amount within 
three months of the bank's claim. It encourages banks to apply credit policies that give 
priority to a project9s economic feasibility and cash flow, and not to conventional collateral. 
This study has been directed towards an examination of the impact of the Jordanian 
loan guarantee scheme on SMEs. The broad objective of the research, as set out in the 
introduction, is to evaluate the effects of the Jordanian loan guarantee scheme to establish its 
role in improving the supply of funds for SMEs in Jordan. Apart from the introduction and 
concluding chapters, the thesis is structured around seven chapters. In Chapter Two, a 
general overview of the Jordanian economy is given, while the third Chapter examines the 
role of SMEs in the Jordanian economy, and considers the problems facing these firms, 
including the difficulties for SMEs in raising finance in Jordan. In Chapter Four a survey of 
the I oan guarantee literature is presented, including other evaluations, while Chapter Five 
explores the Jordanian experience of loan guarantees. The methodology for the study is set 
out in Chapter Six, which considers the surveys of loan guarantee recipients and commercial 
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banks. The analysis of these data commences in Chapter Seven, with a qualitative analysis of 
the main results, while Chapter Eight undertakes a more quantitative analysis of the firm 
survey data using regression techniques. We now seek to draw out the main conclusions for 
the evaluation of the Jordanian loan guarantee scheme. The chapter also presents the 
recommendations and suggestions for improving the policy and procedures, in order to make 
SME access to finance easier. 
9.2 Main Findings 
9.2.1 The Characteristics of a Success 1 Scheme Ifu 
The Jordanian loan guarantee scheme is designed to encourage the commercial banks 
to provide loans to SMEs, and to encourage small and medium-scale projects with good 
prospects of profitability and success to apply for funds from the commercial banks. The aim 
of the loan guarantee scheme is to cover the risks of SMEs, thereby making their lending 
from the commercial banks much easier. However, the success of the loan guarantee scheme 
depends on how well it encourages the commercial banks to provide loans to a number of 
broad groups of firms and projects that appear have the greatest difficulty in obtaining bank 
finance. These are: firms that suffer from a lack of conventional collateral; projects with 
uncertain profitability (ie. smaller projects or in manufacturing); and projects that are deemed 
by banks to be 'low-quality' (ie. located outside Amman, undertaken by females or by low- 
educated borrowers). Finally, the scheme may be considered successful if it encourages the 
commercial banks to lend to newer firms or to younger borrowers. 
The commercial banks are extremely conservative in their lending to above firms and 
borrowers, even though they may have perfectly good projects. Hence, the purpose of the 
loan guarantee scheme is to encourage the banks to lend to small and medium-sized firms 
with viable projects with any of these characteristics. To the extent that this happens, we can 
judge the success of the loan guarantee scheme in Jordan. This is our main purpose in this 
section, and it serves to summarise the main results and conclusions from the thesis. 
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9. Z2 Survey Results 
Demographic data on the interviewees shows that ninety percent of them are 
managers, and that half have a first degree. Only ten percent of the scheme participants in the 
sample are women. The approximate age of a respondent is around 45 years on average, with 
15 years of experience. Characteristics of the sample firms show that around two-third of the 
firms are sole-traders, and the vast majority of the sample firms are single-plant 
establishments. Only a few firms may be considered as old firms, because most were 
established in the last two decades. Self-finance and the commercial banks are the principal 
sources for capital at the start-up stage, which is generally less than J. D 100 thousand, 
indicating that the firms are mostly very small in size. In general, there is a lack of firms that 
have a history with the commercial banks. Those that have received previous bank loans used 
these for working capital purposes, and around half of them used real-estate assets as 
collateral. 
The vast majority of the sample firms were made aware about the loan guarantee 
scheme by their banks. This reflects the borrowers' lack of information on the scheme and 
the services . offered 
by the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation. The loans receiving 
guarantees are most likely to be used for capital purchases, start-up or for working capital, 
while a high proportion of the recipients still extended conventional collateral for the 
guaranteed loan. This is surprising, as the guarantees are meant to go to firms that do not 
have adequate or any collateral. In addition to the collateral the banks requested the firms to 
prepare other documents, such as a feasibility study, business plan or possibly both. 
However, despite these showing the potential viability of the project, the commercial banks 
still sought conventional collateral, even though the loan was guaranteed. 
The survey analysis shows that more than one-third of the sample firms didn't 
produce any finance additionality at all, while only 8 percent offered full additionality (ie. the 
full amount of the loan would not otherwise have been made). In total, only 16 percent of the 
firms said that they thought more than half of the loan depended on the guarantee, while 72 
percent said it less than fifty percent and possibly zero (the reminder were non-responses). The 
main effects of the projects financed by the guaranteed loans were to open-up new markets, 
develop new products or services and to implement new processes. Three years after the 
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project, around one-quarter of the change in the firms' assets, one-third of the change in their 
sales turnover and one-quarter of the change in employment were due to the project funded by 
guaranteed loan. However, given that the finance additionality is low, then the economic 
additionality is also low. 
The survey of a small number of commercial banks participating in the loan 
guarantee scheme shows that less than one-quarter of the banks' total credit facilities were 
provided to SMEs, and that of this only about one-third was guaranteed under the scheme. 
The banks report that the SMEs seek funds from them for two main reasons: working capital 
and start-up purposes; which is consistent with the survey of loan guarantee recipients. 
However, the banks also report that conventional collateral is the main factor in their 
decision to provide loans to small and medium-sized projects. Further, it is the main source 
of security for loans even when guaranteed under the loan guarantee scheme, which is also 
consistent with the finn survey results. The banks state that the main advantages of the loan 
guarantee scheme are the provision of liquidity in the event of loan default and the lower 
cash reserves required by the Central Bank of Jordan. The disadvantages are that the 
guarantees take a long time to progress, especially in the case of compensation where the 
borrower defaults. Also, many forms need to be filled-in, in their opinion the marketing 
strategy for the scheme was largely ineffective, and the documents that were prepared by 
firms were often of a poor quality. 
Finally, it was found that there was little change in the banks' behaviour due to the 
loan guarantee scheme. This was partly because the scheme was relatively new and the 
banks' experience of it was not substantial, but also, the bureaucratic nature of the scheme 
made banks wary of participating in it. Generally, because of the difficulties in receiving 
compensation in the event of loan default, the banks said that they only lent to fn-rns that they 
would otherwise have lent to in the absence of the scheme, suggesting that it has had a poor 
effect. Again, it is consistent with the evidence obtained from the survey of firrns. 
9.23 Quantitative Analysis Results 
The main findings of the quantitative analysis show that there are several broad 
groups of firms and clients that have difficulty in obtaining bank finance, and where the 
scheme may have had its main effects. These are: smaller firms, manufacturing firms, firms 
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outside Amman, newer firms, and younger, less-educated or female borrowers. We consider 
these in turn. 
The quantitative analysis found that the smaller firms (less than 5 employees) 
suffered from a lack of collateral, as well as an insufficient track record, which made 
obtaining finance much more difficult. These smaller firms are more risky, and they have to 
prepare more documents to prove their ability to repay the loan. The finance additionality for 
the smaller firms was also greater, and the size of the firm had a negative relationship with 
the change in sales turnover after the project, but there were no effects on assets or 
employment. It was found that manufacturing firms were more able to get a loan guarantee 
because they were more able to prepare feasibility studies, cash-flow statements and other 
documents. These manufacturing firms were also more likely to have finance additionality. 
Overall, projects implemented by manufacturing firms have a greater range of effects than 
firms in other sectors, which no doubt reflects the key role attributed to this sector in the 
Jordanian economy. The firrns also had a greater change in employment due to the project, 
and the scheme seems to have been relatively more effective in the manufacturing sector. 
The c ornmercial b anks c onsider p roj ects o utside A mman, and t hose u ndertaken by 
female entrepreneurs or by less-educated borrowers to be 'low-quality'. In the case of firms 
located outside Amman, we found that the commercial banks requested them to take a 
guarantee, despite of the availability of conventional collateral. The size of the loans received 
by these firms was also smaller, and they were less I ikely to open-up new markets or to 
create new jobs. In the case of female borrowers, the results showed that they did not have a 
difficulty with collateral, but their problem in obtaining finance was due to a lack of a track 
record. The commercial banks requested these borrowers to prepare many kinds of 
documents to demonstrate their ability to repay the loan. The results show that if the 
borrower was female the lower were the asset and sales changes, while the change in the 
number of employees was greater. Finally, in the case of less-educated borrowers, the 
difficulty in obtaining for finance was also due to an insufficient track record. These 
borrowers believed that the provision of the loan was less likely to depend on the guarantee, 
perhaps erroneously and indicating some kind of response bias. These borrowers were less 
likely to develop new products or services or introduce new processes or technologies. 
However, the lower was the level of educational attainment the greater were the sales and 
employee changes. 
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In t he c ase ofn ewer f irms, t hey w ere more I ikely top repare a feasibility s tudy in 
order to receive a guaranteed loan, in addition to conventional collateral. The collateral made 
them believe that the guarantee was not additional for them. The results showed that they 
were less likely to open-up new markets, but more likely to have a greater change in sales. 
Finally, younger borrowers were more able to prepare documents, because they needed to 
prove their profitability, especially if they did not have a sufficient track record. Despite 
receiving larger loans and paying lower rates of interest, they did not believe that the 
guarantee was additional. However, we found that the newer firms and younger borrowers 
had a greater tendency to get more advantages from the loan guarantee scheme. 
9.24 Is the Scheme a Success? 
From the firm and the commercial bank surveys, we can observe that the loan 
guarantee scheme seems to have had a relatively poor effect overall. In the case of finns, that 
received the guaranteed loans, we found only 8 percent of them reported full additionality (ie. 
the full amount of the loan would not otherwise have been made). In total, only 16 percent of 
the firms said that they thought more than half of the loan depended on the guarantee, while 
72 percent said it less than fifty percent and possibly zero. The banks also reported that there 
was little change in their behaviour as a result of the loan guarantee scheme. The scheme had 
a weak effect because the commercial banks requested conventional collateral, despite the 
fact that the loan was guaranteed by the JLGC. As such, and the banks failed to adopt the 
appropriate credit policy, which requires them to give priority to projects that are viable, even 
though they do not have enough collateral. 
There are a number of client groups experiencing difficulties in obtaining bank 
finance, as indicated above. However, the quantitative analysis revealed that, apart from the 
smaller firms with less than five employees, these problems did not arise from a lack of 
collateral, but because of an insufficient track record. This makes the banks reluctant to lend 
to t hese f inns, and itn ot o nly a pplies to n ewer firms a nd younger b orrowers, b ut a Iso to 
'low-quality' projects, such as projects outside Amman and female and less-educated 
borrowers. In the case of the female and less-educated borrowers, they often tend to dismiss 
the importance of the loan guarantee scheme, arguing that they have sufficient collateral and 
they would have been able to obtain a loan in any event (ie. the loan guarantee scheme was 
non-additional). However, in part this may reflect their poor understanding of the financial 
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system, in which a lack of track record does play a very important role. Thus, we believe the 
additionality of the scheme to be greater for these borrowers than their responses would 
appear to suggest, but still to be quite low. 
Overall, the additionality of the loan guarantee scheme is poor, although it is better 
for s ome firms orb orrowers. Int he c ase ofs maller f irms, in anufacturing f irms a nd firms 
outside Amman we find that the additionality is greater, enabling these firms to obtain loan 
finance that would not otherwise have got. Their projects also seem to have many important 
effects, so that in this sense the results are encouraging. The results also show that the loan 
guarantee scheme is relatively more successful in encouraging the banks to adopt the 
appropriate credit policy in the case of some kinds of firms or borrower. These are smaller 
firms, manufacturing firms, newer firms and younger borrowers. However, the bureaucratic 
nature of the scheme, including the difficulty in the banks receiving compensation in the 
event of a loan default, tends to make the banks lend only to those firms that they would 
otherwise have lent to. This is part of the reason for the limited change in the banks' lending 
behaviour toS MEs asar esult oft he I oan guarantee s cheme, and itI eads us to in ake t he 
following set of recommendations. 
9.3 Recommendations 
This section offers some recommendations to the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation 
(JLGQ in order to improve the operation and effectiveness of the Jordanian loan guarantee 
scheme. These recommendations are divided in to five categories. These are: application and 
procedures; project approval; nature of the scheme; the target group; and the follow-up and 
evaluation. For each category our recommendations are as follows: 
The loan guarantee scheme should: 
Application and procedures: 
* Activate its marketing strategy to reach the target groups directly, and not to 
concentrate on marketing its services to the commercial banks only. It must try to 
find an appropriate way to deal directly with potential borrowers to show that the 
loan guarantee scheme is providing services to them and not just to the banks. In 
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the absence of such a marketing strategy, the scheme is open to abuse by the 
banks. 
9 Merge the information required by the scheme into a few number of forms. There 
is no need for the huge number of documents that are currently requested from the 
commercial banks, especially in the case of the loan default. 
* Reduce the processing time in dealing with the commercial banks, especially in 
compensation cases. These processes increase the cost to the banks in dealing 
with the scheme, meaning that there is no advantage to them from seeking to 
guarantee the loans. 
* Give attention to training programmes, not only for the credit officers of the 
commercial banks, but also some training programmes and workshops for the 
target groups of firms and borrowers. 
Project qpproval: 
e Give more attention and support to projects that have economic feasibility and a 
good cash-flow. T he Loan Corporation n eeds tobei nvolved int he d ecision to 
lend to these projects, and not to leave it solely to the banks, especially where the 
borrower has good indicators of success. 
Establish a specialised unit to prepare feasibility studies, cash-flow analysis and 
business plans, which will be more objective and much better prepared than is the 
case currently. This will encourage the commercial banks to give more attention 
to the projects that have economic feasibility and a good cash-flow analysis by 
reducing the amount of conventional collateral that is requested. 
Nature of the scheme: 
9 Equalise the ratio of the guarantee, as the commercial banks report, to be the same 
whatever is the amount of the loan. In addition, the scheme should be flexible, so 
that this may change from time to time in response to the needs of the firms and 
the commercial banks, including changes to the guarantee ratio. 
* The banks should not pass on the guarantee fee that they pay to the Loan 
Corporation through the charge of a higher interest rate to the borrowers, as the 
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borrowers report. This makes the rate of interest on the guaranteed loan higher (by 
between I and 2 percentage points), and makes a guarantee less attractive to the 
fin-n. 
9 Encourage the banks to reduce the rate of interest, especially for guaranteed loans 
provided to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
e Tighten procedures to ensure that only those projects genuinely in need of a 
, guarantee receive a guarantee. This can be done by imposing greater controls on 
the banks, and removing the incentives for the banks to use the scheme purely to 
provide cash-flow on loans that are already secure. 
The target groLip: 
* Offer its service across the whole country, especially in rural areas. Currently, the 
guaranteed loans are concentrated in a few governorates. The Loan Guarantee 
Corporation may also consider extending the scheme to all economic sectors. 
* Provide special services for new entrepreneurs and new graduate students to 
encourage them to start their own business. This is consistent with the 
government policy of reducing the unemployment rate. 
9 Give special attention and support to female entrepreneurs and to less-educated 
borrowers, which have sufficient collateral but often have a lack of track record. 
Follow-Lip and evaluation: 
9 The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation has an Evaluation Department, but it 
only examines the cases where there are defaults on guaranteed loans. It does not 
follow-up or monitor firms that received guaranteed loans and are still operating, 
but it is possible that this kind of activity may help to reduce the number defaults, 
especially in the lack of any follow-up and guidance to the firms from the 
commercial banks. 
e Take advantage of the lessons learned from other loan guarantee schemes. The 
UK s cheme ist he c losest tot hat oft he Jordanian s cherne, sot he Jordan Loan 
Guarantee Corporation should try to learn and get as much as they can from the 
UK experience, which appears not to be going on currently. 
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9 Make the ease of access and ease of use of data on loan guarantee cases much 
easier for researchers. The commercial banks should also be more indulgent to 
researchers, by providing a greater level of data than was the case of this study 
9.4 Future Research 
Research on loan guarantee schemes is a new area of study, not only in Jordan but in 
all of the developing countries, whereas there is a much greater experience of such scheme in 
developed countries. This research is therefore a pioneering study in the context of 
developing countries. For future research in this area the following points should be of 
interest and borne in mind, as potentially fruitful avenues of research: 
0 The loan guarantee scheme in Jordan has to be evaluated from time to time, 
possibly using different methods of evaluations, which can provide answers to 
different kind of questions. 
0 The loan guarantee scheme as a tool of government policy to support small and 
medium-sized enterprises should be compared with other policies to support 
SMEs, such as other kinds of subsidy. 
0 Examine if the loan guarantee varies in its impact between regions, and discover 
the factors affecting this. 
0 Study the role of the loan guarantee scheme in reducing or affecting the default 
rates of SMEs and the macroeconomic effects of the scheme on small firm growth 
and investment. 
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Appendix 5.1: Inquiry Application Form (101) 
THE JORDAN LQ-kN GUA=TEE CORPOP-kTlON LTD. 
Date 
Fo= 
IncFuir7 A-P-Plication Fo= No () 
Na-me of the Bank /Financial InstitutC-ion ................... 
Messrs The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporatio. -Li Ltd., 
Greetings, 
Please be kind enough to provide us with the information available 
with you on whether the under mentioned client has previously 
obtained loans from other banks pursuant to the loan risk guarantee 
system and whether the aim sought by the loan was acceptable for 
Purposes of offering guarantees to cover the risks of such a loan. 
I 
Name of the Borrower 
Address of the Borrower 
Amount of the recruired loan 
Purpose of the loan 
Name of the owner / partners 
Ba. nk Signature 
248 
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(Duestions for -Ll- Jordan Loan Guarantee co. 
4 
The Corporation has previously guaranteed loans 
for the client. 
The Corporation has previously guaranteed loans for the 
owner. 
Purpose of the loan is in line with the terms of the 
guarantee Agreement and its addenda. 
The Corporatio-ra has approved tthe loam. 
The Corvoration's signature 
I 
249 
No es 
Subsecraent to the inquiry application form No () submitted by the 
bank ................... relating to the Borrower ................... 
Summary of the pur-poses of the loan, the financing sources and the 
I ,, quarantees Jn kind 
Type of activity: 
Number of employees: 
Pur-poses of the loan: 
Purchase of machinery, equipment and tools 
Financing of working capital 
others (To be specified) 
JDs 
Total: 
Appendices 
A 
I. Assets and other expenses: 
Machinery, equipment and goods 
Cost of installation of machinery 
and electrical works 
Start-u-o costs and rent 
Others (To be specified) 
S 
To tal 
internal Sources of Finance: JDs 
* Paid up capital .............. 
* Loans from banks .............. 
* Other creditors .............. 
* Retained profits and current 
accounts of partners .............. 
Total - 
Other income sources for the cwr-e-- /partners /guaran t ors 
e 
7. Guarantees that may bee provided: 
Real Estate 
Personal 
Shares and Bonds 
Machi-nery a--ad Equ-j'--pment 
8. Estimated values for the guarantees: 
Real Estate of the -value of: .............. 
Shares and Bonds of the value of: .............. 
Machinery and equipment of the value of: .............. 
Others (To be specifies): .............. 
Previous dealings with the bank/Statements from the Central 
Bank ......................................................... 
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Appendix 5.2: Summary of the Loan Granted by the 
Bank Notification of Approval (102) 
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THE JORDAN LGAN GUAP-kNTEE CORPORATION LTD. Date 
(102) 
Su=ary of the loan granted by the Bank 
Notification of approval 
/'Name cf the Bank/Fizaancial I nstitut'o-Li ............................ 
Messrs The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation Ltd. 
Greetings, 
We have the pleasure to inform you of the approval of our Bank//our 
financial institution to grant the loan, of which the details are 
indicated he--ebelow: 
1. Ir. -if o=aL--4 on c----, the client 
* Name of the owner/Names of the partners: 
* Nationality of owner/Naticnality of the company: 
* Name of the-autho--, ized director: 
* Years of experience of the ow-ner/director: 
2 I-Tifo-=ation on the loan 
* Amount of required loan: 
* A-mount of approved loan: 
* Date of bank approval for granting the loan: 
* Purposes of the loan: 
* Number of the granted loan: 
* Number of the clientfs account: 
Date of first drawdown: 
Duration oiff the grace period: 
Number of- installments and their dates: 
1ýmount of one instal-iment a---, d date of t'---he one: 
Appendices 252 
3 Info=ation on the interest rate and cc=-i-ss--Lon 
* Interest rate applicahle on the loan: 
* Rate of collected co=ission: 
* Method of collection of interest: 
A. Tn Fo=ation on the i: )rolect 
* Nature of activity of the project: 
* Date of setting up the project: 
* NuMer of work force including owner: 
* Trade name of the project: 
* Number of the project's trade register: 
* Number and validity date of the project's trade license: 
* Size of exports and its percentage: 
5. Infc=atior- on the -Finaincincr sources and cash -'Flows 
Paid up capital: 
Amounts borrowed from banks: 
* Owner account/Partners current account: 
* Suppliers and other creditors: 
* Size of actual sales/projected: 
* Size of actual purchases/projected: 
* Size of actual inve. ritcry/projected: 
* Amount of actual i)rofits/projected: 
* Other sources of income of the ow-ner/partners: 
* Value of existing equipment/projected: 
6. info=ation on Guarantees whether ; Dersonal_--o.? --- in kind 
* Names of personal guarantors: 
* Sources of income of the guarantors: 
* Type of pledged guarantees: 
* Degree of mortgage 
* Estimated value of the guarantees: 
* Ratio of coverage of the guarantees in kind: 
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7. Ge-rieral Infc=ation 
* Name of Governorate: 
* Location of the project (city/village): 
* Legal status of the borrower: 
* Relationship of the borrower with the bank: 
* Previous exiDer-Jeence with the borrower: 
. 
Check 2-ng obtained f --rom the Central Bank: 
Name and number of the bank branch 
providing the loan: 
Name of the responsible employee: 
As per our con-victions we hereby do asserlt to you that the loan, of 
which the details are described above, meet in conditions and 
purposes with the conditions and, purposes as indicated in the 
guarantee Agreement. and its addenda. Therefore the ratio of the 
risk coverage for this loan will be . 
%. 
Please accept our due respec-L, 
t 
Name and Rank of Signatory Signature 
Appendices 
254 
Appendix 5.3: The Quarterly Report on the 
Guaranteed Loans (103) 
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Appendix 5.5: Claim to the Amount of the Loan (105) 
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THE JORDAN LO. ý-N GUARANTEE CORPOP3ý_7ION LTj, --',! _ 
D at- e 
Form (105) 
CLAIM TO THE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
Name of the Bank / Financial Institution: .......................... 
1. Loan Number: .............. 
2. Name of the Borrower / owner: ....................... 
3. Add-ress of the borrower 
Address the Owner 
Address cf the -project 
Address of the authorized 
director 
5. Amou. -rit of 'Che granted loan 
Rate of interest 
Date of app-roval / /1-93 
Guarantee coverage ratio 
Co=iSsion --ate 
Dat-e of first --I-nsl. --allmenl[- 
Recurrence of instalment-s and amount of each one: 
Kind of existing guarantees (Real Estate, Shares, Bonds, 
Personal Guarantees, others) 
10. Estimated amount for the existing guarantees: 
"I. Degree of the gula-ran'tee: 
Appendices 
Cor-tinuation . 10-or Addend= (f) -Fo= (105) 
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. 12. 
Other creditors taking part in the loan and amount of their 
credi t: 
13. Measures taken by the participants in the loan: 
14. Date of last paid installment / /1-9 
15. Amounts of collections after the date of -", -as'%-- paid 
ills tallment: 
16. Dates o*', -' unrepaid 
installments: 
17. Reasons for nO'n-iDerformance: 
18. The outstanding balance of the loan principal upon the sstart 
of the non-performing period of the loan: 
19. Acc=ulated interest for the non-performing period: 
20. Amount required to he paid: 
21. Terms of the Bank upon granting the loan: 
22. Procedures for f-ollow up and collection: 
23. Legal procedures taken: 
24. Other co=ents: 
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We hereby do assert 'that the above mentioned data is correct and 
that we have undertaken and will undertake to follow up on the 
borrower and the guaran-ý; ors thereo. '-' by way of taking all legal and 
judicial measures for collection pursuant: to what is stipulated in 
the Guarantee Agreement concluded With you. 
Na-me and Rank o --;: S 
ignatory Bank Signature 
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Appendix 5.6: Letter of Claim to the Amount of Guarantee (105/A) 
HE JORDAN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION LTD. 
Dat e 
TORM (105/a) 
LETTER OF CLAIM TO THE AMOUNT OF THE GUARANTEE 
Name of the Bank/Financial Institution ......................... 
Messrs Jordan Loan Guarantee Company Ltd. 
Greetings, 
259 
We confirm that the loan No. granted by us to the client 
has been in default for a period 
exceeding 180 days, therefore it has become due for repayment of 
a sum equalling the already approved risk coverage ratio pursuant 
to the articles of the Guarantee Acgreement concluded with you on 
and in execution of what is stated in the 
articles of the Acýreement and its addenda we do hereby submit to 
you the following forms and documents: Cý 
A photocopy of the Loan Agreement concluded between us and the 
borrower. 
A photocopy of the clientts balance sheet as of the date of 
disbursement or' the loan. 
3, Form No. (! -0,5), Appendix 
(e' duly filled out. 
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4. A photocopy of the bank recommendation and its approval i on 
granting the loan. 
The Credit Feasibility study of the loan comprising the 
financial and profit and loss statements, the financial 
analysis and the cash flows, 
A photocopy Of the mortgage documents, the trade license and I:: ) 
the trade registration certificate. 
7. A photocopy of the statements and documents which evidence the 
exerted efforts for collection. These documents and 
statements include visits paid to the work Site of the 
borrower, a study of his financial position, letters of 
claims, warnings, notices sent to guarantors, measures taken 
f or co 11 eCt_ i on such as se i zure f or secur ity and f orec I osure of 
the collaterals in kind in addition to other relevant lecal 
and judicial procedures. 
8, The bank's opinion on the possibility Of collecting the due 
amounts. 
Furthermore, we 
dates you cieem 
claim, 
will provide you with any informal-ion or other 
necessary to facilitate the procedures for this 
Naine and Rank of Siomatory Bank Sic-nature I=> 1= 
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Appendix 6.1: The Firm Questionnaire 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne Department of Economics 
The Loan Guarantee Scheme in Jordan 
and Its Impact on SMEs 
Finn Code Number 
Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. I can confirm that any information you divulge to us will be held 
on an anonymous basis and treated in strictest confidence. Our purpose of the research is to evaluate the 
effect of the JLGC loan guarantee scheme on small and medium-sized enterprises in Jordan. 
Section A: The Interviewee 
1. Name of interviewee --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2. What is your job title? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3. For how many years have you experience of the small-firm sector? ------------------- 
4. Level of educational attainment? ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Section B: The Firm 
In this section we would like you to tell us something about the nature of your business. 
1. What is the legal status of your finn? (Circle all that apply) 
a- Sole-trader 
b- Partnership 
c- Private ownership 
d- Public ownership 
e- Other (specify please) --------------------------------------------------------- 
2. Is it single-plant, multi-plant or part of a larger group? (Specify please) 
3. When did the firm start trading? ---------------------------------------------------- 
4. When did the firm start trading at this site? ----------------------------------------------- 
5. What are the main products or services that your company manufactures or supplies? 
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6. Please specify the number of employees at this plant including yourselif? 
7. Who are your main competitors? Are they: 
a- Small firms in Jordan 
b- Large firms in Jordan 
c- Foreign firms 
8. What is your current turnover? ---------------------------------------------- 
9. Roughly, what percent of your sales go to the following markets? 
a- Local ----------------------- Percent 
b- National -------------------- Percent 
c- International --------------- Percent 
10. Roughly, what is your share of the local market? 
11. In your view, what are the main problems facing the firm? (Please specify) 
a- Lack of Finance ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b- Labour Market ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
c- Price of Raw Materials -------------------------------------------------------------- 
d- Competition --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
e- Marketing ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
f- Technology ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
g- Government Regulations ------------------------------------------------------------ 
h- Other (Specify please) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Section C: The Start-up of the Firm 
In this section we would like to find out the initial start-up of the firm, either at this site or at 
another site. 
1. What was the broad amount of capital used to start-up the firm (By Jordanian Dinar)? 
a- up to 10,000 
b- 10,00 1- 40,000 
c- 40,001 - 100,000 
d- More than 100,000 
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2. What were the main financial resources used at the start-up stage? (Circle all that apply) 
a- Self finance 
b- Loans from relatives or friends 
c- Bank borrowing 
d- Partners and investors (shares) 
e- Others (specify please) ------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Did you find it difficult to obtain financial support for starting your business? 
a- Yes, Why9 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b- No 
4. In what year did you first receive a loan that was guaranteed by the Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation (JLGC)? ----------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Was this to start-up the firm? 
a- Yes ( Go to next section) 
b- No 
6. Did you receive loans from commercial banks (or any other resources) before this first 
loan that was guaranteed by JLGC? 
a- Yes, Please specify the number and total amount --------------------------- 
b- No (Go to next section) 
7. What was the main purpose of the loans from the commercial banks? (Circle all that 
apply) 
a- Start-up 
b- Capital purchases 
c- Working capital 
d- Financing of new products/service 
e- Other (specify please) --------------------------------------------------------- 
8. What assets did you pledge as security against these loans? (Circle all that apply) 
a- Real-estate assets 
b- Securities and bills of exchange 
c- Goods and equipment 
d- Other guarantor 
e- None ( Go to next section) 
9. What was the value of the collateral that was offered against these loans? 
a- More than the loan 
b- Less than the loan 
c- Of equal amount 
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Section D: The Take-up of JLGC- Support 
As you know in this study we are interested in the support that you received from the Jordan 
Loan Guarantee Corporation. This section seeks to discuss the nature of the loans that you 
obtained and were guaranteed by the JLGC. 
1. How many awards has the plant received in total? ----------------------------------------- 
Please give details. 
a. Project 1: Date ------------------ Loan Award -------------------------------------- Bank--- 
----------------------------------- Size of project -------------------------- Purpose of the 
project -------------------------------------------------------------- 
b. Project 2: Date ------------------ Loan Award -------------------------------------- Bank--- 
----------------------------------- Size of project -------------------------- Purpose of the 
project -------------------------------------------------------------- 
c. Proiect 3: Date ------------------ Loan Award -------------------------------------- Bank--- 
----------------------------------- Size of project -------------------------- Purpose of the 
project --------------------------------------------------------------- 
In Relation to the First of the Loans 
2. How did you first hear of the JLGC guaranteed loans? 
a- Bank 
b- Colleague/ member of staff 
c- Family and friends 
d- Another business 
e- Chamber of commerce/ industry 
f- Other (Specify please) ------------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Did knowledge of the guarantees provided by the JLGC make you more likely to seek a 
bankloan? 
a- Yes 
b- No 
4. Did you first approach the Bank or the JLGC directly? 
a- Bank (Go to Q. 5) 
b- JLGC (Go to Q. 6, which is about the most recent loan) 
5. When you visited the Bank did you discuss a normal loan before considering a JLGC 
guaranteed loan? 
a- Yes 
b- No 
Appendices 265 
The following questions until the end of the questionnaire are 
about the most recent loan that was guaranteed by JLGC 
(Where there is only one loan then this is the first loan referred to above) 
6. Regarding the most recent loan, did you first approach the Bank or the JLGC? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
7. Which of the following did the Bank cite as a reason that you should take a JLGC 
guaranteed loan? 
a- Lack of Collateral 
b- Insufficient track record 
c- Other (specify please) -------------------------------------------------------------- 
8. How many weeks did it take for the funds to become available to you from the time of 
submitting your formal application for the JLGC guaranteed loan? 
a- Less than one week 
b- One - Two weeks 
c- Three - Five weeks 
d- Over Five weeks 
9. What is the rate of interest on your loan paid to the Bank? ------------------------------ 
10. Does this rate of interest differ from that at which you think you could otherwise obtain 
loans from the commercial banks? 
a- Yes, -Higher. 
b- Yes, -Lower. 
c- No 
To remind you that we are interested in the project in respect of the most recent guaranteed 
loan from the JLGC. In this section we would like to talk about the financing of this project 
as a whole. 
1. What was the amount of the loan provided by the Bank and guaranteed by the JLGC? 
2. In addition to the guaranteed loan were there any other sources used to finance the project? 
a. Yes, Please specify the sources and amounts --------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b. No (Go to Q. 4) 
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3. Why did the guaranteed loan not cover all of the project's cost? -------------------------------- 
4. What percentage of the Bank loan was covered by the guarantee? (The answer to this 
question should be 50 or 75 percent) - ---------------------------------------------- 
5. Have you used the guaranteed loan broadly in the way you described in your application to 
the JLGC? 
a- Yes 
b- No, why? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6. Did you extend any kind of collateral for the guaranteed loan? 
a- Yes, why9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b- No (Go to Q. 9) 
7. What was the collateral? (Circle all that apply) 
a- Real estate 
b- Equipment 
c- Another Guarantor 
d- Others (Specify please) -------------------------------------------------- 
8. What was the value of the collateral compared to the value of the guaranteed loan? 
a- Equal 
b- More than the loan 
c- Less than the loan 
9. Did the Bank provide ongoing advice and guidance after you took out the guaranteed loan? 
a- Yes 
b- No 
10. In your view, how much extra Bank loan do you think you received because of the 
existence of the loan guarantee? -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. Do you think that the Bank would have lent to you if the guarantee was not available? 
a- Yes 
b- No 
12. Did you prepare (Circle all that apply)? 
a- Business plan 
b- Feasibility study 
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c- Cash Flow statement 
d- None of the above ( Go to Q. 15) 
13. In your view, was the existence of the Business plan / feasibility study / cash-flow 
analysis the most important reason for the JLGC guaranteeing the loan that you obtained 
from the Bank? 
a. Yes (Go to Q. 15) 
b. No 
14. If no, what was the most important reason in your view? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
15. Thinking about the time that you applied for the guaranteed loan, which of the following 
statements best describes your situation? 
a- "The JLGC was the only option available to me"(Go to Q. 17) 
b- "Other sources of finance were available to me but 
they would only have covered part of the amount 
provided by JLGC". (Go to Q. 16) 
c- " Other sources of finance were available to me 
that would have covered the full amount available through the JLGC guaranteed 
loan, but I still preferred the JLGC". (Go to Q. 16) 
16. Why did you take up the guaranteed loan, when other sources of finance were available? 
17. Since obtaining the loan guaranteed by JLGC, have you used any additional finance from 
the conunercial banks? 
a- Yes 
b- No (Go to next section) 
18. In your opinion how easy was it for you to obtain this other finance? 
Very easy 12345 Very difficult 
19. Did the guaranteed loan help you obtain this other finance? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Section F: The Economic Effects of the Project 
In this section I would like ask you about the economic effects of the project that was funded 
by the JLGC guaranteed loan. Remember we are interested in the most recent project 
receiving a guaranteed loan. 
1. In your view, what were the most important effects of the project? ------------------------------ 
2. Did the project lead to any of the following? 
Yes No 
a. Open-up new markets? 
- in this case, were these new markets local or overseas? 
(Please circle if apply) 
b. Development of new products/services? 
-in this case, were these products/ services already supplied by 
another firm, either local , national1v or internationalljý? 
(Please circle if apply) 
c. Development of new process? 
-in this case, has it improved the efficiency of your firm 
marzinall ,a lot or substantiall j? ( Please circle if apply) 
d. Introduction of a leading-edge technology? 
e. Increase in exports? 
f. New source of supply? 
3. What are the total assets of the firm? 
a- Year before loan --------------------------- 
b- Year after loan ----------------------------- 
c- Two years after loan ----------------------- 
4. To what extent does the change in the total assets of the firm reflect the impact of the 
proj ect? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. What is the total sales turnover of the firm? 
a- Year before loan ----------------------------- 
b- Year after loan -------------------------------- 
c- Two years after loan ------------------------- 
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6. To what extent does the change in the total sales turnover of the firm reflect the impact of 
the project? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7. How many staff did employ in your firm (including your self)? 
a. Year before loan ---------------------------- 
b. Year after loan ------------------------------ 
c. Two years after loan ------------------------ 
8. To what extent does the change in the employment level of the firm reflect the impact of 
the project? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
9. How many new jobs would you say have been created/retained by the project? 
(Please specify number) 
a. Created ------------------------ 
b. Retained ----------------------- 
10. Were any of the employees taking these new jobs previously unemployed? (Please 
specify the number) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Section G: Feedback on the Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Finally, this section is designed to help us to understand your general view on the service 
provided by the JLGC. 
1. Did you encounter any difficulties with the following: (Please circle all that apply and 
explain)? 
a- Filling in the application form for the loan -------------------------------------- 
b- Preparing a Business Plan/ Feasibility Study/ Cash Flow Statement 
c- Meeting the asset security conditions -------------------------------------------- 
d- Any other difficulties --------------------------------------------------------------- 
2. How helpful was the Bank in securing the guaranteed loan? 
Not very helpful 12345 Very helpful 
3. Are there any changes you would like to see in the way the Bank handles the process? 
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4. Are there any changes that you think could usefully be made to the procedures of the loan 
guarantee scheme that will help future applicants? ----------------------------------------------- 
5. Do you think that the guaranteed loan scheme has a advantages over alternative of 
commercial banks finance, in respect of each of the following? (Please explain) 
a- The value of the loan -------------------------------------------------------------- 
b- The grace period ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
c- Collateral ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
d- The repayment period ------------------------------------------------------------- 
e- The administrative cost of the loan ------------------------------------------------ 
f- Interest rate --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6. Are there any disadvantages? 
7. Have you any other comments you would wish to make about the loan guarantee scheme? 
That is all. Thank you very much for your time. It has been very usefuL 
Section H: Interviewers Remarks 
1. Approximate age of interviewee -------------------------------------- 2. Gender of interviewee ------------------------------------ 
3. Location of the plant 
a. Inside Amman. 
b. Outside Amman, Specify ----------------------------------- 
4. Nature of premises: 
a. Domestic, work from home. 
b. Small office. 
C. Shop. 
d. Large office. 
e. Warehouse. 
f. Factory. 
g. Office. 
5. Presentation of premises: Poor 12345 Excellent 
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Appendix 6.2: The Firm Questionnaire in Arabic 
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Appendix 6.3: The Commercial Banks Questionnaire 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Business School 
(Economics) 
University of Newcastle 
Ridley Building 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU 
To Whom It May Concern 
Maher AI-Mahrouq is a Ph. D. student in the Department of Economics at the University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. He is carrying out research looking at the effects on Small 
and Medium Enterprises of the loan guarantees provided by the Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation. 
I would be grateful if every help and assistance could be given to Mr. AI-Mahrouq whilst 
he is gathering inforination for his study. Any information given will of course be treated 
in the strictest confidence, and will only be reported in an aggregated form to protect the 
identify of participant banks. 
Your help and assistance is much appreciated. 
Yours faithfully 
Dr. Colin Wren 
Reader in Economics 
Department of Economics 
Postgraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 5086/8494/7440 
Undergraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 8583 
Switchboard - +44 (0)191 222 6000 
http: //www. ncl. ac. uk/unbs/ 
Appendices 
University of Newcastle 
278 
Department of Economics 
The Loan Guarantee Scheme in Jordan 
and Its Impact on SM[Es 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interview with the credit managers in the commercial banks that participating in the loan 
guarantee scheme by signing 'Amman Agreement' with Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation. 
Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. I can confirm that the interview is 
completely confidential. Our purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of the loan 
guarantee scheme, which executed by JLGC, on the small and medium-sized enterprises 
in Jordan. So we are going to the general discussion about the loans that provided to 
SMEs from commercial banks and guaranteed by JLGC. 
1. Bank Name ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2. Name of interviewee -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Job title of interviewee ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. When did the bank sign the 'Amman agreement' with the JLGC? ------------- 
5. Approximately what is the value of loans made last year (JD' millions) ------------- 
6. Approximately what percentages of these loans were to SMEs (%)? ----------------- 
7. Approximately what percentages of the SME loans were guaranteed by JLGC 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8. What is the main purpose of the projects for which small fmns seek finance from 
bank? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
9. a) In what circumstances would you put forward a firm for a loan guarantee? 
Appendices 279 
9 b) What is the most important of these factors? ------------------------------------------ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
10. a) Is it important for a small firm applying for a bank loan to prepare (tick all that 
apply): 
Bank JLGC 
Business plan 
Feasibility study 
Cash-flow analysis 
10 b) How does this differ for a firm applying for a loan guarantee? (See QIO. a) 
11. In what ways do you think a normal small firm loan and a JLGC guaranteed loan 
differ? (please explain) 
Collateral provided ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Interest rate offered ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Track record of recipient ----------------------------------------------------------- 
- Other (please specify) -------------------------------------------------------------- 
12. Do you think that the recipients of JLGC loans perform any different in their 
projects than other small firm loan recipients? ------------------------------------------- 
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13. Do you think that the existence of the JLGC loan guarantee scheme encourages 
you to make more loans to small firms? (please explain) ------------------------------ 
14. Approximately what proportion of the JLGC supported loans would in your 
opinion have been made if the scheme had not existed? -------------------------------- 
15. In your opinion what are the main advantages and disadvantages of participating 
in the JLGC loan guarantee scheme? ------------------------------------------------------ 
16. What c hanges do you t hink w ould h elp rn ake t he loan guarantee s cheme more 
effective? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
17. In what ways has participation in the loan guarantee scheme changed the banks 
behaviour in its lending SMEs? ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Thankyou very much 
UNIVERSITYOF 
NEWCASTLE 
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Appendix 6.4: Letters Attached to the Firm Questionnai 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Business School 
(Economics) 
University of Newcastle 
Ridley Building 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU 
Department of Economics 
The Hashemite University 
P. O. Box 150459 Zarqa 13115 
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Dept. of Economics 
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Fax +44 191222 6549 
E-mail m. h. h. al-malirouq(kncl. ac. uk 
mahroug75(&, hotmail-com 
ju. d: 8111 ý, A 
A. L4L-AJI 
15045 
13115 
+962 5 3826600 
+962 5 3826613 
Postgraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 5086/8494/7440 
Undergraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 8583 
Switchboard - +44 (0)191 222 6000 
http: //www. ncl. ac. uk/unbs/ 
Appendices 
/-c: 9 
04N 
Gu' 
Rtf. No 
DaLe 
-- ---. 
282 
Jordan Loan Guarantee Corp. Ltd. 
............ 
Nem 
----T --- N--Jýr3; 15, 
L5 LY& 3L 
Jj- 
jP 
13ý 1* p lllý 
0. 
r<ý ýyj 
A Jýj 
rýjjt 
I- \t .t-i" 
A 
-'1 
UNIVERSITY OF 
NEWCASTLE 
Appendices 283 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Business School 
(Economics) 
University of Newcastle 
Ridley Building 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU 
To Whom It May Concern 
Maher AI-Mahrouq is a Ph. D. student in the Department of Economics at the University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. He is carrying out research looking at the effects on Small 
and Medium Enterprises of the loan guarantees provided by the Jordan Loan Guarantee 
Corporation. As part of this work he will need to collect firm-based data from interview 
surveys of the recipients of these loan guarantees. 
I would be grateful if every help and assistance could be given to Mr. Al-Mahrouq whilst 
he is gathering this information for his study. Any information given will of course be 
treated int he s trictest c onfidence, a nd will o nly ber eported inana ggregated form to 
protect the identify of participant firms. 
Your help and assistance is much appreciated. 
Yours faithfully 
Dr. Colin Wren 
Reader in Economics 
Department of Economics 
Postgraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 5086/8494/7440 
Undergraduate Office - +44 (0)191 222 8583 
Switchboard - +44 (0)191 222 6000 
http: //www. ncl. ac. uk/unbs/ 
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Appendix Table 7.1: Main Competitors for the Firms 
Sector 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
Main Competitors No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Small firms in Jordan 53 (75) 41 (80) 9 (82) 7 (70) 110 (77) 
Large firms in Jordan 14 (20) 10 (20) 3 (27) 0 (0) 27 (19) 
Foreign firms 22 (31) 3 (6) 1 (9) 1 (10) 27 (19) 
Missinq 2 (3) 1 (2) 0 (0) 2 (20) 4 (3) 
Note: The table shows the total number of firms citing each category. 
Appendix Table 7.2: Nature and Presentation of Premises 
Manufacturing Services Retail Agriculture Total 
The nature of the premises No. (%) No. (%) No . (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Small off ice 25 (37) 21 (41) 2 (18) 6 (60) 54 
- (38) 
Shop 8 (11) 11 (22) 8 (73) 0 (0) 27 (19) 
Large office 11 (16) 13 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 24 (17) 
Factory 22 (31) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 23 (16) 
Domestic, work from home 1 (1) 5 (10) 1 (9) 4 (40) 11 (8) 
Warehouse 3 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (2) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
Excellent 41 (59) 37 (73) 6 (55) 9 (91) 93 (65) 
Good 26 (37) 14 (27) 5 (45) 0 (0) 45 (32) 
Well 3 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 4 (3) 
Total 70 (100) 51 (100) 11 (100) 10 (100) 142 (100) 
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Appendix Table 8.1: Variable Labels that Used in the Empirical Analysis 
Variable Label Name No. of obser. Min Max Mean CA, 
TITLE Job title of interviewee: 
I= Manager 142 0 1 0.9 --- 
2= Sales manager 142 0 1 0.03 
3= Financial manager 142 0 1 0.04 --- 
4= Partner 142 0 1 0.03 
EDUC Level of educational attainment 142 141.68 --- 
I =A level or less; 2= First degree; 
3= Master degree; 4= PhD 
GENDER The gender of interviewee 142 010.9 
I= Male; 0= Female 
AGE INT Age of the interviewee (years) 142 25 68 45 0.22 
EXPER Experience of the interviewee (years) 140 2 40 15 0.59 
11. Characteristics of the Sam ple Firms 
Variable Label Name No. of obser. Min Max Mean C. V 
LEGAL Legal status of the firm 
1= Sole-trader 142 0 1 0.65 --- 
2= Partnership 142 0 1 0.27 --- 
3= Private ownership 142 0 1 0.08 --- 
ORG Organisation of the firm 
1= Single - Plant 142 0 1 0.89 
2= Multi - Plant 142 0 1 0.07 --- 
3= Part of Large group 142 0 1 0.04 --- 
LOCATE The location of the plant 142 0 1 0.53 --- 
1= Inside Amman: 0= Elsewhere 
AGE Age of the firm 142 1 5 2.11 0.5 
1=I-4 years 
2=5- 10 years 
3=II- 20 years 
4= 21 - 40 years 
5= more than 40 years 
SECTOR The firm's principal activity: 
I= Manufacturing 
2= Services 
3= Retail 
4= Agriculture 
EMP Number of employees 
TURN Current turnover (J. D' 000s) 
142 0 1 0.49 
142 0 1 0.36 --- 
142 0 1 0.08 --- 
142 0 1 0.07 --- 
142 1 95 12 1.22 
122 5 2,800 221 1.96 
Appendices 287 
CAP Capital used for the start-up (JD) 142 142.34 0.46 
1= up to 10,000; 2= 10,001 - 40,000; 
3= 40,001 - 100,000; 4= more than 100,000 
Variable Label Name No. of obser. Min Max Mean C. V 
Did the firm receive loans from commercial banks before the first 
PLI loan from JLGC 99 010.51 --- 
I= Yes; 0= No 
(99 cases applicable) 
Number of loans from commercial banks before the guaranteed 
PL2 loan by JLGC 
(51 non-zero cases) 
PL3 The amount of loans before the JLGC loans (J. D'OOOs) 
(51 non-zero cases) 
PL4 Purpose of the previous loan from commercial banks: 
1= Start-up 
2= Capital purchases 
3= Working capital 
4= Financing new products/service 
5= Other purposes 
(51 cases applicable) 
PL5 Assets pledge as a collateral are: 
I= Real estate 
2= Goods and equipments 
3= Other guarantor 
4= Did not pledge any collateral 
(51 cases applicable) 
46 131.39 0.47 
45 5 500 74 1.6 
51 0 1 0.24 
51 0 1 0.24 
51 0 1 0.3 
51 0 1 0.2 
51 0 1 0.02 
51 0 1 0.55 
51 0 1 0.18 
51 0 1 0.25 
51 0 1 0.02 
PL6 The value of collateral compared with the value of loan 
1= More 50 010.6 
2= Less 50 010.22 
3= Equal the value of the loan 50 010.18 
(5 1 cases applicable) 
TV. Negotiation of the Loan 
Variable Label Name No. of obser. Min Max Mean C. V 
NEGI The firm approached most recent loan through: 142 010.18 --- 
I= JLGC; 0= Bank 
NEG2 The first time that the firm hear of JLGC was from: 
1= Bank 
2= Coll eague/member of staff 
3= Family and friends 
4= Another business 
5= Chamber of commerce/Industry 
6= Other ways 
141 0 1 110/141 
141 0 1 8/141 
141 0 1 11/141 
141 0 1 5/141 
141 0 1 5/141 
141 0 1 2/141 
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Knowledge of the guarantee provided by JLGC make firm more 
NEG3 likely to seek a bank loan 
I =Yes; 0 =No 
NEG4 Bank cites f inn should take loan guarantee due to: 
I= Lack of collateral 
2= Insufficient track record 
3= Bank request 
4= Other reasons 
5= Unknown 
NEG5 Did the firm prepare: 
I= Business plan 
2= Feasibility study 
3= Cash flow analysis 
4= Business and plan and feasibility study 
5= The borrower did not prepare anything 
141 0.5 
141 0 1 0.48 
141 0 1 0.13 
141 0 1 0.26 
141 0 1 0.04 
141 0 1 0.09 
142 0 1 0.25 
142 0 1 0.13 
142 0 1 0.05 
142 0 1 0.31 
142 0 1 0.26 
fn your opinion, was the existence of a business plan, feasibility 
study or cash flow analysis the most important reason for JLGC 
NEG6 guaranteeing the loan? 113 010.88 
I= Yes; 0= No (119 cases applicable) 
V. Characteristics of the Guaranteed Loan 
Variable Label Name No. of obser. Min Max Mean C. v 
LGI Number of the guaranteed loans that the firm received 
LG2 The amount of the guaranteed loan (J. D'OOOs) 
LG3 The size of the project (J. D' 000s) 
LG4 The purpose of the project: 
I= Start-up 
2= Capital purchases 
3= Working capital 
4= finance new product or service 
LG5 The most recent guaranteed loan was from: 
I= Housing Bank 
2= Union Bank 
3= Industrial Development Bank 
4= Cairo Anu-nan Bank 
5= Arab Bank Association ABC 
6= Jordan Gulf Bank 
7= Jordan Kuwait Bank 
8= Jordan Bank 
9= Jordan Investment Bank 
10 = Middle East Bank 
11 = Arab Bank PLC 
12 = Arab Land Bank 
13 = National Bank 
14 = Arab Investment Bank 
15 = Grindlays Bank 
16 = Export and Finance Bank 
17 = HSBC Bank 
142 121.08 0.26 
142 2 150 23 0.96 
135 3 300 45 1.16 
141 0 1 0.28 
141 0 1 0.39 
141 0 1 0.31 
141 0 1 0.02 
142 0 1 0.24 
142 0 1 0.06 
142 0 1 0.25 
142 0 1 0.02 
142 0 1 0.13 
142 0 1 0.01 
142 0 1 0.07 
142 0 1 0.01 
142 0 1 0.02 
142 0 1 0.02 
142 0 1 0.03 
142 0 1 0.04 
142 0 1 0.06 
142 0 1 0.01 
142 0 1 0.01 
142 0 1 0.02 
142 0 1 0.01 
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In addition to the guaranteed loan was the borrower used other 
LG6 source of finance 141 0 1 0.58 --- 
I= Yes; 0= No 
LG7 The Source of the other finance was: 
1= Self finance 83 0 1 0.93 
2= Family and friends 83 0 1 0.04 --- 
3= Other banks 83 0 1 0.04 --- 
(84 cases applicable) 
LG8 The amount of other finance (J. D'000s) 81 2.5 280 33 1.45 
(84 cases applicable) 
LG9 The rate of interest 142 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.12 
LGIO The rate of interest differ from that other bank loans 
1= Higher 140 0 1 0.14 --- 
2= Lower 140 0 1 0.09 
3= No differences 140 0 1 0.77 --- 
LG11 The percentage of the loan covered by JLGC 
1= 75 percent 142 0 1 0.88 --- 
2= 50 percent 142 0 1 0.12 --- 
LG12 Extend any collateral for the guaranteed loans 142 0 1 0.81 --- 
I= Yes; 0= No 
LG13 The Kind of collateral: 
1= Real estate 115 0 1 0.61 --- 
2= Equipment and goods 115 0 1 0.14 --- 
3= Another guarantor 115 0 1 0.23 --- 
4= Another kind of collateral 115 0 1 0.02 --- 
(115 cases applicable) 
LG14 The value of collateral compared to the value of the guaranteed loan 
1= Equal to the loan 115 0 1 0.12 --- 
2= More than the loan 115 0 1 0.69 --- 
3= Less than the loan 115 0 1 0.19 --- 
(115 cases applicable) 
The bank provide ongoing advice and guidance after the borrower 
LG15 receive the loan 142 0 1 0.32 --- 
I=Yes; O=No 
LG16 The size of the loan 142 0 1 0.12 --- 
I= If the loan > 40,000; 0= if the loan < 40,000 
LG17 The value of collateral (J. D '000's) 141 0 817 62.8 1.87 
LG 18 Ratio of the guaranteed loan to the project size 142 0.05 7.78 0.8 1.1 
0 11.9 1.5 1.45 
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V1. Firms Performance 
Variable Label Description No. of obser. Min Max Mean C. V 
Firm believes that the bank would lent them if the guarantee was 
ADD not available 141 010.29 --- 
I= additional ;0= Non-additional 
REQUEST Despite other sources of finance being available the firm chose JLGC loan due to: 
I= Bank request 94 0 1 0.78 
2 =Firms request 94 0 1 0.22 
(102 cases applicable) 
EFFECT Did the project lead to any of the following 
I= Open-up new market 141 0 1 0.6 
I= Yes; 0= No 
2= Development of new products/services 141 0 1 0.6 
I =Yes; 0 =No 
3= Development of new process 141 0 1 0.42 
I= Yes; 0= No 
4= Introduction of a leading-edge technology 140 0 1 0.35 
I= Yes; 0= No 
5= Increase in exports 140 0 1 0.1 
I= Yes; 0= No 
6= New source of supply 140 0 1 0.49 --- 
I= Yes; 0= No 
In fin-ns view, what change in total assets do you think reflects the 
ASSETADD impact of the project (percentage of changes). 122 0 100 23 1.07 
In firms view, what change in sales turnover do you think reflects 
SALEADD the impact of the project (percentage of changes).. 113 0 100 25 3.7 
In firms view, what change in employees do you think reflects the 
EMPADD impact of the project (percentage of changes) 125 0 100 19 3.92 
Difference between assets two years after the loan and year 
ASSTCHG before the loan (J. D '000s') 138 0 1,250 94.7 1.85 
ASSTCHGADD ASSETCHG * ASSETADD (J. D'000s') 122 0 800 23 3.5 
Difference between sales turnover two years after the loan and 
SALECHG year before the loan (J. D '000s') 126 -60 1,350 68.8 2.07 
SALECHGADD SALECHG * SALESADD (J. D'000s') 111 0 135 8.12 1.93 
Difference between number of employees two years after the loan 
EMPCHG and year before the loan 142 -8 30 4 1.4 
EMPCHGADD EMPCHG * EMPADD 125 0 8 1 1.3 
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Appendix Table 8.2: Correlation Matrices 
A: Demographic Data 
291 
Titlel TITLE2 TITLE3 TITLE4 EDUC GENDER AGE-INT EXPER 
TITLEI 1.0 
TITLE2 -0.54 1.00 
TITLE3 -0.60 -0.03 1.00 
TITLE4 -0.54 -0.03 -0.03 1.00 
EDUC -0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.04 1.00 
GENDER -0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.08 1.00 
AGE-INT 0.13 -0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 1.00 
EXPER 0.18 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.25 0.24 0.22 1.00 
Note: The table shows the correlation coefficient for the variables related to the interviewee demographics. 
B: Sample Firms Characteristics 
LEGA LEGA LEGA ORGI ORG2 ORG3 LOCA AGE SECT SECT SECT SECT EM TU CA 
Ll L2 L3 TE OR1 OR2 OR3 OR4 p RN p 
1.00 
-0.84 1.00 
-0.39 -0.17 1.00 
0.20 -0.27 0.10 1.00 
-0.08 0.13 -0.07 -0.77 1.00 
-0.21 0.26 -0.06 -0.58 -0.05 1.00 
-0.07 0.01 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 0.07 0.07 0.26 1.00 
-0.27 0.15 0.24 -0.13 0.11 0.07 -0.05 0.03 1.00 
0.09 -0.00 -0.16 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 -0.04 -0.73 1.00 
0.15 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.28 -0.21 1.00 
0.20 -0.16 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 -0-05 -0.01 0.05 -0.27 -0.20 -0.07 1.00 
-0.31 0.18 0.24 -0.15 0.19 -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.31 -0.20 -0.17 -0.05 1.00 
-0.29 0.19 0.20 -0.10 0.15 -0.02 0.13 -0.04 0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.63 1.00 
-0.22 0.18 0.08 -0.13 0.04 0.16 0.01 -0.24 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 0.04 0.26 0.28 1.00 
C: Previous Loan Variables 
PLI PL2 PL3 PL4.1 PL4.2 PL4.3 PL4.4 PL54.5 PL5.1 PL5.1 PL5.3 PL5.4 PL6.1 PL6.2 
PLI 1.00 
PL2 0.33 1.00 
PU -0.16 -0.40 1.00 
PL4.1 -0.15 -0.45 0.15 1.00 
PL4.2 -0.15 -0.39 0.07 -0.09 1.00 PL4.3 -0.18 -0.40 0.23 -0.10 -0.10 1.00 PL4.4 -0.14 -0.18 0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 1.00 PL4.5 -0.04 -0.10 0.53 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1.00 PL5.1 -0.25 -0.63 0.44 0.35 0.10 0.32 0.27 0.16 1.00 PL5.2 -0.13 -0.23 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.27 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 1.00 PL5.3 -0.16 -0.40 0.09 0.16 0.34 0.11 0.10 -0.02 -0.15 -0.08 1.00 PL5.4 -0-04 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.30 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 PL6.1 
-0.16 -0.24 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.43 0.07 0.38 0.01 -0.07 0.87 1.00 PL6.2 
-0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.29 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.19 0.94 0.79 1.00 
_ýLQ -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
0.07 -0.00 0.30 -0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.07 0.95 0.81 0.88 
Note: These variables exclude the not applicable variables or cases 
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F: Firms Performance 
EFFE EFFE EFFE EFFE EFFE EFFE ASST SALE EMP ASST SALE EMP 
ADD CTI CT2 CT3 CT4 CT5 CT6 CHGADD CHGADD CHGADD CHG CHG CHG 
ADD 1.00 
EFFECTI 0.14 1.00 
EFFECT2 -0.08 0.13 1.00 
EFFECT3 0.06 0.00 0.21 1.00 
EFFECT4 0.02 0.23 0.10 0.32 1.00 
EFFECT5 -0.12 0.14 0.07 0.24 0.16 1.00 
EFFECT6 -0.02 0.33 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 0.07 1.00 
ASST 
CHGADD -0.04 -0.09 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
SALE 
CHGADD 0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.86 1.00 
EMP 
CHGADD 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.20 1.00 
ASSTCHG -0.17 -0.13 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.60 0.63 0.04 1.00 
SALECHG -0.13 -0.15 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.06 -0.07 0.89 0.85 0.05 0.81 1.00 
EMPCHG 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.32 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.49 1.00 
Note: These variables exclude the non-applicable cases. 
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Appendix Table 8.3: Factors Determining the Approach to the JLGC: Logit Model 
Model I Model 11 Model III Model IV 
NEGI Coef z Coef z Coef z Coef z 
TITLE] 1.013 (0.91) --- 0.744 (0.56) 0.879 (0.76) 
TITLE2 1.346 (0.87) --- 0.554 (0.34) 1.185 (0.76) 
TITLE3 --- --- --- --- CL 
1! ED UC 0.450 (1.50) --- 0.251 (0.72) --- tm 
o GENDER 1.668 (1.41) --- 1.940 (1.31) 1.889 (1.40) E 
0 AGE-INT 0.018 (0.79) --- 0.027 (1.03) 0.028 (1.18) a 
EXPER -0-052 (1.77) --- -0.073 (2.15) -0.066 (2.27) 
EXPERM* -- - --- --- 
LEGAL] --- -0.180 (0.33) 0.030 (0.05) 0.011 (0.02) 
LEGAL2** --- --- --- --- 
U- ORGI** --- --- --- --- 
ORG2 --- 0.148 (0.16) 0.109 (0.12) 0.125 (0.14) E 
m LOCATE --- 0.350 (0.65) 0.449 (0.74) --- U) 
(D AGE --- -0-058 (0.25) 0.033 (0.13) --- m 
4.0 4- SECTORI --- -0.326 (0.42) 0.083 (0.10) 0.115 (0.14) 0 SECTOR2 --- 0.737 (1.03) 1.047 (1.30) 0.974 (1.23) 
SECTOR3** --- --- --- --- U) 
EMP --- 0.029 (1.41) 0.022 (0.93) --- 
TURN --- -0.0009 (1.20) -0.0005 (0.54) --- 
CAP --- -0-581 (0.22) -0.108 (0.38) --- 
TURNM --- 0.769 (1-33) 0.852 (1.14) --- 
Constant 4.94 (2.69) -1.902 (1.45) -5.593 (2.08) -4.930 (2-13) 
N 142 142 142 142 
x2 9.57 7.44 19.23 10.13 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.08 
Notes: The table corresponds to Table 8.2 of the text, but using a logit model rather than the liner probability model. 
The dependent variable in each case is NEGI ie. whether the firm first approached the JLGC (NEGI=I) or a 
bank (NEGI =0). Models I to III estimate different versions, while model IV gives the parsimonious version of 
model 111. *Variables dropped due to the facts that predict failure perfectly. ** Variables dropped due to the 
collinerity. X2 is tested the goodness of fit for these models at level of 5%. 
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Appendix Table 8.4: The Economic Effects of the Project 
Dependent Variable EFFECTI EFFECT2 EFFECT3 
_EFFECT4 
EFFECT5 EFFECT6 
Model XXVII Model XXVIII Model XXIX ModelXXX _ Model XXXI Model XXXII- 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
TITLEI --- --- -0.537 (2.55) --- --- -0.277 (1.69) 
TITLE2 --- --- -0.394 (1.44) --- 
TITLE3 --- --- -1.040 (4.13) -0.484 (1.78) -0.483 (3.13) -0.566 (1.80) 2 
r EDUC --- 0.170 (3.89) 0.098 (1.88) 0.127 (2.39) --- -0-096 (2.16) 
GENDER --- --- --- --- --- cm C) E AGE-INT --- --- -0-008 (2.10) --- --- --- 4) EXPER -0.008 (1.72) --- --- -0.007 (1.72) --- 
EXPERM 0.513 (1.08) --- --- 1.386 (4.29) --- --- 
LEGAL] --- --- 
LEGAL2 0.166 (1.91) --- --- --- --- 
ORGI --- --- 0.209 (1.85) --- --- U. ORG2 --- --- -0.157 (3.05) 
LOCA TE 0.209 (2.56) --- 
0 AGE 0.075 (2.09) --- --- --- --- 9 SECTORI 0.157 (1.92) --- 0.222 (2-68) 0.212 (2.52) 0.152 (2.93) --- 
SECTOR2 --- 0.148 (1.75) --- 
SECTOR3 --- 0.287 (1.94) --- -0.293 (3.81) 0.368 (3.00) 
EMP -0.008 (4.00) 0.006 (3.04) 0.007 (3-24) -0.004 (1.49) --- -0-005 (2.14) 
TURN --- --- --- --- 
CAP --- --- 0.080 (2-29) --- 
TURNM --- --- --- --- --- --- 
PLI --- --- --- --- --- --- 
NEGI --- --- --- 0.248 (2.41) --- 
LG2 --- 0.004 (2-08) --- 0.007 (3.03) 0.004 (2.63) 0.004 (1.43) 
LG3 --- --- --- 0.002 (1.74) --- 0.002 (2.09) 
LG3M --- --- --- 0.015 (0.07) --- -0.208 (1.05) 
LG4.1 --- --- -0.187 (2.09) -0.521 (3.47) --- --- 
LG4.2 --- --- --- -0.321 (2.13) 
LG4.3 --- --- --- -0.443 (2.96) --- --- 
LG4. IM --- 0.640 (0-88) 0.015 (2.90) 
LGI 7 --- -0-001 (1.81) --- --- --- --- 
Constant 0.413 (3.69) 0.111 (1.09) 0.6530 (1.99) 0.366 (1.96) -0.045 (1.78) 0.796 (3.97) 
N 141 141 141 140 140 140 
F 4.93 6.48 3.95 4.32 3.87 5.21 
_R 
2 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.15 0.16 
Note: The dependent variables record the effects of the project as follows: EFFECT] (opening-up of new markets), EFFECT2 (ifew 
products or service), EFFECT3 (new processes), EFFECT4 (leading-edge technology), EFFECT5 (increase in exports) and 
EFFECT6 (new source of supply). The parsimonious versions of the full models including the ADD term are shown in Table 
8.12. In the first three models there is one non-response, and in the other model there are two non-responses. 
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Appendix Table 8.5: Effects on Firm Activity 
Dependent Variable ASSTCHG SALECHG EMPCHG 
Model XXXVI Model XXXV11 Model XXXV111 
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
TITLE] -15.366 (0.52) --- 6.456 (0.26) --- 0.739 (0.60) -- - 
TITLE2 171.801 (1.59) 168-330 (2.01) -56.420 (0.84) --- 0.587 (0.21) -- - 
TITLE3 97,035 (0.99) --- 107.605 (1.04) 93.205 (1.15) 4.775 (1.18) 3.892 (1.12) CL 
10 19 1- EDUC -9.880 (1.19) --- -5.0907 (0.61) --- 1.167 (1.88) 1.393 (2.34) Mw 
00 GENDER -4.340 (0.15) --- 37.883 (2.09) 36.368 (2.36) 0.091 (0.08) -- - 
E A GE-INT 1.336 (1.40) --- 0.379 (0.72) --- 0.013 (0.35) -- - (D a EXPER -0.510 (0.48) --- -2.316 (2.57) -2.285 (3.16) -0.047 (0.83) -- - 
EXPERM 66.517 (0.70) --- 212.270 (2.61) 214.549 (3.20) 5.026 (1.060 -- - 
LEGALI 11.136 (0.25) --- -50.903 (1.37) -51.077 (1.71) 4.196 (2.24) -4.177 (2.47) 
f LEGAL2 25.528 (0.56) -68.892 (1.55) -76.651 (1.95) -2.405 (1.20) -2.798 (1.48) 
ORGI 68.269 (1.87) --- 12.578 (0.58) --- 0.550 (0.26) -- - LL ORG2 64.531 (1.47) --- -3.687 (0.13) 0.040 (0.02) -- - 
0.0 LOCA TE 12.680 (0.92) --- 5.439 (0.53) --- 0.375 (0.50) -- - 4- 0 AGE 0.840 (0.08) --- -8.404 (0.90) --- 0.544 (1.04) 0.534 (1.25) 
U) SECTOR] -42.225 (1.05) -35.462 (2.82) -23.273 (0.97) --- -1.192 (0.76) -- - 0 
SECTOR2 11.084 (0.29) -6.308 (0.30) --- -1.699 (1.17) -0.631 (1.20) U) 
SECTOR3 11.928 (0.31) 11.835 (0.53) --- -1.124 (0.74) -- - 
EMP 0.629 (0.54) --- 2.350 (2.01) 1.901 (2.09) 0.243 (5.88) 0.238 (6.46) 
TURN 0.283 (3.98) 0.358 (6.63) 0.201 (3.64) 0.201 (4.17) -0.003 (1.86) -0.003 (2.20) 
CAP 6.814 (0.63) -0.926 (0.13) --- 1.107 (2.30) 1.188 (2.78) 
TURNM -3.95 (0.20) 5.857 (0.31) 36.644 (1.43) 36.468 (1.82) 1.157 (1.22) 1.074 (1.21) 
PLI 5.775 (1.97) 3.038 (2.02) -0.567 (0.22) --- -0.416 (1.150 -0.427 (1.18) 
NEGI -16.195 (1.07) --- -4.866 (0.41) --- -0.750 (0.93) 
LG2 0.644 (0.89) --- -0.117 (0.21) --- -0.045 (1.34) -0.049 (1.55) 
LG3 0.146 (0.70) --- 0.056 (0.30) --- 0.015 (1.10) 0.015 (1.19) 
LG3M 34.682 (0.58) --- 38.332 (0.74) --- 0.727 (0.19) 0.949 (0.27) 
LG4.1 -0.420 (0.01) --- 100.699 (2.47) 94.351 (2.78) 6.032 (1.71) 5.936 (2.11) 
LG4.2 23.968 (0.65) 86.639 (2.40) 76.435 (2.20) 0.316 (0.20) --- 
LG4.3 12.148 (0.40) --- 72.436 (2.30) 65.591 (2.04) -0.333 (0.23) --- 
LG4. IM -357.658 (0.40) --- --- --- -52.438 (1.04) -51.657 (2.24) 
LGI 7 0.093 (0.68) --- 0.101 (1.08) 0.117 (1.46) -0.002 (0.75) --- 
ADD -5.835 (0.40) -10.308 (0.79) -21.121 (1.43) -26.214 (1.75) -0.418 (0.53) -0.328 (0.49) 
ADDM --- ---- --- --- 4.364 (0.61) 3.593 (0.60) 
Constant -136.800 (1.47) 30.466 (2.13) -37.250 (0.47) -26.393 (0.67) -0.796 (0.16) -0.997 (0.40) 
N 138 138 126 126 142 142 
F 9.34 13.93 5.74 5.53 6.10 15.34 
R2 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.64 0.62 
Note: The dependent variable in model XXXVI is ASSTCHG (= Assets two years after the loan - Assets year before the loan), for model 
XXXVII the dependent variable is SALECHG (= Total sales two years after the loan - sales year before the loan), and for model 
XXXVIII it is EMPCHG (= Number of employees two years after the loan - number of employees year before the loan) for model 
XXXVIII. ADDM not included in both XXXVI and XXXVII because there was no missing cases for 138 and 126 observations, also 
LG4. IM not include in model XXXVII because there was no missing cases for 126 observations. 
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